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Ron Chapman Abstract 
 
 
This thesis complements and extends Hutton and Connors' research on forest 
protest contained in their study of the Australian environment movement.   As 
the first comprehensive study of Western Australian forest protest the thesis 
analyses the protest movement's organisation, campaigns and strategies.   Its 
central argument is that the contemporary Western Australian native forest 
protest movement established a network of urban and south-west activist groups 
which encouraged broad public support, and that a diversity of protest strategies 
focused public attention on forest issues and pressured the state government to 
change its forest policies.     
 
The thesis identifies two distinct periods of protest activity in Western 
Australia.  During a first period of protest from the 1890s, conservationists used 
non-confrontational strategies to campaign for the protection of areas of native 
bushland, and the formation of Western Australia's first nature conservation 
groups in the early twentieth century laid the foundations for a contemporary 
forest protest movement.   A second period of protest from the mid-1950s 
comprised five evolutionary phases of growth specific to Western Australia:  a 
formative phase from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s when conservation 
groups combined to save areas of urban bushland; a transitional phase in the 
1970s when forest activists adopted more assertive forms of protest; a 
collaborative phase during the early 1980s when the protest movement achieved 
some success through exploiting a political alliance with the state ALP; an 
expansionary phase in the late 1980s with the spread of forest protest groups in 
the state's south-west; and a final confrontational phase throughout the 1990s 
  i  ii
when frustration at state government inactivity over forest protection resulted in 
an intensive forest campaign which employed both non-confrontational and 
direct action strategies. 
 
The Western Australian forest protest movement was characterised by its ability 
to continually adapt its organisation and strategies to changing social and 
political conditions.   This flexible approach to protest not only led to victories 
in the Shannon River Basin, Lane-Poole Jarrah Reserve and old growth forest 
campaigns, but also transformed forest protest into an influential social 
movement which contributed to the downfall of the Court Liberal Government 
in 2001. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
For over a century Western Australians have been protesting against the 
destruction of their forests, from the muted voices of early conservationists who 
sought to protect specific areas of native bushland to the more vocal cries of 
present-day activists who campaigned to save the state's old growth forests.   
Yet apart from accounts of a few isolated campaigns there are no published 
works that provide a comprehensive study of the native forest protest 
movement.   Forest protest is an important topic in Western Australian history, 
particularly through its transformation into a dynamic social movement that was 
able to influence changes to the state government's forest policies. 
 
This thesis examines the operations of the forest protest movement across the 
period from the origins of early protest in the 1890s to the ending of old growth 
forest logging in early 2001.  It explores the movement’s structures, workings, 
campaigns and strategies. The thesis does not attempt to provide an overall 
explanation for the cessation of old growth forest logging in Western Australia 
although its analysis of the protest movement throws considerable light on this 
question.    This introductory chapter will place the history of Western 
Australian native forest protest within a broader framework of Australian 
environmentalism.        
 
There are differing accounts of the foundation of the Australian environment 
movement and of the relationship between early conservationists and modern 
  1 
activists.  In Spoils and Spoilers (1992)  Geoffrey Bolton observed how a 
conservation movement began in the mid-nineteenth century with calls for 
wildlife protection in New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria and increased 
demands for areas of bushland to be set aside as national parks for public 
recreation.    He argued that the movement that emerged between 1880 and the 
1930s was paradoxical insomuch as a predominantly urban and suburban 
population had called for the protection of areas of undeveloped bushland.    In 
contrast to the early nineteenth century, when the bush was seen by most 
colonists as a hostile environment to be tamed for economic gain, by the early 
twentieth century an increasingly vocal minority had begun to challenge the 
continuing exploitation of the environment for productivity and had started the 
fight to preserve areas of the Australian bush in their natural state.
1 
 
The argument that the Australian environment movement began in the 
nineteenth century is supported by Drew Hutton and Libby Connors.  In A 
History of the Australian Environment Movement (1999) the authors explored 
the historical development of the environment movement as a social movement 
and argued that a movement for conservation existed beside the labour, 
women’s and peace movements of the late nineteenth century and that, while 
the character of the movement changed, there was historical continuity from its 
origins to the more recent movement.
2    Like Hutton and Connors, this account 
of the Western Australian forest protest movement is also placed within the 
theoretical framework of social movement theory where social movements 
comprise organisations and events that are united by a common identity and 
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where 'a shared sense of moral outrage builds participant identity, commitment 
and solidarity'.
3        
 
In their study, Hutton and Connors identified two major waves of Australian 
environmental activity:  the first, from the 1860s until the Second World War, 
comprised four thematic mobilisations centred around scientists, utilitarians, 
adventurers and urban reformers, and a second wave from the post-war years to 
the present which was triggered by new threats to the environment from the 
resource extraction industries.   While the first wave conservationists tended to 
support the political culture of their day and employed only non-confrontational 
strategies such as lobbying and holding public meetings, they were successful in 
broadening debates and developing campaign techniques that carried forward to 
the later movement.
4 
 
Elim Papadakis, in Politics and the Environment (1992), argued that the genesis 
of the Australian environment movement occurred even earlier, suggesting that 
the desire to protect native flora and fauna for aesthetic, ecological, scientific 
and utilitarian reasons was present from the earliest days of white colonisation.   
He cited the efforts of Governor Hunter in 1795 to halt the destruction of trees 
along the Hawkesbury River as evidence of a utilitarian concern to protect 
supplies of timber for the navy and to prevent flooding and destruction of 
property.
5   Like the previous writers, Papadakis emphasised the importance of 
the mid to late nineteenth century in the formation of groups dedicated to 
environmental protection.   He observed that the majority of early 
conservationists were from urban middle-class backgrounds and that the first 
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organizations such as the Royal Societies and wildlife protection societies 
successfully employed strategies of government lobbying, public education and 
information gathering that established precedents for future campaigns.     
Papadakis supported Hutton and Connors’ argument about the historical linkage 
between colonial and modern conservationists by observing how earlier calls 
for the preservation of areas for aesthetic, ecological and scientific purposes 
were reflected in arguments for environmental protection expressed by the 
contemporary environment movement.
6 
 
In a more recent publication, The Politics of the Environment (2001), Neil 
Carter, like Hutton and Connors, argued that in most industrialised nations two 
distinct waves of pressure-group activity could be identified.   He agreed with 
Hutton and Connors over the emergence of a ‘first wave’ of activity in the late 
nineteenth century which saw the formation of conservation groups concerned 
with the protection of wildlife and the preservation of natural resources.     
Carter, however, located the second wave of activity in the 1960s, and identified 
this period as the foundation of the modern environmental movement through 
the proliferation and increasing size of protest groups.
7 
 
This view of the 1960s as a pivotal period in the evolution of modern 
environmentalism is supported by Mathew Trinca and Andrea Gaynor who, in 
Country: Visions of Land and People in Western Australia (2002), identified the 
1960s and 1970s as an era when a fresh mood of ecological awareness resulted 
in people around the world calling for a halt to environmental exploitation.     
They argued that in Australia it was the fight to save the Great Barrier Reef 
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from mining in the late 1960s that heralded the start of a 'new wave' of 
environmentalism.
8 
 
Thus, while there are differing judgements of the exact origins of the Australian 
environment movement, the literature supports the view that there was some 
continuity between the early conservation movement and the later environment 
movement, even though the challenges were markedly different.    This thesis 
will argue that in Western Australia the native forest protest movement 
comprised two periods of protest activity.   The first from the 1890s, with early 
signs of public anxiety at the destruction of the forests for commercial purposes, 
and a second from the 1950s, with the formal organisation of protest groups that 
employed non-confrontational strategies. 
 
The period immediately following the Second World War witnessed a transition 
from the earlier to the later movement and again there is a difference of 
interpretation over which factors stimulated the transformation and when it 
occurred.   Hutton and Connors divided their post-war ‘second wave’ 
movement into four distinct phases.   The first, from immediately following the 
Second World War until 1972, saw a revitalisation of the environment 
movement to cope with new challenges stimulated by post-war economic 
growth and technological advancement.   It was during this time, Hutton and 
Connors have argued, that conservationists became radicalised through a 
realisation that traditional strategies of lobbying and letter-writing were 
ineffective against the demands of powerful companies and that they had to 
address their arguments directly to the Australian public.
9   The second phase, 
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from 1972 until 1983, saw the emergence of a new generation of environmental 
activists who adopted a tougher approach to campaigning using strategies of 
non-violent direct action.
10   Between 1983 and 1990 the environment 
movement attempted to consolidate its victory in the Franklin campaign by 
professionalising its organizational structures with a division occurring between 
those who strove to influence government policy by skilful lobbying and 
becoming partially institutionalised and a more radical stream who were more 
sceptical of political alliances and established an independent Green party.
11  A 
final phase in the 1990s saw a decline in the movement's influence and 
witnessed a struggle between the environment movement’s attempts to promote 
ecologically sustainable policies and governments dedicated to continuous 
economic growth at the environment’s expense.
12 
 
In Power, Profit and Protest (2003), Verity Burgmann placed the origins of the 
contemporary green movement in the early 1970s with the formation of groups 
such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Tasmanian Wilderness Society 
and through the impact of major campaigns such as Lake Pedder and the Green 
Bans movement.    Unlike the previous writers, she did not see any link between 
the earlier and later environment movements, and simply observed that the 
earlier ‘first wave’ environmentalists identified by Hutton and Connors and 
even those in the immediate post-war period were ineffective through operating 
in a political environment that largely ignored them.   It was during the 1970s, 
Burgmann argued, that the green movement emerged as both a cause and an 
effect of expanding environmental awareness and by the end of the 1980s 
became an important political force.
13 
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The formative influence of the 1970s on the modern Australian environment 
movement was supported by John Dargavel who, in Fashioning Australia’s 
Forests (1995), argued it was during that decade that significant numbers of 
Australians began to value the forests for their existence and the spirituality of 
wilderness areas.   He identified the fight to save Tasmania’s Lake Pedder as a 
turning point for the movement, when strategies of passive persuasion within a 
conservationist framework gave way to an era of environmentalism 
characterised by political activism.
14  Dargavel further argued that it was the 
environmental movement that set the public agenda on forest issues from the 
1970s by ensuring that established notions of forest use became open to public 
scrutiny.   While the 1970s acted as a springboard for the Australian 
environmental movement, it was also a time of rapid expansion, when the 
movement formed a variety of groupings and alliances and adopted a more 
radical approach to protest action.
15 
 
Rather than seeking to identify the modern environmental movement’s 
development in terms of its campaigns, organization and strategies, in Green 
Power (2000), environmental historian Timothy Doyle offered an alternative 
approach by dividing the movement into three periods of environmentalism 
since the 1960s, with each stage defined in terms of its relationship to the 
dominant political ideology and the strategic responses from the environment 
movement.    According to Doyle, the first period from the late-1960s to the 
mid-1980s was shaped by a prevailing ideology of unrestrained use that viewed 
the non-human world only in terms of its economic value to humans.   It was 
the environmental destruction wrought by that ideology which caused 
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environmentalists to react and led to the formation of the modern Australian 
environment movement.   Doyle observed how the movement was able to 
reactivate the strategies and networks established at Lake Pedder and Terania 
Creek during the 1970s for the campaign to save the Franklin River in the early 
1980s.   A second phase of environmentalism from the mid-1980s until the 
early 1990s was dominated by a philosophy of sustainable use that sought to 
achieve a balance between human demand and the need to protect the 
environment.   During that period environmentalists attempted to influence and 
initiate changes to environmental policies from within the institutions of 
government.   Doyle identified a final period of development from the mid-
1990s during which an ideology of wise and sequential use placed 
environmentalists in direct confrontation with the government and corporate 
sectors.
16 
 
The literature thus contains different interpretations of the Australian 
environment movement’s transformation into a modern social movement and 
how it developed over time.  Hutton and Connors identified four phases of post-
war environmental movement development:  a radicalisation of the movement 
from the end of the Second World War until the early 1970s as a reaction to 
new challenges to the environment from economic expansion; a more 
aggressive movement and a recourse to non-violent direct action strategies from 
the early 1970s until the early 1980s; the emergence of a more professional and 
partially institutionalised movement between 1983 and 1990; and a final 1990s 
phase when the environment movement's influence waned in the face of 
governments dedicated to economic growth.   Both Burgmann and Dargavel 
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emphasised the importance of the 1970s in the evolution of the contemporary 
movement and argued that it was during that time that environmentalists began 
to exert their influence by refining their organization and strategies.   Doyle, on 
the other hand, located the movement’s modern origins in the 1960s, with three 
periods of growth that were defined by its responses to changing political 
attitudes towards the environment.    
 
The evidence presented in this thesis will show how the Western Australian 
forest protest movement was more closely aligned with the model presented by 
Hutton and Connors in terms of its historical continuity from the nineteenth 
century.   However, while Hutton and Connors divide the post-war environment 
movement into four phases of development, this thesis argues that in Western 
Australia the post-Second World War contemporary forest protest movement 
was characterised by five evolutionary phases of protest activity:  a formative 
post-war phase from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s when Perth 
conservation groups combined and used non-confrontational strategies to save 
areas of urban bushland; a transitional phase in the 1970s when dedicated forest 
activist groups formed and adopted a more assertive approach to protest which 
resulted in the use of non-violent direct action strategies; a collaborative  phase 
during the early 1980s when the protest movement achieved some success by 
adopting strategies of negotiation with the state government; an expansionary 
phase in the late 1980s which saw the growth of a network of protest groups in 
Western Australia's south-west; and a final confrontational phase throughout the 
1990s when frustration at the state government's failure to protect the forests 
resulted in an intensive campaign of direct action protests.     Furthermore, the 
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thesis argues that, as opposed to Hutton and Connors' observations about the 
Australian environment movement's declining influence during the 1990s,
17 for 
the Western Australian forest protest movement the decade was a time of 
intense activity with the formation of the Western Australian Forest Alliance, 
continuous forest blockades, south-west local protest actions, and successful 
campaigns against the Regional Forest Agreement and to protect the state's old 
growth forests. 
 
Writers have observed that the Australian environment movement’s 
organisation and strategies have been influenced by particular campaigns.  In 
Groundswell: The Rise of the Greens (2002), which traced the growth of the 
Greens as a force in Australian politics, Amanda Lohrey, like Dargavel and 
Burgmann, emphasised the impact of the Lake Pedder campaign in the early 
1970s on the foundation of the modern Australian environment movement and 
drew an analogy with the relevance of the 1890s shearers’ strike on the 
formation of the Australian Labor Party.   The failure to save Lake Pedder 
provided the motivation for the formation of the world’s first Green party, the 
United Tasmania Group, and heralded the start of the movement’s efforts to 
effect change as a political actor.   While the Lake Pedder campaign generated 
the movement’s initial impetus, Lohrey argued that it was the Franklin River 
blockade that propelled ecological politics into the mainstream.
18    
 
Like Lohrey, Tasmanian activist and academic Cassandra Pybus also stressed 
the importance of Lake Pedder for Australian environmentalists.    In The Rest 
of the World is Watching (1990) she explained how the Lake Pedder campaign, 
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while initially regarded as a failure, became a powerful symbol that provided 
inspiration for many activists who became prominent figures in the environment 
movement and in Green politics.  The later campaigns to save the Franklin 
River from being flooded and to oppose the construction of a large export pulp 
mill at Wesley Vale not only strengthened the Green movement in Tasmania 
but also attracted nationwide attention and support.   On reflection, some 
activists believed that the failed Lake Pedder campaign was necessary in order 
to provide the foundation for later successes.
19 
 
In their study Wilderness as the Sacred: The Franklin River Campaign (1989), 
Gary Easthope and Geoff Holloway also argued that the campaign to save Lake 
Pedder was the major turning point in the development of the modern 
Australian environment movement because it constructed a central political 
strategy that was used subsequently by activists: continuous pressure on the 
federal government to preserve areas of wilderness by emphasising the moral 
argument that the protection of those areas for future generations took 
precedence over other considerations.
20   They observed how, as a social 
movement, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society waged a successful campaign to 
save the Franklin River by effectively using visual images to convince the 
public that the south-west wilderness was a ‘sacred place’ that needed saving.   
Easthope and Holloway believed that the style and quality of the wilderness 
images used in this strategy reflected the influence of the Society’s association 
with the United States Sierra Club.
21   Richard Flanagan and Cassandra Pybus 
pointed out, however, that the strategy of using visual imagery to influence 
public perceptions of wilderness was not an innovation and that the late 
  11 
nineteenth century Tasmanian photographer J.W. Beattie had already 
established a tradition of propagandist photography to promote conservation 
and tourism in the state.
22   The Franklin River campaign provided many 
strategic lessons for Western Australian activists and the exploitation of visual 
imagery, particularly that of clear-felled areas of old growth forests, played a 
major part in the 1990s forest protests. 
 
The fight to save the Franklin River not only illustrated the value of 
‘wilderness’ as a powerful strategy for environmental activists but the action 
also contained tactical implications for the conduct of future campaigns.  In her 
paper Out of the Wilderness for the Wilderness Issue? (1984), Penny Figgis 
explained how the Franklin River campaign changed the politics of the 
wilderness issue by breaking down many of the prejudices that were barriers to 
informed discussion.   This, she believed, was accomplished mainly through an 
intensive public education campaign that ‘marketed’ a positive concept of 
wilderness by exploiting media interest and persuading the public and 
politicians to visit areas of natural beauty.    The Franklin campaign produced a 
more sophisticated approach to the media, with activists trained in writing press 
releases and conducting media interviews.   Campaigners were encouraged to 
modify aggressive behaviour in order to present a more conservative image that 
would have a better chance of generating sympathy from ‘middle Australia’.  
Good quality, well-researched material was used to support arguments with the 
adoption of a positive, constructive approach rather than a simple negative 
reaction.    Figgis argued that the mixture of grass roots and elite-based 
strategies used in the Franklin campaign resulted from the influence of a rising 
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number of politically aware young activists who did not have the tentative 
approach to government lobbying adopted by previous generations.
23   Many of 
the strategic initiatives used in the Franklin River campaign were employed in 
Western Australian forest protest actions. 
 
Hutton and Connors claimed the Franklin River campaign signified the 
Australian environment movement’s ‘coming of age’.   The massive publicity 
surrounding the river blockade had projected an image of environmentalists 
fighting to save the wilderness, with the action successfully mobilising 
thousands of activists and supporters around Australia.   Furthermore, it had 
developed the movement’s skills and resources to the extent that environmental 
issues had been forced into the mainstream of the country’s political life.   Most 
significantly, Hutton and Connors observed how the Franklin campaign 
illustrated the capacity of the environmental movement to forge links with 
political power – in this case a sympathetic, newly-elected federal Labor 
government – and that this in turn encouraged an optimistic belief among 
environmentalists that, if they could professionalise their operations and 
organise further mass campaigns, they had the potential to influence election 
outcomes and achieve major gains.
24    
 
The willingness of the Franklin campaign environmentalists to seek an 
accommodation with the new federal Labor administration demonstrates how 
contemporary activists employ a form of  'self-limiting radicalism' which Jean 
Cohen argues recognises the failures of revolutionary Marxism and seeks to 
'renew a democratic political culture and to reintroduce the normative 
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dimension of social action into political life.'
25   Burgmann, however, considers 
that, while negotiation with political power might be appropriate at times, the 
environment movement exerts its greatest influence when it employs 
'sustainable activism'.
26   Jan Pakulski also argues that, while the green 
movement will negotiate a partial accommodation with Western political 
institutions, it will continue to carry out its operations outside the realm of 
parliament.
27   This thesis will demonstrate how a political alliance between the 
forest protest movement and the newly-elected Burke Labor Government in the 
early 1980s contributed towards victories over the Shannon Basin and the Lane-
Poole Reserve and how, like the Franklin campaign, this raised hopes within the 
protest movement that further successes would follow. 
 
Although the Tasmanian campaigns undoubtedly exerted a major impact on the 
growth of the Australian environment movement, protests in other states further 
strengthened the movement’s organisation and expanded its strategies. The New 
South Wales and Victorian Green Bans movements during the 1970s were 
unique insofar as they were the first time in an industrialised country that a 
workers’ union had agreed to form an alliance with ordinary citizens and 
withhold its labour to protect portions of urban bushland and inner-city heritage 
areas from destruction.    In Green Bans (1978), Richard Roddewig observed 
how feelings of powerlessness against the rapid pace of development and the 
inability of the political process to represent their points of view forced people 
to form residents' action groups and unite with the Builders Labourers’ 
Federation to preserve their local environments.     Roddewig believed a number 
of social and political factors coincided to promote the growth of the Green 
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Bans movement: a strong public reaction against intensive urban development, 
an influential radical left wing in the labour movement and a tradition of using 
strike action for political ends.
28    
  
Hutton and Connors considered the Green Bans movement’s most important 
legacy was to introduce legislation in New South Wales that enabled people to 
participate in environmental decisions that affected their daily lives.
29   In a 
recent paper Unions and the Environment (2002), which considered initiatives 
to create green employment in Australia and overseas, Verity Burgmann argued 
that affiliating with unions to achieve environmental objectives, such as 
occurred during the Green Bans campaigns, should remain an important 
strategy of the environment movement.
30   Burgmann’s argument became 
relevant for Western Australian activists during the late 1990s when lobbying 
the union movement was an important strategy during the latter stages of the 
campaign to end old growth forest logging. 
 
The fight to save an area of rainforest from logging at Terania Creek in northern 
New South Wales during the late 1970s saw the introduction of non-violent 
direct action blockading in Australia’s eastern states as a protest strategy by 
rainforest conservationists.  In Fighting over the forests (1990),  Ian Watson 
explored the complex relationship between conservationists and timber workers.   
Adopting a class analysis, Watson argued that the campaign to save Terania 
Creek emerged as a middle-class battlefield where the intellectual resources of 
the protesters and not physical force provided the keys to success.   He 
maintained that the protesters were able to use their superior intellectual skills 
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to their advantage by exploiting political and media networks, presenting well-
researched and articulate arguments and co-ordinating and organising actions to 
ensure maximum media exposure.
31   Burgmann supported this view, pointing 
out how the new social movements were populated by a ‘new middle class’ 
which was characterised by the possession of ‘intellectual capital’.
32    
 
Like Figgis’ observations of the Franklin River protesters, Watson noted how 
strategies employed at Terania Creek were also influenced by a blend of 
middle-class professional moderation and more emotional and spontaneous 
expressions of direct action.
33   In the case of Western Australian forest protest, 
however, this thesis will demonstrate support for Timothy Doyle’s argument 
that a class-based analysis is an inadequate way of explaining the Australian 
environment movement insofar as the diversity of the movement’s individuals 
and ideologies extend beyond the boundaries of any particular class or interest 
group.
34     Hutton and Connors saw the Terania Creek blockade as radically 
altering the nature of conservation campaigning through using non-violent 
direct action strategies to ‘stage’ protest actions that invited media and public 
attention and by providing an organisational blueprint for other direct action 
protests.
35   This thesis will show how some of the strategies used at Terania 
Creek, such as non-violent direct action and media exploitation, had already 
been used by Western Australian forest activists in the late 1970s.  
 
Plans by the Victorian government in the late-1960s to develop 40,000 hectares 
of the Little Desert in western Victoria as farmland sparked a campaign 400 
kilometres away in Melbourne.    Eight metropolitan conservation groups 
  16 
combined to form a Save Our Bushlands Action Committee to save the area.   
In her comprehensive account of the campaign, Defending the Little Desert 
(1998), Libby Robin saw Little Desert as a ‘watershed’ for the conservation 
movement in that, like a division between river systems, it marked a dividing 
line between an older generation of conservation campaigners and the more 
overt strategies adopted by 1970s environmentalists.    She supported this view 
by observing that the Little Desert conservationists reflected a different 
conservation tradition by using tactics of negotiation, lobbying and public 
meetings as distinct from the later strategies of direct action and confrontation. 
Rather than opposing the political system and seeking to attack it, the majority 
of the campaigners believed in the system and sought to persuade politicians 
and bureaucrats that the farmlands scheme was not viable.   Robin argued that 
the Little Desert campaign coincided with and supported changes in ecological 
consciousness that were occurring at that time when people began to question 
the ethics of utilitarian approaches to conservation. In contrast to the failed Lake 
Pedder campaign, she believed Little Desert acted as a symbol of reassurance to 
the environment movement that political pressure could be successful.
36    
 
Hutton and Connors supported Robin’s assertion about the transitional nature of 
the Little Desert campaign, observing that in many ways the action represented 
the first-wave movement’s last mobilisation.   However, in their view, the 
campaign’s major achievements had been to increase government 
accountability and public representation on land conservation issues and to 
heighten environmental consciousness in Victoria that in turn resulted in the 
rapid growth of the state’s environmental movement.
37   These writers’ views of 
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the late 1960s as a transitional period for the Australian environment movement 
will be supported in this thesis by evidence which shows how, at that time, the 
Western Australian forest protest movement’s strategies of passive dissent were 
replaced in the 1970s by more radical tactics of direct action. 
 
The fight to save Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef from mining and oil drilling 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s was inspired by similar motivations to the 
Lake Pedder and Franklin River campaigns.    The Reef was a national icon that 
held a spiritual and emotional attraction for many Australians and there was a 
strong desire among environmentalists to protect its natural beauty for future 
generations.   In her account of the campaign The Coral Battleground (1977), 
Judith Wright described a utilitarian ethos that also prevailed in Western 
Australia.  Notions of ‘progress’ were defined in terms of an expanding 
resource extraction industry that was supported by wealthy private interests and 
a sympathetic state government.   A difference was that in Western Australia it 
was not drilling a coral reef for limestone and oil that provided the threat to the 
environment but the destruction of the state’s native forests for bauxite and 
wood chips.   Wright observed how, as in Western Australia during the 1970s, 
conservationists who banded together to save the Reef were labelled as nothing 
more than a fringe element who were out of touch with the wishes of most 
Queenslanders.
38   She showed how activists were able to transform the battle to 
save the Reef into a controversial public and political issue through the 
application of a range of protest strategies which included presenting scientific 
evidence at Select Committees, initiating legal challenges, lobbying 
parliamentarians and unions, and mounting an intensive public and media 
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campaign that included the first use of car bumper stickers in Australia.  Wright 
viewed the threat to the Great Barrier Reef and the campaign to save it as one 
small part of a much broader issue about protecting the future of the planet.
39    
 
Hutton and Connors identified three tactics used by the environment movement 
in the Great Barrier Reef campaign:  a ‘first-wave’ movement strategy of 
lobbying politicians and bureaucrats through persuasion that proved ineffective, 
a massive public education and media campaign, and a legal argument about 
jurisdiction over the area of the Great Barrier Reef.   It was the second strategy, 
the growing public hostility to drilling the Reef, that they argued provided the 
necessary reprieve for conservationists, while agreeing with Wright that this 
was assisted by public reaction to pollution from environmental disasters in 
Australia and other parts of the world at that time.
40   This thesis will 
demonstrate how, as in the Great Barrier Reef campaign, public education and 
media exploitation emerged as prominent strategies in the fight to save Western 
Australia's native forests. 
 
The ability to create and co-ordinate urban and rural networks of forest activists 
is an important characteristic of the contemporary Western Australian forest 
protest movement, and the organisation and effectiveness of those networks will 
be a major focus of this thesis.   In Green Power (2000), Timothy Doyle used 
the mid-1980s campaign to protect north Queensland’s wet tropical forests as an 
example of how a movement’s networks combined and operated.    He 
identified a web of twenty-five groups and organisations involved in the wet 
tropics campaign that provided a bond between the different groups even 
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though there was no overriding common goal.
41   The primary aim of the 
networks, Doyle argued, was to collate and disseminate essential information 
which improved the campaign’s overall organization by helping to avoid 
duplication, create strategies through collective knowledge, and foster an 
awareness among group members that they were part of a broader and more 
powerful social movement.   While network information was communicated in 
a variety of forms, such as written correspondence, newsletters and personal 
contact, regular telephone link-ups became important through enabling network 
members to discuss resource allocation and plan campaign strategies.
42   Lohrey 
believed Doyle’s idea of how these different networks intermeshed to form a 
social movement provided an explanation for the growth of a powerful ‘political 
constituency’ of grassroots groups, such as the Australian Greens, that cut 
across class and socio-economic divisions.
43 
 
The accounts of these eastern states campaigns not only offer explanatory 
frameworks for the modern Australian environment movement’s organisational 
and strategic approaches but also contain parallels with native forest protest in 
Western Australia.    Tasmania’s Lake Pedder and Franklin River campaigns 
illustrated how the impact of ‘wilderness’ imagery could capture public 
imagination and showed how the application of direct action strategies not only 
attracted media attention but also strengthened movement solidarity.    As well 
as emphasising the need for a sophisticated protest organisation, the Franklin 
campaign showed the potential for movements to achieve real success through 
forming alliances with sympathetic political administrations.   The Terania 
Creek action in New South Wales illustrated how ‘staged events’ such as forest 
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blockades could attract widespread media attention and the Queensland wet 
tropics campaign demonstrated the complexity and fluidity of activist networks 
and their role in maintaining essential communications links between campaign 
participants.   Like the Franklin River campaign, the fight to save Queensland’s 
Great Barrier Reef showed how it was possible to harness public sentiment over 
images of Australia’s natural heritage and transform a local concern into a 
national issue.   However, while these campaigns contained lessons for Western 
Australian forest protesters, this thesis will show how in some instances 
Western Australian activists were themselves the innovators. 
 
Throughout its history the Australian environment movement has been 
characterised by the energy and enthusiasm of its leaders.   In her recent study 
Green Power: Environmentalists who have changed the face of Australia 
(2006), Christine Williams examined the lives of twenty prominent 
conservationists who have influenced the development of Australian 
environmentalism.   She argued that the biographies revealed how a culture of 
‘green consciousness’ was created through the involvement of a group of 
committed activists and that this new sense of consciousness had not resulted 
from any radical element but had been constructed from the voices and actions 
of articulate and ‘reasoning’ Australians.   Williams believed the individuals in 
her book crystallised significant stages in the evolution of the environmental 
movement by reflecting growing public perceptions that the natural 
environment should be protected as an asset for future generations.
44 
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In their study of the Australian environment movement Hutton and Connors 
also showed how it was the actions of individuals which inspired others and led 
to the movement’s expansion.   They singled out New South Wales bushwalker 
Myles Dunphy as one of the key figures in their ‘first wave’ of Australian 
environmentalism, arguing that it was his ability to transpose the physical and 
aesthetic enjoyment of the bush into a conservation philosophy and his 
leadership in organising popular recreational walks that made him the founder 
of the modern bushwalking movement.
45   Dunphy’s greatest achievements 
arose from his desire to ensure areas of bush were preserved for public 
enjoyment and resulted in him providing the driving force behind the creation 
of the Greater Blue Mountains, Southern Blue Mountains and Kosciusko 
national parks.
46 
 
Timothy Doyle observed how environmental campaigns produced people from 
a variety of backgrounds to provide inspiration and leadership.   These included 
the Great Barrier Reef campaign, in which poet Judith Wright co-founded the 
Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland (WPSQ) and was instrumental in 
saving the Reef from mining, ‘alternative lifestylers’ Nan and Hugh Nicholson 
who became centrally involved in the Terania Creek forest conflict, and 
unionist Jack Mundey, who attempted to instil environmental consciousness 
into urban developers.
47  Bolton believed Mundey’s early life in the tropical 
landscape of North Queensland could have influenced his concerns about urban 
pollution in Sydney and a realisation that underprivileged people were not 
adequately protected by town planners.
48   
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In  Patriots: Defending Australia's Natural Heritage (2006), William Lines 
argues that the actions of Australian conservationists represent the expression of 
a more embracing notion of patriotism that drives them to defend their country's 
natural heritage against the unrestrained destruction of governments and 
developers.   Lines further argues that leading conservationists such as Milo 
Dunphy and Judith Wright were successful not only through their persistence, 
tenacity and political skills, but also because of a sense of patriotism that was 
grounded in their awareness of the land as a living reality.
49 
 
While there were many individuals who made significant contributions to the 
growth of the Australian environment movement, in recent times it has been 
Greens' leader Bob Brown who has arguably exerted the greatest influence.     
Several writers have discussed the significance of Brown’s role in the Franklin 
River campaign in the early 1980s.     Hutton and Connors observed that, while 
thousands of activists took part, it was Brown who was at the summit of the 
campaign.   They viewed Brown as a contradictory person who appeared 
modest and unassuming, yet also as one who possessed an acute awareness of 
campaign strategy and of his own ability to motivate and inspire masses of 
people.   It was his sense of generosity and personal integrity, they argued, that 
resulted in him becoming the campaign’s central unifying figure.
50  A recent 
biography,  Bob Brown: Gentle Revolutionary (2004) by James Norman, 
supported this view of Brown as a person who was able to combine modesty 
with personal magnetism by recounting how activists in the Franklin blockade 
commented on Brown’s ability to bring calm and order to a situation by simply 
being there.
51   
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In Easthope and Holloway’s view, Brown’s willingness to forsake his career as 
a doctor, to sell many of his possessions and to rely on the charity of his 
followers in order to devote his energies to the Franklin campaign defined him 
in Max Weber’s terms as a charismatic leader who dedicated himself solely to 
the success of his cause.
52   Lohrey, however, argued that Brown’s plain 
speaking and image of ordinariness, although giving an impression of 
truthfulness and integrity, reflected the very opposite of charismatic leadership.   
While Hutton and Connors’ identified Brown’s apparent contradictions, Lohrey 
contended that his conservative image and stern public demeanour suggested 
that radicalism and respectability could somehow co-exist.
53   Figgis also 
emphasised the crucial role of strong leadership in mounting successful 
environmental campaigns and believed that, without Brown’s guidance, the 
outcome of the Franklin River action could have been markedly different.
54    
 
This thesis will argue that, from its origins in the 1950s, the contemporary 
Western Australian forest protest movement was characterised by a succession 
of influential protest leaders.  The thesis will demonstrate how networks of 
experienced activists directed and co-ordinated a series of urban and rural forest 
campaigns. 
 
Although campaigns and leadership were crucial factors in enabling the 
Australian environment movement to refine and streamline its organisation and 
strategies, the movement was also inspired by broader international 
environmental issues, particularly that posited by American marine scientist 
Rachel Carson in her book Silent Spring (1962), who warned about the 
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damaging effects of synthetic chemicals on the natural environment.
55     Hutton 
and Connors believed the book’s influence for the environment movement arose 
not only from its attack on the chemical industry but also from its ability to 
provoke a worldwide debate over the indiscriminate use of pesticides.
56   In 
terms of Australian forest protest it was environmentalists Richard and Val 
Routley’s The Fight for the Forests (1973) that provided a major stimulus for 
the forest protest movement.  The Routleys argued that the decision to establish 
an intensive timber industry and promote a forest products export trade would 
exert severe pressure on the country’s limited areas of natural forest.   They 
further argued that those entrusted with the management of the forests were 
heavily influenced by the demands of the wood production industry.
57    
 
Dargavel thought the impact of The Fight for the Forests lay not only in its 
attack on the environmental effects of intensive forestry but also in its challenge 
to the entrenched ‘wood production ideology’ of the nation’s foresters.  He 
argued that, more than anything else, it was the book’s influence that moved 
Australian environmental issues onto the public agenda and signalled the start 
of the forest contests.
58   Agreeing with Dargavel about the book’s importance 
for the environment movement, Hutton and Connors asserted that the 
publication represented the first clear expression of the battleground between 
conservationists and the timber industry and observed how subsequent 
campaigns to save native forests continued to emphasise the conflict between 
wood production forestry and conservation values.
59 
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Like Hutton and Connors’ central hypothesis concerning the reasons for the 
development of the Australian environment movement, this thesis will show 
how in Western Australia the forest protest movement was also influenced by 
the appearance of new threats to the environment and the experiences it gained 
from various campaigns.
60   More specifically, the thesis will argue that the 
successful Western Australian forest protest movement was characterised 
organisationally by an inclusive approach to dissent which encouraged broad 
public support and participation through an expanding network of metropolitan 
and south-west forest protest groups, and in its strategic initiatives by its ability 
to employ a diversity of non-confrontational and direct action strategies aimed 
at both maintaining public focus on forest issues and sustaining continuous 
pressure on the state government to change its forest policies.   It will further 
argue that the post-Second World War contemporary protest movement was 
defined in terms of five distinct phases of protest activity that were specific to 
Western Australia.  The thesis will examine how a succession of strong leaders 
was able to co-ordinate a metropolitan and rural network of activist groups to 
combat threats to the state's forests from mining and wood chipping, and 
consider what internal characteristics gave the movement its strength.   An 
analysis of some important campaigns will demonstrate how the movement 
formulated its strategies and offer a comparison with tactics employed in other 
Australian states.   Finally, the thesis will consider the major factors that 
enabled the forest protest movement to succeed in some campaigns yet be 
unsuccessful in others. 
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The thesis is divided into nine chapters.   Chapter 1 comprises an introduction 
and literature review which places the Western Australian forest protest 
movement within the broader context of Australian environmentalism.   Chapter 
2 examines the protest movement's first period of activity from its genesis in the 
1890s, when individuals began protesting about the destruction of the state's 
forests, until the early 1950s when conservation groups protested about the 
environmental effects of rapid post-war development.   Chapter 3 identifies the 
start of a second period of protest from the mid-1950s and considers how the 
campaign to save King's Park and the formation of the Nature Conservation 
Council influenced the movement's early growth.   Chapter 4 examines how the 
1970s heralded the formation of dedicated forest protest groups and a transition 
from non-confrontational forms of protest to the employment of non-violent 
direct action strategies.   Chapter 5 demonstrates how, during the early 1980s, 
the city-based protest movement intensified its use of the legal system as a 
protest strategy and was able to exploit its influence within the state Labor party 
to protect two specific areas of native forest.   Chapter 6 observes how the focus 
for successful protest activity shifted away from Perth with the formation of 
organised and effective local protest groups in the state's south-west.   Chapter 7 
examines how, in the early 1990s, protest groups united to combat increasing 
pressure on the forests, and how frustration at the protest movement's inability 
to halt further logging in the south-west prompted a return to strategies of direct 
action.   Chapter 8 considers the factors that enabled the forest protest 
movement to create a climate for victory in the forests campaign.   Chapter 9 
contains the thesis conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
An Emerging Protest Movement 
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This chapter examines the forest protest movement in Western Australia from its 
origins in the 1890s when individuals began protesting against the escalating 
destruction of the state’s native forests until the early 1950s, when conservation 
groups started to protest about the effects of post-war development.  During this 
first period of protest, concerns for the preservation of the native environment 
resulted in the formation of three prominent conservation groups – the West 
Australian Natural History Society (1904), a Western Australian branch of the 
Australian Forest League (1913) and the Western Australian Naturalists’ Club 
(1924).  In contrast to the larger and more vocal orientation of current protest 
movements, these organisations focussed their concerns on the destruction of 
native habitats as an unfortunate by-product of colonisation and sought to protect 
native flora and fauna through the creation of nature reserves.  The demand for 
timber, both domestic and external, and the consequent growth of timber 
companies combined with a government administration seeking economic 
development, muted those early voices of dissent.   
 
The chapter will support Hutton and Connors' argument about the Australian 
environment movement;
1 that, in this first period of protest, there were some 
elements of protest activity that carried through to a second period of protest 
which began in the 1950s.   Specifically, the early conservation groups 
collaborated with each other and used non-confrontational strategies such as 
political lobbying and letter-writing to protest against the destruction of the 
state's native forests.   A tradition of strong leadership was established, and the 
groups were aware of the strategic importance of public education and gaining 
the support of influential figures. 
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The attitude of Western Australia’s early colonists to their new environment was 
influenced by their British colonial inheritance.   The conquest of new lands 
called for the submission of the natural environment to the demands of its new 
owners. This cultural and ideological transplantation produced a number of 
views on how the land should be used and managed. 
 
Changing Attitudes 
During the early nineteenth century most European settlers regarded the 
Australian bush as a barrier to progress.   The fact that the majority of the 
colonists came from urban backgrounds and lacked an appreciation of the unique 
characteristics of the Western Australian environment compounded their 
adversarial approach to the land.   It was the ignorance and short-sightedness of 
the settlers during the colony’s early years that de Garis argued established a 
pattern for the way Western Australians would continue to treat their 
environment.
2   These observations about the inexperience of Western 
Australia’s first colonists are supported by Cameron, who further argued that the 
failure of the Swan River Colony to conform to pre-conceived expectations of a 
fertile land with rich soils was an important influence on the formation of the 
colonists’ responses to their new land and that inadequate planning and isolation 
from the eastern colonies provided additional obstacles to achieving their 
ambitions.
3    
 
While, on the one hand, the forests were seen as a hindrance to settlement, their 
potential as a commercial resource had also been recognised.   Captain James 
Stirling extolled the virtues of the area’s timber to attract investment and settlers 
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to the Swan River Colony.   During an exploratory visit to Geographe Bay in 
March 1827 he observed: ‘Wood is here abundant for the use of Ships...’, and 
speculated on the possible export of timber to Asian markets.
4   In October 1828, 
after discussions with Thomas Peel, an Association was formed: 
...to send labour and capital assets to the Swan where food, livestock 
and raw materials of all kinds would be produced on land converted 
from its virgin state, and exported to bring them a return.
5 
 
During a later visit to Geographe Bay in 1838, Stirling pronounced the trees of 
the karri forests to be ‘of the finest description for shipbuilding’.
6 
 
Attitudes towards Western Australia’s native forests at the time of British 
colonisation reflected both nostalgia for an English cultural tradition and a 
colonial desire to exploit the forests for a domestic, and possibly export, timber 
trade.   Heathcote has argued that, while Europeans possessed an aesthetic 
appreciation of the Australian landscape that was represented by pockets of open 
woodland and native grass which provided fleeting reminders of home, by 1870 
the dominant perspective was a materialistic view of the bush as a commodity for 
commercial exploitation.
7       Mills suggested that the lack of conservation 
principles in the early years of the Swan River Colony derived from the 
conflicting interests of the rich and the poor.   On the one hand, wealthy 
landowners acquired huge tracts of land which they attempted to transform into 
an English landscape and, alternatively, poor men indiscriminately felled timber 
to make a living.  Additionally, Mills argued, the industrial revolution resulted in 
the exploitation of land and resources for commercial speculation.
8   T h e  
enormity of the impact of European colonisation on the land was emphasised by 
Powell, who argued that between 1788 and 1914 the Australian environment was 
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‘irrevocably’ changed to the extent that complex ecosystems were destroyed or 
modified and exploitative attitudes towards nature became firmly entrenched.
9  
 
One of the major causes of the indiscriminate clearing of Western Australia’s 
forests during the early years of colonisation was a widely held belief that the 
forest was an inexhaustible resource that would quickly regenerate.  A further 
misconception, which promoted the idea of widespread forest clearance, was the 
notion that the density and maturity of the trees signified rich and fertile soils that 
would be suitable for European-style agriculture.   By the time those assertions 
were found to be incorrect, considerable areas of ancient forest had been felled or 
ringbarked and burnt.
10     
 
As well as suffering from misuse through human ignorance, the forests were 
placed under further pressure during the late 1860s and early 1870s when the 
Western Australian government offered long-term timber leases or ‘concessions’ 
over large areas to entrepreneurs in return for a substantial investment.   This 
period marked a turning point in the history of the forests with the 
industrialisation of the timber industry through the introduction of large 
commercial sawmills.
11   Dargavel has argued that, while an increase in railway 
building during the 1880s and the economic impact of the 1890s gold rushes 
produced a boom in the timber industry, it was the impact of international 
demand from the 1890s that resulted in Western Australia becoming the supplier 
of 70-82% of the Australian colonies’ timber exports.
12 (See figures 2.1 and 2.2)   
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Figure 2.1.  Jarrahdale Timber Mill c.1890.   Source: Jarrahdale Heritage 
Society, Weedon Collection. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.   Timber workers at Jarrahdale c.1890.   Source: Jarrahdale Heritage 
Society, Weedon Collection. 
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Although it appeared that the forests faced a bleak future, the latter half of the 
nineteenth century was also a time when a much broader philosophical debate 
was taking place in the industrial world over human attitudes to nature. 
 
In 1864, George Perkins Marsh, an American lawyer and diplomat, published 
Man and Nature, which comprised a study of the relationship of humans to the 
natural world.   Marsh’s central hypothesis was that the balance of nature was 
being disturbed to the detriment of humanity.   In the preface Marsh stated: 
We have felled forest enough everywhere, in many districts, far too 
much.        Let us restore this one element of material life to its normal 
proportions and devise means for maintaining the permanence of its 
relations to the fields, the meadows, and the pastures, to the rain and the 
dews of heaven, to the springs     and rivulets with which it waters the 
earth.
13 
 
David Lowenthal has argued that this book was the first to oppose the myth of 
the inexhaustibility of resources and that it exerted an immediate influence over 
human attitudes to the land and its uses.   Marsh believed tree cover was of 
fundamental importance and considered that the indiscriminate felling of trees 
caused serious environmental harm, such as soil erosion and impoverishment.   
He concluded that people must not only appreciate the consequences of their 
actions towards the natural world, but also learn how to restore and preserve it.
14   
Lewis Mumford considered Marsh’s work to be so significant that in his 
estimation it represented  ‘the fountainhead of the conservation movement.’
15   
Even in remote Western Australia the beginnings of concern for the forests’ 
future became apparent in the 1870s with the first expressions of public anxiety 
about their exploitation. 
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In November 1874 the Fremantle Herald newspaper stated its objections to the 
alienation of the colony’s forests for the benefit of ‘alien capitalists’ who 
monopolised the timber trade and depleted the colony of a valuable resource.   
The writer said it was a mistake to assume the jarrah forests were inexhaustible, 
and criticised the actions of companies that: 
...having no interest in the colony, conduct all their money transactions 
on the principle of getting as much out of the bargain as they can, and 
will when all is exhausted, leave behind them a treeless, heat producing 
desert and seaboard.
16 
 
Similar concerns about the impact of commercial exploitation on the forests had 
already been expressed in New South Wales in 1869, when a correspondent 
observed: 
The devastating axe of the timber-getter has made dire havoc amongst 
the cedar brushes and where a few years ago immense quantities of the 
wood were to be found there is not now a single tree worth 
cutting…They destroy young trees too, with the most culpable 
carelessness, and…care not a button how many young trees they destroy 
in cutting down an old one.
17    
 
An indication of changing official attitudes towards the forests was demonstrated 
by the decision of the Western Australian government to call upon the 
Government Botanist of Victoria, Ferdinand von Mueller, to conduct a survey of 
the colony’s forest resources.   Moore has pointed out that Mueller, an eminent 
natural scientist and arguably Australia’s first conservationist, provided 
encouragement for the formation of the West Australian Natural History Society, 
later to become the Royal Society of Western Australia.
18   Mueller’s report, 
published in 1879, advocated measures to protect the colony’s native forests: 
…as nowhere, not even in the most extensive woodlands, can the supply 
of timber from natural forests be considered inexhaustible, a rational 
far-seeing provision for the maintenance (if not for the enrichment) of 
its forest-treasures is needful for West Australia, however 
indiminishable [sic] these may appear at present...Wise statesmanship 
does not expect to raise extensive incomes from forest lands without re-
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voting at least a portion of the funds so obtained for renovating, or for 
enriching to some extent, the very forests which yielded the revenue...
19 
 
Despite growing concern about the condition and management of the forests, 
there was continuing resistance on the part of the colonial government to take 
positive action. In 1882, the Surveyor General, Malcolm Fraser, still maintained 
that in his opinion ‘the untouched forest area of the Colony is so great that no 
anxiety need be felt as to the supply falling short for very many years to come.’   
While acknowledging that ‘waste of our timber is at present enormous’, he could 
‘see no means or system employed, no method adopted or followed to prevent 
this waste.’
20  It is possible that the reason for Fraser’s inactivity with regard to 
forest conservation at this time was, as Carron suggested, due partly to a lack of 
revenue, but mainly to a persisting view that the relative size of the timber 
industry at that time compared to the immensity of the forests suggested an 
almost inexhaustible supply of resources.  An additional factor was a slump in 
the industry during the 1880s, caused chiefly by a lack of rail transport and of 
substantial capital investment.
21 
 
Notwithstanding the complacency there were some signs of government concern 
about forest depletion by the 1890s.  In 1895 the Forrest government employed J. 
Ednie-Brown, who had wide experience as h e a d  o f  f o r e s t  s e r v i c e s  i n  S o u t h  
Australia and New South Wales, to report on the extent of the forests in Western 
Australia and to recommend how they could best be conserved and utilised.   
Ednie-Brown’s subsequent report identified changing attitudes towards the 
forests.   He believed that the value of the forests was becoming recognised and 
they were not simply regarded as an obstacle to settlement.   He recommended a 
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change of direction for forest management that included a conservationist 
approach: 
…I do not think that the management of State Forests should consist in 
principally trying to make as much out of them as possible.   This, in my 
opinion, should be a minor matter entirely, and always subservient to 
the more important one of efficient conservation and permanency.
22 
 
Unfortunately, Ednie-Brown’s report and recommendations did not prompt an 
immediate government response.   Carron believes that Ednie-Brown, by over-
estimating the total area of forest at 8 million hectares, may have unwittingly 
contributed toward the inactivity through providing evidence to support the myth 
of an unlimited resource – a mythology that a reform-resistant administration 
was only too willing to embrace.
23 
 
At this time there was also growing public awareness of the continuing depletion 
of Western Australia’s forests.   The West Australian newspaper pointed out that, 
although timber supplies were ‘by no means inexhaustible’, there was no 
restriction on the size of trees to be felled and no measures in place to prevent the 
reckless waste.
24   Criticism was levelled at the past practice of letting out vast 
areas of forest for a nominal rental and it was realised that, if the forests were to 
endure and achieve their full market potential, it would be necessary to ensure 
that timber was cut selectively and areas of regeneration protected.
25   An item in 
the Bunbury Herald bemoaned the lack of a proper forest administration and 
conservation policy and appealed to the government to ‘save our forests, which 
are at present being shamefully despoiled and sacrificed to the exigencies of 
trade.’
26   The article provoked a response from the Minister for Lands, who 
decided to write to the Indian Government for advice on conservation, as he 
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concluded ‘there is a need of more vigorous action being taken in regard to 
conserving our timber.’
27 
 
Towards the end of 1902, concerns about a lack of proper forestry legislation and 
management culminated in the establishment of a Royal Commission, the terms 
of reference of which included an investigation into the depletion and waste of 
native forest timber and recommendations regarding legislation to protect future 
supplies.   The Commissioners comprised five parliamentarians and one scientist.  
Its chairman, Charles Harper, was Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and, like 
fellow Commissioner William Atkins, a member of the Forrest group.  Other 
Commissioners included Sir Newton James Moore, a soldier and Liberal Party 
MLA for Bunbury, and Robert Hastie, the Labor Party MLA for Kanowna.  The 
Commission’s final member, William Fitzgerald, a geologist and botanist, was a 
frequent contributor to the West Australian Natural History Society’s annual 
journal.
28    In its final report the Commission observed: 
State acquiescence in the destruction of good timber only because the 
export trade demands it, is a crime against coming generations; and any 
attempts to increase the export in the interests of foreign companies, or 
with the object of inducing more men to join in timber getting at the 
expense of posterity, needs wise resistance.
29 
 
The Commission further stated that effective forest conservation was not possible 
until forest lands were placed under the statutory control of an adequately 
resourced Forests Department.
30   Once again, however, little action was taken 
by the government apart from the appointment of a Forests Advisory Board 
which was dissolved in 1908.
31   More positively, within a forest protest context, 
it was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that three 
influential forest conservation groups evolved in Western Australia. 
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The West Australian Natural History Society 
The late nineteenth century witnessed the formation of a number of societies and 
field naturalists clubs throughout Australia that were dedicated to the 
preservation of native flora and fauna.   These included the Field Naturalists Club 
of Victoria (1880), the Field Naturalists Section of the Royal Society of South 
Australia (1883), the Royal Society of Queensland (1883), and the Natural 
History Association of New South Wales (1887).   While the Tasmanian Field 
Naturalists Club was not formed until 1904, the Royal Society of Tasmania 
(1829) had been calling for flora and fauna reserves since the 1840s.
32     In 
common with Australia's eastern colonies, the period also saw the foundation of 
Western Australia's first organised conservation group.   
 
A Natural History Society had been formed in Western Australia in 1891, and 
was primarily concerned with a scientific appreciation of the colony's flora.  The 
Society's president was the colony's premier, Sir John Forrest, and its patron the 
Governor, Sir William Robinson.   At its monthly meetings scientists and 
amateurs presented a variety of papers pertaining to natural history.   In 1904 the 
Society decided to expand its field of interest to include other areas of natural 
history in addition to botany.  The Society became the West Australian Natural 
History Society, later the Royal Society of Western Australia, and incorporated 
the Mueller Botanic Society, which had been founded in 1897.
33    It stated its 
objectives as: 
…the study of Natural History, to be promoted by periodical meetings, 
conversaziones, field excursions, the formation of a library, and the 
issue of a journal.
34 
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By incorporating the earlier Mueller Botanic Society within its ranks the West 
Australian Natural History Society sought to gain further scientists as members 
in order to establish itself as a ‘useful and influential scientific Society’.
35    
 
An examination of the Society’s membership records reveals its elite status.  In 
1906 the Western Australian governor, Sir Frederick Bedford and Lady Bedford 
were joint patrons, with Dr Charles Riley, Bishop of Perth, president.
36    The 
Society’s journal for 1908 lists a total of 47 members who largely comprised 
members of Perth’s professional and scientific community, including:  J.B 
Cleland, Government Bacteriologist; E.A. Le Souef, Director, Perth Zoological 
Gardens; A. Gibb Maitland, Government Geologist; and E. S. Simpson of the 
Perth Geological Survey Department.
37    In terms of forest conservation in 
Western Australia, the Society was important through the influence of two of its 
key figures. 
 
A prominent member in the advancement of the Society was its secretary, 
Bernard Woodward, who was also a curator, and later director, of the Western 
Australian Museum.   Woodward, who promoted the formation of the Society, 
played a major role as secretary of the earlier Natural History Society in its 
campaign to protect a flora and fauna reserve at Pinjarra, arguing for its 
designation as a National Park in the face of continuing pressure from timber 
interests.  A study of the Pinjarra reserve campaign demonstrates growing 
animosity between those concerned with the area’s preservation and the 
government department responsible for its protection. 
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A 65,000 hectare flora and fauna reserve at Pinjarra had been declared in 
February 1894 by the Western Australian government in response to a letter to 
Premier John Forrest from A.F. Robin, the honorary secretary of a sub-
committee of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 
enquiring what measures were being taken in the colony to preserve native 
species.
38  A sense of the reserve’s fragility in the face of prevailing attitudes to 
land usage can be gauged from a cautionary letter to Woodward from Robins at 
the time of the reserve’s declaration, advising: 
...that you should secure the vesting of your reserve in trustees in 
perpetuity.   Our sad experience with forest and kindred reserves leads 
me to make this remark.   The great and wise democracy generally 
regards all such reserves as practically useless and of merely sentimental 
value.
39 
 
While the Pinjarra reserve remained virtually undisturbed for several years, 
pressure was eventually exerted on the government to accede to the demands of 
the timber trade.   When asked to declare his views regarding the cutting of 
timber on the reserve, C.G. Richardson, Secretary, Woods and Forests 
Department, said he failed to see why timber on the reserve should be preserved 
as the block contained a large quantity of valuable, mature trees that should be 
logged.   He rationalised that the timber would deteriorate if left standing and 
risked being consumed by bush fires.
40    
 
It was evident that illegal timber cutting had been taking place on the Pinjarra 
reserve.   In July 1903, the Royal Commission into Forestry requested that 
instructions be issued to prevent cutting of timber on the flora and fauna 
reserve.
41   On hearing of this request, Premier James said he was under the 
impression that timber cutting on the reserve had long ceased and that, as he had 
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refused permission for Whittaker Bros to cut timber, he had assumed others had 
also stopped.   The Premier said he agreed with the Commission that the reserve 
should not be logged.
42 
 
A member of the 1903 Forestry Royal Commission, William Fitzgerald, 
protested to the Premier in November 1904 about the action of the Woods and 
Forests Department regarding the reserve.   He pointed out that the area had been 
set aside for a specific purpose, and that, as nothing had been done to revoke the 
terms of the reservation, no permits should be issued to remove timber.     
Fitzgerald complained that the Pinjarra reserve was being exploited through 
‘being worked under one of the crudest systems of royalty...’
43 When it was 
suggested the area be designated as a national park, the Acting Inspector-General 
of Forests, C.G. Richardson, again voiced his opposition to its conservation, 
stating that in his opinion: 
...it would be a most unbusinesslike policy to lock up such a large tract 
of valuable timber for the mere preservation of native fauna and flora 
when a large amount of revenue could be obtained if the area were 
thrown open to timber cutting.
44 
 
Despite petitions and lobbying by influential members of the West Australian 
Natural History Society that included Anglican Bishop Charles Riley, the reserve 
was sacrificed for the exploitation of its material wealth and, on 4 April 1911, its 
purpose changed from the preservation of native fauna and flora to timber for 
government requirements.
45      
 
The history of the Pinjarra reserve not only provided an early example of the 
rising conflict between the interests of conservation and those of the Forests 
Department, but also represented the growth of the powerful influence of 
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industry on environmental politics.   It demonstrated how a government, which 
was initially persuaded to adopt a conservationist approach to the environment, 
became susceptible to the growing demands of the timber trade and gradually 
compromised its original position. Most significantly, the failure of 
conservationists to protect the Pinjarra reserve had revealed the limitations of 
early protest strategies.   As Moore argued, conservation at the time was not an 
important issue and, while the West Australian Natural History Society adopted 
persuasive tactics such as petitions, submissions and personal representations, it 
was unlikely that the ‘gentlemen’ of the Society would have organised a public 
campaign to pressure the government to change its mind.
46 
 
Conservationist J.G. Hay, who had been involved with Woodward in the 
attempts to save the Pinjarra reserve and became the West Australian Natural 
History Society’s acting honorary secretary, emerged as one of Western 
Australia’s most influential early conservationists. Prior to his move to Western 
Australia in 1907, Hay was employed as an official with the New South Wales 
Lands Department and this enabled him to gain valuable experience during the 
creation of Australia's first national park at Port Hacking in 1879, later the Royal 
National Park, and also through pursuing his own conservation projects which 
resulted in the creation of two public parks in the Blue Mountains west of 
Sydney.
47    
 
Following a visit to the Stirling Ranges early in 1910, Hay submitted a proposal 
to James Mitchell, the Western Australian Minister for Lands, recommending 
that the area be dedicated as a national park for the enjoyment of future 
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generations and urged immediate action to preserve the area before it was 
developed.  While Hay initially proposed a reservation area of 327,000 hectares, 
pressure from settler groups resulted in a significant reduction, so that in June 
1913 an area of 109,000 hectares was finally gazetted as national park.
48   
 
In a recent study, Joseph Christensen argued that Hay’s 1911 speech to the West 
Australian Natural History Society, in which he called for ten per cent of the 
state’s farmland to be retained as virgin bush for the protection of native birds, 
defined him as the first conservationist in Western Australia to publicly question 
prevailing ideas of ‘progress’.
49    Christensen concluded that Hay was a 
paradoxical figure who echoed earlier European romantic attitudes to nature yet 
was also a pioneer of later environmental activism through his commitment to 
conservation and his challenge to the dominant ethos of destruction.
50       
 
The West Australian Natural History Society provided a forum for voicing public 
concerns about environmental issues, such as that raised by Mr G.F. Berthoud, 
manager of the State Farm, Hamel.   In July 1909 Berthoud wrote to the Society 
deploring the destruction of native forests through the expansion of settlement, 
and asked: 
So far, what is being done to assist nature, to recuperate and replenish 
with young trees, the areas now being denuded of their natural timber?   
And what steps will the State Government take to provide for the timber 
wants of a rising nation?   Upon the S.W. Hills much valuable timber is 
unnecessarily ring barked and destroyed...is it not now wiser for us to 
cultivate the higher ideals, and relegate mere money making to a 
secondary place in our thoughts.
51 
 
While the Society’s correspondence thus revealed individual concerns at the 
destruction and waste of forest timber as a consequence of industrial and pastoral 
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expansion, it also protested as an organisation against some proposed land uses 
by writing dissenting letters to public authorities.   These protests included 
registering concerns at the depletion of native fauna due to the destruction of 
bush in the Stirling Ranges,
52 an objection to proposals to introduce non-native 
species into King’s Park,
53 and opposition to a scheme to use areas of the Cape 
Le Grand/Recherche National Park for grazing purposes, with a plea that ‘the 
present generation should preserve this area, with its unique fauna and flora, for 
the benefit of future generations.’
54 
 
Although the West Australian Natural History Society and the later Royal 
Society of Western Australia were primarily concerned with non-confrontational 
lobbying to preserve the state’s native flora and fauna, the Pinjarra reserve and 
Stirling Range campaigns both contained early evidence of conservationists’ 
willingness to canvas the support of prominent personalities as a strategy to 
achieve their aims.   As Moore observed, Hay was not simply content to write a 
letter proposing the reservation of the Stirling Range, he also realised that he 
needed the endorsement of influential public figures such as Sir John Forrest, 
Winthrop Hackett and Cecil Andrews.
55 
 
The Australian Forest League 
The formation in 1913 of a Western Australian branch of the Australian Forest 
League saw the creation of the first organisation in the state dedicated 
specifically to the protection of native forests and acknowledged by Lane-Poole, 
the Conservator of Forests, as ‘the only society in WA founded with the avowed 
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object of assisting in the preservation of the nation’s forest land.’
56    The aims of 
the League included: 
The education of the public by all possible means to a realisation of the 
value of forests and of the evils resulting from their destruction, so that 
eventually A Forest Consciousness shall be created in the public mind.
57 
 
While the League promoted an appreciation of the ‘value’ of the forests, its 
motivations were not founded purely out of a desire to preserve the forests as a 
value in themselves.   There was the qualification that ‘they must look at this 
question not merely from the sentimental standpoint but also from the economic 
side.’
58     It also appeared that the Western Australian branch may have been 
reluctant to pursue forest issues energetically, and adopted a compliant attitude 
towards government agencies through fear of causing ill-feeling.  When called 
upon by the Deputy Conservator of Forests to describe the activities of his 
organisation, J.S. Ogilvie, the Honorary Secretary, commented: 
So far as I can judge, the West Australian Branch of the Forest League 
is the only one in Australia that is really alive and doing some useful 
work.   In the other States, the League has not always been on the best 
of terms with the local Forest Department, for it has from time to time 
offered criticism of forest management that did not meet the approval of 
those in authority.
59 
 
Although little evidence remains of its membership and support levels, some idea 
of the philosophy and motivations of the Western Australian branch of the 
Australian Forest League can be gauged from the few copies of its quarterly 
journal Jarrah, published between 1918 and 1920 and edited by the Honorary 
Secretary, J.S. Ogilvie, who emerged as the driving force behind the 
organisation.   The publication represented the League’s major protest strategy 
against the destruction of the forests and was significant in providing an early 
example of the use of the print media by a conservation group to educate the 
public about particular environmental issues and to canvas support for its aims.   
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While in a preamble to each edition the journal stressed its position as a non-
political publication, it also welcomed  ‘the assistance of patriotic politicians in 
its propaganda’.
60 
 
A continuing theme of the journal was the arousal of public sensitivities to the 
need to preserve the wealth of the forests as a national asset, and to criticise 
government attitudes and policies.   The publication called for the eradication of 
the notion of forest inexhaustibility and a demand for a proper Forests Act ‘to put 
the forests on a permanent basis as a source of national wealth’.   The 1918 
Forests Bill was criticised for its inability to control the activities of sleeper-
hewers, with observations that parliament, rather than taking the opportunity to 
conserve ‘a great national heritage’, was instead ‘providing effective means for 
the destruction of that heritage’.   Further criticism was levelled at Premier 
Mitchell’s 1920s Group Settlement Scheme, which was seen as promoting 
settlement at the expense of the forests.   It was argued that any reduction in the 
state’s forest areas, particularly those containing valuable export timbers of 
jarrah and karri, would not be in the national interest.
61 
 
The life of the Western Australian branch of the Forest League was short.     
Although advertised as a ‘quarterly’, the period between the final two editions of 
Jarrah expanded to eight months, and in 1935 it was observed that the Western 
Australian arm of the League ‘had become extinct’.
62         
 
Why was there such government apathy towards forest conservation in Western 
Australia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?   Bolton 
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asserts that while a more enlightened attitude towards Australia’s native forests 
was emerging in the late nineteenth century, with South Australia, Victoria, New 
South Wales and Tasmania establishing forestry administrations, this did not 
readily translate into official forest policy in Western Australia due to a pre-
occupation with land clearance and commercial production.
63   Additionally, 
Robertson argued there were two main reasons for the inactivity in Western 
Australia: first, the head of the Forests Department, C.G. Richardson, had little 
interest in shielding the forests from commercial exploitation and, second, the 
‘public conscience’ had not yet been fully awakened to its responsibilities to 
protect the forests.
64   This observation on Richardson’s ineffectiveness is 
supported by Carron, who noted that there was little ‘progressive forestry’ during 
his 17 years as department head.
65   While it has been shown that there were a 
few isolated voices raised in concern at the lack of adequate protection for the 
state’s forests, protest at the time was ineffective against government support for 
an expanding timber industry. 
 
Until the First World War the Western Australian government adopted an 
ambivalent attitude towards the state’s native forests.  Although the importance 
of conservation to the survival of the timber industry had been recognised, albeit 
grudgingly, successive governments were reluctant to implement a practical 
forest management policy.  This inaction was largely born out of a sense of 
complacency over the inexhaustibility of timber supplies and a belief that the 
practice of forestry would jeopardise the progress of agriculture.
66     During the 
war years several factors combined to change that attitude. 
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In 1914, the renowned scientific forester, David Hutchins, was asked by the 
Western Australian Government to write a report on the state’s forests to be 
included in a book he was writing on forestry.
67   According to R.T. Robinson, 
Minister for Woods and Forests: 
It was this report that finally decided the Government of the day to 
appoint an expert forester to take charge of the forests of the State, and 
to advise as to what course should be pursued in order to establish them, 
and the timber industry dependent upon them, on a sound basis for all 
time.
68 
 
Additionally, during the war period, there was an increasing demand on local 
hardwood timber, with the result that conservation of this valuable resource 
became an issue of importance.   There was also a movement by other Australian 
states to adopt forest conservation legislation and to have qualified foresters 
oversee its application.
69   During the period between the two World Wars 
official policy towards Western Australia’s forests was dominated by two 
prominent figures who held diametrically opposing views about forest 
management and land use. 
 
Conservation versus Destruction 
The appointment of C.E. Lane-Poole as Conservator of Forests from 1916 to his 
resignation in 1921 marked a watershed period for forest conservation in 
Western Australia.   Lane-Poole was a professionally trained forester who had 
graduated from the National Forestry School at Nancy and had extensive 
experience in South Africa and Sierra Leone.
70   Immediately after his 
appointment, Lane-Poole carried out a survey of the state’s forests and began a 
reorganisation of the Woods and Forests Department.   His report for the year 
ended 31 December 1917 confirmed that previous estimates of the size of the 
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jarrah forests had been incorrect and that probably not more than two million 
acres remained.   The dramatic reduction, he stated, was due to the indiscriminate 
and uncontrolled cutting of timber by sawmills and sleeper hewers, and he 
deplored the fact that the findings of the 1903 Royal Commission on Forestry 
recommending a reduction in timber cutting had been disregarded.
71      He 
argued strongly for a change in attitudes towards the forests that would recognise 
their value for the future: 
For many years past Western Australia has been engaged in destroying 
an asset which is clearly the property of the nation, that is to say, the 
property of all future generations...Forests instead of being regarded as 
assets were looked upon as irritating excrescenses [sic] on the face of 
the earth to be sawn up, ring-barked, or otherwise destroyed to make 
room for the settler.
72 
 
The culmination of Lane-Poole’s efforts to change attitudes towards forest 
conservation and to implement sound forestry practices crystallised in the 1918 
Forests Act, which was designed ‘to provide for the better Management and 
Protection of Forests.’
73   When presenting the legislation to Parliament in 
September 1918, the Minister, R.T. Robinson, referred to the ‘slough of apathy’ 
that had characterised past approaches to forestry and the mining of timber at the 
expense of future generations.   He admitted that for over two generations ‘we 
have been misled by politicians and administrators, who have considered our 
timber resources inexhaustible’, and that it was now necessary to consider how 
much forest could be cut without endangering future supplies.   The four main 
provisions of the Act would be:  the permanent reservation of prime timber for 
forestry; the restriction of timber cutting to a quantity that the forest would be 
capable of naturally reproducing; carrying out silvicultural operations to promote 
regeneration; and the formation of pine plantations to meet the demand for 
softwood.
74    
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After the legislation’s enactment Lane-Poole sought to convince people that the 
interests of forestry and land settlement were not mutually exclusive, but 
dependent upon each other, and that it was a question of determining the ‘best 
use’ to which each type of land could be put.   He was critical of the waste and 
destruction of fine timber and, reflecting on the export of jarrah for railway 
sleepers, asserted that the ‘prostitution of one of the finest of the world’s 
hardwoods for such a use is to be deplored...’
75 Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Lane-Poole was not averse to publicly voicing his opinions on 
forest conservation and criticising past practices.  In a reply to an enquiry from a 
member of the Australian Forest League regarding forest policy he stated: 
...during the interregnum between the death of Mr Ednie Brown and my 
arrival here, a period of something like 15 years, no settled policy 
existed in regard to the forests, or, if one did exist, it certainly was a 
policy of drift...There has been great exploitation, not always conducted 
with wisdom nor with consideration for the future...
76 
 
Lane-Poole’s forthright approach to forest management, and the introduction of 
more stringent regulations regarding felling, caused considerable  antagonism.   
His views also clashed with those of Premier James Mitchell, who regarded the 
forests as obstacles to land development.
77   However, it was his objections to the 
destruction of the forests by large sawmills and the extension of leases to the 
powerful Millars combine that ultimately led to his resignation.   
 
In 1920 Lane-Poole observed that the state sawmilling permit areas were being 
exploited ‘with a maximum of waste and without any view to the future’, and 
that this was also true of the operations of private firms in the jarrah forests.
78   
Commenting on the government’s agreement to extend the leases on Millars' 
timber concessions he said: 
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The decision thus arrived at will have the effect of definitely postponing 
the inauguration of sound forestry methods until the expiration of the 
period extension of the larger part of the leases, that is about 1931.   At 
the present rate of cutting...there will be little or no virgin forest left in 
Western Australia by the time these rights expire...There remains to-day 
only 350,000 acres of virgin jarrah forest, and practically all of it is 
already granted to sawmillers and will be cut out in ten years’ time.
79 
 
The forest policy of Western Australia, Lane-Poole concluded, was undergoing a 
crisis, and without the support of the government threatened ‘to become a total 
wreck’.   He believed the answer lay in removing the management of the forests 
from political interference.
80 
 
Despite many disappointments Lane-Poole remained optimistic.  His report for 
the 1920 British Empire Forestry Conference in London contained a prescient 
message for the future of the forests: 
It is true that trees today have no votes, but when the people develop a 
forest conscienceness [sic] the position will be entirely altered, and they 
themselves will see to it that the forest policy is maintained and the 
forests are used for the benefit of the community as a whole for ever, 
and not for the benefit of the few sawmillers, timber hewers, and timber 
merchants of to-day.
81 
 
Paradoxically, the tensions generated by Lane-Poole’s criticism of government 
policies had the positive effect of raising levels of concern and stimulating a 
change of attitude towards the forests.   One of his parliamentary supporters, 
L.G. Pickering, moved in the Legislative Assembly that a Select Committee be 
appointed to inquire into the workings of the Forests Act and the extension of 
Millars’ timber leases and concessions.
82 The ensuing Royal Commission, 
instituted at the direction of the Premier, examined over 100 witnesses, including 
Lane-Poole, who said that, while he agreed the Millars’ combine had brought 
substantial capital into the country, the forest practices they had been allowed to 
use had caused losses far in excess of their value to the state.
83   Lane-Poole 
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caused further controversy when he charged Premier Mitchell with misleading 
the public over Millars’ concession and lease arrangements.
84   Among its 
conclusions, the Commission recommended that the system of lengthy 
concessions and leases be replaced by the issuing of permits but  ‘permit areas be 
extended where conditions made that necessary for profitable cutting’.
85   In  
1921 Lane-Poole resigned following disagreements over the Western Australian 
government’s decision to extend leases and concessions to the Millars’ timber 
consortium at the expense of smaller sawmillers.
86 
 
The importance of Lane-Poole’s influence over the future of Western Australia’s 
forests stemmed from the decision to appoint him as Conservator of Forests at 
that particular time in the state’s forest history.   Until 1916 approaches to forest 
conservation had been apathetic. Voices of dissent had been suppressed by 
governments that were sympathetic to the wishes of the timber trade.  Not only 
did Lane-Poole possess the energy and determination to steer forest policy in a 
new direction but, more importantly, he was also a conservationist who was 
appointed to a position which gave him the power and opportunity to influence 
government thinking.    Through innovative legislation and a systematic 
classification of the state’s forest lands he attempted to strike a balance between 
the principles of forest conservation and the demands of industry and agriculture.   
The message proved too strident for his political masters. 
 
Group Settlement 
As well as marking the resignation of Lane-Poole as Conservator of Forests, the 
year 1921 also heralded the start of a period that had further devastating 
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consequences for Western Australia’s forests.   Premier James Mitchell’s Group 
Settlement Scheme was promoted with the dual purposes of increasing 
immigration and developing large expanses of land for dairy farming.         
Subsidised migrants were recruited from the United Kingdom with a promise 
that, after clearing their blocks of native vegetation, they would own their own 
farms.  The area to be cleared comprised some of the best jarrah and karri forests 
in existence.
87    
 
The dominant view, held by both Group Settlers and the government, was that 
clearing the forests represented progress and all that had to be considered was the 
cheapest and most efficient method of achieving that end.    In her study of group 
settlement in the Northcliffe area Patricia Crawford argued that the language of 
the settlers when describing the destruction of the forests suggested that they 
believed they were waging war on a natural phenomenon they found threatening 
and wished to subdue.
88   This warlike attitude towards the forests can be readily 
observed from contemporary accounts. 
 
Thomas Doyle, who observed land clearing at the Margaret River Group 
Settlement during the early 1920s, expressed admiration for those who were 
adept at killing trees: 
The next stage was to do the ring barking and in the early stages with 
those twenty-five acres, they did sap ringing, not ring barking.   They 
cut right in till they got into the heart wood in each case round about and 
the tree would die, start to die in twenty-four hours...We hadn’t had any 
experience in this line of course and in three days there was the leaves 
turning from green to dying off, a marvellous thing the way that was 
done.
89 
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The association of tree felling and a decimated landscape with the bringing of 
human social order becomes evident in the reflections of Phillip Blond, who 
grew up on a Group Settlement in the Willyabrup-Miamup area: 
It was a strange feeling to see the blackened, ash-covered ground and 
the occasional upright tree in the clearing surrounded by a wall of forest 
trees and undergrowth which had not yet felt the axe of civilisation.
90 
 
A few voices were raised in protest.  One correspondent in the Daily News asked 
why the Lands Department wished to destroy Western Australia’s valuable 
forests and believed the Group Settlement Scheme had been implemented 
without sufficient planning.   The land selected, it was argued, was not suitable 
for farming:   
It is purely forest country.   Nature intended it for such, and why should 
we waste thousands of pounds trying to turn it into an agricultural area, 
and probably cause the ruin of the whole of this country, which will 
happen if the trees are destroyed.
91 
 
By the middle of 1924 there were serious concerns over the financial viability of 
the Group Settlement Scheme, with many settlers abandoning their holdings and 
others accumulating large debts.   A Royal Commission was instituted to enquire 
into all matters pertaining to the Scheme, its final report comprising a detailed 
criticism of Group Settlement.   The Commissioners found the most serious 
aspect of the Scheme had been the settling of inexperienced migrants on areas of 
poor land.
92 
 
Although Group Settlement had been severely criticised, a new agreement at the 
end of 1925 provided for shared subsidies between the United Kingdom, the 
Commonwealth and the state. While the new arrangements provided renewed 
optimism, they also increased the pace of land clearing, and many settlers took 
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the opportunity to augment their income through contract clearing.   The result 
was that vast areas of land were quickly denuded of vegetation.
93    
 
During this period tree felling had also become a public spectacle.   Dick Sproge, 
a timber worker at the State Sawmills concession at Pemberton, announced his 
intention to lop a karri tree while suspended some 120 feet above the ground: 
At 2pm on Sunday Sproge, amid the clicking of scores of cameras, 
swung himself on to his ladder and climbed nimbly to his narrow 
platform 115ft from the ground... For forty minutes Sproge’s axe 
swung...before the familiar rending noise of the falling tree announced 
that the man had succeeded...A few moments later he was on the 
ground, shaking hands with acquaintances and accepting the plaudits of 
the crowd.
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The Conservator of Forests was so impressed with Sproge’s performance that he 
requested copies of photographs of the event.
95 
 
Group Settlement continued until the late 1930s, when disputes between the 
settlers and the banks over repayments finally forced many holdings to be 
abandoned and later absorbed into War Service Settlement schemes.    It was 
estimated that during the period 50,000 acres of karri forest had been 
destroyed.
96 
 
Although the Scheme did contribute towards increasing the area available for 
 
In summary, the Group Settlement Scheme represented a renunciation of the 
responsible forestry practices advocated by Lane-Poole.   Whereas he had argued 
for a sustainable approach to Western Australia’s forests that was removed from 
political interference, Group Settlement was a scheme devoid of conservationist 
principles and which employed an adversarial approach to the environment.     
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farming and encouraged the provision of a transport infrastructure, the overall 
outcome was the destruction of huge areas of forest for little or no return. 
 
The Western Australian Naturalists' Club 
The third prominent conservation group of this period, the Western Australian 
Naturalists’ Club, was founded in 1924.   A formalisation of the Club’s aims in 
1936 stated: 
The objects of the Club shall be to study and encourage the study of 
Natural History in all its branches, and to endeavour to prevent in every 
way the wanton destruction of our native Flora and Fauna.
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During its early years membership was small and consisted mainly of natural 
scientists.  A forestry and botanical section was formed in 1935, with Colonel 
Goadby acting as the official leader of the group.
98     
 
An examination of the Club’s correspondence reveals non-confrontational forms 
of protest similar to those employed by the Royal Society.   There was 
disapproval of the proposed alienation of King’s Park for a hospital because it 
was considered that the Park represented ‘one of our first assets – a healthy open 
space, and sanctuary for animals, birds and plants within the confines of the 
city.’
99   Like the Royal Society, the Club protested against ‘the planting of 
exotic trees’ within the Park.
100   A preoccupation with the preservation of native 
flora and fauna was apparent in an address by the Club’s President, C.G. 
Hamilton, who pointed out: 
…the deplorable fact that much of our native life is still being ruthlessly 
destroyed in a manner which could be prevented, or at least delayed.   If 
this destruction is permitted to proceed unchecked it will not be so very 
long before some of our most wonderful and unique natural beauties 
will be entirely lost to future generations.
101 
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Evidence of a reciprocal relationship between the Western Australian 
Naturalists’ Club and the Royal Society was apparent in a 1949 letter from the 
Club to the Royal Society requesting support to lobby members of Parliament for 
greater protection of flora and fauna and observing that ‘we feel your 
organization has aims similar to ours.’
102   This correspondence is significant in 
demonstrating collaboration between early Western Australian conservationists 
and the use of political lobbying as a legitimate protest strategy. 
 
Despite the negative impact of the Group Settlement Scheme on Western 
Australia’s forests, two external influences combined to slow down the rate of 
depletion.   Firstly, the depression of the early 1930s caused a dramatic fall in the 
price of forest products and led to widespread unemployment.   During the next 
decade, thousands of men were employed on rehabilitation work and the planting 
of pine forests.   The expiration of concessions and leases also provided an 
opportunity to monitor supplies of timber in accordance with a policy of 
sustainable yield.   Secondly, while timber was in great demand during World 
War Two, with Western Australia being the only state with an excess of timber 
for export, a depletion of forestry personnel for war service and a reduction in 
export markets for sleepers led to a decrease in production.    After this brief 
respite, pressure was again placed on the forests, with the advent of a post-war 
building programme, a supply of migrant labour from Europe, and the 
introduction of mechanised equipment for felling.
103 
 
While demand for timber fluctuated considerably during this period, voices of 
protest from concerned groups at the destruction of the forests could still be 
  60 
heard.   In July 1937, the Perth branch of the Royal Australasian Ornithologists 
Union drew attention to the depletion of bird life caused by indiscriminate land 
clearing.  It requested that the Minister for Lands set aside reservations for the 
protection of native flora and undertake reafforestation operations on each land 
holding.
104   Similarly, in July 1950, the Western Australian Naturalists’ Club 
expressed concern at the contraction of the habitats of native fauna and flora due 
to settlement and asked the government to set aside sanctuaries ‘before it is too 
late.’
105   The rapid pace of post-war construction sparked a plea from the 
Country Women’s Association who, in September 1953, argued for the 
immediate setting up of native flora and fauna reserves ‘in view of the large scale 
developmental programme on which the Government is embarking.’
106   
 
Early forest protest in Western Australia reflected changing attitudes towards the 
environment.   Initially, protest was directed at the depletion and waste of trees as 
a valuable material resource and at the export of timber outside the colony.   
Although the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the growing 
influence of more enlightened environmental philosophies and small concessions 
by government to appeals for native flora and fauna protection, the emergence of 
influential timber consortiums and the imperatives of land settlement 
compromised any attempts to implement effective conservation policies.   While 
the influence of Lane-Poole was crucial in providing the basis for a sound 
forestry administration and in stimulating public awareness of the value of 
forests for future generations, the circumstances surrounding his demise and the 
devastating effects of the ill-conceived Group Settlement Scheme both provided 
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examples of the continuing tendency of governments to sacrifice conservation for 
the sake of political and economic advantage.         
 
The emergence of early conservation groups in Western Australia supports 
Hutton and Connors’ observations that late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century campaigners, who were predominantly well-educated professionals, 
reacted against the destructive consequences of industrial expansion by 
employing non-confrontational protest strategies to challenge authorities.
107   
Several characteristics of these first period protest groups and their campaigns 
can be identified in the contemporary forest protest movement.    The Pinjarra 
Reserve campaign provided an example of the emerging conflict between 
conservationists and logging interests and reflected the capacity of the timber 
industry to influence the state government’s forest policies.   The groups 
demonstrated their ability to collaborate with each other on issues of mutual 
interest, and the Pinjarra and Stirling Range campaigns both illustrated the 
importance of strong leadership in the persons of Woodward and Hay.    Early 
non-confrontational strategies such as lobbying, petitioning, letter-writing, public 
education, group collaboration and canvassing the support of influential figures 
all featured as tactics in later forest campaigns.  Ultimately, it was the concerns 
about forest depletion expressed by the early conservation groups that were the 
forerunners of the collective voices of organised protest that would emerge in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
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Map 3.1.   Western Australia - areas of significance discussed in Chapter 3. 
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A first period of forest protest in Western Australia was important in establishing 
the first conservation organisations that employed non-confrontational strategies 
to campaign for the preservation of native flora and fauna.   However, while 
there was evidence of some collaboration, the groups tended to pursue their 
objectives separately.   During the 1950s and 1960s protest groups collectivised 
their activities to strengthen their argument for nature conservation.   Although 
protest was focused principally on urban campaigns, opposition to bauxite 
mining in the early 1960s signalled the start of broader concerns to protect the 
state’s forests. 
      
A campaign to preserve the natural vegetation of King’s Park during the mid-
1950s marked the start of a second period of forest protest in Western Australia 
with the emergence of co-ordinated and organised protest activity and, although 
dissent continued to be expressed in a non-confrontational manner, tactics 
expanded and diversified.  While the King’s Park campaign provided a model for 
co-ordinated action, it was the formation of the Nature Conservation Council in 
1967 which marked a significant turning-point for the Western Australian forest 
protest movement through establishing an umbrella organisation for the state’s 
conservation groups.   The Council not only provided a forum for dialogue 
between the groups but also promoted the sense of collective identity that Hutton 
and Connors argue to be such an important element in the construction of a 
modern social movement.
1   The beginning of the second period of protest also 
provides early evidence of the importance of key leaders in driving campaigns 
and organising protest activity.   
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Pressure on the Forests 
The period immediately following the Second World War exerted a formative 
influence on the direction of forest protest in Australia.   Hutton and Connors 
have observed that rapid post-war economic growth combined with improved 
technologies resulted in human intrusion into new and remote areas and that this 
in turn produced a fresh awareness of the threat posed by environmental 
degradation.
2   This increased pressure on the environment can be readily 
observed in the case of Western Australia’s forests. 
      
In its annual report for 1949/1950, the Forests Department noted a change in 
orientation of the timber industry from supplying large section timber for 
overseas export to small-section cutting for domestic house-building.   By 1950 
the number of timber mills had increased from 134 pre-war employing 3,188 
men, to 250 mills employing 4,109 men, with 61 of the mills located within a 25 
miles radius of Perth.
3    In 1951 a sharp increase in timber production took the 
total volume to its highest since 1928.    In his report, T.N. Stoate, the 
Conservator of Forests, expressed concern at the increasing number of sawmills 
and felt ‘there is already more sawmilling capacity in the State than the Jarrah 
and Karri forests can support continuously.’   His anxieties about future supplies 
of forest timber were reflected in the observation: 
It is of interest that, for the first time in Australia’s history, enquiries 
have had to be made overseas for vital supplies of railway sleepers.     
The paucity of Australia’s timber supplies is slowly becoming 
apparent.
4 
 
Despite the Conservator’s concerns, four years later the Forests Department 
reported a ‘record production’ of almost 19 million cubic feet of timber and 
argued that ‘a more optimistic view may now be taken of the capacity of State 
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Forest to produce in perpetuity’ through the expansion of pine plantations, the 
dedication of additional lands as state forest, and a revised assessment indicating 
‘a greater forest capital in the far south than had previously been thought.’
5    
This optimism over the supply of forest timber appears to have been short-lived.   
Answering a question in Parliament in September 1958 on the effects of an 
increasing population on timber supplies, the Minister for Forests estimated that, 
if the state’s population reached one million over 25 years, ‘we will need more 
than our present timber production from native forests for our own 
requirements’, and advised against the irresponsible and self-interested release of 
valuable forest areas for land selection.
6 
      
During the early 1950s, the Western Australian Naturalists’ Club became 
increasingly concerned with the effects of urban expansion on native flora and 
fauna, albeit from an aesthetic rather than environmental viewpoint.   A letter 
from the Club to the Under-Secretary for Lands denounced the ‘unfortunate 
practise’ of clearing land to the edges of roads, and complained that ‘With this 
interesting nature cover removed, the countryside loses in interest and becomes 
very monotonous travelling for the tourist.’   It was requested that consideration 
be given ‘to the retaining of at least a chain of natural bush on the sides of roads 
in new areas being opened up.’
7   
      
There were later signs, however, that the Club’s national body had begun to 
realise the broader implications of the post-war boom and anticipated that more 
sophisticated arguments and strategies would be necessary to combat the new 
threats.  In a 1957 circular, the Federation of Field Naturalists’ Clubs of 
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Tasmania suggested that a booklet entitled ‘Why Conservation?’ be produced, 
with the objective of providing ‘protesting clubs’ with reference material in order 
that they may ‘readily put forward clear and convincing reasons for 
conservation.’     The circular observed: 
The commercial interests put forward very specious arguments in the 
press and elsewhere to attain their desired ends and those who protest do 
great work in countering those arguments but, so often, individual 
members of the protesting clubs find that in private and public 
discussions they need some quick reference...
8 
 
This correspondence provides an early example of co-ordinated planning for 
protest action and collaboration between national and state organisations. 
 
The Tree Society 
Mounting concern over the ceaseless destruction of trees, combined with a lack 
of any organisation dedicated specifically to their protection since the demise of 
the Western Australian branch of the Forest League, resulted in the formation of 
the Tree Society of Western Australia in 1956.   According to the Society’s first 
President, Neville Roennfeldt, the organisation was formed ‘because a number of 
citizens of this State felt so strongly about the growing despoliation of our 
countryside that they came together to present a united front to this National 
problem.’
9   The original idea for the establishment of the Society came from 
Women’s Service Guild President, Mabel Talbot, who believed that there was 
growing public concern over the destruction of native forests and that it had 
become necessary to have an organisation to deal specifically with that issue.
10 
      
The Society’s membership was broad and included a number of professional 
foresters.
11    Its main objectives were to promote an appreciation of trees in the 
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state, and to encourage the public to lobby for the preservation of particular trees 
and reserves.   While branch members were concerned with local campaigns, the 
Society’s executive attempted to convince people of the wider implications of its 
cause: 
The message of conservation must be preached to all that we meet.   The 
generation that is here today, and especially the young generation that 
follows must receive it to ensure that we, as a Nation, do not continue in 
the folly of destroying forever our most precious heritage.
12 
 
A desire for future generations to adopt a more enlightened approach to the 
natural environment emerged as an integral part of Tree Society  philosophy.   
The formation of the Junior Tree Society in November 1959 aimed at fostering a 
caring attitude towards the environment in the minds of the young, and was one 
of the most successful ventures of the Society, mainly because of the promotion 
of the Junior Tree Society in state schools.   In late 1971, the Tree Society Review 
noted the Junior Society comprised 320 schools and 33,210 junior members.
13   
      
John Thomson, a forester with the Forests Department, became the first general 
secretary of the Western Australian Tree Society and formed 33 country 
branches during the late 1950s.   He was particularly interested in the education 
of schoolchildren in the value of the forests, and, with the approval of the 
Department, toured schools in the state talking to children about tree 
conservation.
14  Two thousand new child members promised ‘to protect trees, 
shrubs, and gardens in my district’ and to ‘save bushland and wildflowers 
wherever possible and encourage the planting of more trees.’
15   T h e  
environmental message was further advanced through the celebration of Arbor 
Day,
16 when schools were encouraged to plant trees to shade and beautify their 
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grounds and when members of the Tree Society would talk to children about the 
value of trees and forests.
17 
      
While the Tree Society attempted to exert its influence over both urban and rural 
areas of the state, it had its greatest successes within the metropolitan area.     
Typical activities aimed at protecting roadside verges and preserving trees in 
suburban areas, such as a group of mature elm trees in William Street, Perth,
18 
and an avenue of Sugar Gums in Bay Road, Claremont.
19    One of the most 
notable public campaigns occurred in 1961, when the Society called a public 
protest meeting to object to the bulldozing of mature native trees in The 
Boulevard, Floreat Park, in order to plant a war memorial rose garden.   The 
position of the Tree Society was clearly stated by the State President, Peter 
Thorn:  ‘What a colossal mistake to uproot WA Jarrah trees to plant English 
roses as a memorial to Australian soldiers, what imagination!’
20   Eventually, 
after a ‘lively protest meeting’ of ratepayers, Perth City Council abandoned the 
idea of a rose garden in favour of ‘a memorial garden of native trees and 
shrubs.’
21 
      
Although the Perth activities of the Society had an impact, albeit a minimal one, 
there was a perception among some members that urban issues were 
overshadowing broader environmental concerns.   John Thomson finally resigned 
in 1961 because he believed the organisation was interested in saving trees only 
in Perth and neglected country areas.
22    This view was well-founded.    In 1967 
members voiced the complaint ‘that the concern of the Society was directed to 
preservation within the metropolitan area rather than State-wide conservation.’
23 
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Save King’s Park 
 For many Perth people King’s Park was ‘the people’s park’, the attraction of 
which lay in its preservation as an area of natural beauty within the city’s 
environs, where visitors could appreciate the beauty of the state’s native flora 
which had supposedly been preserved for all time.   When, in 1954, Perth City 
Council announced its intention to build an Olympic swimming pool in the park, 
the proposal provoked an immediate response from a group of Perth citizens - 
most notably the Women’s Service Guild, led by Mrs Bessie Reischbieth, 
arguably the pioneer of environmental activism in Perth.
24 (see Figure 3.1.) 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.1.   Mrs Bessie Rischbieth.  Source: Daily News, 21 April 1964.                                          
                 
Bessie Rischbieth was an important early Australian feminist and social activist.   
She became involved in the women's suffrage movement after attending a 
conference in London in 1908 and became co-founder of the Women's Service 
Guild of Western Australia in 1909 and co-founder and president of the 
Australian Federation of Women Voters from 1921 until 1942.   Rischbieth's 
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influence was not limited to women's movements.   She became a prominent 
social activist involved in issues such as the Aboriginal Rights movement, urban 
planning, and conservation of the natural environment. 
 
A meeting of the Guild and the Naturalists’ Club was convened in October 1954 
‘to discuss suitable action to take to protest against any alienation of land from 
King’s Park Reserve for suggested Olympic Pool.’     The meeting decided to 
write to other Perth organisations to seek support for opposition to the pool, and 
to obtain publicity in the local press.
25   These resolutions are significant in 
demonstrating how protest groups at the start of the second period of protest in 
Western Australia appreciated the strategic importance of establishing mutual 
support networks and using the media to publicise their cause.    One month later 
this early initiative resulted in the formation of the Citizen’s Committee for the 
Preservation of King’s Park, later to become the Society for the Preservation of 
King’s Park and the Swan River.
26   It was the first organisation in Western 
Australia’s history formed specifically for a single environmental campaign. 
      
A clear declaration of the Committee’s position was contained in a resolution 
adopted at a conference on the King’s Park issue convened by the Women’s 
Service Guilds in September 1956.   While the organisation welcomed the 
establishment of an Olympic Pool and Aquatic Centre, it was ‘implacably 
opposed’ to its location in King’s Park.   The conference resolved: 
...to prepare a plan of action to preserve King’s Park for the recreation 
and enjoyment of all citizens for all time without destroying in any way 
the beauty of its natural growth and flora, which is indigenous to 
Western Australia and not known to any of the other States of 
Australia.
27 
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As the campaign gained momentum, so the number and type of strategies 
employed to defeat the pool proposal increased.   While protest groups adopted 
some of the tactics that had been employed during first period campaigns, such 
as lobbying parliamentarians and writing to the press, they also used local radio 
for publicity, held public meetings and appealed to the public for funds.
28   Mrs 
Rischbieth, who spearheaded the movement against the pool, also wrote to 
various department stores in Perth, requesting permission for her members ‘to 
use one of your principal entrances to display and distribute pamphlets, and 
answer enquiries concerning the King’s Park Aquatic Centre controversy.’     
Unfortunately for the campaign all her requests were denied as being contrary to 
companies’ policies.
29 
 
A major obstacle for the King’s Park protesters was the West Australian 
newspaper’s support for the pool proposal.   A frustrated opponent wrote to the 
Committee complaining:  ‘I find it increasingly difficult to get the “West” to 
print anything opposed to the pool in the Park.’
30   In an editorial, the newspaper 
exhorted the Legislative Assembly to decisively pass the King’s Park Aquatic 
Centre legislation, believing that: 
The question of an Olympic Pool is merely a test case.   It offers the 
opportunity of establishing a principle for the beautification and 
landscaping of the State’s most magnificent park in a way which will 
open it to maximum public access and, at the same time, enhance the 
prospects of expert care of the indigenous flora.
31 
 
The eventual success of the anti-pool campaign resulted not only from the 
combined efforts of two major interest groups – the women’s lobby and nature 
conservation groups – but also from the influence of prominent public figures, 
notably Olympic athlete Shirley Strickland and naturalist Vincent Serventy. (see 
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Figure 3.2.)   Describing her motivations for supporting the protest, Strickland 
said she thought it was necessary to convince people and authorities that King’s 
Park had a value in itself and could not simply be cleared for development.   She 
believed that a time comes when you have to say ‘Stop – this is not going to 
happen’, and the King’s Park issue was such a time.
32  
 
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Shirley Strickland, Vincent Serventy and Bessie Rischbieth meet 
together in 1959 before taking part in a deputation protesting against the King's 
Park Olympic Pool plan.   Source: Battye Library (State Library of Western 
Australia) 7560B. 
 
Reflecting on the reasons for the campaign’s success, Shirley Strickland believed 
it was a combination of a pre-existing emotional attachment to the Park and the 
fervour of the campaign.    Her support involved particular personal sacrifices: 
I’m sure my stand there lost me a lot of friends...They saw me as a 
sporting person – they didn’t realise that I was also an environmentalist.   
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It [King’s Park] survived because we generated so much emotion over 
it.
33 
 
Strickland’s impact on publicity for the campaign can be appreciated from 
headline reports of her attendance at a protest meeting, during which she accused 
Lord Mayor Howard of delaying release of plans for the pool so that the public 
would be forced into accepting the King’s Park option as the Empire Games 
drew closer.
34 
      
The struggle to preserve the indigenous flora and fauna of King’s Park contained 
a number of implications for future forest protest in Western Australia.   For the 
first time there occurred a mobilisation of influential members of the Perth 
community, mainly women, who were prepared to take a united stand over a 
specific issue of nature conservation.   It was an early example of the type of 
campaign within which, as Hutton and Connors argue, ‘a shared sense of moral 
outrage builds participant identity, commitment and solidarity.’
35 
      
Most significantly, the King’s Park controversy motivated groups to band 
together and form an organisation dedicated specifically to an environmental 
cause.    Although the tactics employed during the campaign were non-
confrontational, they became more diversified.    The sympathetic involvement 
of a national sporting figure in the debate provided an example of the use of 
celebrity status as an effective tactic to gain sympathy for the cause.  This 
strategy featured prominently in later Western Australian forest campaigns. 
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In a historical context the King’s Park campaign heralded a break with the first 
period of protest identified in this thesis.   Gloria Butcher, a Chairman of the 
Conservation Council, reflected in 1973: 
Western Australia’s conservation history may be said to have expanded 
from purely scientific and natural history circles to the realm of the 
ordinary citizen and layman in 1954, when a citizens’ committee was 
formed to prevent the building of an aquatic centre in Perth’s only 
bushland park.   This battle lasted five years and was successful.
36 
 
While the campaign was a victory for Western Australia’s fledgling 
environmental protest movement over a single emotive issue, it was a growing 
sensitivity to the impact of post-war resource development upon the landscape 
that provided the stimulus for a broader response to the destruction of the state’s 
forests. 
 
Mining in the Forests 
Although deep mining in Western Australia’s forests had been practised on a 
small scale since the 1920s, surface mining had been restricted to tin and gravel 
extraction, and small mineral-sand operations.
37   In June 1961, the Brand 
Government announced plans to construct a $5 million alumina refinery at 
Kwinana, which would process bauxite mined in the Darling Range, 
approximately 50 kilometres south-east of Perth.   Mining operations would be 
conducted by a new enterprise, Alcoa of Australia Pty Ltd, and the bauxite 
transported to Kwinana on a specially-constructed rail line.  The company would 
be granted a bauxite mineral lease over an area of 2,799 square miles, with 
additional temporary reserves over 2,739 square miles.  Charles Court, Minister 
for Industrial Development, believed the project would become much larger and 
bring millions of pounds of wealth into the state.
38   The venture was reported in 
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the media as a further stage in Western Australia’s industrialisation that would 
stimulate employment and overseas investment, a West Australian newspaper 
editorial assuming that ‘the State’s interests in timber and water conservation 
will be safeguarded in the big areas reserved.’
39 
      
The announcement immediately provoked concerns from a variety of 
perspectives about the effects of bauxite mining on the forests.    Dr Joe Gentilli, 
a geographer from the University of Western Australia, believed that the 
extraction of bauxite by quarrying or scraping away the surface of the land would 
have a serious effect on the jarrah forest and cause accelerated water run-off.    
He called for Alcoa to disclose its methods of bauxite extraction, and for detailed 
reports from government experts on the likely effects of the exploitation.
40   A 
correspondent from Cottesloe, D. McMillan, believed officials who opposed the 
project had been silenced, and commented: 
It is one thing to develop natural resources, but in a country already 
overstocked and overcleared such further widespread denudation 
deserves close  and protracted scrutiny before it is too late.
41 
 
The Western Australian Naturalists’ Club informed Premier Brand that, while the 
Club welcomed new industry, the proposal to mine bauxite in the Darling Range 
had produced misgivings and suggested a public statement on the effects of 
bauxite mining should be made by a responsible authority.  The Club advanced  
aesthetic as well as ecological arguments: 
...we feel that the public at large would welcome reassurances and 
detailed statements from the government as to what will be the 
consequences of the mining operations.   We ourselves, of course, are 
primarily concerned with the effects on scenery and landscape and the 
effects on the native flora...The removal of the surface cover must 
completely alter the plants which grow on it...we feel that this is 
contrary to public opinion...Gravel workings near main roads and the 
quarries in the Darling Scarp are already becoming major eyesores.
42 
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Others voiced concerns about jobs and the local economy.    Raymond Tilley of 
the Associated Sawmillers and Timber Merchants feared that mining in the forest 
could jeopardise the interests of the timber industry and threaten the livelihood of 
timber workers.
43   A Jarrahdale resident, J. Darcey, sought an assurance that the 
project would be in Western Australia’s long-term interests, and called for a clear 
statement from Minister Court on the terms of the bauxite agreement, reminding 
him: ‘It is not only overseas investors who have a stake in the resources of this 
State.’
44 
      
The debate in the Legislative Assembly over the Alumina Refinery Agreement 
Bill raised further misgivings over mining in the forests, despite assurances from 
the Minister that the effects would be minimal.
45   A.M. Moir, Labor MLA for 
Boulder, was concerned that mining would not only produce conflict between the 
mining and forest industries, but could also destroy areas of forest forever, with 
minimal economic return to the state.
46    The Labor MLA for the south-west 
electorate of Warren, J.N. Rowberry, was sceptical of assertions that the mined 
areas would regenerate, and expressed disbelief that the Conservator of Forests 
had agreed so readily to the proposal: 
...I find it very difficult to reconcile the Minister’s statement that the 
present-day Conservator of Forests is entirely amenable to the 
destruction of one of our best prime forest regions...here we propose to 
destroy our jarrah forests-which are unique to Western Australia, which 
grow nowhere else in the world-for a common mineral that is found all 
over the world.
47 
 
Despite the voices raised in concern, bauxite mining officially commenced in 
Jarrahdale in July 1963 with local support.  The first mining operation involved 
clearing 55 acres of mill timber and topsoil, with the remaining forest being 
cleared and burnt.    Serpentine-Jarrahdale Shire Council’s President G. Ladhams 
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represented local feeling as he saw it:  ‘It is gratifying for our district to be 
connected with such a project...It is something from which we must all benefit 
either directly or indirectly’.
48 
      
The granting of permits to mine in forest areas favoured mining companies or 
consortia rather than individuals.   An application by Wesley Moore to mine 
bauxite on reserved land at Donnybrook was refused because the land contained 
‘a good quality jarrah forest’, which would be reserved for timber purposes.
49   
On the other hand, objections by the Western Australian Naturalists’ Club to the 
pegging of 77 mineral claims by mining company Kennecott Explorations in the 
South Yilgara area were ignored by the Forests Department.
50   The Club took 
the opportunity to voice its protest at the inadequacy of the Mining Act: 
This blanket application for mining claims over large areas is a 
symptom of the unsatisfactory and anachronistic state of the present 
Mining Act.   The Act was formulated at a time when conservation was 
not even thought of in this State, and is now becoming increasingly out 
of touch with present-day attitudes.
51 
 
The bauxite mining issue also provoked action by local community groups.     
Roleystone residents lobbied parliamentarians to protest against ‘a new and 
vigorous bauxite search’ in the Darling Range, which resulted in the local Shire 
Council lodging objections against mining company Singlex Pty Ltd, which 
planned to mine over 706 acres of land.
52   In response to the concerns, Mines 
Minister Griffiths merely advised people ‘in the middle of a bauxite pegging 
rush’ not to be unduly disturbed by the activity.
53 
      
There were also signs that some Western Australians were willing to adopt a 
more aggressive stance against mining companies.   A. Evans of Clackline 
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protested about the mining of bauxite on the Dryandra Reserve at Narrogin, and 
declared a willingness to directly confront the new threats to the environment: 
I joined the army to prevent foreign troops from despoiling my land, and 
now have to fight to preserve it from a fifth column within Australia.   I 
would like to join up again in this battle of the dollar; so give me a gun 
and let’s get started.
54 
 
The introduction of bauxite mining into Western Australia’s forests in the early 
1960s produced some new considerations for environmental groups.    Firstly, 
mining operations were to be conducted on a large scale by national and 
international companies.
55  Secondly, the overt nature and scale of the operations 
provoked debate over the environmental consequences of forest mining.     
Thirdly, there was a demand for public disclosure by companies and government 
of the likely effects of mining on the forest and, finally, the period saw the 
growth and consolidation of the relationship between the state government and 
mining companies.
56    
 
The Power of One 
While bauxite mining provided the stimulus for increased public anxiety over the 
effects of rapid industrialisation on the environment, there were also those who, 
like Woodward and Hay’s first period campaigns to conserve the Pinjarra 
Reserve and the Stirling Ranges, fought individually to ensure that certain areas 
were protected for all time.  Graeme Rundle
57 visited the gorges in the 
Hamersley Ranges in the mid-1960s as part of his work with the Department of 
Main Roads, and became concerned about the environmental impact of mining 
for iron ore.    He discovered that the Academy of Science had recommended a 
national park be established in the Ranges and decided to begin a personal 
campaign to ensure that this took place.
58    
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His tactics comprised lobbying influential parliamentarians about the need to 
preserve the Hamersley Range gorges for future generations and gaining support 
from environmental groups such as the Naturalists’ Club and the Tree Society.   
His efforts were successful, and in 1969 the Hamersley Range (now Karijini) 
National Park was established.
59   On reflection Rundle believed the Park was 
created as the result of a ‘bureaucratic mistake’, because a number of iron ore 
agreements had already been approved within the area: 
The reaction of the government of the day, when they found out what 
they had really done – they had just created a national park over what 
they felt at the time was prime iron ore country – was to say we’ll have 
no more national parks.
60 
 
Perceived threats to Western Australia’s forests from mining operations during 
the early 1960s prompted some individual expressions of dissent and signalled an 
expansion of protest beyond areas of urban bushland.    The latter part of the 
decade saw the introduction of a proposal that would have far-reaching 
implications for the Western Australian forest protest movement. 
 
Waste for Wood Chips 
In his 1960 annual report, W.R. Wallace, the Conservator of Forests, drew 
attention to the fact that approximately 50 million cubic feet of forest waste 
became available every year and suggested there was sufficient scope for ‘other 
types of wood-using industries in the State.’   He was convinced that a wood pulp 
industry would be established, with marri providing the major source of raw 
material, and estimated that the Pemberton area could supply 825 tons of marri 
per day for one hundred years without affecting the sawmilling industry.
61    The 
Conservator’s observations proved prophetic, for in 1967 the Japanese expressed 
interest in obtaining supplies of Western Australian wood chips for the 
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production of paper pulp.  Similar proposals were also submitted to New South 
Wales, Victoria and Tasmania.
62 
      
During that year the Western Australian government invited proposals for the 
establishment of a wood chip export industry in the south-west, which would 
involve cutting and shipping 500,000 tons of wood chips a year from state 
forests.
63   After considering submissions from Bunnings and its main rival 
contender, Britain’s Hawker Siddeley Company, the government finally 
announced in October 1968 that it had granted Bunnings the concession for a 
wood chip mill to be located at Diamond, near Manjimup.    In June 1969, the 
state government signed an agreement with the W.A. Chip & Pulp Company Pty 
Ltd and Bunnings Timber Holdings Ltd, to establish the $11 million industry, 
with Bunbury as the export harbour.
64 
      
In comparison with the reaction in eastern Australia, the introduction of a wood 
chip industry into Western Australia was notable for the absence of dissenting 
voices.   When, in late 1967, the New South Wales government announced an 
agreement with the Australian-Japanese company Harris-Daishowa to supply 
pulpwood from state forests at Twofold Bay for export to Japan as wood chips, 
the decision ‘sent shock waves through the conservation community’,
65 and 
‘triggered a conservation explosion’.
66   Graeme Rundle identified several 
reasons for the absence of any protest against wood chipping in Western 
Australia in the late 1960s.   First, there was no group dedicated specifically to 
protect the forests.  This chapter has observed that the Tree Society tended to 
limit its focus to urban tree campaigns and failed to broaden its strategies to 
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encompass rural areas of the state.   Second, at that time the Australian 
Conservation Foundation had limited influence and there was no environmental 
legislation to cover forest protection.   Finally, Western Australia’s geographical 
isolation contributed towards the failure of eastern states protests to influence 
any similar action in the west.
67 
      
At the time of the Western Australian agreement there was little regard for the 
impact wood chipping would have on the forests and the environment.    The 
local press described the venture as ‘a much-needed shot in the arm for the 
Manjimup district’, and one which ‘had almost overnight wiped out the feeling 
of insecurity that had developed in the Warren area in the past few years.’  The 
potential benefits of the wood chip industry were extolled:  sawmilling would be 
increased by one third almost immediately; the marri timber that would be used 
had been of no economic value; and the cleared land could be re-afforested with 
pine.
68 
      
Similarly, the debate in state parliament over the Wood Chipping Industry 
Agreement Bill revealed no concerns over the environmental impact of wood 
chipping.    Charles Court, the Minister for Industrial Development, stressed the 
potential economic benefits of the industry to the state – a similar pronouncement 
to that he had made on bauxite mining some eight years previously.   He 
emphasised the impetus the agreement would give to the timber industry and to 
employment opportunities, arguing that the state would benefit through ‘the fact 
that large areas will be cleared and this will permit reafforestation with other 
species which will have a greater role to play in the future.’
69   The Labor 
  86 
Opposition’s position was stated by H. D. Evans, MLA for the electorate of 
Warren, who later became its spokesman on agriculture, lands and forests: 
The Opposition supports this Bill and I might add that there is not one 
single individual in this House more pleased than myself to see this 
present move initiated...The importance of the wood chip industry 
cannot be overstressed.   Coming as it does, to the south-west at this 
time it could provide the economic breakthrough that has long been 
awaited.
70 
 
The introduction of an export wood chip industry into Western Australia in the 
late 1960s did not produce any initial outcry from the state’s environmentalists.  
During a period of instability and uncertainty in the south-west timber industry, 
wood chipping was promoted as an exciting venture that would reinvigorate the 
local economy and labour market.    It was only after the industry began 
operations in the mid-1970s that the impact of wood chipping on the forests 
became apparent and provided the motivation for concerted protest action. 
 
The Nature Conservation Council 
While Graeme Rundle’s campaign to protect the Hamersely Ranges provided an 
example of what could be achieved through individual vision and persistence, it 
was during the mid-1960s, as Kylie Elston observed, that Western Australia’s 
conservation groups realised that their urban focus had detracted from broader 
issues and that threats to the environment had become so compelling that a 
united stance was necessary.
71    Public concern was increasing over an 
acceleration of land clearing in the wheatbelt, a concentration of polluting 
industries at Kwinana, and the expansion of bauxite and mineral sand mining 
operations in national parks and state forests.
72    
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Three prominent groups – the Tree Society, the Wildflower Society and the 
Naturalists’ Club – were communicating regularly and it was suggested that 
delegates from each organisation should meet monthly to discuss common 
issues.   As a result of this proposal, the Nature Conservation Council of Western 
Australia held its first meeting on 27 April 1967 at the Tree Society headquarters 
in South Perth, with representatives from six organisations: the Society for the 
Preservation of King's Park and the Swan River, the Naturalists' Club, the 
National Trust, the Wildflower Society, the Tree Society and the Junior Tree 
Society.
73   Shirley de la Hunty (formerly Shirley Strickland), who was President 
of the Tree Society and originally conceived the idea for a monthly meeting of 
groups, explained how this occurred: 
When we’d come up with some problem, some issue that we needed to 
address, we would say, well, what do the Naturalists think about this, 
what do the Wildflower Society think about this, and we’d invite them 
to confer with us and see if we could get together on some of these 
because a lot of the issues overlapped...and that’s when I formed the 
concept of having a separate organisation, where these emerging 
environmental groups would meet separately, rather than the long, 
drawn out process we were involved with.   We could get the whole 
thing coming together.   The discussion place would be there, and they 
would discuss it and we’d come up with some sort of a common tactic 
or common information-gathering, and that formed the Conservation 
Council.   It was my particular concept of doing that.
74 
 
The value of the monthly Council meetings, de la Hunty believed, was that they 
provided the opportunity for anyone who had an interest in an environmental 
issue to contribute towards a ‘common discussion point’.
75 
 
The main objectives of the Nature Conservation Council, later to become the 
Conservation Council of Western Australia, were the adoption of a nature 
conservation code by the state government, the establishment of a Nature 
Conservation Authority for policy implementation, and the co-ordination of 
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activities of organisations interested in nature conservation.
76   As the Council 
expanded to embrace a total of 21 groups by the mid-1970s, its objectives 
correspondingly increased to include liaison with national and international 
bodies, the promotion of environmental education and research, and lobbying for 
action by ‘appropriate authorities’ on agreed policy.
77 
      
Several key figures contributed to the early development of the Council.    Gloria 
Butcher, an active member of the Women’s Service Guild and the Society for the 
Protection of King’s Park and the Swan River, became the Nature Conservation 
Council’s Honorary Secretary in 1967.   In his study of the Council’s early 
history, Ian Monk described Butcher as a charismatic leader who transformed the 
organisation into a vigorous action group.   He argued that her dominance was 
such that ‘for a while, the council was mainly an expression of the needs and 
aspirations of one person.’     Monk considered her greatest abilities to have been 
a capacity to influence politicians and industry through reasoned argument and 
using the power of education to instil conservationist ideals and values.
78 
      
The Council’s first President, John Oldham, was a landscape architect who 
became an activist during the mid-1950s when, as a member of the Tree Society, 
he fought for the protection of trees in suburban streets and played a prominent 
role in the battle to save King’s Park from development.   His involvement with 
the National Trust provided him with an awareness of wider conservation issues 
and with an appreciation of the need for conservationists to broaden their 
horizons and fight for issues that exceeded the interests of any single group.
79    
      
  89 
While Butcher and Oldham were the driving force behind the Council, there was, 
as Monk points out, a nucleus of prominent conservationists in Western Australia 
who were keen to contribute their particular expertise.  Dr Vincent Serventy was 
one of the state’s most influential naturalists and an active conservationist on 
both the east and west coasts of Australia.
80   Shirley de la Hunty and Rica 
Erickson both understood the scientific implications of environmentalism - de la 
Hunty through her training in nuclear physics and Erickson through her work as 
a naturalist.   According to Monk, there were also those who lent their support 
for a variety of reasons – farming families who had an affinity with the bush, 
members of the affluent middle-class who were keen to preserve the landscape 
for their holidays, and those who simply appreciated areas of natural beauty.
81         
      
In the late 1960s the Nature Conservation Council embarked on a strategy to 
establish an agency within government that would express environmental 
viewpoints and sympathies.   It launched an ambitious campaign to induce the 
state government to establish a Ministry of Conservation, which would address 
the contentious issues of land clearing and agricultural expansion and the 
protection of conservation areas from mining exploitation.   Graeme Rundle 
explained the success of this campaign in terms of the combined talents of the 
different groups: 
A number of the member bodies had the sort of people with special 
flairs… we had a Tree Society that was good at administration, and we 
had a Naturalists’ Club that had articulate people.
82 
 
The centrepiece of the campaign was the drafting of a Conservation Bill of 
Rights.   The document called for the creation of 20 million acres of additional 
‘A’ Class Reserves, a guarantee of the inalienability of existing reserves and their 
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protection from mining, and the retention of wilderness areas ‘in their natural 
state.’
83   In March 1970, conservation groups took part in a protest march on 
state parliament to present the ‘Bill’, and a petition containing 13,000 signatures.   
Placards carried by the marchers included ‘Reserve Not Reclaim’, and ‘Save Our 
Forests’.   While there is wide disparity over estimates of the numbers attending 
– from 250
84 to 15,000
85 - the march was significant in providing early evidence 
of public protest against the damage to Western Australia’s forests.    
      
It soon became apparent that the campaign had been influential in prompting a 
shift in both the major parties towards accommodating the concerns of a growing 
environmental lobby.  In October 1970, Premier Sir David Brand, introduced his 
Liberal Country Party coalition government’s Physical Environment Protection 
Bill which proposed to create a Department of Environmental Protection and a 
Physical Environment Council that relied on ‘co-operation and goodwill’ rather 
than coercive powers.
86   While the bill successfully passed through parliament, 
it was not formally proclaimed before a change of government, and in 1971 the 
new Tonkin Labor government introduced stronger legislation to establish four 
environmental bodies:  a Department of Environmental Protection, an 
Environmental Protection Authority, an Environment Protection Council, and an 
Appeals Board.  The EPA was required to take positive action on environmental 
issues, to set standards for environmental protection, and to provide avenues for 
public consultation and appeals.
87 
      
In summary, the formation of the Nature Conservation Council in 1967 proved a 
definitive moment for the organisation of environmental protest activity in 
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Western Australia.    Conservation groups realised that, while each had its own 
message to deliver, their voices were more likely to be heeded if they sounded in 
chorus.    They had begun to appreciate that, although each group was keen to 
promote its own particular cause, there were many areas in which interests 
overlapped.   They were all united in a concern to protect the natural 
environment from the effects of rapid post- war development.         
      
As in the rest of Australia, the post-war industrial boom years in Western 
Australia were important through their influence on the future direction of forest 
protest.   Increasing sensitivity to the consequences of rapid urban development 
initially found expression through campaigns to save isolated areas of urban 
bushland and native trees, and ultimately led to the formation of the Tree 
Society.   The campaign to save King’s Park from development as an aquatic 
centre heralded a movement towards collective protest activity.   The issue 
galvanised Perth’s conservation groups into combined action and this, in turn, led 
to a refinement and expansion of their organisation and strategies.    Most 
importantly, the campaign effectively thrust conservation into the public 
foreground and removed it from the exclusive domain of scientific and naturalist 
elites.    
 
With the establishment of the Nature Conservation Council, later the 
Conservation Council of Western Australia, environment groups were provided 
with a medium through which they could discuss issues of common interest and 
consolidate their efforts to present a united stance against the increasing demands 
of government and industry.   This collective approach became a hallmark of the 
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forest protest movement in the succeeding decades.    The emergence of 
prominent leadership figures such as Bessie Rischbieth, Mabel Talbot, Shirley 
Strickland, Gloria Butcher, John Oldham, John Thomson and Graeme Rundle 
continued and expanded the tradition of leadership that was established by first 
period conservationists Woodward and Hay.    
      
A fledgling forest protest movement had formed during Western Australia's post-
war period of economic and industrial expansion.   The 1960s also produced the 
two elements that would accelerate and expand the movement – forest mining 
and wood chipping.   Most significantly, these issues also stimulated the 
transition of forest protest strategies from traditional expressions of peaceful 
dissent to more radical forms of direct action. 
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The 1970s:  A Time of Transition 
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Map 4.1.   Western Australia - areas of significance discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The start of a second period of forest protest during the 1950s and 1960s had 
contained some key events that were of fundamental importance for the growth 
of the Western Australian forest protest movement.    The formation of the Tree 
Society and the Nature Conservation Council provided conservationists not only 
with forums for discussion but also the organisational frameworks within which 
they could plan their activities and formulate strategies to further their aims.     
Additionally, the action to save King’s Park from development gave activists the 
opportunity to obtain practical experience in a major campaign and resulted in 
groups combining their activities and creating new strategies to gain public 
support.    However, while the creation of these organisations and their activities 
were significant, their focus was chiefly on urban issues, and it was not until the 
1970s that protest groups were formed with the broader and more specific 
objective of protecting Western Australia’s forests.    Although some influences 
from the early post-war protest groups, particularly organisations such as the 
Nature Conservation Council and prominent conservationists such as Graeme 
Rundle and Shirley de la Hunty, carried through to later decades, it was the 
1970s, as Hutton and Connors point out, that provided a time of opportunity for 
the Australian environment movement, when a new generation of activists 
adopted different strategies and a more forceful approach to campaigning.
1 
      
This chapter will examine how mounting concern over increased threats to 
Western Australia’s forests resulted in the adoption of a more assertive stance 
from some conservationists and how this led to the formation of two dedicated 
forest protest groups that adopted markedly different approaches to achieving 
their common goal of protecting the forests from destruction.   Furthermore, it 
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will be argued that, during the 1970s, threats to the forests from mining and 
wood chipping stimulated a transition, whereby non-confrontational expressions 
of dissent were expanded and supplemented by more aggressive strategies of 
non-violent direct action which were designed to maintain public attention on the 
need to protect the forests. 
 
Winds of Change     
Changes in approaches to forest protest in Western Australia during the early 
1970s occurred both as a reaction to state government inactivity over forest 
conservation and as the product of a number of broader social and political 
forces.   It was a time when an incoming federal Labor leadership promised 
radical reform and when the impact of the anti-Vietnam marches was still fresh 
in the minds of activists.   Most significantly, environmental groups in Perth 
were provided with the infrastructure within which they could interact and co-
ordinate their activities.                                                                                      
      
Evidence of rising concern for the environment during the early 1970s becomes 
apparent from Western Australian Naturalists’  Club  correspondence.      
Replying to an enquiry about feelings towards conservation in Western Australia, 
L.E. Sedgwick, the Club’s secretary, commented that, while the general attitude 
seemed to be one of complacency, over the previous two years ‘the concerned 
minority has greatly increased in numbers, and has become very much more 
vocal than ever before.’   Sedgwick further observed that affecting an interest in 
conservation had become almost fashionable in middle-class circles and that 
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schools had begun to place a greater emphasis on ecology, as opposed to 
anatomy and physiology.
2 
      
Patricia and Ian Crawford noticed how the early 1970s also produced changes in 
the way the land was represented in philosophical and verbal terms, with 
‘conservationist’ replacing ‘naturalist’ as a description of a person concerned 
with the protection of flora and fauna and ‘environmentalist’ signifying a person 
who adopted a broader conception of global interrelatedness.   The terms 
‘wilderness’ and ‘green’ also became more prevalent.
3   In the state 
parliamentary papers dealing with the 1969 wood chip legislation, the terms 
‘conservation’ and ‘environment’ were not used at all, whereas in the 1973 
amending legislation the two words appeared 38 times.
4 
      
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Australian environmentalists were aware 
of a need to streamline their communication networks through the formation of 
co-ordinating councils and to establish bases from which to organise campaigns.  
This resulted in the formation of Conservation Councils in Victoria (1969), South 
Australia (1971) Queensland (1970) and Western Australia (1973 - formerly the 
Nature Conservation Council).
5    
      
The 1972 election of the Whitlam Labor government raised high expectations 
that environmental protection would be absorbed into the political mainstream.   
In Western Australia the federal government’s 1974 funding initiative for the 
establishment of Regional Environment Centres laid the foundations for the 
organisation of environmental activism in Perth.   The Environment Centre in 
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Wellington Street became the home for several organisations, including the 
Conservation Council of Western Australia, the Campaign to Save Native 
Forests (WA) (CSNF), Friends of the Earth, and the Campaign Against Nuclear 
Energy.
6     The Centre provided not only the infrastructure for the organisation 
of co-ordinated protest action but also a social milieu that encouraged group 
members to feel they were part of a dynamic movement for change.
7 
      
At this time there were also signs of growing environmental awareness and 
collective activity in rural areas of the state.   The Leeuwin Conservation Group 
was founded in 1970 by local citizens of the Shire of Augusta-Margaret River 
who wished to protect the Blackwood River from sand mining.   During the 
1970s the group expanded its activities to lobby for selections of Crown Land to 
become National Parks.
8   Barry Blaikie, a foundation member, explained that 
the main reason the group was formed was to ensure that members of the 
community were kept informed about local developments and their possible 
impact on the environment.   He recalled that during the early 1970s the group 
focussed on gathering information rather than taking any form of direct protest 
action.
9  
      
Activists were also inspired by events occurring elsewhere in Australia.   The 
Green Ban campaign in New South Wales during the early 1970s, which resulted 
in an alliance between environmentalists and trade unionists to preserve areas of 
urban bushland from commercial development, resonated in Western Australia.   
A public meeting in Perth Town Hall in August 1975 organised by the Campaign 
to Save Native Forests called for the implementation of a union green ban to 
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prevent the Manjimup Wood Chip Project from going ahead.   This decision 
resulted in the CSNF requesting the Western Australia Trade and Labor Council 
to consider taking industrial action.
10   While the Council voted in favour of 
union measures to prevent over-cutting of native forests,
11 no action was taken 
because of strong opposition from the Timber Workers Union.
12    A further 
formative influence on the growth and character of environmental activism in 
Perth during the 1970s was the anti-Vietnam War movement.   Andrew Thamo, a 
founder member of the CSNF, was actively involved in that campaign and 
considers it to have been ‘a very important component for all of us that actually 
formed the nucleus of what was to become the Campaign to Save Native 
Forests.’
13 
      
One of the most visible indications that attitudes towards environmental protest 
in Australia were changing occurred on 17 October 1973.   Criticism of the 
Australian Conservation Foundation’s conservative approach to environmental 
issues and particularly its perceived inactivity in the struggle to preserve 
Tasmania’s Lake Pedder resulted in the resignation of seven councillors, 
including one from Western Australia, and in the organisation’s radicalisation.
14   
The councillors who resigned issued a report explaining that the profound 
changes to the organisation brought about by the influence of the Lake Pedder 
Action Committee activists led them to believe they could no longer represent 
their electors.
15   Graeme Rundle, who at the time of the meeting was a State 
Councillor to the Australian Conservation Foundation, said the changes that 
occurred with the election of more campaign-oriented members exerted an 
influence in Western Australia: 
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The sorts of campaign innovations which came out of fighting for Lake 
Pedder were also relayed through the Western Australian membership 
of the ACF back into the Western Australian conservation community, 
and that included eventually the Conservation Council.
16 
 
The formulation of new approaches towards forest protest in Western Australia 
during the early 1970s occurred both as the result of rising concerns over the 
impact of industrial expansion on the state’s forests and from much broader 
influences, such as opposition to the Vietnam War and the eastern states’ green 
ban campaigns, that prompted a more assertive style of activism.     The decade’s 
early years also provided the stimulus that galvanized the Western Australian 
forest protest movement into concerted action. 
 
Chipping Away the Forest 
State government records provide evidence of a growing crisis over the demands 
placed upon forest resources.   The annual report of the Forests Department for 
1970 voiced concerns over mining expansion in the forests: 
The current level of mining activity in forest areas is of major concern.   
The over-riding powers of the Mining Act in respect of State Forests 
and timber reserves which date from the early days of gold mining 
coupled with the marked increase of mining activity, has given rise to 
the greatest threat the forest estate has experienced...more than half the 
area of State Forest is subject to some form of mining claim or 
tenement.
17 
 
The 1970 report observed that, while it was first estimated that bauxite mining at 
Jarrahdale would result in an annual loss of 14 hectares of forest, the mine had 
expanded to the extent that 121 hectares were lost every year.     The 
Department’s anxieties over the decline in forest areas, however, reflected a 
desire to protect a valuable industrial resource for production forestry rather than 
any overriding concern for forest conservation.
18 
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In October 1974, the member for Warren, the Hon. David Evans MLA, elicited 
an acknowledgement from the Minister for Forests that the state’s hardwood 
forests had been over-cut for some time in order ‘to support the established 
industry.’
19   Further questions revealed that the level of over-cutting had not 
been reported in the Department’s annual reports.
20   Paradoxically, the practice 
of over-cutting the forest was occurring at the same time that the Forests 
Department was promoting the concept of sustainable forest management.
21  The 
state government’s attitude was characterised by a reluctance to implement 
measures to reduce the level of timber cutting in the face of timber industry 
demands, even though it was aware that over-cutting was taking place and that 
the forests were being depleted. 
     
Federal and state governments did not expect that the exporting of wood chips 
would cause serious conflict in Australia.   The venture was seen by them as a 
logical extension to the prevailing ethos of development and one that presented 
several attractions:  it would boost employment in rural areas, it could lead to the 
establishment of a pulp and paper industry, and by making the forests more 
productive it might lead to high profits for exporters.  Some foresters argued that 
wood chipping would be beneficial for the health of the forests.
22    
      
The presentation in August 1973 of the Wood Chipping Industry Agreement Act 
Amendment Bill by the Tonkin Labor Government and its subsequent 
implementation, however, provided the catalyst for the adoption of more 
confrontational forms of forest protest in Western Australia and indicated that 
attitudes towards the forests were changing.  As the result of a $200 million 
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export contract for the supply of wood chips to Japan, the Bill sought to raise the 
volume of timber cutting to 670,000 tons per annum, with a further anticipated 
increase to 750,000 tons.   The wood chips would be supplied over a period of 15 
years.
23 While Alexander Taylor, the Deputy Premier and Minister for 
Development, assured parliament that the Environmental Protection Council and 
the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) had expressed satisfaction at the 
adequacy of measures designed to protect the forest environment,
24 the EPA’s 
Interim Report, dated three days after the debate in state parliament commenced, 
concluded that insufficient knowledge was available about the wood chip 
proposal for it to receive unqualified endorsement.
25 
      
During the Bill’s preparation there was official concern at possible public 
reaction to the introduction of an intensive wood chip industry into Western 
Australia and the apparent haste to approve the agreement.    An Environmental 
Impact Statement prepared by the Forests Department in June 1973 anticipated 
that the announcement of the project would provoke a ‘strong adverse reaction’ 
from some sections of the public and that recreational users of the forests would 
be concerned when they were refused access or viewed ‘any recently clear cut or 
slash burnt area.’
26   During a meeting held at Parliament House, Canberra, in 
July 1973 to discuss the Western Australian wood chip project, Dr Moss Cass, 
Commonwealth Minister for Environment and Conservation, said that, while the 
Japanese had delayed the project for over six years and were now anxious to sign 
the contract without delay, there was concern that the issue ‘has not been aired 
sufficiently in public’.
27   A Commonwealth parliamentary working group was 
established to examine the economic and environmental aspects of the export 
  105 
wood chipping industry.   The group recommended that, due to ‘the large degree 
of uncertainty surrounding the environmental impacts of the woodchip industry’, 
alternative or amended strategies for the management of wood chip areas should 
be investigated as soon as possible.
28 
      
Prior to the Wood Chipping Industry Agreement Act Amendment Bill debate in 
state parliament there was growing opposition to the establishment of a wood 
chip industry in Western Australia and consideration of organised protest action.    
The Tree Society of Western Australia called for members' views on wood 
chipping and its possible impact on the forests, stating that the organisation had 
received several letters from people who had been refused the opportunity of 
voicing their opinions in the press.
29   One newspaper correspondent deplored the 
‘crashing silence from conservationists and environmentalists’ over the issue, 
and believed the real impact of wood chipping had been ignored by 
environmental protection authorities.
30   John Thomson, an ex-forester with over 
50 years’ experience, was angry at the proposal to clear-fell the karri and marri 
forests and said he and other foresters felt they should organise with other people 
to protest against the impending destruction.
31    
      
Letters of support from eastern states organisations demonstrated the broader 
concerns about wood chipping.  Ecology Action in Sydney intended to publish 
evidence of forest destruction from wood chipping and its implications for 
Australia.
32   A local forest action group in Queensland offered its support and 
described the tactics members had employed during a successful anti-wood chip 
campaign.   These had included writing letters to newspapers, obtaining 
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statements of support from prominent academics and conservationists, hiring an 
aircraft to fly local councillors and politicians to demonstrate the effects of wood 
chipping on the forests, and organising film evenings.
33 
      
The Wood Chipping Industry Agreement Act Amendment Bill passed smoothly 
through the Legislative Assembly, with Opposition Leader Sir Charles Court 
assuring the Minister for Development that the Opposition did not wish to delay 
the legislation.  While acknowledging that there had been increased interest over 
the environmental protection aspects of wood chipping, Sir Charles rejected the 
fears of ‘ecologists and environmentalists’ that the impact of a wood chip 
industry on the forests had been insufficiently researched.
34   The Legislative 
Council debate, however, revealed growing anxiety over the impact of a wood 
chip industry on the forest environment.   F.D. Willmott, Liberal MLC for the 
South-West, read out a letter from the Wildflower Society expressing its concern 
about the proposed wood chip industry and requesting that the proposed Act 
include safeguards to protect indigenous flora and fauna, control salinity and 
erosion, promote species regeneration, and preserve areas of native flora for 
posterity.
35   Country Party members T.O. Perry and F.R. White both felt that 
insufficient time had been given to research on the impact of intensive wood 
chipping on the state’s native forests and that the Bill was being rushed through 
parliament before enough information was available for the matter to receive 
proper debate.
36   Additionally, T.O. Perry quoted a Forests Department 
‘summary sheet’ advising staff to expect a ‘strong adverse public reaction’ to the 
wood chip industry proposal following similar experiences in the United States, 
New South Wales and Tasmania.   He further advised members that some 
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apiarists had approached him asking about the effect wood chipping would have 
on their industry.
37   Despite the several concerns, the Wood Chipping Industry 
Agreement Act Amendment Bill received assent on 9 October 1973.
38 
 
The Campaign to Save Native Forests (WA) 
While the impact of intensive forestry practices such as wood chipping was 
becoming a subject for not only public criticism but also professional critique on 
a national scale,
39 in Western Australia it was the implementation of the 1973 
Wood Chipping Industry Agreement Act and its effect upon the south-west 
forests that motivated the formation of a dedicated forest protest organisation in 
early 1975.    The Campaign to Save Native Forests (WA) (CSNF) initially 
comprised a small group of student activists who intended to purchase a block of 
land near Manjimup and became concerned at the destruction of forests in the 
area through wood chipping. 
      
Andrew Thamo, a founder of the group, recalled that he had become involved in 
student activism while at university and had always wanted to live in the bush.  
He and some student friends decided to look at prospective areas of land in the 
south-west and finally purchased a block of land in what they thought would be 
an isolated area of forest.   After a visit to the block, one of his friends told 
Thamo about the effects of the wood chipping in the area, and the group decided 
that, if they wanted to live in the forests, they would have to organise a campaign 
against the wood chip industry.   According to Thamo, that decision signalled the 
start of the CSNF.
40 
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While the initial members of the CSNF comprised only the shareholders in the 
Manjimup block of land, the group realised that in order to provide an effective 
opposition to wood chipping they needed to attract membership from other 
organisations.   They contacted the Conservation Council and other groups, 
including Habitat Action and the Sporting Shooters Association, and invited 
those who were interested in the campaign to attend a meeting.    The group also 
attracted support from a group of printers at the West Australian newspaper, 
notably Lloyd Thomas, Joe Sullivan and Ian Black.   Thamo recalled that at the 
meeting some reservations were expressed at the political nature of the group, 
especially when some who attended introduced themselves as communists.   He 
believed the meeting was significant in expanding the campaign beyond the 
interests of a small group of student activists.
41      
      
After its foundation, membership of the organisation broadened as other 
environmental groups pledged their support     A packed meeting in Perth Town 
Hall in July 1975 showed that the campaign’s stance against wood chipping was 
gaining considerable public sympathy.
42   Prior to the meeting the group stated it 
was not totally opposed to wood chipping and clear-felling, but objected to the 
scale of the proposed operations and the likely effects on the forest environment.  
It called for a moratorium on wood chipping while an expert commission, with 
representation from both forest industries and the public, investigated how to best 
use the forests for the benefit of the whole community.
43 
 
From the outset, the CSNF recognized the need to present a cogently persuasive 
argument against the effects of wood chipping and this resulted in the 
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compilation of a detailed submission in 1975 to the Australian Senate Standing 
Committee on the Social Environment, which had been tasked with enquiring 
into the impact on the environment of the wood chip industry.   The submission 
comprised a detailed analysis of the anticipated threats to the forest from 
intensive wood chipping, and argued that the Manjimup project had received 
hasty approval, without proper regard for the environmental consequences.   The 
CSNF called for the excision of the Shannon River Basin from the wood chip 
area, a reduction in the tonnage of export timber for wood chips, and the 
initiation of a Royal Commission or similar inquiry into forest management 
practices and the needs of present and future generations with regard to Western 
Australia’s native forests.
44 
      
As part of a strategy to project its message to a wider audience, the group 
presented its arguments against the wood chip industry in an eight-page 
broadsheet, which was both innovative and influential, and prompted people to 
join the organisation.
45   The publication communicated the salient points of the 
CSNF’s submission to the Senate Standing Committee in an attractive format, 
with illustrations, photographs, maps and cartoons, and invited attendance at a 
public meeting in Perth Town Hall.   The broadsheet presented the CSNF’s case 
against wood chipping in terms of its detrimental effects upon the diminishing 
areas of Western Australia’s forests.   The campaign argued that intensive forest 
logging would threaten water supplies through increased salinity and promote the 
spread of dieback disease, and that clear-felling of large areas of forest would be 
highly destructive to native flora and fauna.
46   One year later, the group 
produced a similar broadsheet, this time calling for a halt to the Manjimup 
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project and publicising a demonstration on Perth Esplanade to support proposed 
trade union action against wood chipping.
47 
      
Christine Sharp decided to join the CSNF after being impressed by the arguments 
against wood chipping presented in the campaign’s first broadsheet and then 
attending the Town Hall meeting.   With an academic background in politics and 
some current affairs radio interviewing, Sharp volunteered to become the 
organisation’s first media officer.    Over the next two years she oversaw an 
expansion of the CSNF’s media coverage, particularly on radio and television, 
but recalled that the West Australian viewed the organisation as ‘somewhat 
below par’ and seemed to exercise a form of ‘intellectual snobbery’ against it.   
She saw the reaction against the CSNF during its early years arising from the 
political challenge that the organisation offered: 
The environment had been considered a scientific issue, a management 
issue, and not a political issue, per se, and that was what was new, so 
that from the very beginning the CSNF was political in their 
methods...They were using a lot of science, and good science, but it was 
that political edge to it which was very new and very radical, and 
challenging for the establishment.
48 
 
Both Andrew Thamo and Christine Sharp emerged as key figures during the 
CSNF’s early development, with each offering contrasting yet complementary 
approaches to the group’s organisation.   As a committed and experienced 
student activist with local knowledge, Thamo was able to provide the practical 
leadership required for co-ordinated protest action.   Sharp’s political and media 
background enabled her to place the campaign in a much broader context and to 
position the group as the focal point for the anti-wood chip movement. 
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While public meetings in Perth afforded an opportunity for the CSNF to argue its 
case and gauge levels of support, a gathering in the south-west provided an early 
indication of the tensions that would arise between timber workers and 
environmentalists.   At a meeting in Manjimup in August 1975 convened by 
members of the local branch of the CSNF, the organisation faced a barrage of 
questions from the Institute of Foresters, who received encouragement in its 
arguments from local people who supported the wood chip industry.   Police 
were called when hecklers disrupted the meeting.
49 
      
There were also signs that the group’s anti-wood chipping campaign was 
effectively moving forest issues to the forefront of political debate.   Arthur 
Tonkin, the Opposition spokesman for the environment, said he believed 
‘amateur’ protest groups such as the CSNF were providing a valuable service 
through promoting environmental protection, raising an awareness among 
Western Australians of the value of their forests, and challenging corporations 
whose only motive was profit maximisation.   Premier Court, on the other hand, 
said he was concerned that, if federal funding were used to support 
environmental organisations, ‘the money could be used by irresponsible groups 
to disrupt the activities of government planning projects.’
50 
      
The CSNF was aware of the need to keep the anti-wood chipping campaign in 
the public spotlight and expanded its strategies by creating a number of stunts to 
attract media attention and maintain public focus on the forests.   On Arbor Day, 
a member of the group, dressed as a tree and wearing a slogan, intruded on an 
official ceremony, emphasising the point that planting one tree did not 
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compensate for the destruction of a forest.   The incident was reported by Perth 
news media that evening.
51   In November 1976, members of the CSNF 
organised a march through Perth, protesting at a state government decision to 
allow wood chipping in the Shannon Basin.   A simulated petition was burnt 
outside Parliament House.
52   The group also attempted to raise public awareness 
of forest issues by conducting tours of the south-west, during which visitors were 
invited to compare the natural beauty of the forest with the uniformity of pine 
plantations.
53 
      
In late 1977 the CSNF’s campaign received a boost when internationally 
renowned economist and environmentalist Dr E.F. Schumacher accepted an 
invitation from the organisation to visit Western Australia to support the cause.
54    
After presenting a lecture at the University of Western Australia in July, Dr 
Schumacher acted as narrator during the making of the film The Edge of the 
Forest. In the film Schumacher used the south-west forests as an example of 
prevailing attitudes towards precious resources and argued for a reversal of 
increasing environmental deterioration through the adoption of widespread tree 
planting.
55 
      
Although the CSNF’s initial target was the wood chip industry, it soon realised 
that the wood chip issue was only part of a much broader and more complex 
environmental debate,
56 and later widened its focus to lobby for a change in 
forest management away from commercial exploitation towards a greater 
emphasis on conservation and community benefits.   This change would involve 
a reversal of the decline in forest areas through improved reafforestation, the 
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creation of additional reserves and national parks, and a programme of 
community education.
57 
      
By the late 1970s, the CSNF was able to present a cogent expression of its 
objectives, organisation and methods.   It described itself as ‘a fast-growing, 
voluntary, non-politically-aligned group of people from all levels of society’, 
whose intention was to prevent or limit the destruction of Western Australia’s 
native forests.   Although records of numbers do not appear to have survived, 
membership was drawn from ‘top professionals and schoolchildren, scientists, 
doctors, housewives and battlers’, all of whom shared a common concern for the 
forests.
58   While the CSNF had office bearers, which included a President, Vice-
President, Treasurer, Secretary and Membership Secretary, it considered itself to 
be non-hierarchical, and ‘more concerned with getting things done than with 
rigid formalities.’   The group intended to achieve its objectives by ‘reasonable 
non-violent means’, and to fully utilise the talents of its members.    Its strategies 
would include written submissions, lobbying politicians, the publication of 
articles and broadsheets, use of media, film-making, non-violent demonstrations 
and occupations.
59  At its Annual General Meeting in December 1979, the CSNF 
elected Barrie Margettes as President, with Malcolm Trudgeon and Annette 
Horsler as Vice-Presidents.    The meeting was told that, out of a total income of 
$24,915, the CSNF had expended $23,018.
60  
      
At the decade’s close the CSNF had identified five major threats to Western 
Australia’s forests: pine afforestation, which involved a planned clearing of 
180,000 hectares of forest; clear-felling for wood chips and saw logs at the rate 
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of 3,500 hectares per annum; bauxite mining in the jarrah forest, with the 
potential destruction of 400,000 hectares over a period of 70 years; clearing for 
public utilities of 10,000 hectares over the next 10 years; and extensive clearing 
for agriculture and other mining operations.   The organisation sought to alert the 
public and its own members to the impending dangers, organising public lectures 
at the University of Western Australia and flights over the jarrah and karri 
forests, including Alcoa’s operations in the northern jarrah forest.
61 
 
The South-West Forests Defence Foundation 
The style of campaigning adopted by the CSNF was oriented towards employing 
highly-visible strategies which were designed to attract public and media 
attention and thus maintain a focus on the need to protect the forests.   While 
many environmentalists initially supported the CSNF in its campaign, there were 
some who believed that the expansion of wood chipping could be halted through 
the application of a different strategy.   The South-West Forests Defence 
Foundation (SFDF) was formed in late 1975 by a group of environmentalists 
who were convinced that the Manjimup wood chip project could be stopped only 
by means of a legal challenge. 
      
Beth Schultz was born in Queensland and moved to Western Australia in 1970 
after living and studying in France and the USA.    A former academic, with a 
PhD in romance languages, she also studied law at the University of Western 
Australia and practised for several years before working full-time for the 
Conservation Council where she served as president from 1992-1995.   It was the 
introduction of wood chipping into Western Australia in the early 1970s that 
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drove Schultz to become a forest activist and a founding member of the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests and co-convenor of the South-West Forests 
Defence Foundation.    Schultz's academic background, organisational ability and 
legal skills would see her emerge as a key leader in the Western Australian forest 
protest movement. 
      
During the latter part of 1975, Schultz attended a CSNF meeting and had a 
conversation with beekeeper Wayne Ridley, who thought that wood chipping 
might be unconstitutional through interfering with the state’s water supplies.   
This suggestion gave her the idea of forming a separate group to investigate the 
possibility of mounting a legal challenge to the expansion of the wood chip 
industry.   After obtaining advice from Peter Johnson of the University of 
Western Australia Law School, the SFDF held its first meeting in December 
1975.
62 
      
The other co-convenor of the SFDF, Arthur Conacher, was a geography lecturer 
at UWA, and had already voiced his strong opposition to the commencement of 
the wood chip industry.   His public accusation that the Environmental Protection 
Authority supported the industry and had whitewashed its environmental 
assessment of the Manjimup wood chip project attracted an angry response from 
the organisation’s Director, Brian O’Brien, who expressed regret that Conacher 
had published his views in the media and believed his observations demonstrated 
a lack of professionalism.
63   
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After receiving strong support for his stance over the wood chip issue, Conacher 
decided to become actively involved, and collaborated with Schultz to found the 
SFDF, with the prime objective of taking legal action to halt the establishment of 
the wood chip industry.    In common with the CSNF, the group aimed at 
achieving maximum publicity through both the electronic and print media.     
While SFDF members presented a more conservative image than their CSNF 
counterparts, both groups were united by a desire to protect Western Australia's 
forests.
64  
      
Conacher identifies the 1970s as a key period in the evolution of forest protest in 
Western Australia, during which the forest protest movement was forced to 
become more professional by having to ensure that all the facts it presented to 
counteract official arguments were correct.   He derived personal satisfaction 
from being involved with people who had ‘good sets of values’ and were not 
motivated purely by self-interest.
65  
       
In January 1976, the SFDF sought to develop a legal case against wood chipping, 
which relied on defining the anticipated damage to the forest environment caused 
by the wood chip project as an ‘actionable nuisance’, and thus forming the basis 
for two constitutional challenges.
66    The organisation also sought and received 
support from other groups, including Ecology Action, Sydney, and the 
Environmental Law Reform Group in Tasmania.
67         
 
While the use of legal action to defeat wood chipping remained a core 
component of SFDF strategies, the group decided to make full use of the talents 
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of its members.   Unlike the CSNF, which was aligned to the Labor Party and 
more overtly activist, the SFDF comprised mainly middle-class academics and 
professionals from Perth’s western suburbs.
68   The strong academic base of the 
SFDF was reflected in the production of incisive and analytical publications to 
argue its case, with the bulk of the research and writing carried out by the 
Foundation’s Co-Convenors.     In February 1976, the SFDF published a 
comprehensive appraisal of the Manjimup wood chip project,
69 and later that 
year submitted a detailed analysis of forest management practices, concluding 
that the Forests Department had failed in its role as custodian of the state’s 
forests.
70    The publication in May 1979 of the Foundation’s evidence proving 
non-compliance by the Forests Department with measures designed to minimise 
the effects of the wood chip industry on the environment,
71 resulted in a visit to 
the licence area by the Senate Standing Committee on Science and the 
Environment to verify data in the SFDF report.
72 
      
Schultz remembers that the SFDF's criticism of the Forests Department resulted 
in newspaper journalists, particularly those from the West Australian, adopting 
an 'indifferent if not hostile' attitude towards forest conservationists.   Those 
journalists that were supportive suffered for voicing their opinions.  She recalled 
that  Daily News reporter George Williams  visited the karri forests around 
Manjimup and Pemberton to investigate the SFDF's claims about timber wastage 
and logging taking place near river and stream reserves.   According to Schultz, 
Williams' extensive article in the Daily News supporting the SFDF's allegations 
against the Forests Department affected his career and he was never again given 
a 'good' assignment.
73 
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By mid-1976 the Foundation’s activities had expanded to include public 
education, political lobbying, and surveillance of the wood chip industry.     
Similarly, its objectives had broadened to calls for the implementation of a land 
use plan for the south-west forests, a comprehensive review of the wood chip 
industry, and the reservation of mature karri forests in secure areas.
74    The 
organisation also saw a steady rise in membership during its first two years, from 
364 in January 1976,
75 to 1,000 in October that year,
76 and 1,159 by December 
1977.
77 
      
Although the CSNF and the SFDF were characterised by their adoption of 
different campaign strategies, they were united by the common goal of stopping 
the Western Australian wood chip industry.    This agreement resulted in a 
willingness to collaborate on certain issues, such as the submission to the Trades 
and Labor Council for a green ban on wood chipping.
78   The groups appealed to 
different types of people and, while some would join both groups, others would 
join only one because they could identify with its image and methods of 
operation.
79 
      
By mid-1977, however, the SFDF faced a number of internal challenges.   In 
July, Arthur Conacher decided to resign as president due to work commitments 
and Beth Schultz was appointed to the position.   The organisation had applied 
for incorporation in order to take legal action against wood chipping, but this had 
been refused by the state Attorney-General.   While the Foundation had over 
$2,000 in funds, the costs of appeals against the decision imposed a substantial 
drain on these finances.  An appeal to the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
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failed on the grounds that the Associations Incorporation Act gave the 
organisation the right to ask for incorporation but not the right to be granted it.   
Les Stein of the University of Western Australia Law School considered the 
group had a valid case for incorporation and recommended an appeal to the High 
Court, but this would cost $10,000 that would have to be found through fund 
raising.   An application had been made for legal aid but the chances of this being 
granted did not appear promising.
80    
      
After a two-year struggle, the Foundation found its constitutional argument 
against wood chipping had been ruled invalid, its application for legal aid had 
stalled and the costly appeal to the High Court against a government refusal to 
grant the organisation incorporation had failed.
81   The decision to refuse 
incorporation was seen as an example of political interference by the Court 
Liberal Government in order to avoid legal challenges against the wood chip 
industry.
82 
      
Despite the difficulties, the SFDF increased pressure on the Western Australian 
government to change its policies towards the forests.   At its second annual 
general meeting held in December 1977, the Foundation resolved to request the 
state government to establish a properly constituted inquiry into native forest 
management, which would cover recommendations for an integrated land use 
plan after consultation with government departments, conservations groups and 
members of the public.   The organisation further urged the government to amend 
the Forests Act in order to apply multiple use and sustained yield principles to 
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forest management, and to preserve forest eco-systems through the creation of 
parks that would be reserved from timber cutting.
83 
      
The anti-wood chip campaigns of the CSNF and the SFDF also stimulated the 
formation of a counter group whose members had a vested interest in supporting 
the establishment of a wood chip industry.   In mid-1976 a group of south-west 
timber workers, merchants and professionals initiated the Save Our South West 
Campaign the purpose of which was ‘to counter the damaging propaganda of 
opposition groups’.   Clear-felling, they argued, was an established practice that 
helped the forest to regenerate, and wood chipping assisted this process. 
Campaign supporters, based in Manjimup, asserted that the CSNF was driven by 
politically motivated radicals who were not really interested in the preservation 
of the forests.   They sought to secure the livelihood of timber workers through 
the promotion of multi-purpose forest management, calling upon people to 
ignore those who spoke ‘from the remote cloisters of the universities’ and 
support those who knew best how to protect their forest heritage.
84 
 
The Bunbury Wood Chip Terminal Bombing 
The wood chip issue not only provided the impetus for the creation of Western 
Australia’s first organised forest protest groups but also was the target for the 
expression of an extreme form of direct action.    Early on 19 July 1976, two 
hooded men attempted to blow up the main loading gantry at the Bunbury wood 
chip terminal.   One bomb exploded, causing damage to the conveyor system, 
while a second device, which was designed to destroy the waterfront gantry, 
failed to ignite.   Prior to the explosion, the men had overpowered a security 
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guard at gunpoint and, after setting the devices, had left him tied up in his car at 
Australind.
85           
      
The event prompted declarations of outrage from government and industry.     
Premier Court regarded the bombing as an act of terrorism rather than protest, 
that would delay rather than halt the progress of wood chipping in Western 
Australia.
86     G.W. Kelly, of the Forest Products Association, said ‘pseudo 
conservationists’ in the anti-wood chipping campaign could not escape 
responsibility and believed the incident resulted from extremists who had 
‘inflamed emotions with a campaign of bitterness and hatred, divorced almost 
entirely from the truth’.
87  
      
In the local press the bombing heightened the intensity of the wood chipping 
debate.   The West Australian believed the action could only harm the cause of 
conservation and that West Australians should consider the climate created by 
violent protest and where it might lead them.
88   One correspondent voiced the 
frustrations of many who felt that the destruction of large areas of native forest 
was itself ‘an appalling act of violence against the environment’, and could 
understand how a minority could resort to violent action as the only means of 
gaining a hearing.
89   The SFDF reacted strongly against the assertion by G.F. 
Kelly of the Forest Products Association that extremist members of the anti-
wood chipping campaign had influenced the Bunbury bombing and called for 
specific evidence to substantiate the accusation.
90 
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The incident produced mixed reactions from local environmentalists.  While the 
actions of the bombers aroused spontaneous expressions of sympathy from some 
members of Western Australia’s forest protest groups,
91 both the CSNF and the 
SFDF disassociated themselves from the action, and the prevailing view was that 
the bombing had been detrimental to the furtherance of their cause.  On the one 
hand, there was a perception that the incident reflected to some extent the public 
reaction against wood chipping, while it also had the effect of associating the 
entire forest protest movement with extreme forms of direct action.
92 
      
During their investigations police discovered seven cartons of gelignite in an area 
of Glenoran State Forest near Manjimup.  They also seized a Valiant Galant 
station wagon that had been hidden in the forest.     Shortly after this discovery, 
John Chester and Michael Haabjoern, who both lived on a farming community 
outside Manjimup, were charged with causing the Bunbury explosion.
93     At 
their trial in October, Chester and Haabjoern faced five charges relating to the 
bombing:  stealing $1041 worth of detonating equipment, rendering a night guard 
incapable of resistance, causing an explosion likely to cause injury, placing an 
explosive substance with intent to damage property, and depriving the night 
guard of his liberty.
94 
      
Neither of the bombers appears to have been associated with any formal 
environmental organisation, and both seem to have acted from personal 
motivations.    Haabjoern stated: 
My concern towards the destruction of our environment was the motive 
for my participation in the events to which the charges relate...it was a 
once only venture on my part and was done in the hope of forestalling 
operations of the said company for a period, until the public could be 
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made aware of the threat to our native forest and a more enlightened and 
moral legislation could be introduced concerning the timber industry.
95 
 
Chester said he was prepared to die for the forests in order to preserve nature for 
his children.
96 (see Figure 4.1.) 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  John Chester twenty years after the Bunbury bombing.  Source: West 
Australian, 20 December 1996. 
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Although both men were subsequently convicted, and sentenced to seven years’ 
imprisonment for causing the explosion, the imposition of a minimum non-parole 
period of only 10 months attracted considerable criticism.   Mr Justice Jones said 
he had been satisfied that Chester and Haabjoern had both been motivated by an 
ideal which arose from their deep concern over the destruction of the forests 
caused by wood chipping.  He explained that he was moved to impose the 
minimum term because he believed both men had come to realise that the end did 
not justify the means, and that their type of action would not achieve the 
objectives they sought.
97   As the only proven example of 'ecotage' on a large 
scale in Australia,
98 the case raised the novel question of whether the bombers’ 
idealism mitigated their offence or aggravated it through using deliberate 
violence as a direct threat to democracy.   In its appeal, the Crown argued that 
Justice Jones had taken too great an account of the men’s idealistic motivations 
and had not reflected society’s need to condemn such violence and to deter 
others from committing similar acts.  A majority of the Full Court agreed to 
leave the maximum sentence at seven years, yet increase Chester and 
Haabjoern’s minimum sentence to three-and-a-half years.
99       
      
The campaign against the wood chip industry exerted a definitive influence on 
the development of a forest protest movement in Western Australia.   While, as 
has been noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the initiation of a wood chip industry 
into Western Australia in the late 1960s had attracted little opposition from 
conservationists in comparison with the reaction in eastern Australia, by the mid-
1970s the dynamics of forest protest had changed.  People had become 
concerned at the implications and effects of intensive wood chipping and the 
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reaction against it provided the stimulus for the creation of two groups 
specifically dedicated to forest protest.   Although the groups were unable to halt 
wood chipping, their campaigns resulted in the emergence of more aggressive 
and innovative strategies and, most importantly, the construction of two co-
ordinated and professional organisations.    
 
The Bunbury terminal bombing demonstrated the emotive power of the wood 
chip debate to arouse a violent form of activism.   However, the response of the 
forest protest movement to distance itself from the incident also shows that it was 
only willing to express dissent by lawful means.   By rejecting a violent approach 
to protest the movement was exercising a form of 'self-limiting radicalism' 
whereby it was content to exert its influence within the structures of liberal 
democracy.
100   Another threat to the forests in the late 1970s created the 
conditions for a further escalation of protest. 
 
The Battle Against Bauxite Mining 
While the threat to the forests from wood chipping had provided the stimulus for 
the formation of Western Australia’s first dedicated forest activist groups in the 
mid-1970s, conservationists soon realised that they had to expand their focus and 
strategies in order to protect the forests from the potentially damaging effects of 
increased mining activity.   In July 1975, the Tree Society wrote to Premier 
Court, urging him in the public interest to refuse applications to mine the Ludlow 
tuart forest for minerals.
101    Three mining companies had pegged claims 
covering the tuart forest between Busselton and Capel; however, objections to 
the mining had been lodged by the Forests Department, the Tree Society, the 
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Western Australian Naturalists’ Club, the Conservation Council, and the CSNF.   
Perth’s Daily News newspaper noted the irony of the fact that, while the Forests 
Department and the CSNF had been in opposition over the wood chips issue, 
they now appeared united in a common cause.
102    It was emphasised that the 
Ludlow forest comprised the only surviving pure tuart forest in the world.   The 
mining applications were subsequently refused.
103 
 
In a visit to Perth, Dr Geoff Mosley, Director of the Australian Conservation 
Foundation, voiced his concerns over the protection of Western Australia’s forest 
reserves against mining.   While the areas were supposed to be protected, Dr 
Mosley said it was possible for the state government to change the status of those 
areas without the gazetted amendment being challenged in parliament and the 
public being made aware of what had occurred.   He believed there was a need 
for greater protection of forest reserves through the introduction of legislation 
that would increase public attention and ensure that their status could be revoked 
only by Act of Parliament.
104  
      
When it became apparent that an expansion of bauxite mining was proposed for 
the Darling Range, the Fremantle City Council passed a motion raising concerns 
that the Court Government was pressing ahead with mining before environmental 
reports were made public.   The motion called for the government to reconsider 
any decision to proceed with mining until after the public had been given ample 
time to consider the implications for the environment.
105  
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Christine Sharp recalled that the CSNF’s decision to broaden its campaign to 
focus on the impact of bauxite mining was prompted by comments made to her 
by Dr Syd Shea, the future executive director of the Department of Conservation 
and Land Management, but who in the late 1970s was a senior employee of the 
Western Australian Forests Department.   She explained that, prior to an 
interview with Dr Shea for her thesis on the Shannon Basin, he had asked her 
why the CSNF was not protesting against the proposed expansion of bauxite 
mining, which he regarded as ‘ecological suicide’.  According to Sharp, Dr 
Shea’s remarks motivated her and Andrew Thamo to initiate a CSNF-led 
campaign against bauxite mining.
106  In February 1978 the CSNF produced a 
four-page broadsheet as part of its strategy to warn people of an impending threat 
to Western Australia’s water supply through increased salinity caused by the 
state government’s plans to allow Alcoa to expand its bauxite mining operations 
in the jarrah forests.   The publication advertised a public meeting in Perth Town 
Hall to discuss ways to prevent the expansion and to force a review of the 
company’s existing operations.
107   
      
The CSNF was supported in its campaign by the SFDF, which produced a 
publicity leaflet voicing its opposition to any expansion of bauxite mining in the 
state.  As well as drawing attention to the detrimental effects of bauxite mining, 
such as threats to water quality, the potential spread of dieback disease, and 
inadequate environmental assessments, the organisation also drew parallels with 
previous mining operations.   It pointed out that in 1961 politicians assured West 
Australians that the effects of bauxite mining would be minimal, with only 10 
hectares of forest cleared annually, whereas the current proposal involved the 
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annual clearing of 270 hectares.   The conclusion was that politicians’ assurances 
in 1978 were worth no more than those given in 1961.
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Prior to the introduction of legislation in the Western Australian parliament to 
allow Alcoa and Alwest to open new bauxite plants at Wagerup and Worsley, the 
CSNF commenced an intensive campaign.  Sharp said the CSNF had come to 
realise the strategic advantages of starting a campaign early:  
I learnt from that initial wood chipping campaign the importance of 
getting in on an issue before it has been finalised…acting when the door 
is ajar rather than when the door is slammed closed.
109 
 
Circulars to group members and volunteers urged participation through a variety 
of activities, including lobbying members of parliament, distributing broadsheets, 
pasting posters, and encouraging attendance at film evenings and social functions 
to support the campaign and raise funds.
110   On the opening day of the debate on 
the bauxite legislation in state parliament, the organisation planned a ‘salt 
assault’, during which a quantity of salt would be placed on the steps of 
Parliament House to remind parliamentarians of their responsibility to protect the 
state’s forests and water supplies.
111 
      
At this time the CSNF received support from various quarters.   The Western 
Australian Division of the Institute of Foresters opposed the expansion of mining 
in the Darling Range, saying that ‘the risks were too great and the consequences 
too serious.’
112    The state Labor Party called for a Royal Commission into 
Alcoa’s bauxite mining proposals and vowed to oppose the bauxite legislation if 
environmental reports were not made available.
113   Citing a lack of adequate 
legislation to protect the jarrah forest, the Tree Society called for a moratorium 
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on bauxite mining in the Darling Range.
114   Dr Geoffrey Mosley, Director of the 
Australian Conservation Foundation, said he believed Western Australia’s 
bauxite legislation typified the problems facing Australia’s conservation 
movement and believed the haste with which the bill had passed through 
parliament demonstrated the government’s disregard for public opinion on 
environmental issues.
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While protest groups mounted a vigorous campaign aimed at persuading the state 
government to halt the proposed expansion of bauxite mining, the level of 
pressure exerted by the groups could not match the powerful economic 
arguments of the mining companies.  Mr Walter Kommer, General Manager of 
Alwest, pointed out that if Australia was slow to develop mining then other 
countries would take advantage in order to supply world markets. While 
acknowledging that bauxite mining would disturb the environment, he argued 
that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, believing that, while the 
environment would be different after bauxite mining, it would be ‘aesthetically 
more pleasing’.
116 
      
During the bauxite legislation debate in state parliament, the CSNF established a 
protest camp at Mt William, 110km south of Perth, at the site of the proposed 
bauxite mine near Wagerup.   While the establishment of the camp was 
successful in attracting prominent media coverage and generating publicity for 
the anti-mining campaign, press reporting was negative, noting that the camp had 
attracted ‘seasoned campaigners’ from other environmental causes, and that 
‘ironically’ some were drinking from aluminium cans.
117 
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The decision of the CSNF to oppose an extension of bauxite mining operations 
prompted strong criticism from the state Liberal government.   The group’s 
arguments were denounced by Premier Court as being based on distortion and 
slanderous accusation.   He considered the organisation posed more of a threat 
than mining by threatening the livelihood of thousands of workers.
118   Graeme 
MacKinnon, the Minister for Conservation and the Environment, thought the 
CSNF’s claims on salinity were exaggerated and believed the group’s actions 
represented a desperate effort to revitalise the organisation after its anti-wood 
chipping campaign had stalled.
119   The Tree Society wrote to Colin Porter, the 
Director of Conservation and Environment, objecting to his reference in the 
media to a ‘fifth column’ of environmentalists who were opposed to industrial 
expansion.
120 
      
During the late 1970s, two of the state’s environmental organisations faced 
funding cuts that were interpreted as government efforts to restrict their 
activities.   In December 1977, it was reported that the Conservation Council of 
Western Australia had its federal grant reduced by $4300 and threatened the 
closure of the Council’s office in Wellington Street.  The organisation’s 
treasurer, Barbara Arthur, said the reduction in funding combined with the state 
government’s refusal to support the organisation could be seen as attempts to 
weaken the Western Australian conservation movement.
121   In May 1978, the 
Tree Society had publicly criticised the environmental report for the Wagerup 
alumina project.
122   It was reported in July that the state government had decided 
to stop making grants to the organisation.
123 
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Some measure of the effect of the CSNF’s strategies to raise awareness of the 
possible damage to the forests from the bauxite campaign can be gauged from 
the Legislative Assembly debate on the Alumina Refinery (Wagerup) Agreement 
Bill.   H.D. Evans, the Opposition spokesman on agriculture, acknowledged that 
the group had been active in voicing its concerns over the potential impact of 
bauxite mining on Western Australia’s fragile environment and believed the 
CSNF expressed the beliefs held by many other people in the state.   He further 
noted that the Tree Society, while not ‘spectacularly active’, had a large 
membership of intelligent people who held similar fears to those expressed by 
the CSNF and who believed further investigation into the effects of bauxite 
mining on the environment was necessary before the industry should be allowed 
to expand.
124   Despite the reservations, however, the Alumina Refinery 
Agreement Bills successfully passed through parliament.    
      
During the late 1970s the bauxite mining issue emerged as a major area of 
contest for Western Australia’s forest protest groups.   There was a perception 
that the Court Government had succumbed to pressure from mining interests to 
expedite the Wagerup and Worsley legislation and had ignored the potential 
impact of an expansion of bauxite mining in the Darling Range.   The campaign 
demonstrated the continuation of a more confrontational style of activism and the 
willingness of groups to collaborate against a common enemy. 
 
The Wagerup Occupation 
When it became apparent that the Western Australian government was 
determined to proceed with the expansion of bauxite mining, the CSNF realised 
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it was necessary to adopt more aggressive strategies.   In mid-1978 two 
American Quakers visited Perth to conduct a series of workshops on protest 
based on the Quaker philosophy of non-violence and several of the younger 
CSNF members attended.   As a result of the workshops, a recommendation was 
made that the group should hold a non-violent occupation to protest at a further 
extension of mining in the jarrah forest through the building of Alcoa’s third 
alumina refinery at Wagerup.
125   In June 1978, the CSNF held its first training 
weekend at Wellington Mills, during which guidelines and strategies for non-
violent civil disobedience were formulated.
126     
      
The latter half of 1978 saw a period of mounting tension between the Western 
Australian Liberal government and the forest protest movement.   The SFDF had 
decided to extend its activities to include the northern jarrah forest and formed a 
special sub-committee to examine the effects of bauxite mining.   After 
examining Alcoa’s Environmental Review and Management Programme for the 
Wagerup project, the organisation recommended that the refinery should not 
proceed and that Alcoa should limit its operations to the established alumina 
industry sites at Kwinana and Pinjarra.   In conjunction with the CSNF, the group 
hired the Perth Town Hall in August for a week of activities entitled ‘A Forest 
Affair’, during which photographs, displays and films were used to increase 
public knowledge about the forests and what was happening to them.   The 
week’s activities culminated in a ‘Darling Range Parade’, where various 
environmental groups marched with placards calling for a public enquiry into 
bauxite mining.
127 
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As part of its campaign against bauxite mining, the CSNF formed a research 
group to substantiate the organisation’s claims about the adverse effects of 
mining on the forests.   A submission to the Environmental Protection Authority 
criticised Alcoa’s Environmental Review and Management Programme for the 
Wagerup project, arguing that the document failed to recognise the 
environmental implications of intensive bauxite mining, and exhibited ‘a 
disgraceful disregard for the environment and people of Western Australia by 
Alcoa’.
128   A further study examined the energy utilisation of the alumina 
industry in Western Australia and concluded that the industry placed excessive 
stress on local energy resources and that the expansion of alumina production 
would exacerbate the problem.
129 
      
Both the CSNF and SFDF expanded their media campaigns, with warnings that 
the state government was ignoring the opinion of experts and jeopardising the 
future of Western Australians.
130   Alcoa published an advertisement showing the 
transformation of the Jarrahdale bauxite mine site into a public recreation area as 
an example of the company’s caring attitude towards the environment.
131  The 
CSNF and SFDF retorted with a full-page advertisement which showed a 
photograph of an Alcoa bauxite mine site near Dwellingup and asked the 
question: 'Anyone see a jarrah forest around here?'.
132    The Tree Society 
observed that one isolated area of rehabilitation by Alcoa did not represent the 
real impact on vast areas of forests and their complex ecosystems.
133   
      
Premier Court appealed to the public to stop the ‘noisy campaign’ by militant 
conservationists that had produced a crisis threatening the state’s economy and 
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future prosperity.
134  The growth of dissident groups became such a serious 
concern to the government that consideration was given to the establishment of a 
Directorate of Public Safety to contain the rise of civil disorder.
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During November 1978, the CSNF drew up plans for a non-violent occupation of 
Alcoa’s proposed new alumina refinery site at Wagerup.   The group justified its 
decision to adopt tactics of civil disobedience by stating that all legal avenues of 
protest had been exhausted and it had become apparent that politicians viewed 
the forests as expendable and disregarded public concern.   Since the campaign 
could not condone violence, those volunteering to participate in the occupation 
would be required to undertake non-violent civil disobedience training to be 
conducted by a specially formed ‘Non-Violent Action Group’.
136  During four 
training weekends in December 1978 and January 1979, potential occupiers 
studied the history and philosophy of non-violent protest, group decision-
making, and participated in role-playing.
137  The group also viewed films of non-
violent occupations at Seabrook, USA, and Whyl, West Germany, in order to 
gain some appreciation of what lay before them at Wagerup.
138 
      
The proposal to utilise tactics of civil disobedience for the occupation at 
Wagerup caused anxiety within some sections of the CSNF about the impact of 
the strategy upon the overall campaign.   During a meeting of the group, 
members were asked to consider whether the escalation of the campaign into 
civil disobedience was appropriate when other methods and tactics were still 
being employed.   The possibility of losing some public support was also raised, 
with the observation that critics of the organisation would be provided with 
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‘plentiful ammunition’.   Concerns were also expressed that the core group of 
activists dedicated to non-violent civil disobedience would deplete the human 
resources of the organisation for other actions and that the Wagerup occupation 
could involve a considerable financial burden in fines and litigation expenses.   It 
was emphasised that occupiers would have to exhibit a ‘high level of moral 
purpose and resolve’ as they could face high personal costs, which might include 
possible criminal convictions, police abuse, loss of jobs and physical violence.
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On Saturday, 3 February 1979, sixteen members of the CSNF climbed past a gate 
into the site of Alcoa’s proposed refinery at Wagerup and thus began the first 
occupation of a site in Australia utilising tactics of non-violent civil 
disobedience.
140   Immediately prior to the occupation a rally of some 300 
supporters were addressed by Alan Tingay, CSNF president, John Dawkins, 
Labor MHR for Fremantle, and Jack Evans, state president of the Australian 
Democrats.   A proportion of the crowd comprised members of the Down to 
Earth Association, who had attended a conference and festival on alternative life-
styles at Nanga Brook the previous weekend and decided to support the action.
141 
      
During the first two days the occupiers of the site remained unchallenged, as 
Alcoa decided to halt operations over the weekend.   The protesters demanded 
that the project be suspended and called for a federal public inquiry into the 
bauxite industry in Western Australia.   While not offering violence, the 
occupiers intended to disrupt operations when work resumed by obstructing 
roads, machinery or fuel supplies.
142 
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Jane Hutchison, a politics lecturer at Murdoch University, recalls that she first 
became involved in the forest protest movement in 1978, and believes this 
occurred largely through the influence of her parents, who were politically active 
and sympathetic to conservation issues.   As a member of the CSNF who took 
part in the first Wagerup occupation, Hutchison said the objective of the protest 
was to occupy the site for as long as possible and to gain maximum publicity.   
The main purpose of non-violent civil disobedience, she explained, was to ensure 
that public attention was kept focused on the ‘cause’ and not the ‘protest’.     
Hutchison argued that the Wagerup occupation demonstrated a controlled and 
disciplined approach to protest through ensuring that those who participated were 
vetted and properly trained before the action began and that one person was 
designated as a media spokesperson.    While some members of the CSNF 
thought the protest would result in a backlash against the organisation, she 
judged the action to have been successful by increasing publicity for the 
campaign against bauxite mining and demonstrating the group’s resolve over the 
issue.
143 
      
The Wagerup occupation was remarkable not only for the establishment of a 
benchmark for non-violent protest in Western Australia, but also for the 
exploitation of the media.    Neil Bartholomaeus became actively involved in the 
conservation movement in 1974 and emerged as one of the key figures in the 
CSNF.   He acted as the organisation's spokesperson for five years and played a 
prominent role in the 1981 Jarrah Class Action.   
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As the CSNF’s media spokesperson at the time of the Wagerup occupation, 
Bartholomaeus recalled that the action generated considerable attention as that 
particular method of protest had not been employed before.   He said one of the 
group’s main objectives was to attract as much publicity as possible through 
using the media effectively.   In order to achieve this aim, Bartholomaeus 
organised media workshops prior to Wagerup as part of the group’s overall 
campaign strategy.
144 
      
During the afternoon of 5 February 1979, twelve protesters were arrested by 
police and later charged with obstructing a lawful activity under Section 67 of 
the  Police Act.   The charges were subsequently dismissed after it was 
established that, while Alcoa had been given oral approval, the company had not 
received written authorisation for its operations from the state government.
145 
(see Figure 4.2.) 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Wagerup protesters gather outside the Yarloop Police Court.   
Source: Daily News, 6 February 1979. 
 
The CSNF capitalised on the publicity generated by the Wagerup occupation and 
published a broadsheet explaining why it had been necessary for activists to 
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occupy the site and place themselves in jeopardy.   Their actions, it was stated, 
arose from a desire to protect the interests of present and future West Australians 
and to take a ‘moral stand’ over the expansion of bauxite mining.   The state’s 
forests, water catchments and resources were being handed over to multi-national 
companies and this, the CSNF declared, posed a threat to everyone.   The 
publication called on the government to abandon the construction of the 
Wagerup refinery and to conduct a full public inquiry into the alumina 
industry.
146  
 
During April 1979 the CSNF conducted further training weekends for a planned 
second occupation of the Wagerup refinery site, with an appeal for participation 
from those who were ‘prepared to make a moral stand against the machinery of 
the multi-nationals’.   Those members who had previously been reluctant to take 
part were urged to commit themselves to attend the final training session on the 
weekend of 5-6 May.
147  
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Figure 4.3. Poster advertising second Wagerup occupation.  Source: Mahon 
archive, Battye Library (SLWA). 
 
On Saturday, 26 May 1979, the second anti-bauxite mining protest organised by 
the CSNF began at Wagerup. (see Figure 4.3.)   After assembling outside the 
Waroona Hotel and watching a street theatre performance, about 200 
demonstrators were addressed by organisers of the campaign.    At around noon, 
25 members of the group scaled a fence and entered Alcoa’s bauxite refinery 
site.
148  Like the first occupation, the group remained undisturbed over the 
weekend.   When Alcoa commenced work at the site on Monday 28 May, 23 of 
the occupiers were arrested after forming a human blockade to prevent 
earthworks operations being carried out.
149 (see Figure 4.4.)   The demonstrators 
were convicted of obstruction but the convictions were subsequently quashed 
because of the Crown’s failure to demonstrate that Alcoa was acting under a state 
licence.
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Figure 4.4.  Anti-bauxite mining protesters attempt to haul their banner onto a 
bulldozer during the second Wagerup occupation.  Source: West Australian, 29 
May 1979.  
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The organisation and activities surrounding the second Wagerup occupation 
formed the basis for a documentary that illustrated the organisation and strategy 
of the CSNF during its campaign against bauxite mining.   The film Wagerup 
Weekend followed the protesters through a role-playing practice session prior to 
the Wagerup demonstration and contained discussion amongst group members of 
preparations for action at the site.   Interviews revealed a sense of unity and 
belonging to a common cause: ‘Feel proud of everyone here – feel that we’re 
doing something that’s right – something that needs to be done – everybody 
supports each other.’   One young female protester who was arrested told of her 
fear during the protest: 
I stood at the side of the bulldozer but in front of it, it just kept on 
coming towards me...I felt like running away, I was just so frightened.   
But I thought this is really what I’m here for and I just had to stay there.   
I can’t run now, if I just stay here he’ll have to stop.   And eventually, 
when the mud got half-way up my leg he did stop.   It was just such a 
terrifying thing but I knew that I had the power, and that if I just stayed 
there and could withstand the terrifying experience of having this 
bulldozer coming right at you then eventually he would stop and that’s 
exactly what happened.
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While not actively involved in the physical occupation of the Wagerup site, 
Christine Sharp and Andrew Thamo were both instrumental in the organisation 
of the events.       Sharp recalled that the forest protest movement during the 
1970s was important as the first mass environmental protest issue in Western 
Australia and for establishing a new era during which forest protest became part 
of the political landscape: 
What was new was that this was an environment movement, it wasn’t a 
socialist movement...effectively it was a new movement in that the 
focus was on the protection of the environment, and that was something 
very new in Western Australia...and we were at the very forefront of 
that.
152 
 
  141 
Thamo considered that, while the Wagerup occupation was an important event in 
the evolution of the Western Australian forest protest movement, he believed the 
main activity had begun to occur in the political arena.
153      
      
The failure to successfully prosecute any of the Wagerup occupiers resulted in 
the introduction of new legislation to protect development projects from 
disruption by protesters.  Premier Court believed the government had a 
responsibility to take action to prevent ‘protesters, malcontents and others’ from 
disrupting projects that were essential to the nation’s economic prosperity.
154   
Under the Government Agreements Act, 1979, people who hindered or obstructed 
activities being carried out under agreement with the Western Australian 
government would in future be liable to a $5,000 fine or 12 months’ 
imprisonment.
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Threats to Western Australia’s native forests from the expansion of wood 
chipping during the early 1970s provided the catalyst for the creation of two 
dedicated forest protest groups which in turn resulted in an expansion and 
intensification of forest activism.    The groups applied different strategic 
approaches to forest protest, with the CSNF employing more confrontational 
forms of activism such as demonstrations and staged events, while the more 
conservative SFDF relied on detailed submissions and legal challenges to present 
its arguments.  Most importantly, the formation of the two groups afforded 
people alternative means through which to express their dissent. 
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Despite the differences in their forms of protest, both groups were united in a 
common aim to protect Western Australia’s forests and, in some instances, they 
were willing to collaborate in furtherance of this objective.    Through the use of 
a diverse range of tactics, the groups succeeded in using the media to focus 
attention on the forests and projecting the issue of forest protection as one worthy 
of public and parliamentary debate.  Like many protest groups, the success of the 
CSNF and SFDF depended on the dynamism of leaders such as Andrew Thamo, 
Christine Sharp, Beth Schultz and Arthur Conacher, who were instrumental in 
framing the groups’ characteristically different approaches to forest protest. 
      
Reactions against the potential environmental damage to the jarrah forest from 
bauxite mining during the late 1970s further transformed the forest protest 
movement.   It was the Wagerup occupation that completed the transition of 
forest protest from conventional forms of dissent to more explicit and 
confrontational strategies of direct action.   Most significantly, the decade 
witnessed the emergence of native forest protest as a cohesive and dynamic 
social movement that promised to exert an increasing influence on Western 
Australia's political landscape. 
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Although the strategies of non-violent direct action employed at Wagerup were 
still fresh in the minds of activists and were used effectively during eastern states 
actions such as Terania Creek and the Franklin campaign, in Western Australia at 
the start of the 1980s forest protest groups shifted away from strategies of overt 
physical protest.   A new orientation provided an early example of the ‘liberatory 
and corporatist tendencies’ that Hutton and Connors argue occurred within the 
Australian environment movement from 1983 to 1990.
1    There was a noticeable 
move towards organisational professionalism, utilisation of complex and 
intensive research, employment of legal advocacy, and ongoing criticism of 
government environmental policy and forest management practices.   At this time 
the forest protest movement reflected the dilemma identified by Beder, in which 
environmental groups had to decide whether or not they should continue to use 
direct action to further their cause, or whether they should risk compromising 
their position by entering into negotiation with government agencies.
2     
      
Whereas the final images of the 1970s were those of physical confrontation, the 
early 1980s saw the employment of a range of non-confrontational tactics aimed 
at both generating pressure on governments to conserve Western Australia’s 
forests and elevating forest issues as an area of priority within state politics.    
The 1983 election of an apparently sympathetic Labor government and the 
fulfilment of two key election pledges raised expectations that real progress 
could be made on conserving the state's forests.   However, while on the one 
hand the 1980s was a decade of growth and optimism when activists sought to 
thrust forest issues into public prominence and convince people that conservation 
of the state's forests deserved their attention, it was also a time of mixed success, 
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when a series of major campaigns tested the movement's organisational strength 
and the effectiveness of its strategies. 
      
This chapter argues that the early 1980s was a watershed period for the Western 
Australian forest protest movement, during which new activist strategies and 
political turbulence combined to produce a shift in the dynamics between forest 
protest groups and powerful elites.      The chapter examines how, at the start of 
the decade, the involvement of Western Australian activists in Tasmania's 
Franklin River campaign established valuable communication networks and 
provided organisational and tactical guidance for the conduct of local protest 
actions.   It argues that, while legal challenges failed as protest strategies, the 
protest movement benefited from considerable media exposure.  Most 
importantly, the chapter argues that the forest protest movement's two major 
victories in the 1980s occurred as a result of the success of urban-based forest 
protest groups in employing effective political negotiating strategies that 
influenced the inclusion of specific forest conservation policies within the 
Western Australian Labor Party's policy platform and ensuring that those policies 
were implemented when the party won government. 
 
The Franklin Campaign in Western Australia 
 In June 1979, Tom Hogarth, a student at the University of Western Australia, 
decided to apply to the Tasmanian Wilderness Society executive to  'revive' the 
Western Australian branch of the Society which had previously existed on an 
informal basis.  Following the success of several slide shows about western 
Tasmania he had organised during the previous year, the level of attendances and 
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the extent of public interest in Tasmania, Hogarth believed a ‘small but keen’ 
group could be established, and requested information on the availability of 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society publicity material.
3     
      
The Tasmanian Wilderness Society had been founded in July 1976 to oppose a 
threat to the south-west Tasmanian wilderness posed by a proposal to dam the 
Gordon River below its confluence with the Franklin.
4  During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the campaign to save the Franklin River transformed the 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society into a national organisation, with branches 
opening around Australia.   It also succeeded in placing wilderness preservation 
firmly on the national political agenda.
5 
      
Hogarth had worked in Tasmania before returning to Perth and had been a 
foundation member of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society at its inaugural 
meeting at Bob Brown’s house near Launceston.    The Western Australian 
branch of the Society was created to lend credence to the expansion of the 
national campaign and as part of an overall strategy to establish branches in all 
Australian capital cities.   Most people joined the group because they had been 
walking or climbing in Tasmania and had developed an emotional attachment to 
the central and west coast.  According to Hogarth, the prohibitive cost of air fares 
to Tasmania at the time tended to restrict membership to the more affluent.     
Initially the Western Australian group comprised 30 to 40 members, with about 
10 being actively involved.
6  
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As branch secretary, Hogarth immediately began organising an active campaign, 
seeking ideas from members and emphasising the need for urgent action to save 
the Franklin.   Supporters were invited to attend regular meetings and to bring 
along their friends.   Those working in Perth were asked to distribute pamphlets 
and to attend slide shows and film evenings.    The Society’s newsletter 
'Freecurrents' was widely distributed, with invitations for contributions and 
suggestions for improvement.
7    Representations to Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser sought the intervention of the federal government to preserve Tasmania’s 
south-west as a World Heritage and National Heritage Wilderness area.
8  
      
The local branch gained from being able to draw on the expertise of the Society's 
central organisation in Hobart, which issued guidance on the logistics of 
establishing a Tasmanian Wilderness Society branch and advice on meeting 
procedure, bank accounts, fundraising, lobbying, stunts, and branch initiation.
9   
At the height of the Franklin blockade the branch was kept informed of progress 
by regular bulletins, which included reflections on training and preparation, 
appraisals of operations and tactics, and thoughts on future directions.
10  
      
By August 1980, Hogarth was able to report to the Tasmanian Wilderness 
Society National Meeting that the membership and activities of the Western 
Australian branch had increased beyond expectations and that a core of six 
central group workers provided logistical support through donating the use of 
telephones and other facilities.   Media coverage had expanded, with publicity on 
the ABC and the Western Australian Institute of Technology radio station 6NR.   
  152 
Letter writing and film nights were regarded by Hogarth as the group’s most 
successful campaign strategies.
11 
      
The profile of the Western Australian Branch of the Tasmanian Wilderness 
Society was enhanced in July 1981, when one of its members, Peter Robertson 
from Dalkeith, decided to raise funds and public awareness of the Franklin 
campaign by cycling from Perth to Hobart across the Nullarbor Plain.
12   
Robertson, a farmer's son and originally from Kojonup, was concerned about 
increasing levels of land clearing during the 1970s, and it was this, combined 
with a growing sensitivity to environmental issues, that influenced his decision to 
become involved in the movement to protect Western Australia's forests.   In the 
late 1970s he joined the Campaign to Save Native Forests (WA) and the 
Wilderness Society, and had taken an active part in the 1979 Wagerup 
occupation to protest against bauxite mining in the jarrah forest.  Along with 
Beth Schultz, Robertson would emerge as a prominent figure in the Western 
Australian forest protest movement through his abilities as a campaign strategist 
and media spokesperson. After successfully completing the 7,000 kilometre trip 
to Hobart, which he described as ‘uneventful, just long and quite lonely’, 
Robertson said he received a positive response from the media and was able to 
‘spread the wilderness message’ over more than twenty newspapers and radio 
stations, and five television stations.
13 
 
As the campaign to save the Franklin gathered momentum, the local Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society branch produced publicity leaflets that explained to Western 
Australians why they could not afford to ignore what was happening in 
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Tasmania.    The Society argued that legal and environmental precedents 
established during the Franklin campaign would have future implications for the 
conservation movement in Western Australia and that Tasmania’s wilderness 
areas were not solely the property of that state but rather part of a broader 
national heritage.    It further pointed out that the construction of a dam to flood 
the wilderness area would be built partially with money from Western 
Australians through federal taxation.   Electors were urged to voice their 
opposition to the Gordon-below-Franklin dam by writing to state and federal 
politicians.
14 
      
Basil Schur, who in 2005 was Projects Manager for Green Skills in Denmark, 
Western Australia, had been an active member of the CSNF during the 1980s.   
In December 1982 he went to Tasmania and joined the Franklin River blockade.   
Schur remembers ‘cross-fertilisation’ between environmental groups in eastern 
and Western Australia and recalled that the tactics of non-violent direct action, 
imported from the United States and used by members of the CSNF during its 
occupation of Alcoa’s Wagerup bauxite refinery site in early 1979, influenced 
the strategies employed by the Tasmanian Wilderness Society in the Franklin 
campaign.   Before leaving to take part in the blockade, Schur undertook a course 
of non-violence training in Western Australia.
15 
      
The political impact of the Franklin campaign and its influence on the election of 
the Hawke government in 1983 have been subjects of a number of studies.
16   
Hutton and Connors argue that the campaign’s effects were twofold: firstly, on a 
constitutional level, to confirm the Commonwealth government’s external affairs 
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power to intervene in state government issues to protect areas of conservation 
value that are World Heritage listed, and secondly, to increase the environment 
movement’s awareness of its capacity to exert substantial political influence, 
particularly within the Australian Labor Party.
17    Political scientist Amanda 
Lohrey views the Franklin River blockade as a defining moment in Australian 
political history, when the Wilderness Society campaign thrust ecological issues 
into the political mainstream by galvanising national public opinion and, for the 
first time, empowering a green organisation to play a key role in determining the 
fate of the major parties.
18      
      
While the impact of the Franklin issue may not have exerted as great an influence 
on Western Australian electors as those in the eastern states,
19 the Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society (WA) campaign, driven by the enthusiasm and leadership of 
Tom Hogarth, contributed towards the overall organisation of protest in Western 
Australia.  The campaign succeeded in two important areas.   The establishment 
of regular communications with the Tasmanian Wilderness Society's central 
organisation in Hobart consolidated links with eastern states environmental 
groups and provided valuable guidance on strategies and tactics to be employed 
in the local campaign.   Additionally, the group's public education strategies 
stimulated a broader sense of environmental awareness among many Western 
Australians. 
 
After the success of the Franklin campaign, the 1980s saw a gradual expansion of 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society (WA) activities.   Besides maintaining a 
campaign office in Perth, the branch opened a retail outlet in Fremantle.   In 
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1989, the national organisation placed Western Australia on a shortlist of 
campaign priorities, with Peter Robertson appointed as the state’s campaign 
officer.   Robertson said he was particularly concerned about proposals for 
mining in National Parks, and sought the support of the Western Australian 
community for the proper protection and management of the state’s wilderness 
areas.
20   The decade ended with the Society participating in a procession 
through Perth streets to the Premier’s office, calling for the declaration of Mt 
Lesueur as a national park in the face of threats from mining interests.
21    
      
The fight to save Tasmania's Franklin River motivated an energetic Perth-based 
campaign that provided local activists with invaluable campaign experience, 
albeit eastern states-based.   Western Australia's two dedicated forest protest 
groups, along with others, soon found themselves organising and devising 
strategies in renewed opposition to the threat to the forests that had inspired their 
foundation. 
 
Wood Chipping 
The early 1980s saw an intensification of the campaign against wood chipping in 
Western Australia’s south-west forests, particularly in response to the WA Chip 
and Pulp Company’s intention to seek an increase in its export quota of wood 
chips. The campaign demonstrated how, during the early 1980s, the forest protest 
movement employed non-confrontational strategies aimed at maintaining a 
public focus on forest issues by educating Western Australians about the need for 
forest protection and using the media as a forum to stimulate debate. 
      
  156 
As part of their campaign strategy, protest groups continually reminded the 
public about the debilitating environmental effects of wood chipping and, in 
January 1980, members of the South-West Forests Defence Foundation (SFDF) 
invited journalist Andre Malan from the West Australian newspaper to 
accompany them on a tour of the karri forest.   During the visit, Malan was able 
to observe the impact of clear-felling on the forest: 
It is not always a pretty sight.   The sombre majesty of the forest is 
shattered at intervals by a flattened landscape churned up by tracks of 
bulldozers and strewn with the stumps and sawn-off logs of huge 
22 trees.  
During the two-day visit, SFDF members pointed out instances where aspects of 
the Forests Department’s clear-felling operations had not complied with 
environmental impact recommendations, with the Department admitting that 
there had been ‘some oversights’.   Malan, however, was not entirely convinced 
by the SFDF's arguments.   He concluded that, while SFDF monitoring of the 
wood chip industry effectively reduced opportunities for excesses that would 
damage the environment and increased public awareness of 'a unique resource', 
the organisation’s case was weakened by its unsubstantiated claim that the 
Forests Department was unaware and unconcerned about the impact of its 
forestry practices.
23 
      
A further tactical initiative by the SFDF at this time was the introduction of 
conducted weekend trips to the Pemberton area, with the object of exposing 
members of the public to the ‘shock therapy’ of visiting areas of wood chipping 
operations.   Foundation members would be on hand to explain aspects of forest 
management, and to foster an appreciation of the reasons for protest actions.   
Organisation members were encouraged to persuade supporters of the wood chip 
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industry to participate in the tours.   By July 1980 four weekend trips had been 
held and, while exact numbers of those who participated are not known, SFDF 
members described those who visited the clear-felled areas as 'sympathetic but 
with little inkling of the full extent of the disaster'. 
24 
      
In May 1980, the SFDF learned from a ‘leaked’ state government document that 
in November 1979 the WA Chip and Pulp Company had applied for a 50% 
increase in its export wood chips quota, comprising 150,000 tonnes of jarrah 
sawmill residue and a further 200,000 tonnes of other material.   The Company 
had obtained approval for the first portion of the increase from the federal 
Minister for Primary Industry.
25   As a consequence, the Conservation Council 
pointed out to the federal Minister for Science and the Environment that the 
Western Australian government had apparently supported the request without 
following guidelines established for the variation of export licences, which 
required the application of social and environmental impact studies.
26   
      
In response, the Federal Minister stated that the Western Australian government 
had asked the WA Chip and Pulp Company to prepare an Environmental Review 
and Management Programme on its proposal, and on this basis his department 
did not consider an Environmental Impact Statement was required.   While the 
initial 150,000 tonnes of sawmill residue had already been approved, there was 
provision for review of the approval after the Environmental Review and 
Management Programme had been considered.
27    The Conservation Council 
subsequently registered its concern at the ‘illogical and unacceptable’ procedure 
that permitted approval for increases in wood chip production prior to the 
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preparation of environmental reviews and impact statements, and requested that 
these studies be available for public scrutiny and comment before approval was 
granted.
28 
      
The WA Chip and Pulp Company’s application attracted protests from other 
groups.   The Tree Society believed there had been insufficient public debate 
over the proposal to expand wood chip exports and was concerned that the 
increase would deplete timber stocks for the home market.   Furthermore, 
considering the lack of adequate jarrah and karri forest parks in the state to 
protect the species for future generations, the Society could see no justification 
for additional exports.
29 
      
Reacting to the proposal, the CSNF emphasised the WA Chip and Pulp 
Company’s greed for profits, drawing attention to the fact that, while the 
Company’s 1975 licence allowed it to export 750,000 tonnes of wood chips 
annually for 15 years, the Company now wished to chip a further 350,000 tonnes 
of material after only five years.  The group alleged that in approving the initial 
component of 150,000 tonnes the state government had manipulated the truth by 
presupposing the outcome of environmental reviews.
30   The CSNF considered 
the threat to the forests from the significant expansion of wood chipping to be a 
major challenge for the ensuing year.
31   A four-page broadsheet alerted the 
public to the fact that over three-quarters of the state’s native forests had been 
cleared in less than 150 years, and argued that, unless new policies were 
implemented immediately, by the year 2000 most of the state forest in the wood 
chip lease area would have been clear felled.
32 
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The selection of the wood chip issue as a subject for debate on a 1982 edition of 
Robin Williams’ Science Show, reflected the ability of Western Australia’s forest 
protest movement at that time to thrust the controversy onto the public platform.    
The programme examined three questions:  whether trees were being cut down 
faster than they could be replaced; whether or not saw-log quality timber was 
being wood chipped; and whether there was evidence that the state’s taxpayers 
were benefiting from the wood chip industry.
33   In seeking answers to these 
questions, the programme also demonstrated the increasing power of the forest 
protest movement’s anti-wood chipping campaign.   
      
On the programme geographer Arthur Conacher argued that the Forests 
Department believed the forests were its possession to exploit for timber 
production, whereas they really belonged to the people of the state.    Conacher 
contended that, rather than providing economic benefits, the wood chip industry 
had cost the state $9 million through subsidies to the Forests Department and for 
infrastructure, with timber industry employment falling by 1,000 workers 
between 1970 and 1980.  Ex-forester John Thomson related his personal 
experiences regarding the waste of timber resources, alleging that timber mill 
quality logs had been used for wood chips.
34   
      
In response, Bruce Beggs, the Conservator of Forests, agreed that the forests 
were being over-cut: 
In any cut of an over-mature forest you will find that the level of cut is 
well in excess of the rate of growth.   Regrettably, we have been 
imprisoned by our own jargon...and have referred to “sustained yield” 
when it wasn’t achievable in an old growth forest...There is certainly 
more wood being taken out from the hardwood forest at the present time 
than is being added to the forest capital each year. 
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Beggs emphasised that the Forests Department’s long-term objective was 
directed towards a sustained yield forest policy, with a reduction in cutting timed 
to coincide with increased production of pine saw logs.   He refuted Thomson’s 
claims over chipping of quality timber, claiming there was no evidence to 
support the allegation.
35 
      
While the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s initial licence for the export of 150,000 
tonnes of jarrah sawmill residue was not used because of the discovery that 
jarrah was not suitable for paper pulp,
36 the intensification of the anti-wood chip 
campaign at this time further strengthened the forest protest movement's 
influence.    The adoption of ‘persuasive’ as opposed to ‘confrontational’ 
strategies, such as encouraging visits to clear-felled areas of forest, were 
successful in generating sympathy by exposing both the public and the media to 
the stark environmental consequences of wood chipping.    Most importantly, 
pressure on the state government over its decision to support the WA Chip and 
Pulp Company's wood chip licence application and the lack of an adequate public 
consultation and review process, ensured that the government and its agencies 
were aware that future actions would attract the scrutiny of an energetic Western 
Australian forest protest movement.    
 
The Jarrah Class Action 
At the start of the 1980s, the forest protest movement became aware of 
increasing threats to the environment and public health from the expansion of 
bauxite mining in the jarrah forests.   Furthermore, frustration mounted at the 
state Liberal Government’s failure to listen to the voices of environmentalists 
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and the public over the issue and its refusal to conduct an inquiry into the bauxite 
mining and alumina industry.   While the 1979 occupations of Alcoa’s Wagerup 
refinery site had generated considerable publicity for the plight of the jarrah 
forests, it had failed to halt the company’s operations or secure any concessions 
from the state government.   These frustrations were further compounded by state 
government procrastination over the Conservation Council’s jarrah reserve 
proposal and the application of policies that embodied commitments to mining 
rather than conservation.
37  As a result, the movement turned to one of its most 
controversial and confronting strategies.   
      
In January 1981, Ross Lonnie, a Perth lawyer, was working in the United States 
representing Australian Vietnam veterans in a class action that had been initiated 
by American veterans against the manufacturers of the Agent Orange defoliant.   
Lonnie mentioned Western Australian environmentalists’ concerns over the 
effects of bauxite mining to the leader of the class action, Victor Yannacone, 
who had pioneered legal actions in the United States against companies whose 
practices affected groups of people rather than individuals.   After Lonnie 
showed him some photographs of the impact of bauxite mining on the jarrah 
forests, Yannacone was shocked that Australians tolerated actions from 
American-based companies that would not be acceptable in the United States.
38   
After Yannacone indicated that a class action might be possible over the 
environmental effects of bauxite mining, a special meeting of the Conservation 
Council of Western Australia’s executive authorised him to act on its behalf.   An 
initial sum of $10,000 was raised, with $2,000 from the Council, $3,500 from the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF), and the balance from private 
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individuals.
39   Although the CSNF was a major influence in initiating the action, 
that organisation’s failure to incorporate had prompted the Conservation Council 
to assume the leading role.   Some saw this as a courageous move by the Council, 
particularly as the case could involve a heavy financial commitment.
40 
      
In formulating the action, Yannacone could not rely on the applicability of 
United States environmental protection legislation in other countries.   For this 
reason he decided to frame the case around anti-trust legislation, which made it 
an offence to combine or conspire in practices that restrained trade.   The 
successful application of the legislation in an action brought by Westinghouse 
against four Australian companies had created the impression that United States 
courts would consider issues beyond its borders.   The Western Australian class 
action would also provide ‘novelty value’ as the first by an environmental group 
outside the United States to be heard in an American court.
41 
      
Neil Bartholomaeus, a CSNF member who had played a prominent role as media 
spokesperson at the Wagerup protest and was now president of the Conservation 
Council, assumed the leading role in the action and, in mid-February 1981, 
travelled to the United States to confer with Yannacone on preparation of the 
case.   Although Western Australian forest activists had endeavoured to keep 
their plans confidential, media interest sparked by ‘environmental sources in the 
Eastern States’ fuelled speculation that the state’s environmentalists were 
planning legal action to shut down alumina exports to the United States.   Perth's 
Western Mail newspaper observed that the Conservation Council president had 
flown overseas and would not divulge the reason for his trip.
42 
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On 24 February 1981, the Conservation Council, as plaintiff, initiated a class 
action in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, against the Aluminium Company of America (ALCOA), and the 
Reynolds Metal Company.   The complaint was based on a doctrine of ‘equitable 
trust’, which held that a nation’s resources are held in trust for the public by the 
sovereign, and that no government could legislate away the public’s right to 
appeal against the misuse of those resources.   Specifically, the complaint 
asserted: 
...the rights of the people of Western Australia, not only of this 
generation, but of those generations yet unborn, to the full benefit, use, 
and enjoyment of the resources of the hydrosphere, atmosphere, 
lithosphere, and biosphere associated with the Darling Range Ecological 
System of the South-West Botanical Province of Western Australia, and 
the natural, economic, social, and societal systems operative therein and 
thereupon without degradation and damage attributable to the bauxite 
mining, alumina refining, and aluminium smelting operations of the 
defendants ALUMINIUM COMPANY OF AMERICA (ALCOA) and 
REYNOLDS METALS CO., their subsidiaries and joint venturers.
43 
 
The action sought judgements restraining the defendants from further bauxite 
mining, alumina refining and alumina smelting operations within the forests of 
Western Australia, unless and until it could be established that such operations 
did not damage or degrade the Darling Range Regional Ecological System of 
Western Australia, did not increase salinity, and did not encourage dieback 
disease.   The complaint listed the names of 30 organisations as being affiliated 
and represented in the action by the Conservation Council.
44 
      
The five months between the initiation of the Jarrah Class Action in February 
1981 and the court judgement in August produced one of the most turbulent and 
tense periods in the history of Western Australian forest protest and generated 
considerable publicity for the movement.         From the outset, the Conservation 
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Council’s initiative attracted extensive media coverage.   The American press 
described the action as ‘precedent-setting’ and ‘unusual’, with an Alcoa 
spokesperson expressing surprise that anyone would challenge the Company’s 
environmental record in Australia.
45   National newspapers in Australia 
emphasised the potential impact of a successful court case on the country’s 
economy, with estimates that exports worth $300 million a year were 
threatened,
46 and that Alcoa’s Western Australian operations could be shut 
down, with the loss of 20,000 jobs.
47   In an editorial, the West Australian argued 
that the environmentalists’ action tarnished Australia’s reputation, and that they 
could not prevent the future development of the state’s resources.
48 
      
An ABC Four Corners debate in March 1981 emphasised the division between 
the parties to the issue.   While Senator Gareth Evans, the Shadow Attorney-
General, acknowledged conservationists’ frustrations at the inadequacy of 
Australian law to resolve their complaint and control the operations of multi-
national companies, both state government and opposition representatives 
deplored the strategy of attempting to seek legal redress in the United States 
courts.
49   In a radio discussion, ALP opposition MLA (Fremantle) David Parker, 
said he believed bauxite mining could take place without devastating important 
areas of forest and still be economically viable but this was not happening at the 
moment.  While considering the Jarrah Class Action an inappropriate method of 
seeking forest conservation, he believed it was important in highlighting the need 
for class action procedures in Australia, and for greater control over bauxite 
mining.
50   
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Predictably, the state Liberal Government was outraged at the Conservation 
Council’s actions.   Premier Court called on the conservation movement to ‘curb 
the extremists’ within its ranks or be discredited in the Western Australian 
community.   He believed that environmental activists had misled the public, and 
likened the Jarrah Class Action to holding a gun to the head of 50,000 workers 
and families.
51   Gordon Masters, the state Minister for Conservation and the 
Environment, called on the Commonwealth Government to stop funding the 
Conservation Council of Western Australia, arguing that public money should 
not be used to take legal action against an industry that provided almost 20,000 
jobs.
52 
      
Parliamentary debates illustrate the seriousness with which the Court government 
regarded the Jarrah Class Action and the anger the issue provoked.   In the 
Legislative Assembly, Tom Herzfeld, Liberal, Mundaring, initiated a debate on 
the threat he believed was posed by environmental extremists in Western 
Australia.   He argued that Neil Bartholomaeus   was part of an international 
conspiracy to destroy western democracies.  The affiliation of Western 
Australian environmentalists with overseas activist groups he regarded as a threat 
to the sovereignty of the state.
53 
      
In April 1981, Premier Court moved the following motion in the Western 
Australian Parliament: 
That the Parliament of Western Australia views with grave concern the 
action taken by the Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc. in 
launching in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania a class action aimed at restricting and possibly crippling 
the bauxite/alumina industry in Western Australia...This Parliament 
deplores the institution of this action which it believes is directed 
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against the best interests of the State of Western Australia, the 
livelihood of many thousands of Western Australians and the Australian 
nation...The elected representatives of the people of Western Australia 
in this Parliament assembled assert their right to determine what matters 
are in the best interests of the people of Western Australia and their 
right to make and uphold the laws of the State of Western Australia...
54 
 
Presenting the motion, Premier Court said he believed that, if the class action 
were successful, it had the potential to challenge not only the sovereignty of 
Western Australia but also that of the nation, and hence the economic 
development of the country.   The Premier listed a number of threats posed by 
the action, which included threats to the future of an industry that had 
parliamentary favour, to the economic benefits conferred by the alumina 
industry, to the prosperity of south-western towns and to the two alumina 
refineries under construction.  
      
In reply, the Leader of the Labor opposition, Ron Davies, said he wished to 
dispel any notion that the Australian Labor Party was associated with the class 
action, insisting that the Party was committed to a policy of opposing any attempt 
to interfere with the sovereignty of the Australian government.  He said the 
opposition was, however, sympathetic to conservationists’ frustrations at the 
government’s insensitivity and failure to respond to their requests, and expressed 
the Party’s concern at the lack of any legal recourse in Australia through which 
environmentalists could present their case.   Hendy Cowan, National Party, 
Merredin, argued that, while his party opposed the class action, believing that the 
issue should be determined in Western Australia, the fact that the action had 
generated considerable public support was an indictment of the parliamentary 
system.  He stated that governments were too lenient in making agreements and 
that, as parliamentarians, they should be ashamed that conservationists were 
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given no opportunity to represent their views.   After the defeat of an opposition 
amendment on party lines, the original motion was passed.
55   The motion 
subsequently received the concurrence of the Legislative Council.
56 
      
One of the major impacts of the Jarrah Class Action was the emergence of a split 
within the Western Australian Labor Party between those members who adhered 
to the party’s pro-development policy, and environmentalists, who opposed the 
expansion of bauxite mining.
57   In early March 1981, Mike Barnett, the 
opposition spokesman on conservation and the environment, stated that the ALP 
had never opposed bauxite mining and would not support any move to close the 
industry.
58  Neil Bartholomaeus, who had initiated the Jarrah Class Action while 
at the same time a prominent member of the ALP, became a target for criticism, 
with senior party members concerned that the action was becoming identified 
with the Labor Party.   Gil Barr, secretary of the Australian Workers’ Union, said 
the Union objected to Bartholomaeus’ stance because it threatened the 
employment of its workers and asked how, as a member of the ALP’s industrial 
development committee, Bartholomaeus could attempt to stifle development.
59    
The division within Labor ranks was exploited by the Liberal government.  In 
state parliament, Herzfeld suggested that the ALP was embarrassed at having 
Bartholomaeus as a member and that his activities might not be tolerated.
60  ALP 
polarisation became complete when, in defiance of the parliamentary party, the 
state executive voted to support the Jarrah Class Action, with the executive’s 
conservation lobby arguing that multi-national corporations should be held 
accountable for their activities in the courts of their parent nations.
61 
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By the end of May 1981, the Jarrah Class Action had attracted the serious 
attention of the federal Liberal government.   Peter Durack, the Attorney-
General, said the government was ‘deeply concerned’, particularly regarding the 
implications of the action for the freedom of the Australian parliament to 
determine resource development policies.  He advised that the Commonwealth 
government had already asked the United States government to intervene in the 
proceedings, and to consider the difficulties such action would pose for relations 
between the United States and Australia.
62     On 8 June 1981 the Australian 
government, in consultation with the Western Australian government, filed an 
amicus curiae brief  with the Pittsburgh District Court, challenging the 
jurisdiction of the court to hear the complaint, and submitting that ‘natural 
resource development and environmental protection within Australia are matters 
exclusively within the jurisdictional competence of the Australian nation.’
63  
      
Reaction from the bauxite mining industry to the Jarrah Class Action was aimed 
at placing economic pressure on the state government.   At Alcoa’s annual 
general meeting, company chairman Sir Arvi Parbo said the action by the 
Conservation Council displayed contempt for the Australian government, which 
had approved the company’s activities.   He emphasised the great benefit of the 
industry to the nation and rejected the efforts of environmentalists to override 
Australia’s legal processes.
64  James Vann, Alcoa’s general manager in Western 
Australia, suggested the Jarrah Class Action held frightening implications for 
Australian investment, given the country’s dependence on American capital, and 
voiced his company’s concern that a legal precedent could allow the American 
legal system to decide issues that should be decided within Australia.   He called 
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for greater media coverage of the opinion of genuine ‘mature conservationists’, 
as opposed to those narrow-minded ‘callous environmentalists’ who tainted the 
conservation movement’s reputation through purporting to represent the general 
view.
65   During the same week, Vann announced that Alcoa would not sign any 
contracts to purchase gas from the A$5 billion North-West Shelf offshore gas 
project until the class action lawsuit was settled.
66 
      
While the Jarrah Class Action signified a departure from tactics of 
confrontational direct action, for the forest protest movement it also represented 
an innovative strategy that forced the state government and the mining 
companies to confront the struggle between the imperatives of intensive resource 
extraction and forest conservation.    In practical terms the class action provided 
an opportunity for the forest protest movement to gather public support for the 
campaign to save Western Australia’s jarrah forests.   Immediately following the 
initiation of legal proceedings, an international appeal for funds was launched at 
a public meeting in Perth Town Hall.   The meeting, attended by over 700 
people, heard guest speakers, including Vincent Serventy, explain why the action 
was being taken.   The appeal sought to raise $100,000 to cover estimated legal 
costs, ideally by persuading one thousand Australians to donate $100 each.
67   
During March donations were received at the rate of $1,000 a day, and by the 
end of the month the Western Australian public had donated $27,000.   By late 
May the fund had exceeded $50,000.
68   At the campaign’s close, over 1,000 
supporters had donated a total of $60,000, which left a deficit that the 
Conservation Council did not consider to be ‘debilitating’.
69 
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As well as appealing for donations, both the Conservation Council and the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests maintained constant pressure on politicians to 
support their action on behalf of ‘this class of concerned Australians’.   Letters to 
parliamentarians lobbied for a public enquiry into the alumina industry, stronger 
environmental protection legislation, and reform of Australia’s legal system to 
enable concerned community groups to present their grievances as a ‘class’.
70    
      
The campaign was successful in attracting support from environmental 
organisations outside Western Australia.   Two influential American groups, the 
Sierra Club and the National Resource Defence Council, offered their 
assistance
71 and, in May 1981, the Australian Conservation Foundation decided 
to join the class action as a co-plaintiff.   Geoff Mosley, the organisation’s 
director, said he believed that Australian citizens who were concerned about the 
impact of trans-national corporations’ activities on the Australian environment 
had the right to complain about those corporations.
72   The Foundation pledged 
an initial contribution of $10,000.
73 
 
Although the forest protest movement was heartened by the level of support, 
allegations in the media that the Jarrah Class Action was being promoted by a 
small group of activists and that the issue had caused a rift within the 
environment movement were worrying.  Alcoa general manager, James Vann, 
insisted that a serious split had formed between members of the Conservation 
Council, that the leadership did not speak for the collective membership,
74 and 
that the action had been brought by a small group of people who were 
ideologically or politically motivated.
75   The West Australian reported that the 
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class action had ‘raised wide dissension’ among Conservation Council members, 
and among groups associated with the Council.
76  Additionally, the Western Mail 
described the Council as being ‘completely isolated’ over the issue, with little 
political, financial or grass roots support.
77   Peter Brotherton, a member of the 
Australian Conservation Council Executive and manager of the Environment 
Centre of Western Australia, argued that the media allegations were fabrications 
designed to destabilise the campaign.
78    
      
To counter the allegations of disunity, the Conservation Council of Western 
Australia unanimously passed a resolution stating: 
...that this General Meeting of the Conservation Council condemns and 
deplores the misleading and mischievous speculation in the media that 
there are serious divisions within the Council over the Jarrah Class 
Action.
79 
 
A further resolution expressed continuing support for the action, with 21 groups 
voting in favour, none opposed, and three abstentions.
80   Neil Bartholomaeus, 
the Council’s president, said the show of solidarity refuted statements of a split 
within the Council and accusations that the action had been taken by a small 
clique.
81 
 
There was, however, evidence that some environmental groups and individuals 
did not support the Conservation Council’s action.   Ted Blythe, President of the 
Western Australian Division of the Australian Institute of Landscape Architects, 
reminded the Council that his organisation had abstained from the original 
motion to proceed with the Jarrah Class Action, and asked that the Institute’s 
name be removed from the legal complaint document.  He considered the 
extensive publicity surrounding the action to be a potential source of 
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embarrassment and further requested that the Conservation Council forward a 
letter of apology to the National President of the Institute.
82   While supporting 
the class action, the Tree Society observed that it was not consulted prior to the 
Conservation Council executive’s decision to commence proceedings.
83   
Prominent conservationist Harry Butler could not countenance the prospect of an 
American court exercising jurisdiction within Australia and decided to resign 
from all organisations that supported the Jarrah Class Action.    He believed the 
action would divide the Australian conservation movement.
84 
      
In the face of this opposition, the Conservation Council leadership remained 
resolute.   On moving to Western Australia from Melbourne, Barbara 
Churchward became actively involved in forest issues during the 1970s after 
being impressed by the diversity and accessibility of Perth’s urban bushland.       
As Tree Society delegate to the Conservation Council of Western Australia, she 
became increasingly interested in environmental issues and was subsequently 
elected the Council’s secretary, assuming a key role in the Jarrah Class Action 
campaign.   In a circular letter to affiliated groups she explained that the court 
action had been taken in order to force the United States to accept responsibility 
for the environmental effects of Alcoa’s operations and that the initiative had 
increased the awareness of Western Australians: 
One consequence of the JCA is that the operations of the aluminium 
companies are now of concern to an increasing number of West 
Australians.  They are questioning the ease with which the governments 
sign away the rights of the people to the benefits of a unique natural 
resource treasure – the Jarrah forest – in order to encourage multi-
nationals to mine the Darling Range to produce one of the world’s most 
abundant minerals.
85 
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Churchward recalled that both Alcoa and the state government were  'horrified' at   
the audacity of the Conservation Council in initiating the class action and she 
believed the government regarded the action as undermining the agreement it had 
with Alcoa over bauxite mining.
86  
      
Recalling the campaign as the first action of its kind by an Australian 
environmental group, Neil Bartholomaeus believes the Jarrah Class Action 
generated a high level of public opposition to bauxite mining expansion in 
Western Australia, with people deciding to support the court case who would not 
have considered taking part in non-violent direct action.
87   He emphasised that a 
principal objective of the campaign was to highlight the fact that ordinary 
Australians, as environmentalists, could not seek relief on environmental issues 
on a class action basis within Australia.    The Jarrah Class Action was, for 
Bartholomaeus, the ‘zenith’ of the Campaign to Save Native Forests’ activities.
88 
      
On 9 July 1981, in the Pittsburg Pennsylvania District Court, Judge Maurice 
Cohill dismissed the class action complaint.   The court held that it did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint, that the complainant had failed to 
state a cause of action under anti-trust legislation, and that the complainant had 
not stated a cause of action under Australian law.
89   Bonyhady has argued that 
the class action was weakened through lawyer Yannacone’s attempt to base the 
action on anti-trust legislation.   There was no allegation that the companies had 
‘contracted, combined or conspired’ together, there was no proof that the 
companies had harmed the American economy, and there was no attempt to 
identify a market that had been influenced by anti-competitive conduct.   The 
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case relied only on allegations of the detrimental effects of the companies’ 
operations on the Western Australian environment.
90 
      
Although the Conservation Council seriously considered appealing the 
judgement, it finally decided not to proceed.   Any appeal would have been 
restricted to laws that formed the basis of the February complaint and, as this had 
proved ineffective, it was agreed that resources would be better used in 
attempting to locate more appropriate legislation.
91   Furthermore, the cost of 
mounting an appeal would have imposed an additional financial burden for a 
campaign that had already ‘placed great stress on the human and logistical 
reserves of the Council’.
92   A measure of the effort expended on the class action 
can be gauged from the Conservation Council’s financial records, which show 
that, to the end of June 1981, the Jarrah Class Action Fund had received a total of 
$62,283.02, of which $51,292.64 was from donations.
93 
      
Reaction to the court decision from the Western Australian state government and 
the mining industry was predictably one of relief.    Premier Court interpreted the 
judgement as upholding the fact that foreign courts had no jurisdiction over the 
sovereignty of Australian parliaments. Alcoa affirmed the soundness of its 
environmental practices and believed the successful outcome would be a relief 
for its Western Australian employees.
94  
      
The Jarrah Class Action emerged from a sense of frustration among forest 
activists at the inaction of the state government over measures to protect the 
jarrah forest and at the failure of Australian laws to provide an outlet for their 
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grievances.  As a response to this sense of powerlessness, the initiation of the 
class action suit conforms to the reaction that Burgmann argues is typical of 
social movement development.   Because the forest protest movement found that 
political authorities resisted its demands and were incapable of offering some 
f o r m  o f  r e d r e s s ,  i t  f e l t  c o m p e l l e d  t o  r e s o r t  t o  s o m e  f o r m  o f  p r o t e s t .   T h e  
identification of a common ‘enemy’, in this case, Alcoa’s bauxite mining 
operations in the jarrah forests, resulted in a campaign of collective action that 
challenged the state’s powerful elites.
95  In increasing levels of practical support, 
particularly through substantial financial donations, with over 1,000 people 
contributing $60,000 to the Jarrah Class Action fund,
96 the campaign also 
typifies Klandermans’ theory of participant mobilisation, whereby sympathisers 
are converted from a stage of ‘consensus mobilization’, or intellectual support, to 
that of ‘action mobilization’, when they are transformed into active participants, 
through donating money, time or skills.
97 
      
The class action proved both confrontational and divisive.   It was viewed by the 
state Liberal government as an audacious challenge to its authority and to 
Australia’s sovereignty – an opinion echoed by the federal government, the 
mining industry and the media.   Equally, the state government’s position was 
influenced by the need to adopt a firm stance in order to placate the concerns of a 
major resource extraction industry.   On a party political level, the issue polarised 
the Western Australian ALP, with the environmental lobby forcing a division 
between the state and parliamentary organisations.    Evidence of dissent within 
the conservation movement over the court action was seized upon by bauxite 
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industry proponents in an attempt to weaken the campaign, forcing activists to 
defend their position. 
      
While the Jarrah Class Action was ultimately dismissed and proved a failure as a 
protest strategy, nevertheless there were some benefits for the protest movement.   
The innovative tactic of seeking judgement on an Australian environmental issue 
in a United States court produced extensive media coverage, focusing attention 
on the threat to the jarrah forests.  Furthermore, the class action drew attention to 
growing concerns over the control of trans-national corporations operating within 
Australia and the inability of the nation’s legal system to address the collective 
concerns of environmentalists.   
 
‘Forests Forever’ 
Though smaller in scale, the ‘Forests Forever’ court action provides a further 
example of an attempt by the Western Australian forest protest movement to use 
the legal system as a protest strategy.    As opposed to the class action, which 
aimed to restrict intensive bauxite mining in the jarrah forest, the 'Forests 
Forever' campaign sought to disprove media statements made by state 
government authorities and the timber industry that forest management practices 
such as clear-felling and prescribed burning exerted positive effects on the 
environment, arguing that this created a false optimism in the public mind about 
the future for Western Australia's forests.
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In 1979, the Forest Products Association of Western Australia and the Forests 
Department produced a film to counter public criticism of the timber industry.   
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The film Forests Forever
99 was released in October 1979, and widely distributed 
in Perth and the state’s south-west.   While critical of the film’s overall 
impression that the state’s forests had benefited and were flourishing because of 
sound forest management, activists were particularly incensed about the film’s 
claims in three key areas.   Specifically, these comprised assertions that clear-
felling could improve on natural processes, that prescribed burning caused no 
damage to forest ecology, and that the state’s reserves and national parks were 
huge areas of bushland that would never be touched.
100 
      
As a result of these concerns, as well as concern over the potential effect of the 
film within the state’s education system, the South-West Forests Defence 
Foundation attempted to stop the film’s distribution or exhibition.   The 
Foundation argued that the film breached Section 52 of the Commonwealth 
Trade Practices Act 1974, which states:   
A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
101 
 
The SFDF remained unincorporated, and thus unable to take legal action in its 
own name, so Marlish Glorie, a committee member, acted as applicant in a 
representative action on behalf of the SFDF committee.   As far as the SFDF 
knew, the case was the first of its kind whereby an Australian environmental 
group took action against industry representatives over claims made by them 
about the impact of their activities on the environment.
102 
      
Because the Forest Products Association was also unincorporated, and the 
Forests Department, as a state government instrumentality, was outside the 
jurisdiction of the Trade Practices Act, the action was taken against the WA Chip 
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and Pulp Company, representing the Forest Products Association, and G.W. 
Kelly, the manager of that Association.   In a ‘Statement of Claim’ filed in the 
Federal Court of Australia in November 1980, the SFDF Committee, through 
Marlish Glorie, sought a judgement that the film Forests Forever was misleading 
or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in that the beneficial effects of cool-
season burns and clear-felling had not been verified, that there was false 
representation regarding areas of national parks and road and stream reserves, 
that, as opposed to remaining untouched, these areas were subject to prescribed 
burning and mining operations, and that the economic benefits of the Manjimup 
production centre  could not be proved or disproved.
103 
      
The ‘Forests Forever’ court action was scheduled for hearing in the Perth Federal 
Court on 16 June 1981 – a date which forest activists noted as coinciding with 
the date of the commencement of the Jarrah Class Action in Pittsburgh, USA.  
Expert witnesses appearing on behalf of Marlish Glorie reflected the 
professionalism of the forest protest movement at that time.   These comprised 
Dr John French, a CSIRO entomologist and forester from Victoria, Dr Alan 
Tingay, a Western Australian wildlife ecologist, and Dr Robert Whelan, a plant 
ecologist from Western Australia, working at the University of Florida.   While 
the SFDF reported that it had managed to meet current expenses for the action, 
the organisation urgently requested additional donations from members and 
supporters to cover costs for the court hearing.
104   
      
The trial, conducted before Mr Justice Morling, lasted for nine days in June, 
which included two days to view the karri forest, and five further days in 
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September.   The respondents in the action called eleven witnesses, comprising 
seven Forests Department officers, who included Bruce Beggs, the Conservator 
of Forests, Professor Eric Bachelard, a forestry professor from the Australian 
National University, Dr John Beard, chairman of the Forest Products 
Association, and two public relations staff. 
      
Justice Morling handed down his decision in December 1981.   He dismissed the 
application for declarations and injunctions, and awarded costs against Marlish 
Glorie.   In summarising his decision, Justice Morling acknowledged the 
uniqueness of the case, commenting that he believed no similar action had been 
tried in Australia.  He said that proof in the case depended on two questions: 
first, whether the film Forests Forever was intended to be exhibited in trade or 
commerce, and second, whether the film’s exhibition can be said to be 
misleading or deceptive.   After considering the evidence, Justice Morling said he 
considered the film had been produced to protect the interests of the Forest 
Products Association and was thus exhibited in furtherance of trade or 
commerce.
105    
 
On the second question, however, Justice Morling believed the contentious 
statements in the film were merely expressions of opinion and, as such, were not 
misleading or deceptive: 
I do not think that a statement is necessarily misleading or deceptive if it 
cannot be demonstrated to be correct beyond any doubt.   Nor is it 
necessarily misleading or deceptive merely if it is not accompanied by 
words indicating that a contrary view is held by others.
106 
 
  180 
He asserted that when a statement is recognised as being an opinion, or a mixture 
of fact and opinion, the person addressed would understand that there was a 
possibility that a different opinion may be held elsewhere.
107 
      
Beth Schultz, SFDF president, considered that the judgement presupposed a 
sophisticated audience that could distinguish between opinion and fact, and this 
was not the case.  She believed that the authoritative role of the Forests 
Department in the production caused most viewers to accept the film as being 
factual.   Although the action had been lost, Schultz observed that the campaign 
had resulted in some positive outcomes, including public evidence from Forests 
Department officers on forest management and policy which would remain on 
record for testing on future events.
108  Summarising the implications of the case 
for Western Australia’s forest environment, she concluded: 
The big gain that we made – any company in the future that makes a 
film of this sort or makes a statement of this sort will have to be very 
careful what it says, because if it says something that is false or 
misleading or deceptive there may well be someone who is ready to take 
them to court over it.
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After the decision, wrangling over payment of costs continued for several 
months.   The WA Chip and Pulp Company sought to recover $41,000 for legal 
expenses, however, as the applicant, Marlish Glorie, would be unable to meet 
those costs, the South-West Forests Defence Foundation offered $5,000 as 
settlement.   After reducing its claim to $21,000 and then $10,000, the Company 
finally decided to accept the SFDF’s initial offer.
110 
      
In the ‘Forests Forever’ court action the SFDF employed the strategy that had 
provided the basis for its formation – the use of the legal system to combat 
  181 
threats to Western Australia’s forests.   Like the Jarrah Class Action, although 
the case was lost, there were some benefits for the forest protest movement.  As 
well as providing further media exposure that maintained public attention on the 
plight of Western Australia's forests, on a broader scale, the use of litigation as a 
protest strategy in the Jarrah Class Action and the ‘Forests Forever’ court cases 
supported Hutton and Connors’ assertions of the conservation movement's 
increased professionalism during the 1980s.
111   
      
From the mid-1970s, Western Australia’s forest protest groups had maintained 
constant pressure on the state government and its agencies to preserve significant 
areas of forest from the encroachment of the mining and wood chip industries.  It 
was not until the early 1980s, however, that they were able to mount two 
successful campaigns that not only provided inspiration and encouragement for 
forest activists after the failure of legal challenges, but also reflected the protest 
movement's orientation at that time towards strategies of negotiation and 
collaboration with authorities rather than direct confrontation.    
 
The Shannon Campaign 
The idea of protecting areas of native forest through their incorporation within 
parks and reserves has been a significant feature of approaches to forest 
conservation in Western Australia as elsewhere since the nineteenth century.
112   
The creation of the Pinjarra flora and fauna reserve in 1894 marked the first real 
attempt in WA to preserve a large area of native bushland purely for its intrinsic 
value, even though the reserve was eventually sacrificed to the demands of the 
timber industry.
113     In 1909 the Beedelup and Warren National Parks were 
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created in order that future generations could experience examples of virgin karri 
forest and, during the 1920s, a national park was established at Nornalup after 
the area became a focus for tourism.   Between 1930 and 1969 there was little 
expansion of the conservation reserve estate in the south-west forests, and it was 
not until a 1970 campaign by the Western Australian Conservation Council that 
the newly-established Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was prompted 
to take action in 1972 by establishing a Conservation Through Reserves 
Committee (CTRC) to examine the state’s reserve system and to report on 
proposals to expand it.
114   
      
Occupying an area of approximately 58,000 hectares, the Shannon River Basin is 
situated between Walpole and Pemberton, and comprises 21,500 hectares of karri 
forest and a smaller area of jarrah and non-forest bushland.   For conservationists 
the area represented a final opportunity to reserve an entire river catchment area 
in the state’s south-west that had not been the subject of intensive land clearing 
or logging.
115  
      
The campaign to save the Shannon River Basin from exploitation has its origins 
in a 1974 Conservation Through Reserves Committee report, which 
recommended that clear felling should not be permitted in the Shannon River 
Basin during the first 15 years licence period of the Wood Chipping Agreement.  
It further recommended that, at the end of the 15 years moratorium, an area of 
karri forest should be set aside in perpetuity as a major conservation reserve and 
the area managed as though it were a national park.   The Conservation Through 
Reserves Committee believed that the reserved area could provide a yardstick 
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with which to compare the effects of intensive forestry practices, such as clear 
felling and burning, on the karri forest, and recognised the area’s future 
economic potential as a tourist asset rather than a timber resource.
116 Since their 
foundation in 1975, both the CSNF and the SFDF had urged the declaration of 
the Shannon River Basin as a national park and promoted the issue as one of 
their key objectives.   Both organisations cited the Conservation Through 
Reserves Committee recommendations and drew attention to the depletion of the 
karri forests through wood chipping.
117    
      
Bill Thomas, a foundation member of the CSNF and chairman of the ALP state 
conservation and environment committee from 1976 to 1986, believes it was the 
struggles taking place within the Western Australian Labor Party that provided 
the key elements of the Shannon campaign.
118    The accuracy of this recall 
becomes more apparent when examining the political background to the Shannon 
debate.   In September 1975, the Western Australian state executive of the ALP 
voted to initiate a new forests policy, and the party’s environment committee was 
tasked with preparing a report for endorsement at the 1976 state conference.     
Particular concerns had been expressed at the level of forest over-cutting, and the 
new policy included a proposal from the ALP state executive that the ALP 
support the creation of the Shannon National Park.   The parliamentary party, 
however, feared that support for reservation of the Shannon would threaten the 
seat for Warren, held by Dave Evans, the Deputy Leader, and it was decided that 
the Shannon proposal would be opposed at the conference.   Dr Syd Shea, who 
would later become the executive director o f  C A L M  b u t  a t  t h e  t i m e w a s  a n  
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employee of the Forests Department and politically active within the ALP, 
moved the necessary amendment to block the Shannon recommendation.
119 
      
Reflecting on his decision to oppose the Shannon proposal, Dr Shea said that 
wood chipping had become a source of division within the ALP and he believed 
that, if the proposal was passed, it would signal the end of the saw-milling 
industry: 
It’s ok to sit in Nedlands and pontificate about how important the forests 
are but there is some poor bastard down there who is going to have to 
live on $80 a week unemployment benefits with five or ten kids or some 
incredible thing, without a job.   You’ve got to balance that!
120 
 
Furthermore, as a professional forester, he considered that the environmentalists’ 
representation of the Shannon Basin as a pristine total catchment area was 
technically flawed and that the Basin comprised several self-contained streams; 
therefore it was not necessary to reserve the entire area.   Dr Shea concluded that, 
while his technical opinion played some part in the state conference overturning 
the Shannon proposal, there was also pressure within the ALP to abandon a 
politically sensitive issue in anticipation of a forthcoming state election.
121    
      
Arthur Tonkin, MLA for Morley, who chaired the ALP’s environmental 
committee, initially declared that the Party would support the Shannon proposal 
but subsequently shifted his stance after realising the political implications of the 
decision.   He believed that south-west hostility towards the CSNF at the time 
over its stance against wood chipping and the potential electoral repercussions 
were both factors that generated opposition to the proposal.
122    Finally, at the 
1976 conference, the Shannon motion was defeated by show of hands, 105 votes 
to 48.
123 
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Following the defeat, little progress occurred to protect the Shannon over the 
next four years.   In its 1978 state platform, the ALP undertook to ensure that a 
management plan would be produced for the Shannon River Basin in order ‘to 
preserve the advantage of a contiguous reservation on a river basin scale’ but 
which would not exclude the area from timber production.   While 
acknowledging the merit of reserving the entire Basin, the ALP argued that 
protecting the area solely for conservation would prejudice the application of 
multiple-use forest management practices.
124     
      
At the 1980 ALP state conference, however, the Shannon reservation proposal 
was carried overwhelmingly. Bill Thomas attributed the change of heart to a 
greater level of sophistication among the Shannon’s main proponents.    As the 
proposer, he was an influential trade union official able to lobby the union vote, 
and the seconder, Neil Bartholomaeus, was an articulate environmental advocate 
who had not been an ALP member at the time of the 1976 defeat.   Thomas 
explained that after the 1976 motion defeat the CSNF had increased its influence 
through greater professionalism and that public sympathy for protecting the 
forests was increasing.
125   The proposal to declare the 50,000 hectare Shannon 
River Basin a national park was included in the ALP 1980 state platform.
126 
 
Despite this apparent victory for supporters of the Shannon proposal, the Western 
Australian ALP continued to vacillate on the issue.   In September 1981, Brian 
Burke successfully challenged Ron Davies for leadership of the state 
parliamentary Labor Party.   Echoing previous concerns, Burke became 
convinced that the Shannon issue posed a threat to Dave Evans’ seat of Warren, 
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and he proposed to allay these fears by removing the words “National Park” from 
the 1982 state conference platform.   The CSNF lobbied ALP delegates attending 
the 1982 conference, urging them to support the retention of the 1980 policy 
commitment on the Shannon.   It argued that reservation of the Shannon Basin 
would have no impact on jobs as employment within the timber industry had 
already declined by 41% since 1965.
127   At the conference, the pro-conservation 
lobby supported by left-wing union members triumphed, and the ALP’s 
commitment to the Shannon National Park remained.
128 
      
Neil Bartholomaeus has provided a personal account of the conflict that was 
taking place within the state ALP at that time.   Bartholomaeus, a committed 
environmentalist, was a member of both the CSNF and the SFDF.   He had also 
been a member of the Western Australian Liberal Party until he resigned after 
becoming frustrated at his inability to change the Party’s environmental policies.   
In 1978 Bartholomaeus joined the ALP, and in 1979 became the endorsed 
candidate for the seat of Mundaring.   His support for the reservation of the 
Shannon Basin at the 1982 State Conference attracted criticism and threats of 
expulsion from the Party: 
It was uncomfortable at that time being involved in environmental 
issues, personally uncomfortable, but you know you can either have an 
exciting life and attempt to change things, or a comfortable life...you 
can’t do both.   I never really gave a lot of thought to not getting on with 
these things that we felt should be done, and we felt everything we 
could do should be done, and we pretty well did everything we could.
129 
 
Bartholomaeus’ experience provides a further illustration of how the Western 
Australian forest protest movement was strengthened by a succession of 
prominent personalities and public figures who were willing to take a stand to 
protect the state's forests. 
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During 1982, the campaign to reserve the Shannon Basin gathered momentum.  
With a destabilised Liberal Party following the resignation of Premier Court in 
the previous year and a revitalised and supportive Labor Party, the forest protest 
movement was optimistic that success with the Shannon was within its grasp.  In 
order to present their views on management of the south-west karri forests, and 
as a response to the Environmental Protection Authority’s call for submissions 
on options for the Shannon River Basin, the CSNF, SFDF, and the Conservation 
Council of Western Australia presented a collective proposal Karri at the 
Crossroads arguing for the conservation of the karri forest, based on principles 
of multiple-use sustained-yield management, with improved levels of forest 
reservation.   The groups concluded that diversification of the south-west’s 
forest-based economy was essential in order to halt the decline in employment 
within the timber industry.  While the creation of the Shannon National Park was 
a central feature of the proposal, the publication drew attention to the state 
government’s inability to protect forests located within national parks, which 
could be subject to mining and logging with parliamentary approval.
130   
      
Publication of the conservationists’ study generated greater public interest in the 
Shannon debate with group representatives given the opportunity to state their 
case on Perth radio station 6WF.   Beth Schultz from the SFDF, Barbara 
Churchward of the Conservation Council, and ex-forester John Thomson 
participated in a discussion and talk-back programme debating the question 
whether or not Western Australia’s karri forests were being managed effectively.   
During the discussion, Churchward explained that the Karri at the Crossroads 
report had been produced as part of a strategy to stimulate public debate and 
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encourage people to make submissions on the future of the Shannon Basin.   The 
report, she believed, provided a future perspective for the karri forest that was 
compatible with timber production while allowing for adequate conservation, and 
offered an alternative plan to that proposed by the Forests Department.   The 
debate prompted a telephone response from Bob Bunning, general manager of 
the timber division of Bunning Bros Pty Ltd, who argued that 30% of karri forest 
had already been reserved in the Manjimup area and that further reservation 
would have a serious effect on forest industries.
131 
      
The tactics employed by the forest protest movement at this time, such as 
producing informed publications and participating in media discussion groups, 
continued to reflect a non-confrontational approach to protest which was aimed 
at persuading people to support forest protection.   The Conservation Council 
invited the public to participate in ‘The Shannon Karri National Park project’, 
which it described as a ‘joint effort by the Campaign to Save Native Forests 
(WA), Conservation Council of WA, and the South-West Forests Defence 
Foundation’.   It appealed for generous donations to the ‘Shannon Karri National 
Park Fund’, and urged supporters to lobby politicians and write submissions to 
the State Environmental Protection Authority in response to a request for public 
comment.
132 
 
The campaign also attracted support from organisations in eastern Australia.  The 
Victorian National Parks Association wrote to the Department of Conservation 
and Environment voicing its concern at the lack of adequate karri reserves in 
Western Australia and expressing support for the creation of the Shannon 
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National Park.
133   A submission from the Tasmanian Wilderness Society in 
Hobart concluded that the Shannon campaign was vital in retaining a significant 
area of the south-west karri forests for present and future generations.
134 
      
In November 1982, the Western Australian Department of Conservation and 
Environment released a report by Dr Peter Attiwill, a forester and plant ecologist 
from Melbourne University, who had been commissioned by the Environmental 
Protection Authority to undertake a study of present and proposed karri reserves, 
including the Shannon River Basin.  On the basis of Dr Attiwill’s report, the 
State Liberal-National Party Coalition Government adopted six of the seven 
recommendations regarding management of the karri forests, but fell short of 
supporting the declaration of the Shannon River Basin as a national park on the 
basis that the area was in need of rehabilitation.
135   While conservationists 
welcomed the adoption of the majority of the EPA’s recommendations regarding 
management of the karri forests, the reasons given for not reserving the Shannon 
Basin were regarded as a pretext to ensure the continued exploitation of the area 
by the timber industry.
136   Forest activists were further angered by an 
announcement that the state government had decided to continue clear-felling in 
the Shannon Basin, using the excuse that parts of the forest were fire-
damaged.
137 
      
The election of the Burke Labor Government in February 1983 signalled the start 
of an intensive effort by Western Australian environmentalists to ensure the new 
administration fulfilled its pledge to create the Shannon National Park.   Brian 
Burke’s pre-election policy speech had made no reference to the Shannon, or, 
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indeed, to the environment.
138    In a meeting with the new Premier, 
representatives from the Conservation Council, CSNF and SFDF drew attention 
to impending logging in the Shannon Basin, and received an assurance that the 
state government intended to implement the ALP platform to declare the 
Shannon a national park.   The Forests Department would be asked to formulate 
a management plan that would guarantee the timber industry alternative sources 
mber.
139 
s important that the 
rnment receive input from the people most affected.
143 
      
of ti
      
Meanwhile, the fight for the Shannon continued in the newspapers.   The SFDF 
called on the state government to direct the timber industry to leave the Shannon 
Basin, and on the timber companies to demonstrate some public spirit and 
concede the area to the people of Western Australia.
140   Environmentalists 
emphasised the potential economic benefits of tourism and multiple-use forest 
industries, as opposed to the devastating impact of clear-felling and redundancies 
caused by new technologies.
141   The West Australian newspaper sided with the 
timber industry, arguing that the state government would be foolish to alienate 
voters in the south-west, and that ‘controlled harvesting’ of the karri forests 
would protect the livelihood of timber workers.
142    In an employee newsletter, 
the Bunnings Group of Companies stated its opposition to the proposition by 
‘environmental pressure groups’ to create the Shannon National Park, believing 
the proposal would cause a dramatic reduction in the timber industry’s log 
resource.   The Group invited comments from employees and suggested they 
communicate their feelings to parliamentarians, as it wa
gove
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In October 1983, a public meeting, attended by 500 residents, was held in 
Manjimup to discuss the impact of a state government decision to close the 
Shannon Basin to logging.    Premier and Minister for Forests, Brian Burke, 
failed to convince the meeting that there were valid reasons for the Shannon’s 
closure and angered the audience by referring some questions to CSNF President, 
Bill Hare.   The meeting concluded with an overwhelming show of support for 
the Manjimup Shire Council’s opposition to the state government’s action in 
closing the Shannon to logging.
144    
      
To support its argument against the Shannon proposal, the Shire Council 
subsequently produced a brochure disputing conservationists’ assertions that the 
Shannon Basin was worth preserving and that tourism could replace the local 
timber industry.   The Shire recommended that certain areas of the Basin should 
be reserved as “Forest Sanctuaries”, with the remainder managed by the Forests 
Department for commercial logging.
145   The SFDF responded by circulating a 
letter to Manjimup residents, condemning the Council’s bias in favour of wood 
production and its apparent insensitivity to the area’s natural beauty.   It further 
drew attention to inconsistencies in the Council’s argument: on the one hand the 
Shire argued that the Basin had been heavily logged and was not worth 
preserving, yet also stated that once ‘rehabilitated’, meaning ‘logged’, the area 
would be suitable as a national park.
146 
 
While the Shannon Basin’s environmental significance had been acknowledged 
through designation of some parts of the Basin as management priority areas, the 
CSNF argued that this did not guarantee long-term security and that there was 
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continuing pressure from within the state government and the timber lobby to 
prevent the Shannon being granted national park status.    The group urged the 
Western Australian public to visit the Shannon Basin and experience its forests 
and then write a letter or submission to the Department of Conservation and 
Land Management, commenting on the proposed draft management plan for the 
area and stressing the desirability of national park status.
147 
       
There was also evidence that Western Australians were becoming more 
sympathetic towards forest conservation.   In July 1985, the Conservation 
Council of Western Australia commissioned a public opinion survey to 
determine what people thought about national parks and how much they knew 
about them.   The results of the survey were compared with a previous study 
conducted in 1982, which had found that Western Australians felt that the loss of 
flora and fauna was the most important environmental issue at the time with the 
majority of people having little knowledge of how conservation reserves helped 
to prevent those losses.   The later survey revealed that nearly 70% of 
respondents considered national parks to be important or very important with 
most people understanding the role of national parks in protecting the natural 
environment.
148   
      
At the 1986 ALP state conference following the re-election of the Burke 
Government, it was unanimously decided to upgrade karri forest conservation 
areas with a view to their establishment as national parks.   The SFDF 
congratulated the ALP on its decision, considering that the move demonstrated 
the party’s genuine commitment to conserving the world’s only karri forest and 
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emphasising that only national park status would protect the Shannon Basin from 
plans to turn the forest into wood chip plantations.
149 
      
In June 1987, the Minister for Conservation and Land Management, Barry 
Hodge MLA, introduced a motion in the Western Australian Parliament to 
revoke part of the Shannon Basin as state forest, with the intention of creating the 
Shannon National Park.
150   The debate in the Legislative Assembly produced 
accusations from the Shadow Minister for the Environment, Barry Blaikie, that 
the government had not fully considered the economic and social implications of 
the Shannon proposal, and that the decision to proceed had occurred because of 
the Labor Party’s association with radical extremists within the conservation 
movement.   An amendment proposed by the Opposition to reduce the area of 
revocation was defeated and the matter passed to the Upper House.
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The importance of the impending Legislative Council debate for forest 
conservation in Western Australia was recognised by the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, which saw the state government motion to excise the 
Shannon from state forest and declare it a national park as the culmination of a 
13-year struggle to protect the karri forests.   Conservationists organised a 
delegation and rally to lobby parliamentarians to support the motion.
152   
Although the Legislative Council debate proved an anti-climax, with the matter 
adjourned until spring to allow consideration of further public submissions,
153 
the impact of two developments during the intervening period exerted a crucial 
influence on the outcome of the Shannon issue. 
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In mid-October 1987, a committee of inquiry, established in August by the 
Minister for Conservation and Land Management to consider the implications of 
creating the Shannon River Basin National Park, delivered its findings.   The 
committee, chaired by Department of Conservation and Land Management 
executive director Dr Syd Shea, concluded that plans to reserve the area as a 
national park had ‘scientific merit’, and that the reservation would have no long-
term impact on the economic viability of the timber industry.
154 Even more 
importantly, the National Party, which controlled the balance of power in the 
Legislative Council, indicated its willingness to compromise over the Shannon 
issue provided certain conditions were met.   These conditions included an 
undertaking that the state government would underwrite any job losses that 
occurred in the Manjimup Shire as a result of the creation of the Shannon River 
National Park, the submission of annual reports to Parliament on effects on 
timber industry employment, and a guarantee that the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management would not purchase more private land in 
the Manjimup Shire for afforestation without obtaining the prior approval of 
parliament.
155 
 
During the ensuing Legislative Council debate, Gordon Masters, Leader of the 
Opposition, said the Liberal Party recognised that the majority of people in the 
community were concerned about the environment but that, while party members 
agreed there should be a national park in the Shannon River Basin, they believed 
the area proposed by the government was too large.   He urged the Liberal and 
National parties to reject the motion in its present form.
156   Harry Gayfor, MLC, 
Central, said the National Party would support the motion only if the government 
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agreed in writing to the guarantees previously circulated.
157   In response, Kay 
Hallahan, Minister for Community Services, said the government was happy to 
provide the undertaking.    With National Party support, the motion of revocation 
that would open the way for the creation of the Shannon Basin National Park was 
finally passed.
158 
      
The decision sparked a period of celebration for Western Australia’s forest 
conservationists.   Letters of congratulations were forwarded to those who had 
supported the Shannon campaign.   The Conservation Council commended the 
Burke Government for honouring its commitment and believed the decision 
reflected a far-sighted vision for the long-term interests of the community.
159   
Similarly, the Australian Conservation Foundation saw the decision as a victory 
for all Western Australians, and the successful culmination of 12 years of public 
debate.
160   The crucial part played by the Western Australian National Party in 
passing the motion was acknowledged by the SFDF, which believed the 
declaration of the Shannon Basin National Park to be ‘the most important event 
in the history of forest conservation in Western Australia’.
161   A response from 
Hendy Cowan, MLA, Leader of the Western Australian National Party, 
acknowledged previous representations to him from the SFDF on the Shannon 
proposal and conveyed the National Party’s feeling of pride at playing a leading 
role in the issue.
162 
 
Despite the victory in parliament, the Shannon still occupied the attention of 
conservationists for a further year.   Frustrations grew at what appeared to be 
government procrastination over the official declaration of national park status.   
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Criticism from the Australian Conservation Foundation attracted an angry 
response from Barry Hodge, who was ‘bitterly disappointed’ that the 
government’s commitment to the Shannon could be questioned after such a long 
and hard struggle.  He explained that delays had arisen over the complex process 
of defining the area’s boundaries, however, the process was well advanced, and 
he undertook to have the park declared before the end of 1988.
163    T h e  
revocation of those areas of State Forest that would become the Shannon Basin 
National Park was finally proclaimed on 16 December 1988.
164 
      
The successful campaign to protect the Shannon Basin karri forest contained 
major implications for the future of native forest protest in Western Australia.   
While the elevation of the Shannon to national park status had been an objective 
of the conservation movement since the mid-1970s, it was a sequence of events 
during the early 1980s that provided the impetus for an intensification of 
campaign activities.   By that time, conservationists had increased their level of 
influence within the ALP to the extent that they were able to gain a firm 
commitment to preserve the Shannon.   The installation of a sympathetic Labor 
Government in 1983 both enhanced the power of the conservation lobby and 
raised the profile of forest issues in the eyes of Western Australian electors.   The 
relevance of the Shannon campaign for forest protest lay not simply in its ability 
to unite the movement over a common cause but, more significantly, in 
empowering the movement to negotiate within the state’s political arena from a 
position of strength. 
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Lane-Poole Jarrah Reserve  
While the early 1980s can thus be regarded as a pivotal period for the campaign 
by Western Australian conservation groups to protect the south-west’s karri 
forest, also at that time a parallel campaign was initiated to preserve a large 
section of the northern jarrah forest.  Like the Shannon campaign, the jarrah 
reserve initiative provides further evidence of how the forest protest movement 
was able to achieve a successful campaign outcome by adopting strategies of 
negotiation within a changing political landscape. 
      
The area concerned was located between Dwellingup and Collie (see Map 5.2.), 
and included the original 1894 Pinjarra Reserve, which was discussed in Chapter 
2 of this thesis.   Some observers have suggested that the loss of this reserve to 
forest production in 1911 provided the inspiration for the 1980s campaign.
165   
Again, the jarrah forest campaign evolved through the activities of the 
Environmental Protection Authority’s Conservation Through Reserves 
Committee, which was tasked in 1972 with reviewing Western Australia’s nature 
reserves and national parks, and making recommendations for additional reserves 
and their use and management.   The Committee divided the state into twelve 
‘systems’, with the northern jarrah forest included in System Six.   By the late 
1970s, the Committee had made recommendations for all except Systems Six and 
Seven.   The Forests Department was also developing a system of conservation 
and recreation Management Priority Areas to counter proposals for more national 
parks.
166    
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Map 5.2.  Location of the proposed reserve.   Source: Jarrah Reserve: A 
Proposal for a major reserve in the Northern Jarrah Forest of Western 
Australia, Conservation Council of Western Australia (Inc.) 1980, p.18. 
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Following recognition of the difficulties with resolving complex land-use issues, 
the Conservation Through Reserves Committee was replaced in 1976 by a 
System Six Committee, which had responsibility to systematically evaluate areas 
proposed for future conservation.
167     The exclusion of conservationists from 
representation prompted criticism that the Committee reflected only the interests 
of the state government and industry.  Input from community groups and the 
conservation movement was allowed only through the medium of public 
submissions.
168 
      
In November 1979, the Conservation Council of Western Australia circulated a 
letter to various community organisations, seeking endorsement for a proposal 
from a ‘group of conservationists, academics and concerned individuals’ who 
were attempting to secure a Class A Reserve in the northern jarrah forest.   The 
proposal was prompted by recognition of a need to preserve a representative 
portion of the state’s remaining jarrah forest for ‘science and posterity’, and to 
satisfy a demand for recreational space in the face of technological advancement 
and urban growth.  The reserve would not only ensure the preservation of flora 
and fauna but also cater for scientific research, public education, tourism, 
recreation, and the provision of a ‘wilderness experience’.      A published 
document setting out the proposal in detail formed the basis of the submission, 
and organisations were encouraged to allow their names to be included in order 
to demonstrate a broad spectrum of support.
169  During succeeding months the 
Conservation Council worked on an authoritative document to provide a 
compelling argument for the establishment of the jarrah forest reserve.   An 
inspired tactical manoeuvre added considerable weight to its case. 
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The month following the approach to community organisations, Bernard Mahon, 
the Conservation Council’s co-ordinator, wrote to former Governor-General Sir 
Paul Hasluck about the jarrah reserve proposal suggesting that, if he felt inclined 
to support the idea by writing a foreword to the Council’s published proposal, his 
influence would provide a major boost to the project.
170  In March 1980, Mahon 
reminded Hasluck of the suggestion that he write a foreword, stating he had been 
encouraged by his ‘known concern on environmental matters and especially with 
regard to our forests.’
171   Hasluck eventually agreed to write the foreword after 
voicing concerns over the need to obtain Forests Department and National Parks 
Authority support prior to the reserve’s declaration, and that the reserve would be 
free from external interests.
172   His observations lent an influential voice to the 
Conservation Council’s campaign: 
This booklet presents a proposal which deserves attention by everyone 
who loves the land in which we live and cares about its treasures.   It 
also calls for fundamental reconsideration of the impact of development 
on the environment...The jarrah forest of the South-West of Western 
Australia is unique...If it is destroyed it cannot be restored.  At best what 
is unique may be replaced by what is commonplace.  At worst, we may 
see the desolation of a deteriorating environment...The concept of 
preserving the forest as a whole is put forward clearly and imaginatively 
for thoughtful consideration.  It deserves close study and I trust that 
from that study all those who are concerned with one aspect or another 
of the problem will be able to join in a constructive effort...The full 
civilised man restrains his greed and looks for some other guide than his 
own appetites or his own material advantage.
173 
 
The publication’s title page contained evidence of the forest protest movement’s 
continuing professionalism, with a statement that the work included contributions 
from ‘botanists, consultant wildlife ecologists, a research scientist, graduates and 
students in the arts, environmental science and anthropology’.
174 
      
  201 
In a comprehensive proposal, the Conservation Council suggested the 
consolidation of existing Forests Department Management Priority Areas to 
provide a reserve of some 77,000 hectares, with the main objective of preserving 
representative portions of the jarrah forest ecosystems.    The proposal 
emphasised the requirement that the reserve be afforded the protection of Class A 
status, which could be revoked only by Act of Parliament.   While 
acknowledging that other bodies such as the System Six Committee would be 
making recommendations for vesting and management, the Council argued that 
control of the proposed reserve should rest with a separate authority.   It was felt 
that the National Parks Authority was ill-equipped to manage the reserve, and 
that the Forests Department’s management practices were ‘inimical to 
conservation’.   The publication concluded with a list of 89 organisations that had 
endorsed, in principle, the proposal to create a major reserve in the northern 
jarrah forest.
175 
      
The release of the Conservation Council Jarrah reserve proposal in June 1980, 
and particularly the endorsement from Sir Paul Hasluck, produced widespread 
media interest.   In an interview on television’s Nationwide,  Norman Halse, 
President of the Council, said that the jarrah forest was not sufficiently protected 
by the Forests Department and that immediate action was necessary to guarantee 
legal protection from the Department’s forestry activities.   Interviewer John 
Mills commented that, if Premier Court would not listen to the Conservation 
Council, he might be more inclined to listen to Sir Paul Hasluck’s comments in 
the foreword to the proposal document.
176   During a radio interview, Gordon 
Masters, the Minister for Conservation and the Environment, said he was 
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disappointed that the Conservation Council had not presented the proposal earlier 
as part of the System Six study.  When asked about the apparent contradiction 
between setting aside an area as a national park and then granting mineral rights, 
he replied that, while he believed national parks should be set aside and 
preserved as far as possible, the government had a responsibility to consider 
whether the development of resources would be of general benefit to the public.   
Masters said he felt that the needs of people took priority over the environment 
and there had to be a balanced approach to development.
177 
      
The Conservation Council publication effectively elevated the jarrah reserve 
proposal into a mainstream political issue and provided the forest protest 
movement with an opportunity to capitalise on enhanced public interest in 
preserving the forests.  Conservationists were aware of the strategic value of Sir 
Paul Hasluck’s contribution to the campaign and expressed their gratitude to him 
for the nationwide interest that resulted.
178   By mid-June, over 100 organisations 
and four of the five major political parties had endorsed the proposal.   The 
Australian Democrats, the Conservation Committee of the ALP, and the National 
Country Party (WA) had given full endorsement, and the National Party 
provisional endorsement.
179   The 1980 ALP state conference endorsed a 
platform that included an undertaking to ‘establish a National Park in the 
northern jarrah forest of not less than 100,000 hectares in extent.’
180 
      
Unfortunately, for forest activists, the mood of optimism generated by the initial 
public response to the jarrah reserve proposal was followed by a period of 
frustration at state government procrastination over the issue.   The CSNF 
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believed the long delay in the release of the System Six recommendations was 
attributable to pressure from the bauxite mining industry to protect its interests in 
the jarrah forests, and that the Conservation Council's jarrah reserve proposal 
itself was, in effect, a compromise that attempted to mollify competing interests.   
It considered the Council’s proposal to protect only 7% of the jarrah forest was 
insufficient and that a much larger area should be preserved from mining and 
dieback disease.   Finally, the CSNF believed there were indications that the state 
government had decided that the jarrah reserve would not become a reality 
despite widespread public support.
181 
      
Release of the long-awaited Darling Range System Six report in April 1981 
produced further disenchantment among environmentalists.   The report was seen 
as subordinating environmental protection issues to the imperatives of industrial 
development, and endorsing the environmentally ineffective practices of the 
Forests Department.   There were concerns that the report would be regarded by 
the state government as validation for its policies and practices towards native 
forests, and used as a ‘weapon’ against the environmental movement.
182   Further 
dissension resulted from a decision by the Minister for Conservation, Gordon 
Masters, to withdraw the support of his Department for a Community Committee 
that had been established to promote discussion on the System Six report. While 
the Minister justified his action on the grounds of impartiality, the move attracted 
accusations that he was unhappy with environmentalist representation on the 
committee and was attempting to stall the discussion process.
183 
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In November 1981, the CSNF resorted to a strategy of non-violent direct action, 
and organised a rally at Parliament House to protest against the inadequacies of 
the System Six report and to promote the case for a jarrah national park, similar 
to the Blue Mountains National Park west of Sydney.
184   The rally, attended by 
more than 500 people, responded noisily to Gordon Masters, the Environment 
Minister, when he argued that the state government had a favourable 
environmental record. Environmental activist Alan Tingay alleged that 
approximately 30% of the northern jarrah forest had been set aside for bauxite 
mining and argued for the reservation of at least 10% of the area.
185 
      
Forest campaigners urged the public to pressure the state Liberal government 
into implementing the jarrah reserve proposal by presenting submissions on the 
System Six report before the 30 November closing date.     The Conservation 
Council pointed out that, if the report’s recommendations were implemented, 
there would be no national park in the northern jarrah forest and offered to 
provide speakers to interested community groups.   A suggested submission letter 
addressed to the Department of Conservation and Environment was circulated to 
encourage a large public response.
186   In a specially-produced broadsheet, the 
CSNF called for greatly increased conservation and recreation reserves in 
Western Australia’s south-west forests and argued that within 70 years bauxite 
mining would have destroyed or degraded 400,000 hectares of the northern jarrah 
forest.   While the Forests Department’s Management Priority Areas were 
supposedly designed to protect sections of forest for scientific research, water 
catchment, conservation and recreation, the boundaries could be altered through 
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pressure from the mining and timber industries, and they did not afford long-term 
security.
187 
      
As was the case with the Shannon Basin, material progress on the creation of a 
northern jarrah forest reserve did not occur until the election of the 1983 Burke 
Labor Government, when conservationists called upon the ALP to honour the 
commitment made in its 1980 State Platform.   Some indication that the issue 
was receiving early attention by the new government can be gauged from a 
response in Parliament from Brian Burke, Premier and Minister for Forests, who, 
when asked his government’s intentions, replied that the matter of a jarrah 
reserve was ‘under active consideration’.
188    
      
In October 1983, the state government announced that it would establish a major 
jarrah reserve around the Murray Valley, initially covering 49,000 hectares, with 
a provision for further expansion.   While three-quarters of the reserve would be 
zoned for conservation and protected from mining or timber extraction, these 
latter activities could be carried out in the remaining ‘recreation’ zone, subject to 
rehabilitation requirements.   The creation of the reserve was promoted by the 
government as a demonstration of a consultative rather than confrontational 
approach to resolving issues of land use that reflected its commitment to both 
conservation and the interests of the hardwood timber industry.
189   T h e  
Conservation Council gave qualified support to the decision.   While applauding 
the government’s apparent recognition of the jarrah forest’s value for 
conservation and recreation, the Council considered the proposal to allow 
logging and mining in the recreation zone to be unacceptable.
190 
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In December 1984, Premier Burke announced the addition of a further 48,000 
hectares to jarrah forest reserves between Mundaring and Bridgetown, boosting 
the total reserve to 96,000 hectares of prime jarrah forest.   The largest reserve of 
52,000 hectares, centred on the Murray River Basin, would be named the “Lane-
Poole Reserve”, after one of the state’s most prominent foresters.
191   T h e  
proposal to increase the overall size of the jarrah reserve attracted strong 
opposition from mining and timber interests, which believed the reservation 
threatened the long-term future of both industries.   Subsequent negotiations 
achieved a compromise, whereby resource extraction companies agreed to 
relinquish part of their claims within the main reserve area and the state 
government reduced the amount of the area to be reserved.
192 
      
During 1986, public comments and submissions were invited in response to the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management’s proposed management 
plan for the Lane-Poole Jarrah Reserve.   The CSNF, which at that time 
described itself as ‘a voluntary conservation organization comprising 
approximately 500 members’, objected to the reduction in size of the reserve 
from the original proposal, and the allowance of logging within one section.     
The organisation believed that these concessions demonstrated the state 
government’s lack of commitment to jarrah forest conservation.
193   In February 
1987, nine reserves, comprising a total area of 51,600 hectares, and later 
collectively named the “Lane-Poole Reserve”, were accorded ‘A’ Class status 
and changed from state forest to reserves vested in the National Parks and Nature 
Conservation Authority (NPNCA).
194 
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The Lane-Poole Jarrah Reserve campaign further illustrated how, during the 
1980s, forest protest in Western Australia was maturing into a co-ordinated and 
professional social movement.     While the jarrah reserve publication was 
presented under the banner of the Conservation Council, the proposal originated 
from the combined efforts of several environmental groups and individuals who 
supported the central idea of preserving part of the jarrah forest for posterity.   
The subsequent endorsement of the proposal by over 100 community groups 
emphasised the sense of collectivism and enhanced public support that the 
campaign had generated.   In summary, the Jarrah Reserve campaign was 
strategically successful through a combination of the forest protest movement’s 
capacity to present a cogently argued case that was supported by an eminent 
public figure and, like the Shannon campaign, the movement’s ability to 
capitalise on the election of a sympathetic Labor government. 
      
The early 1980s marked a significant turning-point for forest protest in Western 
Australia.     It was a time of optimism and opportunity that saw the protest 
movement adopt strategies aimed at persuasion and public education rather than 
direct confrontation.    The foundation of a local branch of the Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society in Perth to support the Franklin River campaign resulted in 
the establishment of valuable communication networks with Australia's eastern 
states and stimulated public awareness of much broader threats to the 
environment that were occurring beyond the boundaries of Western Australia.   
During the campaign against the expansion of wood chipping, the protest 
movement employed tactics aimed at raising public awareness of forest issues 
through media debates and forest visits.  Although the Jarrah Class Action failed 
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as a protest strategy, as the first legal action of its kind brought by Australian 
environmentalists it attracted worldwide publicity about the threat to Western 
Australia's jarrah forests from bauxite mining. The campaigns to protect the 
Shannon River Basin and to establish a reserve in the northern jarrah forest were 
successful because of a change in the forest protest movement's strategies that led 
the movement to negotiate its position within a shifting state ALP policy 
platform and to hold the newly-elected Labor government to its commitments.     
Campaign leaders Tom Hogarth, Neil Bartholomaeus, Beth Schultz, Barbara 
Churchward and Bernard Mahon were representative of a succession of 
prominent forest activists who would continue to influence the organisation and 
strategies of the Western Australian forest protest movement. 
      
Despite the failure of its legal challenges, the early 1980s demonstrated how the 
protest movement was able to achieve some successes by employing a 
combination of different strategies other than direct action to educate the public 
about the need to protect the state's forests and, most crucially, to strengthen its 
influence within the state ALP.    Like the Franklin campaign in Tasmania, 
whose ultimate success followed the election of a federal Labor government, the 
Western Australian forest protest movement's successes in the early 1980s also 
resulted from the election of a sympathetic state Labor administration which, as 
Hutton and Connors have observed about the environmental movement, 
generated an optimistic belief that the Labor Party offered the best option for 
achieving good environmental outcomes.
195   Both the major victories for the 
protest movement in the early 1980s related to specific areas of forest, and the 
campaigns were driven by well-organised Perth-based forest protest groups that 
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were able to exploit the favourable relationship they had cultivated with the new 
state Labor government.   The late 1980s would not only challenge that 
relationship through testing the ability of those groups to influence the much 
broader subject of state government forest policy, but also herald the rise of an 
organised and effective forest protest network in Western Australia's south-west. 
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The Late 1980s:  An Expanding Movement 
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Map 6.1.    Western Australia - areas of significance discussed in Chapter 6. 
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The early 1980s had been a period of optimism for the Western Australian forest 
protest movement.   By that time it had emerged as a highly-organised and 
influential social movement that had devised a range of strategies to further its 
objective of protecting the state's forests.   It had achieved two major campaign 
successes through influencing the state ALP's forest policy platform and 
maintaining pressure on the newly-elected Labor government to ensure it 
honoured its commitments.    However, while the city-based forest protest groups 
were heartened by the Shannon Basin and Lane-Poole victories and had high 
hopes of further successes, the protest movement found that the state government 
was willing to compromise its position on forest protection in order to fulfil its 
commitment to the timber industry. 
      
This chapter argues that a shift in the balance of successful protest activity 
occurred during the late 1980s when, in contrast to their earlier successes to 
protect specific areas of forest, Perth-based forest protest groups failed to extend 
their influence over the state Labor government's forest policy.  The effectiveness 
of the city-based groups' strategies was tested in a campaign that not only caused 
some division within the movement but also demonstrated how earlier 
expectations of success were dispelled by a state government that had initially 
been supportive.  The chapter will further argue that the forest protest 
movement's major successes during the period resulted from the rise of organised 
and effective local groups and campaigns in the state's south-west that employed 
non-confrontational strategies aimed at public education and media exposure.   
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The Campaign Against CALM 
In April 1983, the incoming Burke Labor government established a Task Force 
on Land Resource Management, with the responsibility of reviewing land 
resource management in Western Australia’s south-west region.   An interim 
report released in October 1983 recommended the amalgamation of the state’s 
Forests Department, National Parks Authority, and Wildlife Section of the 
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife into a Department of Natural Resource 
Management, with the administration of public lands divided into three parallel 
divisions of ‘production’, ‘recreation’, and ‘conservation’.
1   The Task Force’s 
final report in January 1984 confirmed the proposal to amalgamate the three 
bodies to form a new body to be called the Department of Natural Land 
Management, to manage state forest and timber reserves, national parks and 
nature reserves, and wildlife generally.   The three land-use divisions were 
abandoned and replaced by a focus on categories of land, such as national parks, 
nature reserves and state forest.
2    
      
After studying the proposals, the Conservation Council of Western Australia 
wrote to ALP branches and members of Parliament, voicing its opposition in 
three key areas.   First, it said that the Task Force’s assertion that the new 
department would eliminate wasteful overlap of functions was incorrect, with no 
evidence having been produced to support the argument.   Second, it was 
inappropriate for a single government agency to exercise responsibility for both 
forest conservation and forest production, particularly with the numerical 
superiority and influence of ex-Forests Department staff within the proposed 
department.   Finally, there were better options for the rationalisation of public 
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land management in Western Australia and amalgamation should be limited to 
the National Parks Authority and the Wildlife Authority.
3 
      
In July 1984, after having failed to secure various safeguards that would have 
rendered the government’s proposals acceptable, the Conservation Council 
requested ALP branches to raise the issue of the amalgamation at the September 
state conference.   Concerned party members were encouraged to demonstrate 
their disapproval of the new body, now to be called the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management, by contacting the Premier and Ministers 
for Forests, Fisheries and Wildlife, and the Environment.
4   
      
The Conservation Council’s action prompted Premier Burke to write to ALP 
branch secretaries denouncing the Council’s ‘immature and unrealistic concept 
of Government administration’, arguing that the formation of the new department 
would result in greater efficiency and less duplication, which in turn would 
produce a major improvement in land management.   The Premier observed that 
some members of the conservation movement had chosen to take their 
grievances to the Liberal Party, and that the Opposition would use this in an 
attempt to embarrass his government.   He called upon branches to reject this 
attempt by the Conservation Council to discredit his administration.
5 
      
A coalition of groups was formed to oppose the Burke government’s proposals.  
These included the Tree Society, the WA Field and Game Association, Amateur 
Canoe Association of WA Conservation Committee, WA Speleological Research 
Group, the Western Australian National Parks and Reserves Association, 
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Denmark Environmental Group, and the South-West Forests Defence Foundation 
(SFDF).   In a letter to the Premier, the groups supported the arguments raised by 
the Conservation Council and emphasised the inadequacy of public consultation 
over the proposed restructuring.
6 
      
Although in one sense the coalition of groups united the movement, the 
campaign also highlighted the growing predicament faced by the Western 
Australian forest protest movement during the early 1980s over the extent to 
which it was willing to compromise its position by entering into negotiation with 
the state government.   Sharon Beder has argued this dilemma revolves around 
the incompatible differences that separate the ideological prisms of  ‘light green’ 
and ‘dark green’ environmentalism, with the light green end of the spectrum 
accepting the possibility that involvement with existing power structures may 
enable environmentalists to initiate change and influence decisions.   For dark 
green activists, however, there is no room for compromise, with a firm belief that 
green values cannot be traded away, and that reforms can occur only as the result 
of a radical paradigm shift.
7   The light and dark green shades of 
environmentalism identified by Beder reflect the debate among modern social 
movement theorists about how modern movements are, on the one hand, anti-
systemic through challenging political institutions,
8 yet also build on a form of 
self-limiting radicalism whereby they attempt to exert their influence from with 
the structures of liberal democracy.
9 
      
In the Western Australian context, the difference between the two ideological 
approaches manifested itself in the polarisation that developed between some 
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members of the Campaign to Save Native Forests who were members of the ALP 
and willing to support the Burke Government’s proposals, and other activists 
who considered that the restructuring posed new threats to the state’s forests and 
refused to compromise their ecological values.    The South-West Forests 
Defence Foundation believed the political aspirations of prominent ALP 
conservationists had hindered the progress of the campaign and that the 
credibility of the conservation movement might have been endangered through 
its identification with party politics.   The Foundation argued that it had a duty to 
speak out clearly on conservation issues and to remain unencumbered by 
political loyalties.
10   Beth Schultz recalled that the disruption was more 
obviously expressed when prominent CSNF members Neil Bartholomaeus and 
Bill Thomas supported the Conservation and Land Management Bill for the sake 
of their own political aspirations within the ALP.   The disunity resulted in the 
SFDF combining with the Tree Society and other groups in an effort to defeat the 
proposed amalgamation.
11 
      
Despite mounting opposition to the proposal, in August 1984 the Acting Premier, 
Malcolm Bryce, introduced the Conservation and Land Management Bill into 
state parliament, and explained that the Bill had been designed to fulfil three key 
objectives: 
firstly, to ensure the security of tenure and purpose of lands which have 
been reserved for nature reserves, national and marine parks, other lands 
reserved for conservation and recreation and State forest and timber 
reserves...secondly, to provide a mechanism for public participation in 
land management policy formulation...and thirdly, to provide the 
legislative basis for an administrative system of land management which 
allows effective management of the public lands of Western Australia in 
the most efficient way.
12 
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He said the proposal to form an integrated land management department had 
received ‘broad support’ from a variety of interested groups and that the 
conservation movement would benefit through increased participation in policy 
formulation.   The Acting Premier rejected the arguments that foresters were not 
capable land managers and that the production function of the department would 
conflict with its conservation responsibilities.
13 
 
In response, Barry Blaikie, Liberal MLA for Vasse, argued that the government’s 
use of the acronym CALM appeared to be a misnomer, as the proposal was the 
antithesis of ‘calm’, and would result in the creation of a ‘mega-department’ that 
would create ‘mega-problems’ for land management in Western Australia.   He 
observed that prominent ALP conservationists such as Neil Bartholomaeus, Alan 
Tingay and Bill Hare, who had been vociferous in opposing the state Liberal 
Government during the 1970s and early 1980s, were now silent.   Furthermore, 
he claimed that the conservation movement now found itself ignored by a Labor 
government that had sympathised with it while in opposition.   In a speech 
supporting the conservationists’ position, Mr Blaikie argued that the government 
had failed to provide conclusive evidence that forest management would be 
improved by the proposed system of centralised control and that there had been 
insufficient public and industry consultation.
14 
      
In mid-November 1984, a Legislative Council Select Committee was established 
to examine the Conservation and Land Management Bill, requesting submissions 
by the end of the month.   An urgent bulletin from the SFDF to its members and 
supporters called for the creation of an adequately funded National Parks and 
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Wildlife Department that would maintain the separation between conservation 
and timber production functions, and asked people to oppose the proposed 
amalgamation by writing directly to the Select Committee.
15     Discussing 
campaign strategies at its December Annual General Meeting, the SFDF agreed 
that opposition to the CALM legislation had begun too late, thus emphasising the 
importance of ‘getting to issues early’.   Further evidence of some internal 
division within the protest movement is apparent from an observation at the 
meeting that, while initially the Conservation Council had strongly opposed the 
proposed amalgamation, it now appeared to have adopted an ‘acquiescent 
attitude’, and that the state government’s intransigence had resulted in increasing 
conservationist support for the Liberal Opposition.
16   Despite the efforts of 
forest activists, and following Select Committee endorsement, the Conservation 
and Land Management Act was proclaimed on 22 March 1985.
17 
      
Reflecting on the failure of the campaign against the formation of CALM, the 
SFDF concluded that, while the conservation movement was united in its 
opposition to the department's creation, there had been some 'deep and disturbing 
divisions' over strategies to prevent it.  Specifically, the organisation considered 
that the fragmentation occurred between ‘career conservationists’ who wished to 
adopt a conciliatory approach to the state government, and rank and file members 
who pushed for a more forceful and direct opposition.   The SFDF concluded that 
the Burke Labor Government had proved as dictatorial as, if not more so than, its 
Liberal predecessors, and that its pro-conservation platform had apparently been 
abandoned.
18 
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Unlike the Jarrah Class Action, the unsuccessful campaign to prevent the 
creation of CALM provided few benefits for the Western Australian forest 
protest movement.   The proposed legislation by the Burke Labor Government 
tested the conservation movement’s relationship with the ALP and forced a split 
that was essentially a contest between political aspirations and environmental 
values.   On a more positive note, the campaign sensitised forest activists to the 
inherent risks of political alliances and provided the motivation for a prolonged 
critique of the new department’s forest policies. 
      
Immediately following the enactment of the CALM legislation, the SFDF 
renewed calls on the state government to initiate a Royal Commission into forest 
management in line with its platform commitment.   The call was prompted by 
the release of a report from the government-appointed WA Timber Utilization 
and Marketing Task Force, which called for increased protection and assistance 
for large timber producers.  This recommendation was seen by the SFDF as an 
attempt by the timber industry to increase its profitability.
19 
      
As a result of mounting public concerns over CALM's functions and pressure 
from the forest protest movement, a Royal Commission was established to 
examine CALM's operational structure and forest management practices.
20   In 
June 1985, the SFDF presented a submission to the Royal Commission observing 
that the establishment of the Commission indicated that there were serious 
misgivings about forest management in Western Australia.   The submission 
stressed the organisation’s anxiety over the dominance of forestry and timber 
industry interests within CALM, despite assurances by Dr Syd Shea, the 
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department’s executive director, that policy formulation for conservation and 
production areas had been separated.    Further concerns were held over the 
uncertainty within the new legislation’s statutory procedures for the creation of 
national parks, particularly those located within state forest.
21 
      
The Department of Conservation and Land Management's “Draft Regional 
Management Plan and Draft Timber Strategy” produced in April 1987 was 
designed to provide a plan for an efficient and sustainable timber industry within 
Western Australia.  It was proposed that the quantity of timber supplied from 
state forest should be sufficient to meet local demand for wood at competitive 
prices, and also sufficient to meet export demands that would be of ‘economic 
and social benefit to the State and nation’.    In order to meet these commitments, 
it was proposed that the proportion of hardwood logs processed to high value 
products be increased from 13% to 50% by 1997, and that exports of timber 
products increase from 10% of hardwood sawlog production by 1990, and to 
30% by 2000.   The strategy was based on assumptions that there was an 
equitable reservation of forest areas for conservation, recreation and timber 
production, that the forest would be managed under principles of multiple-use 
and sustained yield, that ‘harvested’ areas would be regenerated, and that the 
processing of logs from state forest would be managed to maximise the economic 
benefit to Western Australia.
22   The proposals soon attracted a response from the 
forest protest movement. 
      
While acknowledging that the draft strategy and plans contained some good 
points, such as converting significant areas of karri forest into national parks and 
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increasing royalties paid to the state by the timber and wood chip companies, the 
SFDF found that they failed to make sufficient provision for the establishment of 
conservation reserves that were secure from exploitation.   The organisation 
believed that, in order to protect the forests for the future, logging should not take 
place until an area had been studied for its recreation, tourism and heritage 
values, that wood chipping should be limited to sawmill waste or logs from 
private plantations on cleared land, and that over-cutting and clear-felling must 
cease.   Supporters were urged to lobby politicians and the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management to register their opposition to the 
proposals.
23 
      
The other major forest protest groups decided to combine their efforts, and in 
August 1987 the Campaign to Save Native Forests, the Australian Conservation 
Foundation, the Conservation Council of Western Australia, and the Coalition for 
Denmark’s Environment published Time for Change, which summarised the 
groups’ responses to CALM’s Management Plans and Timber Strategy.   In 
addition to supporting the SFDF’s arguments, the group called for increased 
effort by CALM to conserve Western Australia’s native forests, an expansion of 
the National Park, State Park and Nature Reserve system, and improvements to 
the regulation of the timber industry and forest management practices.   The 
response also argued for greater involvement of the Environmental Protection 
Authority in controlling the operation of the state’s timber and wood chip 
industries.
24 
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A major criticism of CALM’s approach to forest management, and a strategic 
target for protest groups, was the practice of clear-felling large areas of forest and 
then burning the cleared area to stimulate regeneration.   In 1988, the Tree 
Society expressed its concern at the loss of species in Western Australia’s south-
west forests, and argued that clear-felling resulted in a reduction in species 
diversity, extinction of some local species, and increased risk of spreading forest 
diseases.   The organisation called for an intensive biological inventory study of 
all the south-west’s forested areas by an independent scientific body.
25   At the 
same time, the effects of clear-felling were receiving increased media attention, 
with Denmark conservationists drawing attention to the logging taking place at 
Deep River, near Walpole – an area that had been nominated for National Estate 
registration because of its ecological diversity.
26   D r  S y d  S h e a ,  C A L M ’ s  
executive director, attempted to allay fears over the effects of clear-felling, 
describing conservationists’ claims of the threat to native species as ‘outlandish’, 
and insisting that there was no evidence that the growth rate of regrowth karri 
would decline but rather that it would increase by as much as 40%.
27  
      
In mid-1989, Pemberton and Northcliffe residents met with national television 
journalists to protest against the impact of clear-felling on local areas of native 
forest.   The meeting was viewed by forest activists as the latest expression of 
mounting opposition to CALM’s public land management in Western Australia, 
which they argued would increase now that the devastation caused by clear-
felling was open to public view.   State forest, they pointed out, did not belong to 
CALM or the timber companies, but to the people of the state, who had the right 
to object to what was happening and to demand changes.
28 
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SFDF activist Beth Schultz’ evidence to the 1989 Select Committee on Land 
Conservation catalogued some of the forest protest movement’s arguments 
against CALM’s management practices.    She argued that the preponderance of 
foresters within the department had resulted in a bias towards production 
forestry, and that this had carried over into its conservation function.    Schultz 
maintained that the wood chipping industry was influencing CALM’s forest 
practices and that over-cutting and clear-felling were occurring because 
otherwise there would be a shortfall in timber production.   She believed that 
CALM’s venture into production forestry on private land was responsible for 
land degradation and cited an incident in which a Bridgetown farmer’s land had 
been eroded through the department’s indiscriminate use of heavy machinery.
29 
      
For the forest protest movement the campaign against the creation of CALM was 
the first major test of the movement's ability to influence forest policy since the 
1983 election of the Burke Labor government and the Shannon Basin and Lane-
Poole Reserve successes.   The protest movement employed a range of tactics 
such as political lobbying, detailed submissions and media exposure to maintain 
constant pressure on the state government and the new department to adopt more 
environmentally sensitive forest policies.   Its failure to prevent the creation of 
CALM or to influence the conduct of its forest management activities, however, 
demonstrated that, during the late-1980s, the movement's earlier optimistic 
expectations had been diminished and that there were limitations on the extent of 
the new state government's willingness to co-operate  on  forest  protection.    
Furthermore, the campaign against CALM had revealed division within the 
protest movement over strategies.   Some CSNF members, who were loyal ALP 
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supporters, accepted the new department's formation and sought to effect reform 
from within the state government, while others in the forest protest movement 
remained firmly opposed.    
 
The Anti-Wood Chip Licence Campaign 
 
Map 6.2.   Location of the wood chip licence area in the south-west of Western 
Australia.   Source:  Arthur and Jeanette Conacher, Environmental Planning and 
Management in Australia, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.20. 
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In September 1985, the Campaign to Save Native Forests received information 
that the federal government had negotiated with the WA Chip and Pulp Company 
to prepare an environmental impact statement in readiness for the company’s 
application for an extension of its Manjimup wood chip export licence which 
would expire in 1991. (see Map 6.2.)  The CSNF recommended that the 
conservation movement should oppose the renewal of the licence on 
environmental and social grounds, or demand substantial modifications.
30  Forest 
activists were advised that the WA Chip and Pulp Company was applying to 
export 750,000 tonnes of karri and marri wood chips annually for a further 15 
years from 1991, and warned of proposed changes to the licence agreement that 
included the logging of mature and virgin jarrah and marri forests, both inside 
and outside the licence area, and a proposal to increase the number of immature 
karri trees being wood chipped.
31 
      
The South-West Forests Defence Foundation campaigned against the export 
licence renewal in its June 1987 newsletter by alerting its members to the 'serious 
implications' of the proposal.  Why was it necessary to renew the licences four 
years before they were due to expire?   The organisation believed that the WA 
Chip and Pulp Company was seeking to preserve the security of the wood chip 
industry in the face of mounting public opposition.   It also questioned why the 
licence application did not take into account CALM’s draft timber strategy and 
forest management plans and believed that the Western Australian public was 
unaware of important environmental aspects of the renewal proposal.  The 
Foundation argued that there were several environmentally sound alternatives to 
the wood chip proposal such as using wood from saw mill waste and plantations, 
  232 
recycling paper and wood products, and logging state forest only for Western 
Australia's needs. Members were urged to forward submissions opposing the 
wood chip licence renewal to the State Environmental Protection Authority and 
Premier Burke.
32   In line with its main strategy of legal challenge, the SFDF also 
sought advice on whether or not the organisation would have standing to oppose 
the wood chip licence legislation through the court system.   It was advised, 
however, that, due to a lack of any clearly defined course of action, the political 
system remained the better alternative for furthering the SFDF’s objectives.
33 
      
As the time drew close for a federal cabinet decision on the export licence 
renewal, the forest protest movement directed its attention at state politicians.   
The CSNF highlighted the period between April and June 1988 as a critical time 
when members and supporters should attempt to influence the licence outcome.   
People in Labor electorates were urged to write to their local Members of 
Parliament, and those in Liberal electorates to Premier Peter Dowding, and the 
Ministers for Conservation and Land Management, and Tourism.
34   T h e  
organisation also seized the strategic opportunity to exploit the support of one of 
its most prominent personalities.   Comedian Spike Milligan, a CSNF honorary 
life member, released a statement in England to publicise his views on the wood 
chip licence renewal: 
In the light of the increased world concern about destruction of native 
forests and trees, I am appalled at the Western Australian Government 
even considering the renewal of WACAP’s export wood chip licence.   
What these environmentally blind people are doing is throwing away 
their tomorrow and completely ignoring the needs of future generations.   
This is what brought about the disasters in places like Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, and the Sudan.   They blew their tree cover and are paying the 
price.   Despite this knowledge, the Western Australian Government 
seem blind in the light of it.
35 
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In mid-April 1988, the federal Minister for the Environment, Graham 
Richardson, announced that, after examining an environmental impact statement 
prepared by the company, he had recommended to the Minister for Resources, 
Peter Cook, that the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s licence be renewed.   It was 
claimed that the renewal would guarantee wood chip exports for a further 15 
years, and ensure the security of 550 jobs in the $50 million a year industry.  
Richardson said his department believed that the ‘environmental consequences of 
the proposal can be minimised providing certain conditions are met’.   In what 
appeared to be an effort to placate the conservation lobby, Cook said he believed 
there was a need to reduce the dependence on wood chip exports and proposed 
the introduction of a ‘forest accord’ between governments, the timber industry, 
the unions, and the conservation movement.
36   
      
The federal government recommendation attracted the attention of the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, which immediately called on Senator Cook to defer 
his decision on the wood chip licence renewal.    The Foundation seized upon the 
Senator’s hint of a forest agreement and the fact that important environmental 
concerns had not been addressed as reasons for delaying approval of the wood 
chip licence.   Furthermore, the organisation felt that the company and CALM 
had failed to provide essential information, such as whether or not cutting levels 
were sustainable.
37   Urging Senator Richardson to reconsider his conclusion, the 
Coalition for Denmark’s Environment argued that the information supplied by 
CALM on which the recommendation had been made had minimised the impact 
of the greenhouse effect on climatic change, which in turn affected the growth 
rate of native forests.   Although Dr Syd Shea, CALM’s executive director, said 
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his department was carefully monitoring the greenhouse effect, the Denmark 
coalition cited the statement of a CALM policy adviser, who had told a Busselton 
meeting that climatic change had not been considered when CALM had prepared 
its management plans and timber strategy.
38 
      
The report and recommendations of the Western Australian Environmental 
Protection Authority on the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s wood chip licence 
renewal application was released in July 1988.   It concluded that: 
...the derivation of woodchips from low-grade logs from integrated 
operation in State Forest is environmentally acceptable as long as the 
conservation and amenity values of multiple use old growth forest in the 
Southern Forest Region and the salt sensitive areas of Jarrah-Marri 
forest in the Northern, Central and Southern Forest Regions are 
maintained...that the derivation of woodchips from regrowth thinnings 
in State Forest is environmentally acceptable provided the Department 
of Conservation and Land Management’s normal harvesting 
prescriptions are maintained.
39 
 
The Environmental Protection Authority's report further recommended that 
reviews and extensions of approvals for wood chipping should be linked to the 
ten-year review of the Timber Production Strategy and Forest Region 
Management Plans, and that the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s licence would 
thus be reviewed in 1998, and not 2006 as previously intended.   Acknowledging 
the ‘philosophical difference’ between conservationists and forest managers that 
underlay much of the tension over forest issues, the report advocated continued 
use of consultative processes to reduce conflict.
40 
      
While the forest protest movement recognised that the Environmental Protection 
Authority's report contained some positive recommendations for forest 
conservation, the findings produced a mixed reaction.
41   Although the 
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Conservation Council of Western Australia supported the recommendation not to 
clear native forest on private land for wood chipping and to develop plantations 
on already cleared private property for wood production, it decided to appeal 
against the report on the grounds that the forests could not sustain the annual 
quota of 750,000 tonnes of chip logs permitted under the proposed 10-year wood 
chip licence.   Further criticism was levelled at the contradiction between a call 
for research into the environmental effects of clear-felling on the one hand, and 
the endorsement of export wood chipping.   The Council asked affiliated groups 
to lodge appeals against the report with the State Minister for the Environment, 
Barry Hodge, asserting that ‘combined action’ was essential in order to persuade 
the Minister to amend the conditions of the wood chip licence.
42    
      
In a circular to forest activists, the Conservation Council asserted that many 
environmental scientists were prevented from publicising their findings because 
of government-imposed censorship.
43   The claim echoed the Council’s support 
for Dr Graham Chittleborough, the Environmental Protection Authority’s Chief 
Research Scientist, who resigned in April 1987, after alleging that a conservation 
strategy and review paper he produced for the 'Department of Conservation and 
Environment' had been suppressed.  Dr Chittleborough had argued that usage of 
Western Australia’s native forests exceeded sustainable rates, and concluded that 
in order to meet the demands of an ‘accumulated environmental debt’, the state’s 
population might have to accept some modifications to its living standards.
44 
 
The Australian Conservation Foundation rejected the Environmental Protection 
Authority’s assertion that clear-felling forests for wood chips was 
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environmentally acceptable, claiming that there was no scientific evidence to 
support that view.   In order to protect the state’s forests the Foundation believed 
it was necessary for the government to transfer the wood chip industry from the 
forests to a plantation-based strategy using already cleared land.
45   W h i l e  
conceding that some of the recommendations in the Environmental Protection 
Authority's report relating to the use of plantations and forest resources were 
‘praiseworthy’, the Campaign to Save Native Forests considered that the report, 
while appearing progressive, was a rhetorical attempt to divert attention away 
from the fact that Western Australia’s forests were being over-exploited and that 
conservation values were being ignored.   The organisation called on the 
Environmental Protection Authority for ‘courage and commitment’ to take 
immediate action to protect the remaining stands of the state’s native forests and 
that this should include a full public review of CALM's draft forest management 
plans, a public inquiry into Western Australia's timber industries, a restructuring 
of the export wood chip industry to ensure that only saw mill residue and 
plantation timber is used, and the rejection of any permanent use of native forests 
for timber production until the resource has been assessed for the risk of 
environmental damage.
46 
      
As part of a strategy to increase public education and support for their campaign 
against the export wood chip licence renewal, the Conservation Council of 
Western Australia, the Australian Conservation Council, the Campaign to Save 
Native Forests and the South-West Forests Defence Foundation united under the 
banner of “The Combined Forest Conservation Groups of WA”, to arrange two 
public events.  A weekend telephone “Forest Hotline” held over the weekend of 
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30-31 July 1988, and designed to provide members of the public with an 
opportunity to express their views about wood chipping and the logging of native 
forests, resulted in an average of 30 calls per hour, with people expressing strong 
concerns about the impending wood chip licence renewal.   Politicians were 
urged to take notice of the ‘public outcry’ against the destruction of forests, and 
to consider the strength of the opposition when making decisions.
47   The WA 
Chip and Pulp Company dismissed the phone-in as ‘unfair tactics’ that were 
designed to influence the federal Minister for the Environment against a 
‘responsible and well-controlled woodchip industry’.
48 
      
A public seminar “When the Chips are Down” held at the University of Western 
Australia in September 1988, was designed to allow all sides in the forests debate 
to air their views and was described by the Conservation Council as a landmark 
in the history of Western Australia’s conservation movement that heralded a 
fresh approach to public participation on controversial environmental issues.   
Subjects discussed included: the ownership and management of the forests, 
obstacles to a forest accord, and the difficulties faced by small timber millers.   
Speakers included academics, environmental scientists, conservationists, and 
timber industry representatives, and the seminar concluded with a public 
forum.
49   Bunnings timber company decided not to send a representative as it 
believed advance publicity for the event indicated there would be little 
opportunity for an impartial and rational discussion.
50 
 
The efforts of the conservation groups were to no avail, with the state 
Environment Minister dismissing appeals against the Environmental Protection 
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Authority’s report and insisting that wood chip operations could be compatible 
with forest management provided that tight controls were imposed to protect the 
timber resource and its long-term environmental value.
51   The Conservation 
Council warned that the state government’s decision would be resisted by the 
conservation movement: 
We believe that the Minister for the Environment has lost touch with the 
electorate.  He has severely underestimated the strength of public 
feeling  about clearfelling and destruction of the forests of the south 
west.   We find it incredible that a Labor Government cares so little for 
the future of Western Australia that it is prepared to allow the removal 
and export of its life support system at a time when much of the system 
is under severe stress.
52 
 
The SFDF supported the Conservation Council’s scepticism over industry 
controls, alleging that the WA Chip and Pulp Company had already been 
breaching the terms of its wood chip licence by chipping timber quality logs, and 
that CALM’s executive director had failed to enforce the current licence 
conditions.
53 
      
In an effort to capitalise on mounting opposition to the wood chip licence 
extension and native forest logging, the Conservation Council convened a public 
meeting in October 1988 to assess levels of support and consider the future of 
forest conservation in Western Australia.   The meeting was attended by 
representatives of various conservation groups, including the CSNF, SFDF, Men 
of the Trees, and the Great Walk Network.  It was decided to expand the 
campaign against wood chipping beyond the realm of the four major forest 
protest groups that had united for the "Forest Hotline" and "When the Chips are 
Down" actions, and to initiate a 'consolidated forest conservation movement' that 
included concerned members of the public and supporters of particular forest 
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conservation groups who would be encouraged to place their names on a formal 
roll as “Friends of the Forest”.   A $2 donation would register support for 
‘retention of mature native forests because of their importance for conservation 
and recreation’.  Members were asked to write to the federal Minister for 
Resources, requesting him not to renew wood chip licences.
54 
      
Western Australian conservationists met in November 1988 with the federal 
Minister for Resources to discuss the proposed Forest Accord and the renewal of 
wood chip export licences.   During the meeting, Roy Bate, the CSNF 
representative, called for a moratorium on the signing of wood chip licences as a 
demonstration to the conservation movement that the federal government was 
sincere in its desire for a Forest Accord.   Craig Chappelle, from the Coalition for 
Denmark’s Environment, argued that people felt powerless because of the lack of 
an adequate mechanism through which they could represent their feelings on 
forest issues.
55  Both the CSNF and the SFDF insisted that any Forest Accord 
agreement would depend on the outcome of wood chip licence applications, 
demanding a major revision of the renewal proposals to achieve reduced 
duration, decreased tonnages, phasing out logging in old growth forests, and 
transferring the resource base from native forests to private plantations.     
Additionally, the CSNF called for a major restructuring of Western Australia’s 
export wood chip industry, a full public inquiry into the industry and its forest 
management practices, and no allocation of native forests for wood production 
until the areas were assessed for their biological, recreational and heritage 
values.
56 
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The close of 1988 was a period of confusion and mixed emotions for the forest 
protest movement.   On 23 December, the state Minister for Conservation and 
Land Management announced that wood chipping in state forests would be 
phased out from the year 2000 and replaced by a forestation programme on 
cleared farm land.   He said the decision had been made possible because of a 
restructured log-pricing system and the development of a technologically 
efficient timber industry based on value-added hardwood products and state 
government tree-planting programmes.  The Minister believed the historic 
decision would strike a balance between forest conservation and ensuring the 
future of timber and wood chip industries.
57     
      
The Australian Conservation Foundation applauded the initiative as ‘a 
fundamental change in direction’ by the state government, believing that the 
move towards plantation forestry would provide a sustainable solution to the 
long-term problem of forest conservation.   Similarly, the Conservation Council 
of Western Australia was delighted with the decision, and optimistic that it 
signalled ‘a new level of co-operation between the timber industry, the state 
government and the conservation movement.’   The organisation was pleased that 
at last the government was responding to widespread community concerns about 
forest management, and hoped that it would heed further recommendations from 
conservationists.
58  Others were more cynical, believing the decision was 
politically motivated, after opinion polls showed that about 75% of Australians 
were concerned about forest conservation.
59    
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Predictably, the plans to phase out wood chipping produced strong opposition 
from the timber industry, who believed the decision would see a return to the 
days when waste timber was burnt instead of being put to good use.   John 
Oldham, managing director of the WA Chip and Pulp Company, said there 
would always be waste material after logging, and pointed out that, while 
conservationists had said they wanted full use of resources, the state government 
was now placing restrictions on how wood should be used.
60   In a circular letter 
to members of parliament, the Institute of Foresters protested that the end of 
wood chipping would disrupt the economic structure of the timber industry, and 
result in a 30-40% increase in the price of house timber.   The Institute argued 
that wood chipping was needed for efficient forest management, and that the 
industry was essential to ensure that ‘low grade trees or unsaleable species are 
not left to dominate the forest and inhibit regeneration.’
61 
      
The mood of optimism among conservationists generated by the planned wood 
chip phase out was short-lived.   At the end of December, the federal Resources 
Minister announced that he had renewed long-term approval for the WA Chip 
and Pulp Company to export wood chips at the rate of 900,000 tonnes per annum 
over a reduced licence period of 10 years.   The licence would be subject to 
review after two years, and strict conditions would be attached to protect 
environmental values, encourage tree plantations and improve forest 
management practices.
62   The Western Australian government considered the 
reduction of the licence period and the introduction of a two-yearly review 
condition would ensure that timber resources were utilised efficiently.  It further 
believed that the implementation of a Forest Accord would accommodate the 
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interests of both the industry and the conservation movement and ‘enable all 
parties to make a direct contribution towards an agreement which will reduce 
conflict over the forests and protect both jobs and the forest’.
63  
      
The announcement prompted an angry response from members of the forest 
protest movement who were quick to point out that the licence renewal appeared 
to conflict with the state government’s intention to phase out wood chipping 
from the year 2000.    The Conservation Council argued that the granting of the 
licence threatened the future of the south-west forests and vowed that the 
conservation movement would intensify its campaign to stop wood chipping and 
clear-felling in state forest.   It thought the federal Minister’s announcement had 
been mistimed, considering the impending state election, and that politicians had 
underestimated the strength of public sympathy for the forests.
64  The Council 
sought assurances when wood chipping would be phased out, and called for 
restructuring of the wood chip industry, with tighter controls over export 
licences.
65      
       
Despite assertions from the state Conservation and Land Management Minister 
that the issuing of a new wood chip licence did not conflict with plans to phase 
out the industry,
66 the state government’s ambiguous wood chipping policy 
caused confusion not only for the forest protest movement but also for the timber 
industry.   Peter George, commercial manager for the WA Chip and Pulp 
Company, said there was widespread concern among timber workers over their 
employment and called upon the government to clarify the future of the wood 
chipping industry.
67 
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The campaign against the renewal of the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s wood 
chip licence emphasised the continuing conflict between the demands of a 
resource-dependent state economy and increasing calls from the forest protest 
movement for the conservation of Western Australia's forests.   Like the 
campaign against the formation of CALM, the action reflected the failure of the 
forest protest movement to influence the state Labor government's approaches to 
forest management and to build upon the successes of the Shannon Basin and 
Lane-Poole Reserve campaigns. On a more positive note, the campaign to stop 
the renewal of wood chip licences once more demonstrated the ability of the 
movement to unite around a common goal and to employ non-confrontational 
strategies such as phone-ins, seminars and endorsements from prominent 
personalities to gain public attention and maintain a focus on the need for forest 
conservation.    While forest protesters initially gained some satisfaction and 
encouragement from a belief that their campaign may have exerted some 
influence on the state government’s pledge to phase out wood chipping, the 
federal government's subsequent decision to renew the wood chip licence served 
only to create a climate of confusion and uncertainty.     
      
Although campaigns against the creation of CALM and the granting of wood 
chip licences enabled activists to further expand their strategies and intensify 
their activities, both represented failures by the large city-based forest protest 
groups to combat the powerful timber lobby.   It was the increasing threat to 
specific areas of forest in Western Australia's south-west that provided the 
catalyst not only for an expansion of the forest protest movement but, most 
significantly, for a shift towards successful regional protest action. 
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Denmark Protests 
A campaign by Denmark environmentalists to prevent the introduction of an 
export wood chip industry into the area demonstrated how, during the 1980s, 
forest activists in the state's south-west began to organise around local forest 
issues and how those campaigns came to be driven by prominent leaders.       
Furthermore, the campaign illustrated evolving networks of co-operation and 
support between regional and Perth-based environmentalists and contained 
examples of the 'persuasive' rather than confrontational tactics that became a 
hallmark of forest protest during the 1980s. 
      
The town of Denmark is situated some 400 kilometres south-east of Perth on the 
south coast and located on the eastern edge of the karri forest adjacent to the 
Walpole Wilderness Area.   It is surrounded by areas of large native trees, 
especially jarrah, karri, marri,  and red tingle, which can reach a height of 60 
metres.  The area is unique because many of the area's trees have managed to 
survive free of human interference.    
 
Denmark's early progress stemmed from the opening of a timber mill on the 
banks of the Denmark River in 1894.   When the hardwood karri timber was 
found to be particularly durable it provided the raw material for a variety of 
export products, which included railway sleepers and telegraph poles.    During 
the late 1970s, a group of people in the area became aware of increasing threats 
to the local environment and decided to band together to protect it. 
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Alex Syme, a farmer from the state’s Wheatbelt, moved to Denmark in 1976 and 
was concerned at the high levels of salinity in the Denmark River.   On hearing 
of a proposal to cut down areas of forest on private land to supply a wood chip 
mill, he decided to become actively involved in environmental issues.     
According to Syme, the Denmark Environment Group was formed in 1978, 
principally to enable local people to learn about the natural environment and take 
part in the debate on environmental management.   The group’s formation was 
well-supported, with between 90 and 100 members.   Its membership represented 
a broad spectrum of the local community, including newcomers to the district, 
long-time residents, academics and business people.   Syme’s agricultural 
experience introduced a pragmatic approach to environmental issues: 
I was looking at the countryside from a land management point of 
view...I probably was recognising mismanagement rather than any 
emotional connection.
68 
 
In 1985 members of the Denmark Environment Group were informed of a 
proposal by McLean Sawmills Pty Ltd of Denmark to establish an export wood 
chip industry in the region, based on the acquisition of logs from karri, jarrah and 
marri forests on private land.   Farmers would be encouraged to replace the local 
species with eastern states eucalypts to ensure future supplies.  It was intended 
that between 1,000 and 5,000 hectares of native forest would be felled each year.   
The logs would be processed at the local mill and transported to Albany for 
shipment overseas.  The Company intended to apply for a federal licence to 
export 240,000 tonnes of wood chips annually.
69 
      
On hearing that the project was part of a Great Southern Region Economic 
Study, the group decided to formulate a submission.    Citing past land 
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management practices, such as excessive clearing, that had resulted in soil 
erosion and increased salinity, their submission argued that the project should not 
proceed before an environmental impact study could show that there would be no 
environmental degradation.   The group further proposed that, if the state 
government wished to promote a wood chip industry in the area, consideration 
should be given to providing direct assistance to farmers to establish plantations 
on existing cleared land and pasture.
70    The group reinforced its opposition to 
the project in a critique of a state government study on the future of the Albany 
region that minimised the impact of wood chipping, expressing disappointment 
that the study had failed to recommend that an Environmental Impact Statement 
or Environmental Review and Management Programme on the wood chip 
proposal should be initiated.
71 
      
The group was supported in its opposition to the McLean project by the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF), which argued that the long-term 
environmental costs of the proposal would far outweigh any short-term economic 
benefit to a small section of private enterprise, and that any profits would be lost 
to overseas interests.
72    The CSNF placed the issue in a broader context, 
asserting that the wood chip proposal would foreshadow further extensive 
clearing of native forests in the Denmark area and that publicly owned state 
forest would be under pressure for clear-felling.
73 
      
The McLean wood chip project polarised the Denmark community.   In 
November 1985, proponents of the scheme and supporters of Gordon McLean, 
the sawmill’s managing director, organised the town’s first street march.   Over 
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100 people, led by Mrs Pat McLean, the manager’s wife, marched through the 
streets with posters and a loud hailer, exhorting observers to show support for 
Gordon McLean ‘who has supported this town for years.’   Prior to the march, 
Mrs McLean had cautioned the marchers to avoid ‘slanderous talk about the 
conservationists’, and to respect their right to an alternative opinion.
74    Despite 
this warning, however, local environmentalists were offended at suggestions 
during the march that they questioned McLean’s contribution to the Denmark 
community and felt obliged to state that they fully supported the sawmill in its 
present role, but were opposed to the potential adverse environmental effects of 
the wood chip proposal.
75 
      
The demonstration of support for the McLean project fuelled further debate in 
the local press.    A former employee praised the mill manager for his 
contribution to the town’s progress and believed a tree-planting project would 
greatly assist the unemployed in the district.
76   Alternatively, Wallace Graham, 
the president of the Denmark Environment Group, pointed out that, although 
group members supported plantation forestry on land that had been cleared for 
farming and was relatively impoverished, they were horrified at the prospect of 
clearing away more native forest.
77   A survey of local farmers showed that, 
while few were willing to support local conservationists’ calls to abandon the 
proposal, they were also unwilling to plant trees:  ‘I can’t see myself planting a 
big karri hill back to trees when my grandfather worked his guts out to clear the 
land.’
78 
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Denmark environmentalists realised that in order to mount an effective campaign 
against an increasingly powerful timber lobby they would have to combine their 
efforts.   It was this decision in early 1986 that resulted in the formation of the 
Coalition for Denmark’s Environment.   The new group comprised the Denmark 
Environment Group, Farmers for Forests Survival, Denmark Woodchipping 
Awareness Group, and the Denmark Community Tree Planters.
79 
      
Craig Chappelle moved to Denmark in 1981 as a journalist and is currently 
(2007) secretary of the Denmark Conservation Society, which was formed in 
1990.   He became actively involved in the formation and activities of the 
Coalition: 
There were a disproportionate number of highly-intelligent, well-
trained, well-educated, articulate people who were active in a whole 
range of different arenas...disproportionate for the size of the 
population.   There was never any question of having to drag people up 
into the issues, the people that joined and got involved were aware of 
the issues from the outset.
80 
 
The Denmark community seemed to him evenly divided over the wood chip 
proposal, with some degree of support for the project based on community 
admiration for Gordon McLean, without any consideration of the environmental 
ramifications:  ‘They thought Gordon was a nice bloke and deserved a fair go’.   
Chappelle recalled that in the early 1980s his interest in the environment had 
been stimulated by the Franklin dam case in Tasmania, and the McLean wood 
chip issue provided the incentive ‘to get off my backside and do something’.
81 
      
During 1986 the local campaign on the wood chip proposal gathered momentum, 
with both sides attempting to win over the local community.    A saw-mill 
publicity campaign stressed the importance of forest products in daily life and 
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argued that its capacity to produce those products was being undermined by the 
gross misconceptions of ‘radical conservationists’ who were seen by the 
company as ‘the greatest threat to our heritage forests’.   By opposing clear-
felling and regrowth, conservationists were depriving future generations of 
timber supplies and denying struggling farmers the opportunity to capitalise on 
their assets.   As well, local environmentalists were ignoring the economic 
benefits the wood chip project would bring to both the state and the region.
82     
In response, the Coalition for Denmark's Environment mounted a concerted 
campaign focussing on the potential threats to the environment if the project 
went ahead.   The Coalition’s ultimate success in halting the project resulted 
from the adoption of an intensive programme of public education through public 
meetings, films, newsletters and news releases, that gradually convinced local 
people that the McLean project posed a real threat to their wellbeing and that 
they should take an active part in the debate.    Rather than standing in front of 
bulldozers, the Coalition preferred to ‘dig away at the foundations’.
83       
      
Brochures were produced to stimulate discussion on such issues as salination and 
land degradation, the value of native forests, the social impact of wood chipping, 
and whether or not farmers were likely to establish plantations on their land.   
Alternatives to the project were suggested, such as the introduction of a pine 
share-farming scheme on currently cleared land, value-added processing of saw-
milled timber for furniture manufacture, the establishment of a mill training 
facility to develop a fine timber industry, and the expansion of tourism and 
agriculture.   The Coalition argued that the McLean proposal contained 
environmental, economic and social threats to land and water resources, and that 
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there were other viable options that offered better employment and social 
opportunities for the area.
84 
      
While the Coalition remained the driving force behind the anti-wood chipping 
campaign, the group received strong support from larger organisations.     
Commenting on inadequacies within the draft Environmental Impact Statement 
for the McLean project, the Australian Conservation Foundation, in a circular to 
environmental groups, stated its intention to combine ‘with Perth and local 
conservation organisations’ to oppose the granting of an export licence.   The 
Foundation appealed for assistance in persuading people to write letters and 
submissions.
85   The Conservation Council of Western Australia was successful 
in its application to the State Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment for a 
Special Project Grant to assist in responding adequately to the Denmark wood 
chip proposal, and received a $4,000 grant from the 1985-1986 allocation for 
voluntary conservation organisations.
86   A talk given by Conservation Council 
representatives to the Floreat branch of the Australian Labor Party elicited more 
support for the campaign, and an undertaking from the branch to lobby state and 
federal governments to refuse the granting of wood chip export licences.
87 
      
Throughout 1986 the Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF) demonstrated its 
support for the Denmark campaign by relentless media pressure.   The 
organisation criticised the contradiction in the state government’s promotion of 
both export wood chipping and tourism for the south-west, pointing out that 
tourists did not want to see vast areas of native forests ruined by clear-felling for 
the wood chip industry.
88   It raised doubts over McLean’s assertion that the 
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Company would plant more trees than were cut down and whether the firm 
would be able to resist a take-over from larger and more intensive wood chipping 
companies.
89   In August, the CSNF presented a video entitled 'In Defence of 
Native Forests' to the Denmark public library.   The video had been made by the 
organisation in response to the McLean proposal, and appraised the 
environmental problems the area faced if the project went ahead.   It was 
intended to stimulate informed public debate, and invited people to consider 
alternatives to intensive wood chipping.
90   Finally, in November 1986, the 
CSNF offered an initial response to the Environmental Review and Management 
Programme/Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared by McLean 
Sawmills,
91 emphasising the report’s admission that 10,000 hectares of native 
forest would be lost for ever and criticising its unsubstantiated claims about 
employment growth and the willingness of local farmers to establish 
plantations.
92 
      
Like the CSNF and SFDF campaigns of the late 1970s, the Denmark Coalition 
realised that stopping the McLean project would require a credible critique of the 
wood chipping industry to educate people about the detrimental effects of the 
scheme on the local environment.  The group decided to produce its own 
documentary.    The film The Last Stand demonstrated how wood chipping had 
already had a serious impact on the state’s native forests.   The scale of the 
proposed project was represented as covering an area twelve times that of King’s 
Park, with plantations that would appear more like farms than forests.   The 
argument that the scheme would increase local employment opportunities was 
countered by figures showing that, while log production in Western Australia 
  252 
increased by 21% between 1964 and 1985, employment in the timber industry 
during the period decreased by 47%.
93    
      
The film’s greatest impact derived from interviews with representatives from 
both the timber industry and the Denmark community.   Adrian Price, an ex-
logging foreman with Bunnings, described the wasteful practices he had 
observed during his employment, and how good ‘millable’ trees were being 
turned into wood chips.    Dr Syd Shea, Executive Director of the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management, admitted that, while the amount of over-
cutting of timber should have been less, over-cutting had provided a stimulus to 
the state’s economy.   Local small business and crafts people voiced their 
concerns at the proposed project.  An architect lamented the conversion of prime 
saw logs into wood chips, a tourist operator indicated a clear-felled area of forest 
that should have been a tourist attraction, and a naturalist warned of the 
impending threat to birds and wildlife.
94 
      
Strategically, the documentary proved a great success for the Coalition for 
Denmark's Environment.   Alex Syme believed the film played a major role in 
educating people about the environment, and recalled that copies of the video 
were purchased by the Education Department and shown in schools.  He also 
remembered that the documentary was broadcast regularly on the Golden West 
Network, and was used in the education system on the ‘School of the Air’.
95   
The video film, directed by independent film-maker Frank Rijavec and co-
written by Craig Chappelle, was launched in Perth by Shirley de la Hunty.
96     
An indication of the film’s impact can be gauged from an incident in Subiaco.   
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A viewing was disrupted when a person who introduced himself as Peter George, 
an employee of the WA Chip and Pulp Company, stood up and angrily 
questioned some of the assertions made in the documentary.  He claimed that 
50% and not 6% of karri forest was protected in reserves or national parks and 
alleged that sections of the film were outdated.
97   Lively debate was central to 
the education process. 
      
The campaign intensified during the early months of 1987, through the co-
ordinated efforts of environmental organisations and from a sense that public 
opposition to the proposal was growing.   In a joint submission to the 
Commonwealth Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment and the Western 
Australian Environmental Protection Authority, the Coalition for Denmark’s 
Environment, the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Conservation Council 
of WA, and the Campaign to Save Native Forests, produced a response to 
McLean’s Environmental Review and Management Programme/Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement.   The groups argued that:  
The ERMP fails to address key issues, and presents a biased and 
incomplete assessment of risks and costs associated with the proposed 
McLean Forest Project.  It contains crucial logical errors, contradictory 
claims and false statements.  It should be rejected as an inadequate 
proposal document for an industry that would permanently damage the 
social and biological environment of the south coast region of Western 
Australia.
98 
 
A separate submission by the South-West Forests Defence Foundation contended 
that the project should be rejected primarily because there was no market for a 
second export wood chip industry in the state and the proposed scheme would be 
detrimental to both the local environment and existing industries in the region.   
The Foundation argued that incentives should be provided to promote alternative, 
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environmentally responsible, industries, and that growing trees specifically to 
produce wood chips was ‘like raising sheep to produce daggy wool.’
99 
      
Increasing local opposition to the proposal occurred partly through the ability of 
local environmentalists to cast doubt on the accuracy of data contained in 
McLean’s Environmental Review and Management Programme.   The Coalition 
for Denmark's Environment was able to demonstrate that figures obtained from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics by McLean to supposedly identify 144,000 
hectares of forest had failed to distinguish between forest and uncleared land 
within the area, and that consequently the portion of land proposed for the wood 
chip project did not contain the amount of forest that the company claimed.
100   
The Coalition organised several successful public meetings to promote its video, 
with an attendance on one occasion by prominent environmentalist Vincent 
Serventy.
101  Proof that the Coalition’s strategies were taking effect was 
evidenced at a meeting of 350 Denmark electors, who resolved to oppose the 
McLean proposal ‘because of the threat the project was seen to pose to the way 
of life of the people of Denmark and the native forest of the region.’
102 
      
During April 1987, environmentalists were pleased to observe that the McLean 
proposal was receiving attention in state parliament.    A speech by Dr Carmen 
Lawrence, Labor MLA, Subiaco, on the issue of native forest conservation, 
referred specifically to the Denmark wood chip proposal.    Voicing her 
opposition to the project, Dr Lawrence noted apparent inaccuracies in the 
Environmental Review and Management Programme that had been raised by 
conservation groups, and to the ERMP's failure to consider the scheme’s broader 
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social and economic costs.   It was vital, she argued, to safeguard the remaining 
one-fifth of the state’s native forests: 
We must slow down the exploitation of our forests and manage them in 
such a way that the next generation can have access to them for the 
purposes which all of us consider reasonable.   Anything we can do to 
achieve that is worth considering.  I oppose projects of any kind which 
do not take sufficient account of the long-term effects on this unique 
forest environment, and which prefer to see a short-term benefit rather 
than preserving our resources for posterity.
103 
 
The speech was welcomed by environmentalists, who believed it presented a 
forceful case for the conservation of Western Australia’s remaining native 
forests.
104   Later that month, Dr Lawrence presented a petition to parliament 
opposing the McLean proposal.
105 
      
In June 1987, Barry Hodge, the State Minister for Conservation and Land 
Management and Environment, announced that the McLean wood chipping 
project at Denmark would not proceed.   He explained that the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) had found the proposal to be environmentally 
unacceptable.   The EPA concluded that McLean Sawmills had overestimated the 
amount of private forest available, there was no guarantee that landholders would 
sell their resource, and logging on private property would produce unacceptable 
environmental impacts.  Furthermore, the government had refused to supply 
additional timber for the project from state forest.
106     
      
Following the rejection, McLean Consolidated submitted a revised proposal, 
requesting a licence to export 60,000 tonnes of wood chips per annum using the 
waste material generated from the company’s logging operations in state forest, 
and excluding stands of native forest on private land.   An EPA report found the 
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new proposal to be environmentally acceptable, provided no whole logs were 
chipped.
107   An appeal by the Conservation Council of Western Australia to the 
Minister for Environment against the report on the grounds that the proposal had 
not been subjected to a full public review and that the forest could not sustain the 
yield required, was rejected.
108 
      
The Denmark campaign against the introduction of an export wood chip industry 
evolved as a confrontation between the supporters of a well-respected local saw-
miller seeking to maximise the profitability of the area’s timber resource and 
those who believed the environmental and social costs of his proposal were too 
high.  In terms of the Western Australian native forest protest movement the 
campaign was significant not only in showing how forest activists in the south-
west had begun to organise and co-ordinate protest action that was focused upon 
local forest issues, but also for demonstrating the employment and effectiveness 
of alternative strategies aimed at public education and persuasion rather than 
direct action.  Alex Syme and Craig Chappelle had emerged as key local leaders 
who played crucial roles in co-ordinating group activity and formulating 
campaign strategies.   Most importantly, the Denmark campaign provided early 
evidence of an emerging support network between regional forest activists and 
city-based environmental organisations.  
      
In 1990, the Coalition for Denmark’s Environment was disbanded as part of a 
broader reorganisation of the area’s environmental groups.   The Community 
Tree Planters had already decided to leave, and there had been some confusion in 
the local media when the Coalition for Denmark's Environment had been 
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mistakenly linked to the Liberal/National Party coalition.    The Denmark 
Conservation Society was formed from the more activist members of the 
Coalition who wished to continue the campaign to preserve and protect 
Denmark’s unique environment.
109    
 
Bridgetown-Greenbushes Groups 
A Department of Conservation and Land Management initiative provided the 
impetus for a further expansion of native forest protest into regional Western 
Australia.      The town of Bridgetown, located some 260 kilometres south of 
Perth, lies among the hills and forests of the south-west on the banks of the 
Blackwood River, and was first settled by colonists in 1857.   As well as 
beautiful scenery, the area has rich farmlands, orchards, pine plantations and 
natural jarrah forests. 
      
Mary Frith was educated in England and completed her tertiary education at 
London University, studying botany, zoology and geography.   From 1955 she 
taught biology for three years at a school in New South Wales, and, after meeting 
her future husband, Jim, who at the time was a Western Australian agricultural 
scientist with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, they both commenced farming a property on the outskirts of 
Bridgetown.   In 1986 the Friths became aware of a proposal by the newly-
created Department of Conservation and Land Management to grow pine 
plantations on private land.   Believing that the initiative stemmed from CALM’s 
desire to avoid public criticism by reducing pressure on the local jarrah forests 
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and that it would provide economic benefits, they agreed to participate in the 
scheme.
110  
 
Following the release of its proposed management plan for the forests in 1987, 
CALM encouraged the formation of community groups to discuss the plans and 
to work with the department on local forest management.   A public meeting to 
discuss the forest proposals resulted in the formation of two local forest activist 
groups.    Mary Frith and her husband were founding members of the 
Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest and Mary recalls that the group 
was initially formed to respond to CALM's forest management plans.   Its initial 
objectives were to protect the forests and to increase public education about what 
was happening.   From an original membership of between 20 to 30 people, the 
group gradually expanded its activities, and eventually became one of the state’s 
largest forest protest groups outside Perth, with about 150 members.
111 
      
At about the same time, the Blackwood Environment Society was established by 
a group of local environmentalists who believed there was a need to expand 
activities beyond forest issues and to adopt a broader environmental focus.     
While there was significant cross-membership between the two organisations, 
each group was markedly different in its approach.   Whereas the Bridgetown- 
Greenbushes Friends of the Forest concentrated its efforts on ‘intellectual’ 
activities, which included political lobbying and public education on forest 
issues, the Blackwood Environment Society was orientated towards more 
practical work, such as establishing a local environment centre and promoting 
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recycling initiatives.   Mary Frith believes that the existence of two 
environmental groups worked well, and that each complemented the other.
112 
      
Although the two Bridgetown groups focused on environmental issues within 
their local area, there is evidence of an attempt to draw on the experience of the 
larger city-based organisations.   Nick Dodson, the founder of the Blackwood 
Environment Society, wrote to the South-West Forests Defence Foundation to 
introduce his group and explain that it was concerned about improving the 
environment, particularly around the Bridgetown area, and seeking information 
about any of the Foundation's activities that might coincide with his own group's 
areas of interest.   Dodson hoped that contact between the two groups would 
result in a 'positive exchange of ideas' and requested that the Foundation keep 
him informed of any specific projects that were planned for his area.
113 
      
A major success of the Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest was a 
campaign to establish a jarrah reserve in the Dalgarup forest to the town’s south-
west.   This 3,500 hectares of jarrah forest had been identified as an area of high 
conservation value by the group as early as 1987, and became the subject of a 
protracted campaign to have the forest preserved.   Members of the group 
conducted extensive research to record the area’s ecological value, lobbied 
politicians, and escorted visitors through the forest to increase public sympathy 
for their argument.   Finally, in 2003, after 16 years of campaigning, the 
Dalgarup Forest was recommended for conservation.
114   Mary Frith recalls that, 
while an early submission to CALM’s Nannup office to protect the area received 
a favourable response, the proposal was ultimately rejected by the department’s 
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executive director, Syd Shea, who claimed the forest was required for production 
forestry.   She believes the campaign was ultimately successful because the 
group maintained constant pressure on authorities by lobbying and letter-writing, 
and through incremental conservation achievements, such as the Bridgetown 
Jarrah Park, which resulted in the protection of larger proportions of the jarrah 
forest.
115 
      
Some parallels can be drawn between the creation of the two Bridgetown- 
Greenbushes groups in 1987, and the formation of the Campaign to Save Native 
Forests and the South-West Forests Defence Foundation 12 years earlier.    While 
on both occasions the groups emerged as the result of public concerns over what 
was happening to the forests, there was also a division over the type of campaign 
strategies to be employed.   Like the South-West Forests Defence Foundation, 
the Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest favoured a more intellectual 
approach to forest activism, with public education and political lobbying playing 
a prominent role in their activities.   The Blackwood Environment Society on the 
other hand, like the Campaign to Save Native Forests, adopted more practical 
and overt forms of activism, with focus on a more visible style of campaigning.    
As with their Perth counterparts, each group attracted different sorts of people, 
while some decided to support both organisations.   Most significantly, like the 
city organisations, the two Bridgetown groups provided outlets for alternative 
expressions of protest. 
      
The formation of the Bridgetown groups resulted from a desire by some 
community members to participate in decisions that would affect the future of the 
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forest environment.    Protest groups and individuals in the south-west soon 
decided on a major strategic initiative that was aimed at both publicising their 
campaign to protect the forests and ensuring that the state's political leaders were 
made aware that forest conservation had become an area of real public concern. 
 
The Great Walk 
In March 1988, Denmark environmentalists consolidated their success in the 
anti-wood chip campaign by providing the focus for the start of the ‘Great Walk’, 
which was intended as a Bicentennial celebration of the environment.   The 
event, organised by individuals from the south-west and supporters from Perth, 
again reflected the growth of networks between regional and city-based activists 
and how local communities in the south-west were organising themselves to 
protect the forests.   Publicity brochures informed participants that the walk had 
been initiated by a group of people who were concerned at the diminishing areas 
of native forests and wished to promote a more caring attitude towards the forests 
in order to achieve a sustainable environment.    The walk started from Denmark 
on 20 March, following secondary roads and forest tracks, and would culminate 
on the steps of Parliament House, Perth, on 14 April, when walkers would 
present a Tree Charter to Premier Peter Dowding.
116    
      
While the walk was supported by the Coalition for Denmark’s Environment, the 
event materialised through the work of individuals rather than groups.   Craig 
Chappelle, who took part in the organising, found the experience personally 
fulfilling, strengthening his personal contacts and encouraging interaction with 
individuals whose ages ranged from infants to octogenarians and whose 
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backgrounds were diverse.
117    As plans for the walk progressed, there was an 
awareness of growing social cohesion and sense of purpose:  
There was a sharing of how everyone felt at the conclusion of the 
weekend’s work...there was a great respect and love coming through 
and people contributing their own strength and skill in their own 
‘special’ way, was happening in a really remarkable manner-that the 
spirit of the people working together is going to carry the walk through 
all the difficulties that may and will rise up.
118 
The Conservation Council supported the organisers by circulating leaflets to 
local councils, promoting the event as a celebration of the land’s gifts to Western 
Australians over 200 years, and calling for a commitment to replenish and restore 
that which had been taken over the years.
119 
      
The 600-kilometre trek received extensive media coverage, with some walkers 
attempting the entire distance, while others completed different stages.   During 
the walk, organisers called on people to join them at a cost of $5 a day, which 
included meals and child care services.   Emphasis was placed on the fact that 
forest protection was the concern not only of forest activists but of ‘ordinary 
people...from all walks of life’ who cared about protecting the forests.
120    The 
walk’s greatest public impact occurred at its conclusion when several hundred 
people marched along St George’s Terrace to Parliament House.
121    Premier 
Dowding accepted a Tree Charter, which contained recommendations for 
conserving the environment.  The Premier said the state government was proud 
of its record of forest management but believed there had to be a balance 
between conservation and jobs.  Organisers hoped the Great Walk would help to 
make Western Australians more aware of their individual responsibilities 
towards the forests.
122 
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The Tree Charter presented to Premier Dowding contained specific 
recommendations regarding the state’s forests.   These included the preservation 
of old growth forests, the moderation of intensive management practices, a 
review of the frequency and timing of prescribed burning, the instigation of 
research into forest ecology, and the provision of timber supplies from 
plantations on presently cleared land.   The Charter concluded by urging the 
government to fulfil its obligations to educate Western Australians about 
environmental pressures and their solutions.
123 (see Figure 6.1.) 
 
Figure 6.1.   Premier Dowding receives the Tree Charter from participants in the 
Great Walk.   Source: West Australian, 15 April 1988. 
      
The Great Walk provided some positive outcomes for native forest protest in 
Western Australia’s south-west.    The participation of broad cross-sections of 
local communities reflected how the forest protest movement was becoming 
increasingly more inclusive and made authorities aware that concern for forest 
conservation was not the sole prerogative of small groups of activists but rather 
of a wider and more discerning Western Australian public.   Most importantly, 
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for the forest protest movement, the walk showed that there was growing 
community reaction in the south-west against the destruction of the state's forests 
and that people were willing to band together to demonstrate their opposition.          
      
The late 1980s contained some important implications for the organisation and 
expression of forest protest in Western Australia.     The failed campaigns against 
the formation of CALM and the extension of wood chip licences both served to 
refine the protest movement's ability to offer professional criticism of the state 
government's forest policies and to employ strategies aimed at exposing Western 
Australians to the visual and environmentally-damaging effects of clear-felling.  
In the state's south-west, the successful Denmark campaign against the McLean's 
wood chip mill proposal and the Great Walk from Denmark to Perth both 
stimulated effective regional protest action through the employment of non-
confrontational strategies aimed at convincing local communities that they 
should take action to protect the forests.   The formation of two forest activist 
groups in the Bridgetown area provides further evidence of the expansion of the 
forest protest movement's network in the state's south-west and of how local 
people were not simply content to voice their concerns about forest issues but 
organised themselves for local protest action.  Once again the period reflected the 
continuing importance of strong leadership, with Alex Syme, Craig Chappelle, 
Nick Dodson and Mary and Jim Frith emerging as key leaders in the growth of  
south-west protest activity. 
      
In summary, for the Western Australian forest protest movement the 1980s was a 
decade of contrasts.   While on the one hand it was a time of optimism and 
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enthusiasm fuelled by the successful Shannon Basin and Lane-Poole Jarrah 
Reserve campaigns, it was also a time of disappointment, when high expectations 
were not realised and forest conservationists found themselves limited and 
constricted by a state government that had once been sympathetic to their cause.   
Furthermore, both the Jarrah Class Action and the campaign against the CALM 
legislation caused some disunity within the protest movement, with activists 
arguing over strategies and ALP supporters facing conflicting loyalties between 
their environmental responsibility to protect the state's forests and their political 
allegiance to the party.  Ultimately, it was the forest protest movement's 
frustration at its inability to influence changes to the state government's forest 
policies combined with the expansion of organised and successful forest protest 
into regional areas that provided the momentum for the movement to consolidate 
its activities and consider a return to more confrontational expressions of dissent.      
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Chapter 7 
The Early 1990s:  Protest Escalation 
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While forest protest groups had already demonstrated an ability to combine to 
oppose bauxite mining and wood chipping, it was not until the early 1990s that 
the movement formally gathered its forces under a single forest protest banner to 
mount a concerted campaign against renewed pressure on Western Australia's 
forests.   Increased community sensitivity to forest destruction resulted in the 
escalation of local forest protest activity in the state's south-west, with an 
expanding network of local action groups which formed to protect specific areas 
of native forest. 
      
This chapter will argue that, during the 1990s, the forest protest movement 
gained support by combining a range of non-confrontational strategies such as 
lobbying, written submissions, legal challenges, public meetings and rallies with 
non-violent direct action that included forest occupations and blockades aimed at 
both maintaining the Western Australian public's focus on the forests and 
sustaining pressure on the state government to alter its forest policies.   A 
comparison between the protest movement's first use of non-violent direct action 
strategies in the late 1970s and the resumption of direct action in the 1990s 
shows how the movement had developed and expanded over time.   Whereas the 
1978 Wagerup occupation had been organised by a single protest group, the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests, and had been directed against Alcoa's bauxite 
mining operations at one specific location, the revival of non-violent direct action 
in the 1990s was characterised by a multitude of forest actions in a variety of 
south-west locations that were co-ordinated by a highly-organised network of 
urban and rural forest protest groups. 
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The chapter will further argue that, while protest strategies were initially non-
confrontational and directed towards opposing the state government’s forest 
policy and management proposals, frustration at the protest movement's inability 
to halt an acceleration of logging in the south-west forests during the early 1990s 
provided the catalyst for an intensive campaign of direct action aimed at saving 
Western Australia’s high conservation value forests.   Additionally, the chapter 
will argue that the spontaneous organisation of south-west protest group activity 
to save local forests strengthened the forest protest movement and expanded its 
existing network of urban and rural forest activists. 
 
Western Australian Forest Alliance (WAFA) 
The formation of the Western Australian Forest Alliance in 1990 was important 
for the organisation of co-ordinated and effective forest protest action in Western 
Australia.  While the state's forest conservation groups had discussed the 
possibility of amalgamating in the late 1980s and were aware of the advantages, 
such as ‘unity, efficiency and convenience’, no formal action was taken to 
combine their resources.
1   Eventually, a gathering of 19 activists representing 12 
forest groups met at Donnelly River in August 1990 and decided to form the 
Western Australian Forest Alliance.  In addition to the Conservation Council of 
WA, the Campaign to Save Native Forests, the South-West Forests Defence 
Foundation and the Wilderness Society, the other foundation groups comprised 
the Australian Conservation Foundation (Bunbury, Collie, Perth, South Coast), 
Blackwood Environment Society, Coalition for Denmark's Environment, 
Dwellingup Greenbelt Committee, Friends of the Blackwood Valley, 
Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest, Warren Environmental Group 
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and the Sustainable Agricultural Research Institute.
2   It was decided that the 
new organisation would be co-ordinated by a body of six people, consisting of 
three representatives from Perth metropolitan groups and three from country 
areas.   The initial objectives of WAFA were: to ensure that forest ecosystems 
were adequately represented in conservation reserves, to promote ecologically 
sensitive forest management, to resist timber industry exploitation of Western 
Australia’s native forests and to encourage plantation forestry.
3 
      
Beth Schultz, who was involved in organising the inaugural meeting, recalled 
that WAFA was formed after it was decided to initiate a specific forest campaign 
that would bring together groups and individuals and enable them to work around 
a co-ordinated strategy with specific timetables and objectives.   She believes one 
of the main reasons for the group’s success was the geographical location of its 
key activists: 
WAFA had the most marvellous luck in that every major town in the 
south-west had a one hundred per cent reliable, dedicated, forest 
conservationist, who ran a group to spread the load...it just turned out 
that there was one in Bridgetown, Margaret River, Pemberton, 
Denmark, Donnybrook. 
 
According to Schultz, it was the network of local groups and the information 
they supplied to the city organisations that ultimately made the urban population 
aware of what was happening in the forests.
4    
 
Schultz' observations about a widespread distribution of activists throughout the 
state's south-west can be readily observed from records of those attending 
WAFA's monthly meetings.   In May 1991, for example, as well as 
representatives from the Conservation Council, the CSNF, the SFDF and the 
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Wilderness Society, those present included Jim and Mary Frith (Bridgetown-
Greenbushes Friends of the Forest), Alex Syme (Coalition for Denmark's 
Environment), Andy Russell (Warren Environment Group), and Basil Schur 
(Australian Conservation Foundation South Coast).
5   The September 1992 
meeting included Stan Dilkes and Lyn Serventy (Leeuwin Conservation Group), 
Wendy Goodall (Crowea Committee), and Dave Swainston and Claire Johnson  
(Busselton Peace and Environment Group).
6 
      
At its initial meeting, WAFA not only stipulated its overall objectives but also set 
specific goals that the organisation hoped to achieve over a 30-year period.       
Notably, the objectives contained a first reference to phasing out logging of ‘old 
growth forests’ within six months, with complete reservation within ten years.  
By the year 2020, it was envisaged there would be extremely limited logging in 
state forests, with the majority of timber produced from plantations of mixed 
species.
7 
      
The formation of WAFA prompted media interest and timber industry concerns 
about violent confrontation.   Timber workers attending a Manjimup rally were 
warned by Kalgoorlie MHR Graeme Campbell that environmentalists planned to 
close down the industry and that marchers should ignore taunts from forest 
protesters who enjoyed using violence.   WAFA groups stressed their 
commitment to non-violence and an intention to work with the timber industry to 
ensure its survival through the promotion of plantation forestry.
8 
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Soon after its foundation, WAFA invited applications for the position of forest 
campaign co-ordinator whose duties would include co-ordinating forest protest 
activities, organising WAFA meetings, attracting and inspiring volunteers, and 
maintaining an effective network of forest conservationists.   A $150 weekly 
wage was proposed for two days’ work each week, with an initial trial period of 
20 weeks.   Affiliated groups were canvassed for support and financial 
contributions.
9   In 1993, Peter Robertson was appointed co-ordinator, and 
subsequently convenor, of WAFA.    Robertson, who had a flair for devising 
campaign strategies, believed that, while the advent of new technologies such as 
emails, the internet and mobile telephones offered exciting embellishments to 
forest protest, non-violent direct action had proved effective over time and 
continued to be an essential strategy in any modern campaign.
10 
      
The new organisation sought to broaden its influence and extended invitations to 
other groups, such as the Great Walk Network, the Jarrah Forest Action Group, 
the Leeuwin Conservation Group and the Walpole-Nornalup National Park 
Association, to join it in working towards the goal of protecting the state’s 
forests.
11   Groups would benefit by sharing expertise and  ‘creating a stronger 
voice with which to make media and political gains.’
12  The first edition of 
WAFA's newspaper, The Real Forest News, a four-page spreadsheet published in 
December 1992, drew attention to the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management’s proposals to clear-fell native forests for wood chips and charcoal. 
The publication urged individuals to donate to a ‘Stand Up For The Forests’ 
campaign, and write to Jim McGinty, state Minister for the Environment, to 
complain about the mismanagement of Western Australia’s native forests.   By 
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this time the number of affiliated groups had risen to 17, with the addition of the 
Busselton Peace and Environment Group, Crowea Committee, D'Entrecasteaux 
Defence Group, Great Walk Network and Leeuwin Conservation Group.
13 
      
WAFA meetings were hosted by the various south-west groups operating under 
the WAFA umbrella.   During 1991 and 1992, the organisation met at Bunbury, 
Northcliffe, Bridgetown, Wellington Mills, Pemberton, Margaret River and 
Busselton, with a number of workshops held at other locations.   An analysis of 
WAFA meeting minutes during the early 1990s shows attendances at meetings to 
have been uneven, with an average of 17 representatives present on each 
occasion.  At the July 1993 weekend meeting at Balingup, for instance, when the 
forests campaign was gathering momentum, 30 people attended representing 10 
different groups, while a meeting held on 26 November 1994 attracted only 12 
members.
14  The format and content of the Balingup meeting provides an insight 
into how the WAFA was developing into a well-organised and co-ordinated 
forest protest organisation.   Each conservation group presented a summary of its 
activities since the previous meeting, with proposals for future activities.  A 
‘brainstorming session’ enabled individual group members to present ideas for 
collective discussion.    This was followed by further group discussions on 
various issues, including strategies for the forest campaign, an appraisal of 
previous actions, the organisation of a training weekend on non-violent direct 
action and ideas for fund-raising activities.
15   
 
The consolidation of forest conservation groups through the foundation of 
WAFA heralded a new phase in the concerted and energetic campaign to protect 
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Western Australia’s forests.   Beth Schultz believes that the WAFA's formation 
played a key role in the 1990s forest campaigns by co-ordinating group activities 
and developing united strategies.
16   However, while the creation of WAFA was 
significant, developments within the political arena added further momentum to 
the forest campaign. 
 
The Greens (WA) 
Like the Western Australian forest protest movement's decision to strengthen its 
organisation through uniting its activities, on a national level environmental 
activists were considering how they could combine their forces to increase their 
political influence.    A Getting Together Conference at Sydney University in 
1986 attended by over 500 representatives from a range of environmental 
organisations rejected a proposal to establish a national Green Party, largely 
because of differences in philosophy and strategies.
17   Further attempts to form a 
national party in 1987 also failed.   An initiative to combine the 'left and green 
forces' in Australia stalled because of disagreement over the inclusion of the 
word 'green' in the proposed party's title,
18 and an attempt by Bob Brown to 
persuade Democrats leader Don Chipp to enter into an alliance with the 
Tasmanian Groups and the Nuclear Disarmament Party to form a national Green 
Party was rejected by the Democrats.
19   Until the establishment of the Australian 
Greens in 1992, green groups continued to develop along state lines, with the 
formation of the Queensland Greens in 1985 and the South Australian Greens 
Party in 1989. 
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In late 1989 members of the WA Green Party and the Green Earth Alliance, 
which had itself resulted from an earlier merger of the Alternative Coalition, the 
Vallentine Peace Group and Green Development, commenced negotiations over 
terms for a possible merger.   After a proposal was presented to both groups, it 
was decided to proceed with the amalgamation.   The agreement stated that the 
Green Party and the Green Earth Alliance would merge to form a new political 
organisation called ‘The Greens (WA)’, and be publicly announced on 1 January 
1990.   The new party would be organised on principles of ‘grass roots 
participatory democracy’, whereby individuals would be encouraged to become 
involved in decision-making, thus avoiding a concentration of power among a 
few members.   Similar to WAFA, all decisions, where possible, would be 
reached by a process of consensus.
20 
      
Christine Sharp had been involved in the Western Australian forest protest 
movement since the formation of the Campaign to Save Native Forests in 1975, 
and had taken part in the Wagerup action against bauxite mining and the 
campaign to create the Shannon National Park.   She recalled attending a meeting 
that was convened to bring together people from the peace and disarmament 
movement and the environment movement in order to debate the idea of forming 
a Green political party in Western Australia.    The principal objective was to 
create a ‘political engine’ that would advance a left-wing environmental agenda, 
which many saw as the next logical step in the development of the environment 
movement.
21 
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After its foundation, the Greens (WA) was successful in maintaining continuous 
parliamentary representation.   Jo Vallentine was elected to the federal Senate in 
1984 as a member of the Nuclear Disarmament Party, and in 1990 became the 
first Greens member of the Senate following the merger of the Green Earth 
Alliance with the WA Green Party.   After Vallentine’s retirement in 1992, she 
was replaced by Christabel Chamerette who, in 1993, was joined by Dee 
Margetts, the same year that Jim Scott was elected to Western Australia’s upper 
house.   While Chamarette lost her Senate seat in 1996, that year saw the election 
of Christine Sharp and Giz Watson to join Scott in the Western Australian 
Legislative Council. 
      
From the outset, the Greens promoted themselves as a political party that offered 
a different approach to politics, and an alternative to the two major parties.    The 
party emphasised its commitment to the four key green principles of 
environmental responsibility, peace, social justice and participatory democracy.
22   
After her election, Greens (WA) Senator Christabel Chamarette said the new 
party was committed to changing the political system in order to give a higher 
priority to environmental issues.   Chamarette believed that in Western Australia 
the party would provide a ‘community voice’ to challenge the dominance of two-
party politics, and that this could be achieved by working closely with voluntary 
conservation groups.
23 
      
Whereas the birth of WAFA in 1990 laid the foundations for a co-ordinated and 
highly-focused approach by forest activists, the formation of the Greens (WA) at 
that time provided Western Australian environmentalists with a political avenue 
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through which they could argue their case for the protection of the state’s forests.  
The importance of political party organisation had already been demonstrated on 
a federal level with the appointment in 1987 of Graham Richardson as the 
Hawke Labor government's Environment Minister.   Despite angering 
conservationists through his recommendation to renew export wood chip licences 
in the late 1980s, discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, Richardson's generally 
sympathetic approach to environmental issues and willingness to negotiate with 
the environment movement's leaders had resulted in some significant gains, such 
as listing North Queensland's Wet Tropics, Kakadu National Park Stage III and 
large areas of Tasmania's forests for World Heritage status.
24   This   
combination of concerted group network activity and political organisation 
exerted a crucial influence on the conduct of the Western Australian forest 
protest movement's 1990s
 
 forest campaign.    
 
Media Wars  
In 1990 forest activists used strategies that exploited two media-focused events 
to both maintain public attention on the forests and to support its criticism of the 
state government and CALM's forest management practices.   During March of 
that year the Forest Industries Campaign Association commenced a $1.2 million 
media campaign to convince the Western Australian public that the industry was 
using the forests responsibly.   The newspaper and television advertisements, 
which came to be known as ‘classroom ads’, featured a teacher ‘educating’ the 
public about forest logging.   The commercials sought to assure people that less 
than 30% of all public native forests in Australia was allocated for commercial 
forestry and that only 1% of that figure was logged in any one year, that the 
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majority of the remaining forest was preserved in national parks and reserves that 
could never be logged, and that the timber industry was sustainable through a 
regrowth cycle that ‘keeps going indefinitely.’   The advertisements argued that, 
if people knew ‘the real facts’, there would be no concern that native forests 
might disappear.
25 
      
Prior to the media campaign the Conservation Council had previewed the 
advertisements and believed that, as with the 'Forests Forever' legal action in the 
early 1980s, some of the content was open to challenge as false and misleading 
under the Trade Practices Act.  The Council disputed the 30% wood production 
figure, claiming the figures should be reversed, with 30% in secure reserves and 
70% available for timber production.  Claims of a sustainable timber industry 
were rejected, the Council asserting that old forests were being cut down faster 
than young trees were maturing, and that mature forest ecosystems were being 
replaced with immature pulpwood plantations.   Forest protest groups saw the 
media campaign as an expensive public relations exercise by an industry which 
was trying to preserve its economic prosperity in the face of mounting public 
concern at what was happening to the forests.
26 
      
On 21 March 1990 the South-West Forests Defence Foundation sought an 
injunction in Perth’s Federal Court under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 
on the grounds that the Forest Industries Campaign Association advertisements 
contained statements that were false, misleading and deceptive.   The judge did 
not grant the injunction because the media campaign had almost finished but 
ordered an expedited hearing.   The Foundation immediately began a fund-
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raising campaign to cover the anticipated high legal costs.
27   In a brief hearing 
on 26 October, however, both parties consented to the action being dismissed, 
with each responsible for its own costs.   
      
Beth Schultz explained that the case had become ‘buried in paper’, with Forest 
Industries lawyers employing tactics that prolonged the action and escalated legal 
costs.    As the South-West Forests Defence Foundation did not have the 
financial resources to engage in an extended case, it was decided to withdraw 
from the action and continue the fight in other ways.   Schultz argued that the 
action partly succeeded in its purpose by showing that the facts in the Forest 
Industry media campaign were in dispute and forcing the industry to defend its 
position and alter the content of its advertisements.
28 
      
Like the ‘Forests Forever’ legal action, the Forest Industries advertisements' case 
provided an example of the continuing use of the court system as a strategy to 
challenge perceived misrepresentations of the facts about Western Australia’s 
native forests.   Again, while the action failed, there were some positive benefits, 
particularly media exposure, and making authorities aware that any public 
statements they made would be subject to the scrutiny of a vigilant forest protest 
movement. 
      
Soon after the Forest Industries advertisements, the ABC Four Corners 
television programme screened ‘The Wood for the Trees’.   The documentary 
alleged misuse and mismanagement of Western Australia’s forests and 
highlighted the destruction of native forests, the waste of quality wood, the 
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preferential treatment accorded to timber industry giant Bunnings Ltd and the 
failure of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) to 
properly manage the forests and the timber industry.
29   The allegations 
contained in the programme sparked angry responses from the state government, 
CALM and the timber industry. 
      
Responding to questions in state parliament during the two days following the 
broadcast, Environment Minister Bob Pearce said the programme contained 
many factual inaccuracies that were based on ‘bias, distortion and innuendo’.    
He was particularly concerned at the Four Corners team’s videoing of CALM’s 
executive director, Dr Syd Shea, during a family function, and said he intended 
making a complaint to the national ethics committee of the Australian Journalists 
Association.
30 
      
Following a request from the Environment Minister, CALM compiled an 
extensive critique of the Four Corners programme in which it identified 44 
alleged inaccuracies and presented the department’s response.   The document 
claimed that CALM had been set up ‘as a whipping-boy for its extremist critics’ 
and that the programme was the result of a journalist hunting for a good story 
and ‘refusing to be distracted by facts or hamstrung by a sense of fair play.’   In a 
covering memorandum to the Environment Minister, CALM’s executive director 
speculated that the production of the Four Corners programme shortly after 
loggers had mistakenly felled 86 trees in the Shannon National Park
31 was not 
accidental.    The memorandum’s concluding paragraph provides some insight 
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into the relationship between CALM, and more particularly Dr Shea, and the 
state Labor government at that time: 
I would also like to take this opportunity on behalf of myself and the 
Department to formally thank you for the vigorous, rapid and articulate 
support you gave us publicly and in the Parliament.   I am sure that you 
have never doubted the loyalty and support of the Department to the 
Government’s policies on forest management and to yourself 
personally.   I have to advise you that following the last few weeks’ 
events that if you ever are in a position where you have to walk over hot 
coals there are many people in this Department who would volunteer to 
go with you.
32 
      
In a memorandum to all employees, Bob Bunning, managing director of 
Bunnings Forest Products, refuted allegations in the Four Corners programme 
that the company had monopolised the Western Australian timber market, was 
subsidised by the state government, was wasteful and inefficient, and intimidated 
small saw-millers.   He asserted the state's forests were managed 'with excellence' 
by CALM in a way that preserved forest values as well as timber production 'in 
perpetuity', arguing that the documentary's real agenda was aimed at discrediting 
CALM and the state government, and increasing the power of the 
'preservationists' who, he believed, were intent on stopping the timber industry 
and any industrial development to which they objected.
33 
      
Predictably the Four Corners programme attracted considerable support from 
environmental groups with letters to the Premier and Environment Minister 
calling for a public inquiry into the state government’s and CALM’s  forest 
management  practices.
34   When an ABC inquiry failed to substantiate the 
majority of CALM’s complaints of inaccuracies,
35 conservation groups lauded 
the  Four Corners documentary as a triumph for Western Australia’s 
environmental movement that confirmed allegations of CALM’s 
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mismanagement of the forests and the state government’s taxpayer-funded 
subsidy of the timber industry.
36 
      
The reactions from the state government, CALM and the timber industry to the 
ABC Four Corners programme revealed the sensitivity of those bodies to any 
threat to the stability of the timber industry and their willingness to support each 
other against what was perceived as a common enemy.  For the Western 
Australian forest protest movement, the documentary not only generated 
considerable controversy and national media exposure but, most importantly, 
raised questions in the ABC-viewing public’s mind about the state government 
and CALM’s approaches to forest management, and the nature of their 
relationship with the timber industry.   
 
Mounting Frustration 
Government intransigence over the issuing of wood chip licences increased the 
forest protest movement's frustration and stimulated protest action during the 
early 1990s.      In December 1991 the Western Australian Forest Alliance called 
on federal Minister for Resources, Alan Griffiths, not to renew export wood chip 
licences to the WA Chip and Pulp Company because of continuing breaches of 
licence conditions.   WAFA alleged that the company had carried out intensive 
logging in river, stream and salt risk zones without prior Environmental 
Protection Authority assessment, that chip logs had been removed from private 
property without authorisation and that there had been a lack of public 
consultation on research into the environmental impacts of wood chipping.
37   
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The Minister replied in April 1992 that WAFA’s request was received after 
licence approval had already been granted.
38 
      
Anger at wood chip export licence renewals motivated sections of the Western 
Australian forest protest movement to initiate actions to obstruct the industry’s 
operations.    In early 1993, WAFA began organising a non-violent direct action 
protest to take place on 14 February at the WA Chip and Pulp Company’s 
Bunbury wood chip compound.   A ship was expected to arrive that day to collect 
a cargo of wood chips, and supporters were advised that Perth activists were 
planning a large demonstration to meet the vessel.   The action would occur on 
the wharf around the wood chip pile and in the water, and participants were 
advised to ‘act according to their consciences’, with a commitment to principles 
of non-violent action.
39   During the action 29 protesters were arrested and 
charged with remaining on the WA Chip and Pulp Company's premises when 
they were ordered to leave after unfurling a large banner on top of a 30-metre 
high wood chip pile.  The charges were subsequently dismissed because the 
prosecution failed to prove that the protesters heard the warning to leave the area.   
Activists believed their protest had succeeded in alerting people to the criminal 
destruction of native forests for wood chips.
40 
      
A further action held at Manjimup in July 1994 was designed to highlight the fact 
that wood chip licence conditions designed to protect National Estate forests 
were not being monitored.    Thirteen protesters were arrested at Bunnings’ 
Diamond mill after sitting on railway tracks to prevent a wood chip train from 
loading.   Those arrested included 72-year old Elaine Michael from Bridgetown 
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who said that, although she had always been a person who believed in doing 
things legally, her decision to break the law had been based on moral values and 
there appeared no other way to save the forests.
41   The protesters were originally 
charged with the indictable offence of obstructing a train but the charge was 
changed to that of hindering a lawful activity.   In September 1996 eight 
protesters were eventually convicted, although the magistrate declined to record 
any convictions.  After the trial the protesters addressed the magistrate, 
explaining that they had become frustrated after failing to achieve protection for 
the forests by working within the law and felt that more dramatic action was 
needed to raise public awareness about the destruction of the forests for wood 
chips.
42 
      
Federal government proposals to introduce resource security legislation 
prompted an angry response from forest protest groups.   The Conservation 
Council pointed out that the timber industry in Western Australia already had 
protection under the state government’s 1987 timber strategy, with access to the 
forests guaranteed until at least 1998.   Further legislation, it argued, would only 
‘entrench the current wasteful, inefficient, heavily subsidised and unsustainable 
industry well into the next century’.
43   Parliamentarians were urged to reject the 
proposed legislation.
44   WAFA supported the Conservation Council's position, 
arguing that resource security legislation would force the Western Australian 
government into legislative commitments to the timber industry that it would be 
unable to fulfil and would guarantee the destruction of the remaining areas of old 
growth forests.  The organisation called on its members to write to the Minister 
for the Environment and the Premier and ask them to remove the threat to the 
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forests posed by the new legislation.
45   Welcoming the legislation’s eventual 
defeat, the Australian Conservation Foundation believed a further threat to old 
growth forests had been averted and that governments should now work to 
protect Australia’s forests through promoting plantation development on already 
cleared land.
46 
      
In mid-1991 the federal government’s Resource Assessment Commission 
released a draft report on its inquiry into forest and timber resources.   The report 
received a generally favourable response from the Western Australian 
conservation movement, particularly its observations regarding the lack of 
evidence to show that the state’s forests were being logged on a sustainable basis 
and that priority was given to timber production at the expense of conservation 
and recreation.
47   The Commission’s final report, however, was disappointing.   
It accepted assurances by forest management agencies that the forests were being 
managed sustainably and supported the continuation of wood chipping on 
economic grounds.   Conservationists speculated whether additional evidence or 
political pressure had influenced an apparent change of opinion after the draft 
report.
48 
      
The 1992 release of the Keating government’s draft national forest policy 
statement, which provided for the retention of Commonwealth powers to approve 
wood chipping from native forests, attracted further criticism from 
conservationists with the Conservation Council calling for the formulation of 
separate policies for forests and wood production, and a native forest protection 
policy aimed at preserving ‘all the biodiversity, wilderness and aesthetic qualities 
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of Australia’s remaining native forests.’
49   Similarly, the Wilderness Society 
argued that only the full protection of all native forests would ensure their 
ecological integrity, and that there was no economic justification to continue 
native forest logging.
50    
      
In a letter to Prime Minister Keating, WAFA supported the other groups’ 
opposition to the draft policy but was prepared to accept logging over a 300-year 
minimum rotation, provided the forest ecosystem was preserved. WAFA 
appealed to the Prime Minister to reject the draft national forest policy.
51   A 
National Forest Summit of conservation groups in July 1994 called in vain on the 
federal Environment Minister, Senator John Faulkner, to implement a 
moratorium clause in the final National Forest Policy Statement that required 
forest management agencies to ‘avoid activities that may significantly affect 
those areas of old-growth forest or wilderness that are likely to have high 
conservation value.’
52    
      
On a national scale, the failure of the Keating Government to apply the National 
Forest Policy Statement's guidelines regarding forest protection and the decision 
by Resources Minister David Beddall to renew all wood chip licences and 
increase the volume of exports to almost 7 million tonnes in 1995 provoked an 
angry response from the Australian environment movement.  Prime Minister 
Keating’s hasty intervention to find a compromise that would lessen the political 
impact of the licence decision only increased tensions between conservationists 
and forest industry groups.
53   The Australian Conservation Foundation and the 
Wilderness Society declared that there appeared to be little difference between 
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the two major parties on environmental issues and that the 1980s relationship 
with the Labor Party had effectively been destroyed.
54    
      
In Western Australia the Conservation Council regarded the licence renewals as 
a demonstration of contempt for the state’s native forests and vowed to overturn 
the decision, with ‘concerned people’ resorting to legal challenges and non-
violent direct action.
55  WAFA asserted that the licence decision not only 
condemned Western Australia’s old growth forests to further destruction but also 
made a mockery of the National Forest Policy Statement and effectively 
supported the state government’s exploitation of the forests.
56  T h e  West 
Australian newspaper adopted a neutral position.   It argued that a broad range of 
supposedly 'expert' views had caused confusion and conflict over the wood chip 
licence issue, and that Australians needed to be assured that their forests were 
logged for economic benefit while still protecting their long-term future as a 
unique environment.
57     
      
At a Fremantle rally in January 1995 about 200 protesters heard Greens Senator 
Christabel Chamarette and rock star Peter Garrett speak out against the federal 
government’s wood chip licence approval.   Senator Chamarette said the Keating 
government had pretended to be concerned about the environment when it suited 
its purposes but in reality had succumbed to a false economic argument that 
enabled the logging industry to continue its destruction.
58  The broader national 
context of the movement to protect the forests was apparent in a Canberra rally 
later that month, when a reported crowd of 250 anti-wood chipping protesters 
demonstrated outside the Prime Minister's official residence against the wood 
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chip licence renewals.   Wilderness Society organisers at the event warned that 
the federal government would become the target of a nationwide campaign 
unless it provided security for Australia's wilderness areas.
59 
      
The federal government’s willingness to approve wood chip licence renewals, its 
failure to implement a clause within the National Forest Policy Statement to 
protect areas of high conservation value, and the final report of the Resource 
Assessment Commission which supported a continuation of wood chipping, all 
caused frustration within the forest protest movement and stimulated protest 
activity during the early 1990s.    These factors also strengthened a perception 
within the protest movement of federal government support for a tacit agreement 
between the Western Australian government, the Department of Conservation 
and Land Management and the logging industry to protect the status quo.   The 
challenge for the protest movement was to fragment that alliance and expose its 
weaknesses. 
 
Opposing Forces 
The early 1990s was marked by a sharp deterioration in the relationship between 
the forest protest movement and government authorities responsible for the 
management of the state’s forests.   While various reviews and management 
proposals sought to balance the demands of intensive logging against increasing 
calls for forest conservation, it became clear to activists that, as in the late-1970s, 
government intransigence over forest protection demanded the application of 
more direct forms of protest.    
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In June 1990 the Conservation Council of Western Australia wrote to Premier 
Carmen Lawrence, expressing increasing frustration at the lack of co-operation 
between CALM and the Council on forest issues.
60   While sympathising with 
the Council’s position, Premier Lawrence advised that measures were being 
taken to improve communications between the organisations, which included 
meetings to discuss issues of mutual interest, and a series of open forums to raise 
questions on forest management and policy.   Premier Lawrence stated that the 
Council’s suggestion that CALM should be dismantled had made the formation 
of goodwill more difficult and that, despite their differences, the Conservation 
Council should ‘pursue a positive relationship with CALM’ and raise any further 
concerns with the Minister for the Environment.
61  
      
Further evidence of mounting discord occurred in 1991 when the South-West 
Forests Defence Foundation compiled a report entitled Use and Abuse of the 
Jarrah Forest.   The document argued that Western Australia’s jarrah forests had 
been heavily exploited since European colonisation, that the small area 
remaining was now under ‘enormous and increasing pressure’, and that its future 
should be determined by the people of the state.    CALM, it alleged, had failed 
in its duty as the managing authority to engage in genuine public consultation 
and to provide full information about its activities.   Those concerned about the 
future of the jarrah forest were urged to visit the forests, become involved in 
conservation activities and write to government bodies requesting the facts about 
forestry operations.
62     
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The report was launched in November 1991 by the WA Forest Alliance at a 
‘Save the Jarrah’ night held at the University of Western Australia.   Introducing 
the document as spokesperson for WAFA, Beth Schultz said the publication 
provided a realistic summation of the degradation of the state’s unique jarrah 
forest, and that it was intended as the focal point of a concerted campaign by 
conservation groups to ensure the jarrah forest was properly protected and 
managed.
63   CALM’s executive director, Dr Syd Shea, said that there was no 
scientific basis for the report’s assertions, and that the jarrah forest was being 
used by the conservation movement ‘to satisfy their ideologically motivated 
desire to convince the community that the “sky was falling in”’.
64 
      
In February 1992 CALM invited public comment on proposals to amend its 1987 
forest management plans.
65   This seemingly innocuous request and its 
consequences would play a crucial role in transforming the strategic direction of 
native forest protest in the early 1990s by convincing forest activists that a 
negotiated solution on forest protection within the dominant political power 
structure was not possible and that, once again, it was necessary to adopt a more 
confrontational approach to protest. 
      
Criticising the draft proposals, the Conservation Council saw little modification 
to CALM’s existing approach to forest management:  wood extraction remained 
the dominant goal, wood chipping provided the driving force, and clear-felling 
and frequent prescribed burning would continue.   The Council argued that 
implementation of the proposed management strategy would result in an 
intensification of wood extraction by reducing the amount of forest that was 
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protected in road, river and stream zones.   Additionally, the issues of 
unsustainable logging, forest waste and the conversion of mature forest into 
immature regrowth had not been addressed.   While welcoming additions to the 
conservation estate, the Council called for a moratorium on logging in all virgin 
forest and its protection in secure reserves, an end to clear-felling and a review of 
the royalty system with the removal of subsidies to wood extraction industries.
66  
WAFA observed that CALM's proposals to manage Western Australia's native 
forests provided no evidence of the availability of any additional forest resources 
or that the forests could survive any intensification of wood extraction and 
argued that unless CALM was willing to provide empirical data to support its 
assertions then the public consultation process would be meaningless.
67 
      
Between 1989 and 1994 Christine Sharp served as a member of Western 
Australia’s Environmental Protection Authority.   Shortly after her appointment 
she became concerned that CALM had breached a ministerial condition attached 
to the Environmental Protection Authority’s approval of its 1987 ten-year Forest 
Management Strategy.   The condition stipulated that there should be no 
intensive logging of areas of jarrah that were designated as ‘salt risk zones’, 
which were those areas of forest that received less than 1100 millimetres of 
annual rainfall and represented the majority of the jarrah forest.   Sharp has 
claimed that it was her persistence over this issue that eventually resulted in 
CALM being required to undertake the 1992 review, ostensibly to resolve ‘a 
number of outstanding statutory requirements’.
68   CALM’s revised strategy 
intensified forest logging, resulting from its commitment to pre-existing timber 
contracts.   She considered the only positive aspects of the Environmental 
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Protection Authority review of the proposals was the fact that CALM’s 
intentions for the forests were placed on the public record and that the EPA 
report stimulated an energetic response from forest activists.
69   T h e  
Conservation Council was particularly critical of the EPA’s approval of CALM’s 
proposals after the Authority had expressed some misgivings, and considered 
both organisations exhibited ‘a reckless disregard for our increasingly valuable 
native forests, and a cavalier attitude to public opinion and public 
involvement.’
70  
      
In late 1992, following the findings of the WA Inc. Royal Commission, Bob 
Pearce, the state Environment Minister, resigned and was replaced by Jim 
McGinty.   The new minister decided to visit Kerr forest block to view and 
discuss the impact of clear-felling on the jarrah forest.   Christine Sharp, who 
took part in the discussions, believes McGinty’s visit sparked a brief period of 
progress over the issue of increased jarrah logging with the establishment of a 
special Appeals Committee, chaired by Tos Barnett, to examine appeals that had 
been submitted in response to the EPA’s endorsement of CALM’s forest 
management strategy proposals.
71    
      
WAFA welcomed the committee’s appointment, hoping that it would steer 
CALM towards managing the forests 'for the real long term benefit of present 
and future generations of West Australians.'
72   In an extensive submission to the 
Appeals Committee, the Combined Forests Conservation Organisations, 
comprising the Australian Conservation Foundation (WA), the Conservation 
Council and the Wilderness Society (WA), called for the immediate protection of 
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high conservation value forests, timber industry reform and the restructuring of 
CALM into separate conservation and production agencies.
73   The Conservation 
Council appealed to Premier Carmen Lawrence to ensure that her government 
did not submit to pressure from CALM and the timber lobby, urging her to make 
decisions for the benefit of the community and the environment.
74 
      
The Barnett report, released in December 1992, contained some positive 
recommendations for forest protection and increasing CALM’s public 
accountability.   The committee recommended that there should be no increase in 
cutting levels beyond those specified in the 1987 Forest Strategy, that CALM 
prepare and cost additional options for forest management, including the 
possibility of phasing out intensive commercial logging of native forests, and that 
a ministerial review should determine ways in which CALM could provide better 
public access to information and become more receptive to community input.
75    
      
Initial optimism, however, once again proved to be short-lived.   On 24 
December, Environment Minister McGinty announced that CALM’s forest 
management proposals could proceed, subject to various ministerial conditions.   
These included a rejection of Barnett’s recommendation to restrict logging levels 
and a decision to form an expert scientific committee to consider long-term 
allowable cutting levels for the state’s native forests.   Conservationists regarded 
the imposition of conditions as a dilution of the Barnett report’s main 
recommendations.
76 
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Tension between conservation groups and CALM further increased during early 
1993 with allegations of suppression of scientific information.   During the 
preparation of his report, Tos Barnett had observed ‘a climate of fear’ within the 
department, with CALM scientists reluctant to speak to him and doing so only 
after obtaining guarantees of anonymity.
77    At the beginning of March, the 
Conservation Council produced three documents to support its claims that 
CALM’s executives censored departmental scientific research and silenced or 
ignored its own scientists when their findings questioned the Department’s forest 
management practices.   The documents reported that the effects of climate 
change on forest ecosystems might reduce growth rates and force a reduction in 
cutting levels, that jarrah thinning was responsible for spreading dieback disease 
and that the felling of karri forests was threatening wildlife through habitat 
destruction.
78  To support its allegations, the Conservation Council produced a 
selection of differences between ‘draft’ and ‘published’ versions of the 
documents and suggested that the evidence cast doubt over all CALM 
publications.
79   Denying the allegations, CALM said the Council had taken 
statements out of context and apparently confused censorship with peer review.
80 
      
The forthcoming state election prompted WAFA to initiate a ‘vote for the 
forests’ campaign, with the aims of promoting the forests as an election issue, 
lobbying politicians to accept the full recommendations of the Barnett report and 
supporting Greens candidates for the Legislative Council.   Strategies included a 
mass distribution of ‘vote for the forests’ leaflets, the formation of electorate 
groups to promote the campaign and the organisation of public events such as 
speaking tours of the south-west, rallies and forest-based protests.
81   During the 
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course of the campaign, WAFA criticised both major political parties for their 
failure to commit themselves to ecologically sustainable forest policies and their 
apparent disregard for the Barnett report’s censure of CALM’s management 
practices.
82   The Conservation Council became concerned at ‘strong hints’ of a 
private commitment by Coalition parties to introduce resource security 
legislation to protect the timber industry and implement CALM’s 1992 forest 
management proposals.
83    
      
Following the election of the Court Liberal Government in February 1993, 
WAFA questioned whether or not the new government would continue the 
historical pattern of forest destruction or grasp the opportunity to reform CALM 
and ‘do the right thing by the forests, timber industry workers, all other forest 
users, the wider community and future generations'.
84   Conservationists had 
become disillusioned with Labor’s performance on forest issues since the 1989 
election and initially welcomed the Coalition’s ‘ambitious and attractive 
environmental platform’;
85 however, it soon became apparent that the new 
administration had reneged on its election promises and tended to revert to the 
environmentally irresponsible practices of the previous Court government during 
the 1970s.
86 
      
The new Minister for the Environment, Kevin Minson, set up the ‘expert 
committee’ promised by his predecessor to examine the quantity of timber that 
could be extracted from the forests over a ten-year period.  The committee was 
chaired by marine biologist Dr Tim Meagher.   In a detailed submission, WAFA 
listed 21 key issues that it believed the committee had to examine in detail if its 
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recommendations were to have any credibility.  Those issues included CALM’s 
lack of public accountability, the need for an alternative forest policy that 
included an option for phasing out logging in old growth forests, breaches of 
wood chip licence conditions and the ability of the forests to provide for an 
intensive wood extraction industry.  WAFA expressed concern at the 
committee’s lack of response to its requests to present evidence in person.
87 
      
The Meagher report, released in August 1993, provided further disappointment 
and frustration for the forest protest movement.
88   Launching a 14-page WAFA 
analysis of the committee’s recommendations, Peter Robertson said Western 
Australians had been betrayed by the proposed forest destruction.
89  W A F A  
concluded that the findings would result in a massive increase in the extent and 
intensity of logging in Western Australia’s native forests and a doubling of the 
number of logs to be extracted.   As well, WAFA criticised the committee’s 
review process, alleging that it operated in secrecy, spoke mainly with CALM 
officials and timber industry staff, and ignored the views and expertise of forest 
conservationists.   The Environment Minister’s statement endorsing the 
committee’s recommendations was presented on the same day as the report’s 
release, thus providing no opportunity for prior public comment, and was seen by 
WAFA as a declaration of political support for the interests of the timber 
industry.
90 
 
When it became apparent that CALM’s revised logging plans would proceed, the 
South-West Forests Defence Foundation once again resorted to the court system.   
In September 1993, the Foundation initiated an action in the Western Australian 
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Supreme Court against the Environment Minister, Kevin Minson, and one of 
CALM’s controlling bodies, the Lands and Forest Commission.   The court 
action aimed to stop the implementation of CALM’s forest management plans by 
alleging that the organisation failed to conduct a proper review of the 1992 
amendments to its timber strategy and that a considerable amount of relevant 
information was withheld from the public and the Environmental Protection 
Authority.   The SFDF’s action was supported by EPA Chairman, Barry Carbon, 
and EPA member, Dr John Bailey, who both swore affidavits saying that CALM 
had failed to supply the EPA with important scientific information and misled 
them about logging intentions in high salt-risk areas of the jarrah forest.
91   The 
Supreme Court decision, handed down in November, supported CALM’s public 
review process, stating that the organisation had no obligation to disclose 
information that was only in draft form.   Commenting on the ruling, WAFA 
believed the court ruling provided CALM with an excuse to withhold 
information and diminished the accountability of governments and government 
agencies for their actions.
92 
      
By 1993, the Western Australian native forest protest movement had become 
disillusioned with both major political parties who seemed intent on maintaining 
a strong alliance with the timber industry.   Apart from the Shannon Basin 
National Park and Lane-Poole Jarrah Reserve successes during the mid-1980s, 
the relationship with the Labor Party, as Hutton and Connors have observed, had 
been less than satisfactory.
93  Furthermore, it quickly became obvious that the 
new Liberal Government had no intention of modifying CALM’s proposals for 
an intensification of forest logging.   When the protest movement realised that 
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persuasive arguments to protect the forests had failed, a sense of frustration and 
powerlessness translated into a concerted direct action campaign. 
 
A Time for Action 
Well before CALM began implementing its new forest management plans there 
were signs that local groups in the south-west were organising for a campaign of 
direct action.     As early as January 1992, Northcliffe residents held a meeting 
with Perth activists to develop a campaign strategy to save Crowea forest block 
at Moons Crossing from logging.  The area was a popular recreation venue where 
local people and tourists could swim, fish for marron and enjoy walking in the 
forest.   The local community became angry when CALM bulldozed a logging 
road through the forest in preparation for clear-felling of karri and marri trees.   
Campaign organiser, John Croft, said public opinion had been ignored by 
authorities and there had been little opportunity for people to express their views 
about the use and management of the forests.    As well as demanding the 
protection of Crowea forest, he called for a full public inquiry into the timber and 
wood chip industries and stated that his group was willing to use strategies of 
non-violent direct action to achieve its objectives.
94 
       
In June 1993, Balingup Friends of the Forest organised a rally in the town over 
mismanagement of local forests and throughout  the  south-west  generally.     
People were angry at the ‘entrenched unwillingness’ of government agencies to 
accept accountability for their actions and to consider alternative options for the 
forests.
95   A publicity poster for the rally emphasised the collective goal of 
activists to save the remaining areas of native forest and their determination to 
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succeed, promoting the rally as ‘a dynamic public event to capture people’s 
imagination, stir up their desire for change and show that we all mean 
business.’
96     
      
The Balingup rally was attended by over 200 people, with representatives from 
the Greens (WA), the Wilderness Society, the Conservation Council and some of 
WAFA’s 20 groups throughout the south-west.   The focal point was an action 
that stopped the wood chip train running between Manjimup and Bunbury.     
Activists climbed onto a loaded wagon and unfurled a banner written in Japanese 
which read “From Our Unique Australian Forests to Japanese Dumps”.   Phil 
Gregory of Balingup said the wood chip trains had rumbled through the town for 
17 years; people had finally decided that things must change and that they would 
not stand by and allow the forest destruction to continue.
97  An opposing rally 
held at the same time by the timber industry-based Forest Protection Society 
highlighted the growing tension within south-west communities, with timber 
workers calling on the wood chip train’s driver to run down the protesters.
98   
The Balingup rally was especially significant in that it was initiated by local, as 
opposed  to  city-based,  forest protest groups.
99 
      
Further local action occurred in July, with south-west activists under the WAFA 
banner organising a rally at CALM’s Kirup office to protest against the new 
jarrah forest logging plans.   WAFA supporters attempted to meet with CALM 
workers before the rally to inform them that, if the proposed plans were not 
withdrawn, concerned citizens would occupy the Kirup office and place it ‘under 
new management’.   Media representatives were taken on a tour of the jarrah 
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forest to see the level of destruction, and experts explained other alternatives to 
logging.
100   During an occupation of the CALM office, WAFA supporters 
announced a new mission statement for the organisation that called for ‘the 
development and implementation of strategies for the transfer of logging out of 
jarrah and jarrah-marri forests and onto tree crops and plantations’.   A ‘Kirup 
Declaration’ criticising CALM’s forest management practices and calling for the 
withdrawal of its 1992 proposals was read out and forwarded to the Minister for 
the Environment.
101 
      
Meanwhile, the larger city-based organisations maintained pressure on the state 
government and CALM to suspend the proposed acceleration of logging 
activities.   The Conservation Council revealed that it possessed photographic 
and video evidence of the ecological collapse of an area of jarrah forest at 
Admiral Road near Byford, following Alcoa’s bauxite mining operations, and 
intended showing its findings to a Dutch delegation visiting Western Australia 
who were seeking to ascertain whether or not the state’s forests were being 
managed on a sustainable basis.
102   Following a successful campaign by Friends 
of the Earth activist Leone van der Maesen working in the Netherlands in 
collaboration with the Conservation Council, the Dutch government 
subsequently decided not to buy karri forest timber as it was not convinced that 
the ecological effects of CALM’s management policies on the forests had been 
sufficiently investigated.
103   A circular from the Council warned potential 
overseas importers of state government attempts to market timber from Western 
Australia’s old growth forests as ‘ecologically sustainable’ or ‘environmentally 
acceptable’ alternatives to rainforest timber.
104 
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Forest protest strategies in early 1994 were also aimed at soliciting broader 
political support for the forest campaign.   Responding to a WAFA initiative, the 
Greens (WA) sponsored a national phone link-up between major forest activist 
groups in Western Australia and the eastern states to discuss campaign strategies 
and initiatives.
105   Congratulating Dr Carmen Lawrence on her election to 
federal Parliament, WAFA invited her to address a meeting in Fremantle Town 
Hall to talk about the government’s role in protecting the state’s native forests 
and future forest policy directions.
106   This was despite earlier criticisms by 
conservationists of the Lawrence Labor government's record on environmental 
issues and assertions that one of the reasons for her government's defeat was its 
failure to take the environment seriously.
107   An invitation was also extended to 
Christine Milne, a Tasmanian parliamentarian and environmental campaigner.   
The meeting was promoted as the first major public meeting on Western 
Australia’s native forest crisis and ‘the springboard’ for local south-west 
campaigns to protect critical areas of old growth forest that were under threat 
from CALM’s new forest management plans.
108    
      
It was also at this time that the protest movement directed its strategies at the 
federal government to convince it that federal intervention on forests was crucial.   
In Senator John Faulkner the movement believed it had ‘a new and rather more 
credible federal environment minister’ and thought it might have a greater 
chance of success with a re-elected federal Labor government that could be open 
to persuasion, rather than with a newly-elected state Liberal administration that 
appeared committed to preserving the interests of the timber companies.  While 
acknowledging that some tension existed between sections of the forest 
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campaign and members of the Green Senate team, activists gave consideration to 
combining the protest movement’s resources with the influence of the Greens 
and Democrats in order to increase pressure on the federal government and force 
forest issues onto the political frontline.
109    
 
The First Blockades 
Western Australian forest activists decided to increase the campaign’s 
momentum by taking non-violent direct action. The protest movement realised it 
was necessary to accelerate the forest campaign, not only to stop the 
intensification of old growth forest logging but also because the campaign had 
consumed the efforts of activists for an extended period of time without the 
definitive ‘emblematic victory’ that was essential to maintain enthusiasm.
110  It 
had become obvious that neither the state government nor CALM was heeding 
the mounting voices of protest raised against forest destruction, and that CALM 
had begun implementing plans to log several forest blocks that were interim-
listed in the Register of the National Estate.   Conservationists argued that this 
planned action contravened the 1992 National Forest Policy Statement, which 
specified that there should be no ecologically-damaging activities in old growth 
and wilderness areas until their conservation values had been assessed and a 
‘comprehensive, adequate and representative reservation system’ was in place.
111   
Activists began organising for a month-long forest blockade of Giblett, Hawke, 
Rocky and Sharpe forest blocks. 
 
As the umbrella organisation for forest protest groups, WAFA assumed overall 
responsibility for organising the state’s first forest blockade, with co-ordinator 
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Peter Robertson developing campaign strategies.  As a protest strategy, forest 
blockades had already proved effective in eastern Australia, particularly in the 
Terania Creek (New South Wales), Franklin River (Tasmania) and East 
Gippsland (Victoria) actions.  WAFA and the Wilderness Society pooled their 
experiences to produce a strategic plan for the campaign.  While acknowledging 
that the blockade alone would not protect the forests, Peter Robertson reasoned 
that it could provide a dynamic for change: 
The challenge is to shape the blockade in such a way that the images, 
activity, energy, messages etc generated by and through the blockade 
highlight the ‘injustice and impropriety’ of what is happening and add to 
the community pressure on governments to change policy.
112 
 
The Wilderness Society believed the aims of the blockade should be to highlight 
the fact that logging of high conservation value forests was happening in 
contravention of the National Forest Policy Statement, that the logging resulted 
in a loss of biodiversity and wilderness, that heritage forests were being wood 
chipped, and that a symbiotic relationship existed between CALM and the timber 
industry that was facilitated by the state government through taxpayer-funded 
subsidies and low royalties.
113 
      
As had happened prior to the 1979 Wagerup occupation, participants in the 
blockade were required to attend non-violence training workshops.   The sessions 
included training in Gandhian principles of non-violent action which contained 
ten basic rules for avoiding physical confrontation.   These rules included the 
avoidance of provocative behaviour, seeking common ground to promote trust 
and understanding, and honesty about the campaign’s objectives.
114   A flow-
chart illustrated how principles of non-violence could be applied to campaign 
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strategies, and provided guidelines for activists on how they should react to 
specific provocations by ‘opponents’.
115 
      
Prior to the commencement of the blockade, the forest protest movement 
employed strategies to ensure that the Western Australian public was aware of its 
campaign.   The Wilderness Society published a 19-page booklet to highlight the 
issues on which the blockade was based, emphasising that the state government 
was logging areas of National Estate forest that contained unique wilderness that 
was vital to the survival of many endangered species of flora and fauna.   People 
were urged to save the south-west forests by writing to politicians, joining protest 
groups and attending the blockades.
116   In an appeal to the Premier and all 
members of state parliament for a moratorium on logging in high conservation 
value forests, WAFA offered to meet with parliamentarians prior to the campaign 
to negotiate a resolution of the issues.
117 
      
The forest blockade was launched at the end of May 1994 by WAFA and the 
Wilderness Society.   Reflecting the protest movement's frustration, WAFA 
spokesperson James Duggie said the blockade was necessary because all other 
avenues of protest had failed to convince authorities to take action over the 
forests.
118   An article in the West Australian raised fears that the blockade 
signalled a move towards the more aggressive styles of protest employed in New 
South Wales and Victoria, presumably forgetting the 1979 Wagerup protests in 
Western Australia during which forest activists employed non-violent direct 
action strategies to occupy Alcoa's proposed alumina refinery site.
119 
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Some appreciation of the forest blockade’s professional and strategic 
organisation can be gained from the contents of a comprehensive 63-page 
handbook produced by WAFA and the Wilderness Society and issued to activists 
prior to the commencement of the blockade.   The publication included 
information on peaceful resistance, non-violence theory, affinity groups, 
campsite locations, legal matters, relations with workers and police, and media 
liaison.    All actions would be based on ‘affinity groups’ of between 10 to 15 
people which would practise consensus decision-making and plan possible 
actions to carry out themselves or combined with other affinity groups.   The 
blockade's co-ordinating collective was to be informed of all action proposals in 
order to co-ordinate the campaign.
120 
      
In an effort to minimise conflict between opposing groups, WAFA wrote to the 
Minister for Police, Bob Wiese, advising him of the campaign’s objectives and 
assuring him that the protest would be non-violent.  WAFA expressed the hope 
that the police would take the necessary measures to ensure that those taking part 
in the action would be protected from harassment and violence, and suggested a 
meeting to discuss the issues involved.
121 
      
The timber industry was quick to respond.   Information leaflets told workers that 
green activists wanted to stop logging simply because they opposed the industry 
operating in native forests and that delivery of logs to about 30 sawmills could be 
reduced or stopped altogether.   The livelihoods of south-west communities 
would be threatened, with high unemployment, less revenue and families forced 
to leave the district.   Timber workers were urged to contact their employer to 
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offer assistance to oppose the blockade.
122    A rally was organised in Pemberton 
the day before the action commenced, with families invited to march in support 
of their communities and ‘tell the protesters to go home’.
123    An estimated 1300 
people attended the rally, which was addressed by politicians, the local shire 
president and a representative from the timber industry.   Acting Environment 
Minister Paul Omodei told the audience the protesters should ‘bugger off’ and 
described the polarising effect of their actions on the local community as an act 
of vandalism.   Manjimup shire president Ted Thompson looked upon the forests 
as ‘god given’ assets to the state and the shire did not want to see them locked 
up.
124 
      
Western Australia’s first forest blockade started with a ‘Forest Festival’ in the 
karri forest near Pemberton on the weekend of 2-3 July 1994.    The event 
included workshops on non-violence, guidance on developing affinity groups, 
briefings on the blockade and forest walks.   All activists attending the festival 
and blockade were required to register before attending the various forest camps.  
The registration area also provided medical and child care facilities, and a special 
area for women.
125 
      
Roger Cheeseman, a retired public servant who lived close to Giblett block, 
remembers that he became concerned about global pressure on the environment 
and, in a local context, related this to CALM’s activities that included logging 
interim-listed heritage areas which required federal government approval.   He 
felt compelled to join the protest because ‘it was the right thing to do’, and 
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assisted with logistical support by allowing activists to use his home telephone 
and shed.
126 
      
During the blockade, which ended on 30 July, four protesters were arrested in 
Jane Block after occupying a wooden tower they had erected over logging 
equipment.   They were charged with hindering police and preventing a lawful 
activity.   Conservationists considered the blockade to have been successful 
through gaining a reprieve for some areas of old growth forest and drawing 
public attention to the mismanagement of Western Australia's native forests.
127   
Most importantly, however, the blockade provided the forest protest movement 
with an opportunity to critically examine the effectiveness of its strategies and 
the efficiency of its internal organisation. 
      
At its August 1994 meeting in Walpole, WAFA members evaluated the forest 
blockade, considering what aspects of the campaign had been carried out well 
and those that needed improvement.    The meeting felt there was a lack of clear 
decision-making during the action, which caused some confusion and 
misunderstanding.  Communication between the south-west camps and Perth also 
needed attention because of a lack of adequate information.   Activists believed 
that affinity groups should be given a clearer idea of what was happening during 
a campaign and provided with more support to continue their efforts.   The 
meeting agreed on the continuation of forest blockades as an effective campaign 
strategy but decided that the term ‘forest rescue’ could better describe that 
particular type of action.
128 
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Following the blockade, the protest movement devoted its energies to 
maintaining the momentum of the campaign and keeping public attention 
focused on forest issues.   Two local activists decided to demonstrate their 
personal commitment by ‘fasting for the forests’.    Seventy-two year-old Elaine 
Michael from Bridgetown, who had been arrested at Manjimup in July while 
trying to stop a wood chip train, began a hunger strike outside Parliament House 
in Canberra to persuade the federal government to implement the moratorium on 
forest logging contained in the 1992 National Forest Policy Statement and to 
permanently protect all forests of high conservation value.  Michael said the 
hunger strike was a last resort because she believed people needed to do all they 
could to ensure the forest heritage was passed on to future generations.
129  At the 
same time, Philip Gregory from Mulallyup also commenced a hunger strike on 
the steps of state parliament.   After meeting with Premier Richard Court and 
Environment Minister Kevin Minson and failing to persuade them to stop 
logging in old-growth forests, Gregory believed his hunger strike had been 
successful in highlighting the government’s intransigence over the issue.
130   
Greens (WA) Senator Christabel Chamarette commended the two hunger strikers 
for risking their health because they could no longer stand by while the country’s 
native forests were destroyed for short-term profits.
131 
      
During August and September the protest movement organised a number of 
events to further maintain public attention.  Only two days after the blockade 
finished, an estimated crowd of around 2,000 people assembled in Forrest Place 
in the largest rally for the forests seen in Perth.    The event had been organised 
to coincide with a meeting of federal Cabinet in the city.   Environment Minister 
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John Faulkner was given a large number of petitions, letters and pledge forms 
calling for an end to wood chipping and logging in high conservation value 
forests that had been collected during the blockade.   At the beginning of 
September, a rally in Fremantle organised as part of a ‘National Day of Action’ 
against logging in old growth forests attracted between 750 and 1,000 people.
132   
Workshops conducted by WAFA at this time included sessions on media 
interaction, communicating with politicians, relations with unions and resolving 
conflicts over logging.
133 
      
In early October 1994, WAFA and the Wilderness Society commenced the 
second part of its non-violent protest.  Called ‘Forest Rescue’, the campaign 
would continue until the end of December and was aimed at preventing federal 
government renewal of wood chip export licences.
134   The resumption of direct 
action provoked anger among timber communities, with Save Our South West 
group spokesperson Trish Townsend commenting that the return of the protesters 
would be an unwelcome intrusion and asserting that the earlier forest blockade 
had strengthened local people’s resolve to support the timber industry and protect 
their livelihoods.
135 
      
At the start of the campaign, bulletins advised activists that protest actions would 
be held in forest areas from Balingup to Albany, with training in direct action 
taking place on private land at Northcliffe.   Supporters were asked to give their 
time to help with the action by staffing community information posts, painting 
banners and attending organised events.   People were urged to write letters to 
Prime Minister Keating and the Western Australian government, suggesting 
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alternatives to wood chipping and emphasising that old growth forests were 
irreplaceable.
136    
      
During the three months of the campaign, hundreds of people visited the forests 
and witnessed the impact of clear-felling.   Many protesters endured hardships 
and risked personal injury and prosecution during actions designed to stop the 
construction of logging roads and logging operations.   Extensive media coverage 
ensured that images of forest destruction and protest activity were continually 
kept in the public eye.
137   Although WAFA viewed the forest rescue campaign 
as a success by continuing to focus public attention on forest mismanagement 
and provide positive opportunities to effect change,
138 its overall objective to 
secure protection for the forests from wood chipping was not achieved.   The 
federal government’s subsequent decision to renew export licences not only 
attracted condemnation from the forest protest movement but also strengthened 
its determination to continue strategies of non-violent direct action.
139   While 
both the forest blockade and the forest rescue campaign comprised numerous 
actions in various south-west forest locations that were co-ordinated by the large 
urban-based forest protest groups, the following case-study provides an insight 
into how local communities in Western Australia's south-west were also forming 
organised groups and devising strategies to protect areas of forest that they 
regarded as valuable parts of their local natural heritage. 
 
Jane Block Protest 
John Taylor had lived in the Northcliffe area since 1977, and worked as a timber 
faller for the Western Australian Forests Department, then as a contract faller for 
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Bunnings.   Over the years he became concerned that timber from the forests was 
not being utilised for its true value and this concern stimulated his interest in 
forest conservation.   In December 1994 Taylor observed that bulldozers were 
clearing bush for a logging road in Jane block, which was near his property.  
Concerned residents organised public meetings and in January 1995 formed the 
Friends of Jane forest protest group.   Capitalising on his forestry and 
conservation experience, the group persuaded Taylor to become its first president 
and media spokesperson.
140 
      
Jane block was within ten kilometres of Northcliffe and became an icon and a 
'rallying point' with which local people identified.   Taylor believes it was this 
factor that attracted people to the campaign.   Although some residents were not 
prepared to take direct action, such as lying in front of bulldozers, they believed a 
line had to be drawn somewhere and, for many, Jane forest was their ‘line in the 
sand’.  He recalled membership at the time of the protest consisted of a nucleus 
of approximately 150 people, drawn from a broad cross-section of the Manjimup 
shire community.  While the group's initial focus was on saving Jane block, its 
overall objective was to promote the conservation of the state's south-west native 
forests.
141 
      
As the Crawfords observed in their history of the Northcliffe area, while there 
was some friction with city-based activists, locals played a prominent role in the 
Jane block protest and many of the tactics they used, such as hiding in the bush 
during logging operations and erecting tree platforms, had been employed in 
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eastern states campaigns, and were employed during other south-west forest 
actions.
142  
 
 Map 7.2.   Sites of forest protest action around Northcliffe during the 1990s. 
Source:  Patricia Crawford and Ian Crawford, Contested Country: A History of 
the Northcliffe Area, Western Australia, UWA Press, 2003, p.197. 
 
One of the keys to the success of the Jane forest campaign was the telephone 
network of local activists that played a vital role in ‘getting bodies on the 
ground’, as well as providing both emotional support and a regular flow of 
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information so that everyone knew what was happening.
143    S e v e r a l  f o r e s t  
blocks around Northcliffe became sites for local protest action throughout the 
1990s.  (see Map 7.2.) 
      
While, on the one hand, the formation of the Friends of Jane group and the 
campaign to save Jane forest united sections of the Northcliffe community, the 
issue also provoked anger and conflict.   During a meeting in late January 1995, 
when it was decided to form the protest group and commence forest action, 
timber workers argued their right to continue logging.   Heated exchanges 
occurred between timber industry supporters and those opposed to logging in 
high conservation value areas such as Jane block.   The meeting was attended by 
more than 50 people, including local farmers, business people, tourism workers 
and families.
144   During an earlier protest action in Jane block, activists claimed 
they had been abused by a bulldozer driver clearing a road through the forest, 
and that he had tried to run them down.
145         
      
Robert Daubney’s ancestors came to the Northcliffe area during the 1920s as 
group settlers, and he and his wife Alison run a dairy farm close to Jane forest.   
He said the local forest had always been part of his life and everyone thought it 
would never be logged because it was in a reserve.   When he saw bulldozers 
clearing a road in the forest, Daubney and his wife attended a meeting and joined 
the Friends of Jane group to oppose the logging and protect the block.   Many 
people were opposed to the practice of clear-felling, and objected to the fact that 
intensive logging would not provide any financial benefit to the local 
community.
146 
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In February 1995, timber workers blockaded the Daubney's dairy for five days 
after they allowed protesters to camp on their land.
147  (see Figure 7.1.)     
Daubney believes those who picketed his property were encouraged to do so by 
timber industry management and that their action backfired by providing 
Australia-wide publicity that helped the anti-logging protest.   He recalled that 
the campaign not only polarised the Northcliffe community but also divided 
families, with wives of some timber workers appreciating the long-term benefits 
of protecting the forest.
148    In an article in the West Australian, Claudette 
Rickman, a local poet and writer, described how she and her daughters joined the 
fight to save Jane forest against the wishes of her husband who operated the 
wood chipper at the local mill and feared he might lose his job.
149     
      
According to Daubney, the most positive aspect of the Jane block protest was 
that it made local people aware that they could do something to stop their forest 
being logged.   He believes the campaign succeeded not only because of the 
combination of an efficient network of Northcliffe activists and the 
organisational and strategic support provided by Perth and Denmark protest 
groups but also because authorities underestimated the strength of local feeling 
and emotional attachment to Jane forest.
150   The South-West Forests Defence 
Foundation managed to obtain a Supreme Court injunction to stop further 
industrial activity in the forest after challenging CALM’s right to log the area.   
A Supreme Court action and High Court appeal delayed logging further and 
eventually helped save the forest.
151  
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Figure 7.1.   Robert Daubney celebrates the lifting of the blockade on his dairy 
farm with a glass of milk.   Source:  West Australian, 8 February 1995. 
 
The campaign to save Jane forest provided an example of how the impending 
destruction of a cherished symbol of a community’s natural heritage alerted 
people to authorities’ apparent disregard for local conservation values, and 
motivated them to organise concerted protest action.   It also demonstrated how 
accelerated logging activity in the south-west generated friction between 
conservationists and timber workers, to the extent that communities became 
internally divided.   The Jane forest action showed how, during the early 1990s, 
country and city-based protest groups were increasingly combining their energies 
and activities to develop a more generalised and inclusive forest campaign.  Most 
significantly, the campaign provided further evidence of an escalation of forest 
protest in the state's south-west during the early 1990s with the organisation of 
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co-ordinated community protest action and the application of a constellation of 
protest strategies aimed at protecting local areas of forest. 
 
Court Battles 
During 1994 and 1995 two innovations enhanced the forest protest movement’s 
strategy to mount compelling legal challenges against authorities.   In July 1994, 
Perth lawyer Peter Rattigan and other members of the legal profession decided to 
establish a legal support group to assist WAFA in its campaign to blockade 
logging operations in the south-west and to preserve the forests.  Initially 
operating out of Greens Senator Christabel Chamarette's office, the group won 
injunctions to stop logging in several forest blocks.  The group believed it could 
best assist WAFA by offering legal advice to those involved in direct action and 
providing representation during court appearances.  Additional support would 
involve examination of forest management legislation to ensure proper 
compliance by authorities and assistance with applications for judicial review of 
administrative decisions.
152 
      
The formation of the Western Australian Environmental Defender’s Office 
(EDO) in November 1995 further consolidated support for the forest protest 
movement from the legal profession.   The Environmental Defender’s Office was 
established by lawyers who were concerned that the public interest on 
environmental issues was not adequately represented.   Its objectives included 
empowering communities to protect the environment through legal processes, 
promoting environmental law reform and educating the public about the legal 
system and environmental law.   As a non-profit organisation the Environmental 
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Defender’s Office called for voluntary and financial support from concerned 
environmentalists.
153  It   subsequently produced a handbook for forest activists 
that provided information about relevant offences, the powers of CALM and 
police officers, action to be taken if arrested, and court procedures.
154 
      
These developments in legal support combined with CALM’s increasingly 
visible activity in the forests provided incentives for local protest groups to 
initiate court action as a strategy to delay logging in four forest blocks: Kerr near 
Balingup, Hester near Bridgetown, Jane near Northcliffe, and Sharpe near 
Walpole.   The groups initially involved in the actions were the Bridgetown-
Greenbushes Friends of the Forest, the Friends of Jane, the Balingup Friends of 
the Forest, and the South-West Forests Defence Foundation. 
 
In October 1994 about 30 Balingup residents commenced a blockade of Kerr 
forest.  As the only unlogged forest close to the town the area held great 
ecological significance for the local community.    The Balingup Friends of the 
Forest group claimed the block was of high conservation value, that CALM had 
contravened the Wildlife Conservation Act by failing to protect rare species, that 
it had failed to consult the local community, and that it had also breached 
ministerial conditions regarding logging in high salt-risk zones.   As a result the 
group sought the assistance of the Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the 
Forest, an incorporated organisation, and through them was successful in 
obtaining a Supreme Court interim injunction to prevent CALM’s logging 
operations.   The groups interpreted this as a victory for the local community and 
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the forests, and as an initial step in challenging the authority of powerful 
government agencies.
155 
      
The following month, Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest members 
and supporters held a picnic in Bridgetown’s Hester forest to protest against 
plans to log the area.   The group was angry about a lack of community 
consultation over the block’s future and CALM’s ignorance about 
recommendations that Hester forest should be designated a conservation park and 
only logged over a 300-year rotation to maintain its ecological sustainability.   
Three days after the picnic CALM workers carried out a ‘dawn raid’ and 
commenced logging operations, using three contracted tree fallers and no 
machinery.   Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest members and local 
residents reacted quickly.  At 2.30pm on the same day an interim injunction 
halted CALM’s activities and the department agreed not to continue logging until 
court action was finalised.
156 
 
On the Easter holiday weekend in April 1995 CALM contractors bulldozed a 
logging road into Sharpe block near Walpole.   The 5,800-hectare forest 
contained areas of old growth karri, jarrah, marri and tingle forest and was 
interim-listed on the Register of the National Estate.   CALM claimed that the 
logging was essential to provide supplies of karri logs to Bunnings sawmill at 
Pemberton.
157   The South-West Forests Defence Foundation subsequently 
obtained a Supreme Court injunction to prevent further logging operations 
pending legal action.
158 
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CALM’s incursion into Sharpe block provoked an immediate response from 
environmentalists.  Greens (WA) Senator Christabel Chamarette described the 
road clearing operation over the holiday weekend as ‘outrageous’ and said the 
action ran contrary to CALM’s commitment to protect biodiversity by 
encouraging the spread of dieback disease and destroying the forest without 
having conducted surveys to determine its ecological significance.
159   T h e  
Western Australian Forest Alliance thought CALM’s actions resulted from a 
‘misguided frenzy’ that was driven by its commitment to provide old growth 
forest logs to the timber and wood chip industries.   It intended to present legal 
and scientific arguments why logging should not proceed and believed the 
Western Australian people would not stand by and see Sharpe forest destroyed 
for wood chips.
160 
      
At a Western Australian Supreme Court hearing in May scientists gave evidence 
to support the South-West Forests Defence Foundation's case for an injunction to 
prevent the destruction of forest in Sharpe block.    These included Dr Barbara 
York Main, University of Western Australia Zoology Department, Dr Pierre 
Horwitz, Department of Environmental Management, Edith Cowan University, 
Dr Giles Hardy, Murdoch University, and botanist Dr Arthur Weston.
161   
Although the Supreme Court did not grant an injunction to prevent logging, the 
scientific evidence presented by the South-West Forests Defence Foundation 
resulted in Justice Henry Wallwork not approving clear-felling and burning in 
Sharpe forest block because of the possible adverse environmental consequences.   
The Foundation was given permission to make a further application and continue 
proceedings in the Western Australian Supreme Court.  Conservationists 
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believed the decision cast doubt on CALM’s clear-felling practices and opened 
the way for public and legal argument over the issue.
162 
      
In 1996 the South-West Forests Defence Foundation and Bridgetown- 
Greenbushes Friends of the Forest successfully challenged CALM’s attempts to 
prevent the legal actions over the four forest blocks from proceeding.   The 
Supreme Court supported the right of conservationists to continue their case on a 
matter of public importance.
163   Following the decision lawyers from the newly-
formed Environmental Defender's Office visited the disputed forest areas and 
conducted a ‘forest litigation workshop’ with protest groups to discuss the 
forthcoming legal challenge.
164 
      
The appeals to halt logging were heard by three judges of the Supreme Court in 
June 1997.   Points contested by the conservation groups included a 
determination of whether or not conservation groups had legal standing to 
challenge government contraventions of environmental law, whether CALM had 
a duty towards ecological preservation in state forests, whether conservation 
groups had a legal right to be consulted over logging plans and whether CALM 
had responsibilities with respect to the Wildlife Conservation Act.   Apart from a 
decision recognising that all the groups, except Friends of Jane, had legal 
standing the court ruled in favour of CALM’s forest operations.   The judges 
found that CALM was not bound by the Wildlife Conservation Act to protect 
native animals in general but only to protect endangered fauna, and rejected the 
claim that conservation groups had a legitimate right to be consulted.  The 
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judgement also found that CALM had broad discretion in implementing its 
management plans, provided it acted in good faith.
165   
      
While welcoming the judgement on legal standing, forest protest groups 
interpreted the Supreme Court decision as confirmation that the public had little 
control over CALM’s forest management practices and logging operations, and 
that concerns could be addressed only through government bodies and not the 
legal system.
166   Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest president Jim 
Frith said CALM was apparently allowed such leeway in interpreting its forest 
management plans that they became meaningless.   The Bridgetown community 
felt powerless because it had been ignored during the public consultation process 
over CALM’s management proposals and now the courts had failed to address its 
concerns.
167 
      
The South-West Forests Defence Foundation and the Bridgetown-Greenbushes 
Friends of the Forest subsequently decided to lodge an application for special 
leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia on the grounds that the Supreme 
Court erred in deciding that CALM’s executive director could exercise 
discretionary powers outside the jurisdiction of the courts, that CALM was not 
subject to the Wildlife Conservation Act with respect to native fauna and that 
conservation groups were unable to ensure CALM conformed to any Ministerial 
conditions imposed upon it.
168   In April 1998 a four to one majority of the full 
bench of the High Court sitting in Hobart ruled that the case was not an 
appropriate one for the granting of special leave to appeal.
169    Environment 
Minister Cheryl Edwardes said the court decision vindicated CALM’s ability to 
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sustainably manage the state’s forests while conservationists believed the 
judgement emphasised the fact that CALM was not obliged to comply with its 
own management plan and that its practices remained open to question.
170   
      
While failure to obtain a sympathetic judgement in the nation’s highest court 
raised questions about the effectiveness of expensive litigation as a useful forest 
protest strategy, like the Jarrah Class Action and the Forests Forever court 
actions in the early 1980s, there were some positive outcomes for the forest 
protest movement.   Julie Webb and Ian Barns have argued that, rather than being 
a costly failure, the High Court action succeeded in highlighting CALM’s legal 
obligations towards the forests and acknowledging the importance of the forest 
groups’ challenge.   Furthermore, the court cases gained conservationists 
valuable time in which to initiate other protest action and generate public 
support.
171   Mary Frith of Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest 
agreed, pointing out that, while forest protest groups did not win the court case, 
they and the forests were ultimate winners because during the four years of legal 
action CALM’s logging operations stalled and she believed the public became 
more sympathetic.
172 
 
Marching for the Forests 
By 1995, the forest protest movement was heartened by opinion polls that 
showed increasing support for forest protection with 44% of Western Australians 
strongly opposed to logging in ‘natural’ forests compared to a national average of 
33%.   The surveys were interpreted by conservationists as confirmation of 
federal and state government failures to consider the democratic wishes of 
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Australians for the sake of placating a greedy timber industry.
173   Mounting 
sympathy for saving the forests and frustration at government inaction resulted in 
the application of protest strategies designed to demonstrate mass public support 
and force authorities to reconsider their position.   The actions not only escalated 
the forest campaign but also created a climate for confrontation. 
      
Following a warning by police in late January 1995 that feelings would be at 
‘flashpoint’ at a timber workers' rally in Perth, Western Australian forest activists 
decided not to mount a counter-protest action.   The event had been organised in 
response to the Keating Government’s procrastination over wood chip licences 
and threats of job cuts in the south-west timber industry.
174   Three weeks later 
WAFA organised a ‘Rally to Keep Our Forests’ on Perth Esplanade with the 
object of convincing people that the forests could be saved without reducing 
employment.
175   The rally, attended by an estimated 10,000 people, was viewed 
by organisers as a clear message to governments that Western Australians 
wanted old growth forests protected. (see figure 7.2.)    Seventy-two year-old 
Ray Hilton, who attended his first protest rally, believed it was a case of  'stand 
up and be counted' for the sake of future generations before it was too late.
176    
The Perth rallies echoed demonstrations in eastern states' capital cities with 
logging trucks surrounding Parliament House in Canberra and 10,000 people 
marching through Melbourne to protest against wood chipping.
177    A further 
8,000 people attended rallies in Adelaide, Brisbane and Canberra to protest 
against the Federal Government’s decision to renew export licences for wood 
chips from Australia’s native forests.
178 
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Figure 7.2.   Perth people march along Barrack Street to protest against logging 
Western Australia's old growth forests.  Source:  West Australian, 20 February 
1995.      
 
In an effort to avoid confrontation WAFA set up a ‘jobs hotline’ to talk to timber 
workers about the industry’s future.   Peter Robertson believed conservationists 
and workers should be able to talk to each other and reach a solution.  He 
warned, however, that WAFA would not compromise its position when faced 
with ‘the extraordinary self-serving alliance between some politicians, CALM, 
and the big woodchip companies’ whose objective was to ensure the continued 
access of large timber companies to the dwindling areas of old growth forests.   
Robertson said there was a need to identify and exclude from discussion those 
organisations that benefited from spreading fear and distrust, thus opening the 
way for constructive dialogue with those who genuinely wanted to achieve an 
amicable resolution to the deadlock.
179 
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Forest activists were mindful of the need to keep the attention of city people 
focused on the forest campaign.   On ‘anti-woodchipping day’ in April 1995 
several events were staged in Perth to coincide with activities in 30 other cities 
around Australia and throughout the world.   Commuters travelling to work saw 
banners erected over freeways calling for a halt to wood chipping. Motorists 
indicated their support by flashing their lights and waving.   A lunchtime funeral 
procession in the city mourned the destruction of the forests and loss of wildlife 
habitats through logging.
180   In August shoppers at Garden City were confronted 
by a 70 metre-long karri tree banner designed to show people the size of trees 
being cut down for wood chips.
181   A further WAFA initiative involved 
canvassing those businesses that ‘display the hallmarks of an environmentally 
aware company’ for financial contributions towards the forest campaign.
182  
      
Also in 1995 the federal government introduced plans to implement a national 
forest management and conservation policy through ‘deferred forest assessment’ 
and  ‘regional forest agreement’ processes that depended upon co-operative 
arrangements with each state.   WAFA was apprehensive about the possibility of 
federal and state government collusion that would result in minimal public 
consultation and provide further encouragement for CALM and the timber 
industry to continue wood chipping in old growth forests.   In response, WAFA, 
prompted by principal organisers Patrick Weir and Maggie Burke, decided to 
hold a major public event ‘The Big Forest Rally’, aimed at influencing 
politicians and demonstrating mass support for forest conservation.
183 
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Organisation of the September rally not only provided further opportunities for 
the forest protest movement to consolidate its activities but also demonstrated 
increasing urban community concerns about the fate of the forests.   In 
Fremantle, organisers from the Wilderness Society noticed that people who had 
not previously been involved in environmental issues were now prepared to take 
a stand over the forests and were volunteering practical help in areas such as 
stage lighting, catering, and making banners and t-shirts.   The rally was 
promoted as an ‘environmental fun day’ for the family, with bands, dance groups 
and theatre performances.
184 
      
The rally on Perth Esplanade, attended by an estimated crowd of over 10,000, 
was believed to be the largest gathering of environmentally concerned people in 
Western Australia’s history.   Addressing the rally Australian Greens Senator 
Bob Brown, said Western Australians were calling on the Court and Keating 
governments to end wood chipping of high conservation and wilderness forests, 
and warned that failure to heed the message could result in them both being 
‘clear-felled’ at the next state and federal elections.
185    The Conservation 
Council believed the massive show of support marked a turning-point in the 
forest debate by demonstrating that Western Australians were passionate about 
protecting their forests from wood chipping and that henceforth government 
decisions would be closely scrutinised.
186 
      
While the early 1990s signified a period of unification for the Western Australian 
forest protest movement, it was also a time of mounting frustration over 
government inactivity to protect the state’s forests.   The failure of authorities to 
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implement  National Forest Policy guidelines to safeguard high conservation 
value forests and the continuation of clear-felling for wood chips despite rising 
public opposition resulted in activists utilising strategies of non-violent direct 
action.   New strategies of forest blockades, forest rescues and hunger strikes 
combined with well-established tactics of court action, mass rallies and political 
lobbying to ensure that the forest campaign remained in the public spotlight.   
Most significantly, the formation of organised protest groups in the state's south-
west to protect local areas of native forest expanded the protest movement's 
activist networks and stimulated a broader level of public support and 
participation. 
      
Although the momentum of the forest campaign increased considerably during 
the early 1990s, efforts to secure long-term protection for Western Australia’s 
forests had reached an impasse.   The federal Labor government continued to 
approve export wood chip licences and the state Liberal government and CALM 
maintained their commitment to the timber industry.  By the mid-1990s, 
however, the protest movement had convinced many Western Australians that a 
valuable part of their environmental heritage faced imminent destruction and that 
their elected representatives were doing little to ensure the forests were 
adequately protected.   The movement was on the threshold of converting an 
enlivened public sensitivity into a dynamic force for change. 
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The Late 1990s:  A Triumphant Movement 
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Map 8.1.   Western Australia - areas of significance discussed in Chapter 8. 
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During the early 1990s the Western Australian forest protest movement had 
strengthened its organisation and networks, largely through the formation of 
WAFA and an escalation of protest activity in the state's south-west.   This 
allowed it to mount an intensive and co-ordinated forest campaign that 
capitalised on mounting public dissatisfaction with the Western Australian 
government's failure to protect the state's high conservation value forests.    
      
The late 1990s marked the zenith of forest protest in Western Australia.   This 
chapter will argue that during this period the forest protest movement used a 
diversity of non-confrontational and direct action strategies to create the 
dynamics for victory in the forest campaign.     More spectacular direct action 
protests in the forests and staged events in Perth increased media exposure and 
maintained public attention on the need to take action to protect the forests.   By 
exploiting the support of high profile figures, sporting personalities and 
identifiable groups, the protest movement continued to transform forest protest 
from a minority group activity to a mainstream public issue.    Most importantly, 
the tactical decisions not to participate in the RFA process and to focus on a 
campaign to save Western Australia's old growth forests gave the forest protest 
movement the freedom to attack the credibility of the state government's forest 
policies while at the same time focusing its strategies on exploiting an emotive 
public issue that was attracting increasing support. 
 
Empty Promises 
While the forest protest movement was disappointed at the lack of federal and 
state government initiatives to protect Western Australia’s forests during the 
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early 1990s, the election of the Howard federal Liberal government in 1996 on a 
strong environmental platform seemed to offer some hope for conservationists.   
A $1.15 billion five-year plan entitled ‘Saving our Natural Heritage’ released by 
Shadow Environment Minister Senator Rod Kemp at the start of the election 
campaign was promoted as a ‘historic commitment to dramatically improve the 
state of the Australian environment’.
1    Among many environmental initiatives, 
a future Howard government promised to protect high conservation value native 
forests and establish a sustainable value-adding timber industry with a greater 
emphasis on plantation and farm forestry.
2    Commenting on the Liberal-
National Party Coalition’s victory, conservationists reminded politicians that 
environmental promises had played a significant role in securing the federal 
election outcome and called upon the new administration to honour its 
commitments.
3 
      
The timber industry soon began to apply pressure on federal Environment 
Minister Robert Hill.   In April 1996, Wesfarmers managing director Michael 
Chaney sought an early agreement to obtain a ‘second stage woodchip export 
licence’, arguing that unless this was granted, Japanese customers would be 
forced to seek alternative supplies and that his company’s ability to supply their 
future needs would be threatened.
4   Concerned at disagreement and delay over 
national forest policy, Chaney later requested Prime Minister Howard to 
intervene personally in order to resolve a matter of ‘immediate financial 
concern’, expressing an expectation that the timber industry’s hostile relations 
with the previous federal Labor government over forest issues would be 
exchanged for a more co-operative approach.
5   
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Events during the latter part of 1996 confirmed conservationists’ fears as to the 
extent of the timber industry’s influence over the new federal government’s 
forest policy.
6   In July, federal Primary Industries and Energy Minister John 
Anderson announced a Cabinet decision to allow a 20% increase in annual wood 
chip exports and a new three-year licence system to provide ‘greater certainty’ 
for the logging industry.  Further supplies of wood chips would be available from 
private native forests which had been cleared for hardwood plantations.
7   The 
Conservation Council of Western Australia released a federal government 
document which revealed that wood chip exporters Wesfarmers/Bunnings and 
Whittakers had applied for a 41% increase in wood chip export quotas from the 
state’s native forests, which would increase annual exports from 860,000 to 
1,210,000 tonnes, largely from old growth karri and marri trees.
8    
      
Finally, in November, the federal government issued new wood chip export 
licences which allowed for the export of 19 million tonnes of wood chips from 
Australia’s native forests over three years, comprising an annual average increase 
of 10%.   In Western Australia the decision allowed Wesfarmers/Bunnings 
subsidiary the WA Chip and Pulp Company to increase its exports by 20% to 
900,000 tonnes a year, and prompted plans for expanded operations in the 
Albany and Bunbury regions.   Minister Anderson said the new licences were 
designed to restore confidence in the native forest-based timber industry.
9 
 
Reactions from Western Australian conservationists to the wood chipping 
expansion reflected their sense of frustration and betrayal.   The Conservation 
Council expressed outrage at the Howard government’s wood chip policies, 
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which it said demonstrated contempt for strong public opposition to native forest 
wood chipping.    The Council believed the licence decisions were influenced by 
timber industry pressure on the state and federal governments, and that increased 
wood chipping would result in massive clear felling operations which ignored the 
potential of an expanding tourism industry and the ability to transfer wood 
production from native forests to plantations.
10    G r e e n s  W A  S e n a t o r  D e e  
Margetts warned that conservationists would exercise vigilance to ensure licence 
conditions were not breached, arguing that the new wood chip regulations were 
economically, environmentally and socially illogical because they ignored 
practical alternatives and would encourage the destruction of bush on private 
farmland.
11   Australian Greens Senator Bob Brown asserted that Prime Minister 
Howard had assumed predecessor Paul Keating’s mantle as ‘Australian 
champion woodchipper’.
12 
      
The federal government’s approval of a further expansion of wood chipping in 
Western Australia’s forests left the protest movement experiencing similar 
disillusion and frustration to that which followed the movement's initial 
optimism about the Burke state Labor government in the early 1980s.   Once 
again this demonstrated that there were limits to how far governments were 
willing to co-operate with conservationists over measures to protect the forests.        
The forest protest movement, however, was conscious of its ability to persuade a 
significant number of Western Australians that their forest heritage faced 
imminent destruction and was convinced that the time was right to mount an 
intensive forest campaign.   It was at this time that the movement experienced 
some division between those activists who wished to adopt a more forceful 
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response to the expansion of wood chipping and others who proposed alternative 
strategies that relied on persuasion and argument rather than confrontation. 
While forest protest in Western Australia during the 1990s was influenced 
primarily by the activities of the Conservation Council, the WA Forest Alliance 
and the Wilderness Society, there were some conservationists who sought to 
change government forest policy from outside those three major protest 
organisations.    Reflecting on his experiences as a forest activist in the 
Campaign to Save Native Forests, Basil Schur thought there was a tendency for 
forest protest groups to become inflexible and adopt an adversarial stance that 
failed to take into account changes in the political and social landscape.   He 
believed that there was a need to adopt a more pro-active approach, which moved 
the economy in a new direction away from a focus on primary forest industry 
towards areas such as tourism, plantation forestry and value-adding forest 
products.
13 
      
Schur’s observations regarding the need for an alternative approach to forest 
protest were reflected in the publication in late 1996 of A New Forest and Timber 
Industry Policy for Western Australia by an ‘independent, informal, voluntary 
group’, which comprised Philip Achurch, Dr Kathleen Chindarsi, Dame Rachel 
Cleland, Jim and Mary Frith, Paul Llewellyn and Dr Henry Schapper.   The four-
page document visualised Western Australia with an efficient timber industry 
sustained by farm forestry and plantations, and with publicly-owned native 
forests dedicated principally to nature and wilderness conservation.   These 
objectives would be achieved through an expansion of private plantations and 
forestry on cleared farmland, the establishment of an agency to manage state 
  343 
plantations on a commercial basis, the cessation of logging, clear-felling and 
wood chipping in native forests, and the reorganisation of the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management into a nature conservation agency.   The 
group anticipated that its proposals would result in a more efficient timber 
industry with increased employment opportunities and environmental benefits 
such as reduced salinity and protection of forest biodiversity.
14    
      
Prior to the new policy’s launch in November by Dame Rachel Cleland, 
production of the document caused dissension within the forest protest 
movement.   At a Margaret River meeting of the WAFA in October, Jim Frith 
said that the forest policy proposals were presented by a group that was 
independent of any other organisation and the document was not available for 
modification by WAFA or the Conservation Council.  Beth Schultz, representing 
the South-West Forests Defence Foundation, said she had withdrawn from 
participation in the new policy initiative because she disagreed with the wording 
of the proposals and felt her views had not been sufficiently taken into account.
15   
Mary Frith recalled that the production of the new forest policy revealed 
divisions between the more militant members of the forest protest movement and 
those seeking to present alternative strategies to direct action.   She believed this 
friction resulted in WAFA’s lack of support for the proposals, with people 
‘pulling in opposite directions’.
16   Ultimately, this moderate approach to forest 
protest failed to make any impression on the strategic direction of the movement, 
which launched a more aggressive campaign to protect the forests. 
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Buy-Pass Bunnings 
Coincidental to the release of the ‘independent’ group’s timber policy, WAFA 
commenced a major protest in response to the federal government’s approval of 
increased levels of wood chip exports.   Initially the campaign focused on 
Wesfarmers/Bunnings, as the company which sought to gain financially from the 
wood chip export market.   In early November 1996, forest activists protested 
outside Wesfarmers' annual general meeting in Perth to voice their opposition to 
federal government approval of record levels of wood chip exports from Western 
Australia’s old growth forests.   The protest also marked the launch of a national 
consumer awareness campaign aimed at Bunnings stores around the country, 
with the objective of reducing demand for jarrah and karri timber.
17  
      
Western Australian actions against Bunnings stores commenced in April 1997, 
with the launch of the ‘Buy-Pass Bunnings’ campaign outside the company’s 
Wembley complex.   The public was invited to join members of the Wilderness 
Society and WAFA to hear forest talks, watch street theatre and give their 
support to saving the forests from wood chipping.
18   Over the following year 
Wilderness Society members in Perth, together with forest activists in Albany 
and Denmark, distributed pamphlets and spoke to shoppers, with nearly 10,000 
people signing pledges not to shop at Bunnings until the company stopped wood 
chipping native forests.   Donations attached to the pledges totalled in excess of 
$5,000.
19 
      
After learning that Bunnings was submitting an application to supply jarrah 
timber for the construction of facilities at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the 
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Conservation Council wrote to the Olympic Co-ordination Authority arguing 
that, while the Games were being promoted as being ‘environmentally-friendly’, 
the use of jarrah would be seen as an endorsement of forest management 
practices that ignored the unsustainable levels of logging in Western Australia’s 
remaining old growth jarrah forests.
20    As a result the Authority changed its 
tender documents to exclude jarrah in preference for recycled timber.
21 
      
The Wesfarmers/Bunnings campaign included new strategies that were designed 
to undermine the power of the large timber companies.   During 1997 the 
Wilderness Society facilitated the formation of Wesfarmers Investors and 
Shareholders for the Environment (WISE).  The group described itself as an 
association of Wesfarmers/Bunnings shareholders who were concerned about 
ethical investment and the environment.   They believed that the profitability and 
image of the company would ultimately suffer if it continued its destruction of 
Western Australia’s old growth native forests to produce low-grade export wood 
chips.
22  
 
At the Wesfarmers' annual meeting in November 1997, chairman Harry Perkins 
observed that some forest activists had purchased one share in the company in 
order to dominate the meeting and further their political aims.   Peter Rattigan, a 
Cottesloe lawyer and WISE organiser, challenged Wesfarmers’ wood chipping 
operations and opposed a proposed pay increase for the company’s non-
executive directors, arguing that Manjimup mill workers were living on 
starvation wages after being forced to accept a pay cut.
23   The purchase of 
Wesfarmers shares by activists mirrored the 'shareholder rights' strategy adopted 
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by New South Wales environmentalists between 1969 and 1971 during their 
successful campaign to save the Colong Caves from limestone mining by 
Commonwealth Portland Cement.
24  However, while the forest protest 
movement's energies were directed at persuading people to boycott the company 
which profited most from the wood chipping industry, state government action to 
expand forest logging activities prompted an intensification of direct action 
protest.  
 
Giblett Forest Rescue 
In early 1997, despite representations from conservationists, community leaders, 
scientists and the tourism industry, the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management announced plans to commence clear-felling of Giblett forest near 
Pemberton.   The area had been proposed as a national park and was listed on the 
interim register of the national estate.  It was also one of the few remaining areas 
of old growth karri forest that had not been extensively logged.    
      
In response, WAFA and the Greater Beedelup National Park Society called on 
the public to support a campaign of protests in the forest which would include 
acts of civil disobedience.   People were invited to register for non-violence 
training prior to their participation.   It was anticipated that the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management would declare Giblett forest a ‘Temporary 
Control Area’, ostensibly for public safety reasons, which meant that any person 
entering would commit an offence.   If this were the case, activists would defy 
the regulation by entering the forest, with a rally and non-violent protest actions 
targeting any road construction or logging operations.
25 
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At the campaign launch in April, Peter Robertson said the protest would not have 
been necessary if the state government had not succumbed to the demands of the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management and the forest timber lobby.   
Robertson insisted that, by ignoring viable commercial alternatives to intensive 
logging, such as the forest plantation and tourism industries, the government was 
creating a new crisis for south-west communities.
26   The Forest Industries 
Federation warned green groups to exercise restraint, urging them to resolve 
issues through forest agreement processes and avoid actions such as blockades 
and challenges which disrupted timber operations.
27 
      
Commencement of logging at the end of April signalled a mobilisation of 
activists for the Giblett forest rescue campaign.  Australian Democrats Senator 
for Western Australia, Andrew Murray, was dismayed that operations had begun, 
and encouraged members of the public to attend a weekend protest rally in the 
forest.
28   The Wilderness Society urged its supporters to take part in a range of 
activities which included a bus tour to Giblett forest to observe logging activities, 
raising public awareness through talk-back radio and staffing the Perth Giblett 
rescue office.
29   About 130 people attended the weekend forest rally at the 
beginning of May, which marked the start of activists’ attempts to halt or delay 
logging operations using strategies of peaceful direct action. 
      
The 1997 Giblett campaign contained a number of strategies which influenced 
the organisation of subsequent protest actions.   During the first week of 
activities Chris Lee, a philosophy student from Margaret River, became the first 
activist in Western Australia to protest against the logging of old growth forests 
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from a tree platform.   It was 30 metres above the ground attached to a 400 year-
old karri tree.  Lee said the decision to erect the platform was made when loggers 
commenced scrub-rolling the bush and claimed the new tactic resulted in 
increased support for the forest campaign.   He believed the platform represented 
a powerful yet peaceful tool and that the Giblett protest had become a symbol for 
the broader issue of seeking changes to forest management practices.   During 
five weeks on the tree platform Lee kept himself busy operating a message centre 
and using a mobile telephone to talk to the media and the public.   Further 
platforms were quickly erected over succeeding weeks.
30  Like forest blockades, 
'tree-sitting' had already featured as a forest protest strategy in eastern Australia 
in campaigns in East Gippsland and Tasmania.
31 
      
Former West Coast Eagles footballer Craig Turley’s decision to join the protest 
and demonstrate his support by spending a weekend on a tree platform not only 
provided a boost for the Giblett forest rescue but also signified a continuation of 
the forest protest movement’s strategy of using prominent public personalities to 
gain support  – a tactic that had its genesis in the 1950s when Olympic athlete 
Shirley Strickland joined the campaign to oppose the construction of an Olympic 
pool in Perth’s King’s Park.
32   Beth Schultz recalled that Turley, a known 
supporter of the forest campaign, was invited by Peter Robertson and herself to 
occupy a tree platform in order to increase publicity for the Giblett action and 
that this event was the start of a deliberate strategy to involve other high profile 
figures in protest action in the late 1990s.
33 
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The success of public personalities, particularly sporting figures, as a tactic in 
protest actions became even more obvious in September 1997, when Chicago 
Bulls basketball player, Luc Longley, also decided to join Giblett activists and 
spend time on a tree platform to register his objection to clear felling.  His 
involvement generated considerable media exposure for the campaign, with 
newspapers publishing photographs of Longley standing prominently in the 
centre of an excited group of conservationists beneath a ‘Giblett Will Stand’ 
banner.
34  (see Figure 8.1.) 
   
Figure 8.1.   Luc Longley and forest protesters at Giblett forest block. 
Source:  Manjimup-Bridgetown Times, 3 September 1997. 
 
The protest movement was able to exploit Longley’s participation.
35  Singer John 
Williamson also visited the Giblett camp and entertained an enthusiastic crowd 
with anti-wood chip songs.
36 
      
  350 
While not as visibly effective as tree platforms and the involvement of sporting 
personalities, a political development at the start of the Giblett campaign added 
further strength to the protest movement’s strategic capabilities.   In May 1997 
Dr Christine Sharp took her seat in the Legislative Council as the Greens (WA) 
member for the South-West Region of Western Australia.   Reflecting on her 
motivations for seeking election, Sharp said she was passionate about forest 
issues and held a deep concern about high forest logging levels.   Her decision to 
enter parliament was based on a desire to change government forest policy and to 
continue the work she had been unable to complete during her term with the 
Environmental Protection Authority.   Sharp recalls that her Balingup electorate 
office became one of the focal points for the south-west forests campaigns.
37 
      
During their eight-months occupation of Giblett block, forest activists found 
themselves largely unhindered by authorities, thus enabling them to install a 
well-established forest camp.   Furniture, board walks, shelters and shelves were 
manufactured from felled timber, with further refinements including a portable 
generator and composting toilet.
38  Protesters published a news sheet, the Giblett 
Free Press, which contained information and advice on subjects that included 
action to be taken if Giblett forest was declared a Temporary Control Area, legal 
rights if arrested, and requests for equipment, supplies and job volunteers.    The 
publication provided an insight into life at the protest camp. 
The past few weeks have seen the sunshine and the drying ground but 
once again the rain comes in...The regrowth itself is taller, not much but 
enough to know the resilience of the earth, our mother.   The people are 
more confident and things are a little easier now than in the depths of 
June...Firewood was gathered before breakfast this morning by six 
people and two dogs.  Two loads in time for this afternoon’s rain...The 
office is fitted out and is running well.  The printer has a problem but 
otherwise things are fine.  Having the telephone one hundred yards 
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away from the office is frustrating...A gas oven is under repair.   
Hopefully it will work, certain people have been hanging out for scones, 
others for veggie lasagne...
  
 
The news sheets also reflected the amicable ‘working’ relationship which had 
developed between activists and some police officers and Department of 
Conservation and Land Management staff.
39 
 
Once again local resident Roger Cheeseman played a key role in the campaign’s 
organisation, by not only providing practical support for the protesters but also 
ensuring the action received extensive media coverage through his role as 
president of the Greater Beedelup National Park Society.
40   Cheeseman recalled 
that the 1997 Giblett rescue differed markedly from the 1994 occupation.     
Whereas he judged the earlier action to have been relatively 'low-key' and 
ultimately a failure as the area was subsequently logged, the 1997 'rescue' was 
more intensive, with a greater resolve shown by activists and the innovative use 
of tree platforms playing a major part in gaining publicity for the protest.   He 
believes authorities were reluctant to remove the protesters through fear of an 
adverse public reaction and that the ultimate success of the Giblett rescue 
campaign resulted from the emergence of charismatic leaders, such as Chris Lee, 
and the ability of the 1997 protesters to maximise media attention.
41 
      
Because of his stance over protecting the forests, Cheeseman and his family 
became the target for demonstrations of community opposition to the Giblett 
occupation.   The ostracism of his daughter at Pemberton District High School 
resulted in her transfer to East Manjimup Primary School, and even there she was 
still taunted about her ‘greenie father’.  Other acts of intimidation included death 
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threats, telephone harassment and motor vehicles playing ‘chicken’ by driving 
towards them on a collision course before swerving away.
42 
      
As a key strategist for the Giblett rescue campaign Peter Robertson had to ensure 
that the protest did not lose its momentum if a Temporary Control Area was 
enforced by CALM, thus rendering activists liable to arrest.   Contingency plans 
which aimed at maintaining the element of surprise and capturing public 
imagination included blockading roads, dispersed re-occupations inside the 
forest, mass civil disobedience at the control area boundary, and non-violent 
direct action in Bunbury and Perth.   Robertson believed these actions would 
ensure the continuation of the demonstration of a collective commitment to the 
forest and maintenance of a ‘steady, dramatic and deeply embarrassing spotlight 
on the planned logging of Giblett’.
43   A ‘schematic guide’ produced by 
Robertson at the time located the ‘unholy alliance’ between the Western 
Australian state government, the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management and Wesfarmers as the central focus of WAFA’s forest campaign.
44 
      
Surprisingly, Giblett was not declared a Temporary Control Area and the forest 
occupation developed into a stand-off between activists and authorities, 
providing valuable time for the protest movement to consolidate its position and 
generate further public support.  Roger Cheeseman believes the state government 
was sensitive to growing sympathy for the forest protesters and had decided to 
tread carefully in order to avoid any adverse public criticism.
45  By mid-August, 
the Giblett rescue was viewed by many conservationists as one of Western 
Australia’s most effective forest campaigns.   Activist Joy Van den Haak 
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believed it was succeeding because it made people aware that the government 
had failed them and provided a means for democratic expression.
46  P e r t h  
newspapers became more sympathetic, commenting on the protesters’ resolve 
and high spirits in the face of extreme hardship and their defiance of the Court 
government’s hope that the winter would freeze them out.
47   Video and slide 
presentation nights were organised in Fremantle and Perth, during which films of 
the Giblett rescue were accompanied by ‘informative and inspirational talks on 
the campaign’.
48 (see Figure 8.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2.   Poster advertising Giblett forest rescue video and slide nights. 
Source:  Conservation Council archives. 
 
The confidence and enthusiasm generated during the Giblett action inspired other 
protest activity.   At the end of August a ‘Jarrah Forest Embassy’ was opened by 
the Friends of the Greater Kingston Forest in an effort to save an area of old 
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growth jarrah forest situated about 30 kilometres south-east of Bridgetown.     
Using strategies employed at Giblett, protesters occupied a tree platform 20 
metres above the ground alongside a large jarrah tree.   Camp co-ordinator and 
consultant conservation biologist Dr Jean-Paul Orsini said the group wished to 
educate the Western Australian public about the catastrophic effects of intensive 
logging and clear-felling on the jarrah forest, and invited people to visit Kingston 
and witness the destruction for themselves.
49   After four weeks the group 
believed it had achieved its objectives, and decided to revert to less 
confrontational actions such as exploiting the media and lobbying politicians.   
Non-violent direct action would recommence if logging resumed.
50 
 
More aggressive forms of direct action took place at Manjimup and Bunbury.   In 
September about 30 activists blockaded a wood chip train at Bunnings’ Diamond 
Chip Mill near Manjimup by chaining themselves to machinery, forcing the mill 
to close down for eight hours.  Other protesters climbed a wood chip pile and 
erected banners. The action was directed at the state government’s decision to 
extend chip log supply contracts until 2003.  During the protest four activists 
were arrested and charged with preventing a lawful activity and resisting arrest.
51   
A further protest in early November was planned from the Giblett forest rescue 
camp.
52   Over 100 activists prevented wood chips being loaded onto a Japanese 
ship at Bunbury port, with some protesters chaining themselves to a conveyor 
belt 50 metres above the ground.   The ‘rescuers’ also occupied a wood chip train 
which was unloading and carried out further protest activities on the water.     
Three activists were arrested and charged with trespass.
53   An article in the West 
Australian again indicated changing media attitudes towards the protesters whom 
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they now described as having progressed from being ‘cheeky radicals’ to ‘highly 
organised activists’ whose actions at Bunbury and Manjimup demonstrated their 
determination to prevent the needless destruction of the state’s old growth 
forests.
54 
      
While the Giblett forest rescue provoked predictable opposition from timber 
industry workers and supporters, the occupation also prompted the emergence of 
an energetic women's pro-timber lobby group.   In early June eleven women 
members of the Forest Protection Society carried out a ‘real protest’ near Big 
Brook Dam, Pemberton, in opposition to the Giblett block protest.   The women 
occupied a tree platform 12 metres above the ground.   They argued that tourism 
and the environment were not threatened by logging and that the forest was not 
disappearing.   At a pro-timber rally in the Pemberton Community Centre the 
women were presented with flowers and certificates for their protest action.
55    
 
In state parliament, Bernard Masters, Liberal, Vasse, presented a ‘grievance’ 
from a group of women calling themselves ‘real forest protesters’, who were 
concerned about the threat to 20,000 timber industry jobs and the livelihood of 
south-west communities.   They argued that the high moral stance adopted by 
radical conservationists ignored the fact that the forests were a renewable 
resource which provided an income for thousands of families.
56    Robert Martyn, 
a Pemberton resident and timber worker for over 30 years, believes the women’s 
protest played an important role in representing the views of timber workers.    
While many male timber company employees felt restricted about expressing 
their opinions, the fact that wives and girlfriends of workers were free to 
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demonstrate as they wished provided one avenue of release because ‘they 
couldn’t be touched’.
57 
      
Pressure mounted on the state government to end the seven months’ occupation 
of Giblett forest.   A rally of 400 timber workers and supporters in Manjimup 
united in a call for authorities to remove the protesters.   Forest Protection 
Society spokesperson Trish Townsend believed that local community concern 
about job security had reached crisis level and there was a risk that people would 
take matters into their own hands.
58    Manjimup shire president Keith Liddelow 
said that local residents were annoyed by the prolonged occupation and believed 
politicians had failed the community by allowing the protest to continue.
59   
Sensitive to increasing local discontent the government sought ways to force the 
protesters to leave Giblett forest. 
      
In early December 1997, Department of Conservation and Land Management 
executive director Syd Shea asked his department to evaluate the fire threat 
imposed by the presence of ‘large numbers of protesters’ occupying campsites in 
Giblett block during the summer.   The ensuing report concluded that the 
department could not guarantee the safety of the protesters during periods of high 
fire danger and there was no alternative other than evacuating them.
60   The day 
following the report Environment Minister Cheryl Edwardes requested the 
Conservation Council to ask the Giblett protesters to leave the area because of 
fire and safety hazards.   Edwardes also advised the Forest Protection Society of 
the government’s course of action and reaffirmed its commitment to the timber 
industry and its employees.
61    
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Following intensive negotiations between forest activists, the Manjimup shire 
council and CALM, the Giblett forest rescuers agreed to leave the forest after 
receiving a written assurance from the Environment Minister that the block 
would not be logged before winter 1998.
62   Both the protest movement and the 
timber industry claimed the decision to vacate the forest as a victory.    Activists 
believed their campaign had succeeded in winning a reprieve for Giblett block 
while the Forest Industries Federation saw the withdrawal as a back down by the 
protesters, praising timber workers for their restraint in the face of provocation 
and disruptions.
63    
      
The withdrawal of activists from Giblett was carried out in a spirit of co-
operation and celebration.  Prior to leaving the camp, protesters held a 
‘ceremony’ attended by local police Inspector Steve Roast, who had acted as 
mediator during negotiations, and CALM manager Peter Keppel.   During the 
proceedings activists received a letter from the Environment Minister confirming 
the halt to logging in Giblett forest and then continued on to the main camp 
where the crowd and media representatives watched tree-sitters abseil down from 
their platforms.   In an effort to improve relations the Manjimup Shire Council 
invited two representatives from the Giblett camp to talk to members of the 
council, tourism operators, and agriculture and forestry representatives.       
Activist Chris Lee summarised the feelings of protesters prior to leaving Giblett 
forest: 
On our last night in the forest we had a beautiful heart circle, where we 
talked about experiences of the last eight months and what we will carry 
with us from this campaign.   This campaign has been unique in the way 
that we have combined heartfelt grassroots activism with political 
action, real heartpolitics in action, and we feel empowered and willing 
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to continue the campaign to end the woodchipping of our precious old 
growth forests.
64 
 
The Giblett forest rescue was an important campaign which provided a model for 
native forest protest during the late 1990s.   Activists occupied an area of forest 
for an extended period during which they were able to establish a well-organised 
camp and reinforce their unity and sense of purpose.  They also gained some 
degree of acceptance from local police and CALM staff.  Tree platforms were a 
spectacular and highly successful form of protest that attracted extensive media 
attention, while the support of two sporting personalities maintained public focus 
on the fight to save the forests from wood chipping and clear-felling.     The 
action was successful in gaining valuable breathing space that ultimately saved 
Giblett forest from logging.   
 
The Regional Forest Agreement 
While the Giblett rescue provided a blueprint for future forest campaigns, it was 
the debate over the Regional Forest Agreement which supplied the momentum 
for an escalation of protest activity.   Under the 1992 National Forest Policy 
Statement signed by the federal and Western Australian governments both 
governments agreed to establish an assessment process that would enable them to 
formulate a single agreement to meet their obligations towards forests within a 
specified region.    Comprehensive regional assessments prior to the agreement 
would involve the collection and evaluation of data on the environmental and 
heritage significance of forests.  Relevant state agencies, together with the 
Australian Heritage Commission, would co-ordinate the assessment of 
information following community and industry consultation.
65      
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In August 1996 federal and state politicians hosted public meetings in Perth and 
Manjimup to launch the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process in Western 
Australia.   Representatives of several member groups of WAFA, including the 
Conservation Council, attended.   Following the meetings both these 
organisations and the Wilderness Society declared that, unless the RFA process 
was altered, they would advise their members not to participate.   The 
Conservation Council’s proposed revisions included representation on the RFA 
steering committee, access to government databases and information for Council 
representatives, full involvement of independent scientists and the continuation 
of a moratorium on logging in National Estate forests.
66   When their proposals 
were rejected the three organisations decided to operate outside the RFA process 
and take their case directly to political parties, politicians and the Western 
Australian public.  Beth Schultz recalled that, while the decision not to 
participate had been difficult, it was evident that the federal and state 
governments were acting in bad faith by excluding the community from 
representation on the steering committee.     She believed the process was 
controlled by the Department of Conservation and Land Management, an 
organisation which lacked credibility because of its history of censorship and 
intimidation.
67     
 
Following the decision not to participate in the consultation process, the forest 
protest movement decided to expose the Regional Forest Agreement as an 
expensive sham which mocked public participation and was designed to preserve 
the status quo.
68    Conservationists argued that federal government decisions to 
allow mining in conservation reserves and the extension of wood chip export 
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licences from one to three years indicated the willingness of authorities to 
disregard the guidelines contained in the 1992 National Forest Policy Statement 
on which the proposed RFA was based.   It was further alleged that federal and 
state governments and the timber industry fostered a ‘hidden agenda’ to 
manipulate the RFA process in order to convince people that Western Australia’s 
native forests had been properly assessed and were being logged on a sustainable 
basis.
69   
      
An intensive lobbying campaign to educate politicians and organisations about 
the RFA’s deficiencies was initiated.  Prior to the ALP’s National Conference in 
January 1998 the Conservation Council and WAFA urged delegates to draft or 
support a motion condemning the Western Australian Regional Forest 
Agreement and the continuing destruction of the state’s old growth forests.
70   In 
early 1998 Beth Schultz of the WA Conservation Council, David Mackenzie 
from the Wilderness Society and Peter Robertson of WAFA arranged a meeting 
with Dr Geoff Gallop, Leader of the Opposition, and Dr Judy Edwards, Shadow 
Environment Minister.   During the meeting the three organisations attempted to 
convince the state Labor party that it should not support the Regional Forest 
Agreement and compared the differences between the open and inclusive 
approach adopted by the New South Wales ALP government and the restrictive 
and exclusive attitude of the Western Australian Coalition government and the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management.
71   A letter from WAFA to 
organisations and people concerned about the RFA argued that the proposed 
agreement failed to provide adequate protection for old growth forests and that 
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CALM was manipulating the consultation process by withholding information, 
using unreliable data and restricting opportunities for public comment.
72 
      
In late 1997 WAFA became aware of satellite imagery which had been prepared 
by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).   
Activists decided to use the imagery as part of their strategy to oppose the RFA 
by visibly demonstrating the extent of forest destruction.
73   When the 
Conservation Council managed to obtain 12 images at a cost of $650 it was 
decided to organise a ‘Forests in Focus’ tour of 12 south-west centres to display 
the photographs.  The images were created from three separate satellite 
photographs taken at different times and transposed over each other to show 
changes in forest cover since 1990.    Conservationists argued the images showed 
massive vegetation loss due to logging practices, and that federal and state 
governments intended to suppress the information until after the RFA had been 
signed.   As well as exhibiting the satellite images, WAFA used the tour to 
present its draft proposals for a genuine conservation reserve system for the 
south-west forests.
74  CALM’s executive director Syd Shea denied his 
department had restricted the images’ release, saying they had been displayed on 
a public office wall.
75 
 
The protest movement’s campaign against the Regional Forest Agreement 
caused anxiety within the pro-timber lobby.   In February 1998 the Australian 
Workers Union, the Forest Industries Federation and the Forest Protection 
Society wrote to the federal Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John 
Anderson, voicing concerns that the creation of new forest reserves would mean 
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lost jobs, and stating that, unless an ‘industry enhancement option’ was included 
within the terms of the RFA to provide job creation and timber industry 
development opportunities, then the three organisations would withdraw from the 
RFA process.   The groups observed that, unless a broad range of strategies was 
considered, it would be clear that the RFA process was an attempt to reduce the 
area of forest available for multiple use management and that ‘protest and 
dissent’ was more effective than compromise and co-operation.
76  W A F A  
subsequently learned that the RFA proposals had been amended to include a 
more ‘industry-biased option’.
77 
      
In May 1998 the Joint Western Australian-Commonwealth Regional Forest 
Agreement Steering Committee released a public consultation paper to assist the 
community to provide input into the development of the RFA for the state’s 
south-west forests.   The document stated the RFA’s intention: 
...to provide stability through the establishment of a sustainable resource 
base for industry, while at the same time ensuring the protection of 
Australia’s biodiversity, heritage, old-growth and wilderness through a 
comprehensive, adequate and representative (CAR) reserve system and 
complementary off-reserve management.
78 
 
In order to achieve this objective the RFA would identify and conserve areas 
required for a forest reserve system (see Map 8.2.) and provide for ecologically 
sustainable forest management and the long-term stability of the forest and its 
associated industries.   The final agreement would define joint commitments by 
the federal and state government to forest conservation, forest use and forest-
based industries for a period of 20 years.  Written submissions were invited by 
10 July.
79  
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The paper’s release provoked strong criticism from the forest protest movement.  
An initial response by WAFA cited 14 major failings in the document.  These 
included the presentation of biased options that would result in ongoing 
destruction of high conservation value forests, exaggerated employment and 
economic costs of forest protection, misleading statistics, proposals to log areas 
of forest in national parks, failure to consider industry restructuring and a 
disregard for the ability of plantation forestry to meet the state’s timber needs.
80 
Jim Frith of Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest said the paper was 
deliberately vague about which areas of forest would be logged and believed this 
was a deliberate ploy to conceal what was really happening.
81 
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Map 8.2.  Regional Forest Agreement boundary.  Source: Towards a Regional 
Forest Agreement for the South-West Forest Region of Western Australia, Joint 
RFA Steering Committee, 1998, p.57. 
 
Employing a strategy that the protest movement had used consistently since the 
mid-1970s, WAFA decided to counter the RFA consultation document with its 
own plans for a forest conservation reserve system and sustainable timber 
production industry.   A four-page spreadsheet released at the time of the RFA 
paper included proposals for selective logging based on ecological value, an 
efficient plantation industry, promotion of furniture and fine woodcraft 
industries, and the development of eco-tourism.  WAFA argued that the 
proposals would see 60% of state forest remaining available for sustainable 
logging, with the balance added to the reserve system.
82  
 
The increasing public debate over forest protection generated by the RFA 
consultation paper and the protest movement’s campaign against the proposals 
attracted the attention of a prominent Western Australian sporting personality 
and provided activists with a powerful strategic opportunity.   In June 1998, 
during a television interview, West Coast Eagles football coach Mick Malthouse 
said that he supported former Eagles player Craig Turley, who had taken an 
active part in the Giblett forest rescue, and that the issue of forest destruction in 
Western Australia was more important to him than his job or friendships with 
politicians.    He considered wood chipping an act of vandalism for quick profits 
and an indictment on the state government and CALM, the name of which he 
saw as representing ‘almost a contradiction in terms’.   Realising the strategic 
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advantage of Malthouse’s comments for the forest campaign, conservationists 
persuaded him to travel to the south-west for media interviews which featured on 
that evening's television news.   A photograph of Malthouse admiring a karri tree 
subsequently appeared on the front page of the West Australian and in a feature 
in the Australian Magazine.
83  (see Figure 8.3.)  
      
Widespread media coverage of Malthouse’s stand intensified the friction 
between timber industry supporters and conservationists.   Premier Richard Court 
defended CALM, advising Malthouse to talk to its staff and gain a better 
understanding of forest management practices.   Environment Minister Cheryl 
Edwardes requested that CALM  provide a full briefing to Malthouse, urging him 
to make a submission to the RFA process.  The National Association of Forest 
Industries said that the football coach was ignorant about forest science and had a 
moral obligation to appreciate the opposite side of the issue.   Many West Coast 
Eagles supporters in the south-west said they would cancel their club 
memberships, with Manjimup timber workers symbolically burning a club flag.
84   
Community division over Malthouse’s sympathy for the forest campaign was 
reflected in letters to the West Australian newspaper.   While some 
correspondents praised his stand as courageous and admirable, others saw his 
comments as unsportsmanlike and ill-informed.
85 
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Figure 8.3.   West Coast Eagles coach Mick Malthouse admiring a karri tree in 
the forest near Northcliffe.   Source: West Australian, 4 June 1998. 
 
Malthouse’s statement resulted in the protest movement implementing a strategy 
of persuading identifiable groups to unite in opposition to the Regional Forest 
Agreement.
86   Patrick Weir and Maggie Burke contacted several prominent 
Western Australians who later met at the home of Dame Rachel Cleland to 
support Mick Malthouse and to launch their own campaign to stop old growth 
forest logging.  Those attending included Olympic gold medallist Shirley de la 
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Hunty, fashion designer Liz Davenport, Subiaco and Fremantle mayors Tony 
Costa and Richard Utting, Murdoch University’s Professor Peter Newman, 
environmental research scientist Dr Graham Chittleborough, and obstetrician Dr 
Harry Cohen.   The group intended to influence public opinion over the RFA 
prior to the deadline date for comments.
87    Shirley de la Hunty believed that the 
involvement of people with high community status was most important for the 
progress of the forest campaign because, without their participation, there was a 
risk of activists being discredited as ‘ratbags’.
88 
      
Dr Bill Castleden, a retired surgeon living in Margaret River, responded to a 
request from the Conservation Council to organise a group of 28 doctors who 
would be willing to identify themselves in the media as being opposed to the 
Regional Forest Agreement.   In a full-page advertisement in the West Australian 
newspaper  the doctors asserted the spiritual and cultural significance of old 
growth forests for human health and voiced their opposition to the ‘senseless 
destruction of this beautiful and irreplaceable community asset.’
89    
      
The advertisement resulted in the formation of Doctors for the Preservation of 
Old Growth Forests with Castleden as co-convenor.  He said the group was 
apolitical with the single objective of saving Western Australia’s old growth 
forests. 
We were trying to tell the government of the day that it had got this 
wrong, it wasn’t listening to what most West Australians wanted, it had 
got it wrong and it needed to put it right...We were trying to represent 
the 80-90% of West Australians who wanted the old growth forest 
preserved, we were just trying to be a voice for them as they weren’t 
having a voice.
90 
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While the doctors’ group was informally organised and did not hold meetings, 
membership escalated from the initial 28 doctors to over 200.    Castleden 
recalled that the group was important not only in providing additional financial 
support for the forests campaign but also in demonstrating to the government that 
some Western Australian professionals were concerned about the need to 
preserve the remaining areas of old growth forests.
91   Identifiable groups 
became a prominent feature of the forests campaign, and included Men and 
Women in Suits, Lawyers for Forests and Sporting Elites. 
      
The involvement of sporting personalities, prominent community figures and 
professionals in the forest campaign provided a boost for the protest movement.   
Andre Malan, a well-known journalist for the West Australian, observed that a 
growing number of influential people like Malthouse were questioning how the 
state’s heritage forests were being managed and that it had now become not only 
acceptable but even respectable to be ‘green’.   The forest protest movement had 
gathered momentum and began to look unstoppable.
92   Beth Schultz recalled 
that the support of Mick Malthouse, who was seen by many at the time as a ‘folk 
hero’ in Western Australia, marked a turning-point in the campaign.
93 
       
By the close of 1998 the forest protest movement's inclusive strategies aimed at 
encouraging broad participation in protest action were beginning to have an 
effect on the course of the forest campaign.      David Mackenzie grew up in 
Sydney and came to Western Australia in 1992.   Soon after his arrival he 
decided to resign from his job with a resources company and become a full-time 
volunteer with the Wilderness Society.  In 1998 he became the Society's state co-
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ordinator.  Mackenzie ascribed his passion to protect the state's forests as arising 
from a desire to change an outdated culture of corporate greed that he believed to 
be responsible for forest destruction.  He considered the involvement of public 
figures to have been crucial in helping to make the forests debate a socially 
acceptable subject for discussion and emphasised the protest movement's success 
in expanding the forests campaign by helping people express their own form of 
protest.   
It seemed that as we held more rallies, as we had more public 
spokespeople such as Mick Malthouse, as we had the EPA come out and 
give very black and white views on what the future of our forests was 
going to be under the logging intended by the Premier, Richard Court, 
the more we won over the middle ground, the more I think we started to 
occupy the mainstream...there were a lot of people in the mainstream 
who wanted to help out but they didn’t have an avenue, they didn’t feel 
comfortable going down to the forest strapping onto a dozer...people 
shouldn’t need to step outside their comfort zone to express their 
support for old growth forests, and so what we did was create comfort 
zones which were right for certain demographics.
94 
 
Research into the various influences that persuaded the Perth public to support 
the forests campaign found: 
...that creating a range of different supporter groups from different 
stratums of society, maintaining their separation from conservation 
groups through distinct ‘branding’ and enlisting the support of high 
profile personalities from different walks of life constitutes a significant 
element in a successful campaign strategy.
95 
       
During late-1998 the forest protest movement directed its strategies at convincing 
Western Australians to reject the Regional Forest Agreement.   A series of full-
page newspaper advertisements contained comparison photographs of old growth 
forest and areas that had been clear-felled, arguing that the proposed arrangement 
would allow unsustainable logging practices to continue for a further 20 years.  
Members of the public were urged to write to politicians and ‘stand up and be 
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counted’ at a rally for old growth forests at Perth Concert Hall’s riverside 
forecourt.
96     
 
The July rally, attended by an estimated 10,000 people, was addressed by 
Professor Harry Recher, an eco-management lecturer from Edith Cowan 
University, who told the gathering that most scientists in Australia opposed old 
growth logging but were employed by government, and were afraid to speak out.   
He said the RFA was not scientifically based because governments had no 
information on the effects of logging in old growth forests.   Organisers believed 
the rally’s high attendance showed that the RFA’s function to resolve community 
conflict over forest issues was not working.
97  At the rally, Patrick Weir launched 
a new group, Campaigners for Ancient Forests, which ran bus tours to the forests 
and persuaded well-known personalities such as Sister Veronica Brady to 
become actively involved in the forest campaign.
98 
 
The protest movement received further encouragement from the timely release of 
two state government reports.   Shortly after her election to state parliament, 
Christine Sharp chaired an all-party standing committee inquiry into ecologically 
sustainable management and future use of Western Australia’s state forests.   The 
committee’s terms of reference covered seven separate areas and, in August 
1998, it released its findings on the RFA.  The report was critical of many 
aspects of the process.  It contained 22 recommendations which included 
suggestions that the draft RFA be released for public comment and EPA 
assessment; that in order to avoid any conflict of interest CALM be replaced as 
lead agency in the RFA process; that the state government establish an accord 
  371 
process to enhance public transparency and understanding; that the RFA allow 
timber harvesting levels to reflect sustainable forest management principles; and 
that the process consider the RFA’s impact on other forest-related sectors such as 
tourism, agriculture and the plantation timber industry.
99 
 
Sharp recalled that the committee decided to release the RFA section of its 
inquiry in order to submit its recommendations before the agreement was 
finalised.  She believed that the state government needed to adopt a more 
consensus-based approach towards the RFA, otherwise the process would not 
work, and considered the main problem to have been the conflict between 
increasing public demands to protect the forests for their intrinsic value and 
CALM’s demands to exploit the forests for their commercial value. 
The problem at the end of the day was that there was an agenda for 
CALM, and the agenda for CALM was quite simply to protect existing 
contracts...CALM could not afford to allow a lot of new reservation of 
main belt karri, the lovely tall trees that the public so adored which was 
driving in many ways the public side of the campaign, because if they 
allowed too many of them to be locked up then they wouldn’t be able to 
meet the contracts...that was what the real story was – defending the 
status quo.
100 
 
Conservationists welcomed the committee’s recommendations as a valuable 
contribution towards resolving the forest conflict by expressing community 
concerns about the RFA process.
101   
      
In December 1998 the state Environmental Protection Authority released a report 
in relation to the Regional Forest Agreement comprising a progress report on the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management’s compliance with its forest 
management plans.   The report revealed how CALM had breached or failed to 
comply with several ministerial conditions governing its forest management and 
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logging activities, confirmed extensive over-cutting of jarrah sawlogs, criticised 
its lack of knowledge of sustainable forest practices and identified conflicts of 
interest and administrative anomalies within the department.
102   T h e  f o r e s t  
protest movement regarded the report as further evidence of CALM’s lack of 
accountability and confirmation that its forest management was unsustainable.    
As a result of the findings conservationists called for a judicial inquiry into 
CALM’s organisation and management, a moratorium on logging of high 
conservation value forests and replacement of the RFA process with an accord 
process that would involve all forest interest groups.
103 
      
The perceived mishandling of the RFA public consultation process by the Court 
Liberal government was exploited by Labor.   Opposition Leader Geoff Gallop 
said the government had failed to involve all the stakeholders in the debate and 
the proposals had not been subjected to peer review, with the result that the RFA 
had become a secretive process that lacked credibility.   He argued that Labor’s 
five-point plan, based on transparency and full stakeholder participation, would 
ensure certainty and sustainability in the management of Western Australia’s 
native forests.   The plan included a moratorium on logging in high-conservation 
value old growth forests, an independent audit of the draft RFA, the introduction 
of an industry development and worker assistance fund, an open inquiry into the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management and a review of timber 
royalties.
104 
      
In April 1999 the protest movement became aware that the signing of the RFA 
was imminent.   Although the state government refused to release the draft RFA 
  373 
for public comment, leaked documents suggested that, while there would be 
almost 150,000 hectares of new reserves, the agreement failed to adequately 
protect a significant proportion of the state’s old growth forests.
105   In an effort 
to challenge the government’s apparent disregard for public opinion and to 
protect significant areas of old growth forest Greens MLC Dr Christine Sharp 
introduced a Private Members Bill to require that the RFA was presented to the 
parliament for approval.   If her proposed High Conservation Value Forest 
Protection Bill was passed a temporary moratorium would be placed on 
identifiable areas of high conservation value forests.   Sharp said the Bill would 
ensure that the RFA was subjected to the usual processes of parliamentary 
scrutiny and ratification for an issue of ‘extraordinary community concern’ 
which had produced over 30,000 submissions.
106 
      
After successfully passing through the Legislative Council, the debate over the 
Bill in the Legislative Assembly provided valuable insights into changing 
perceptions of forest protest in Western Australia and Labor’s future forest 
policy intentions.   Phillip Pendal, Independent Liberal, South Perth, observed 
that protesters were no longer marginalised people from the ‘fringes’ but 
comprised mainstream Western Australians who found themselves adopting a 
position that a generation ago was regarded as radical because they felt they had 
to take a stand against an agreement the contents of which had been kept secret 
from them.   He believed the change had occurred firstly because the RFA lacked 
transparency, secondly because values and attitudes had changed to the extent 
that people no longer believed it was necessary to log forests excessively and, 
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finally, because people felt they had been betrayed by successive government 
failures to honour commitments to manage the forests sustainably.
107  
      
Geoff Gallop, Leader of the Opposition, said the Labor Party supported the Bill 
because it provided an opportunity to protect Western Australia’s remaining old 
growth forests, offered a degree of accountability to the Regional Forest 
Agreement process and allowed a re-examination of the government’s approach 
to timber industry restructuring and worker assistance.   Most significantly, he 
announced the Labor Party’s commitment to end old growth forest logging and 
asserted that this would be a major issue at the next state election.
108   T h e  
circumstances surrounding the achievement of this key policy decision by the 
Labor Party will be discussed later in this chapter.   
      
The Opposition’s environment spokesperson, Dr Judy Edwards, observed that 
forest protest activity had escalated as a result of the RFA.   She argued that any 
agreement which disregarded the thousands of people who had protested and 
which locked 100,000 hectares of forest into a 20-year logging programme 
deserved to be scrutinised by parliament.
109   Alan Carpenter, ALP, Willagee, 
prophesied that if parliament ignored public demands to save the forests, this 
failure would have an impact on the government at the next election.   Following 
an intense and prolonged debate the Bill was lost on party lines.
110 
 
Christine Sharp believes that, although her proposed Bill did not succeed, the 
debate in the Legislative Assembly in front of a packed public gallery was 
important in demonstrating to the government the high level of community 
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interest in the forest debate.   She considered the decision of Bob Wiese, a 
National Party member, to ‘cross the floor’ and vote with the Opposition to 
support the Bill, to have been politically significant in showing that the debate 
had raised the level of consciousness of some members of the government and 
that there was some disunity over the forests issue within the coalition.
111 
      
On 4 May 1999, Premier Court announced that the Western Australian and 
federal governments had signed a Regional Forest Agreement for the 
management of the state’s south-west forests as part of a national plan for 
‘balance, certainty and sustainability in forest management’.    The agreement 
would conserve an additional 45,700 hectares of old growth forest, with more 
than two-thirds protected in reserves.   Premier Court said that, while the debate 
over the RFA had been difficult, the government had sought a balanced outcome 
that would protect the future interests of all Western Australians.
112   In response, 
Leader of the Opposition Geoff Gallop said that the signed agreement was a 
tragedy for Western Australia and that the government had produced a recipe for 
continuing conflict over the future of the state’s old growth forests.   He alleged 
the agreement was the result of a secret deal within the coalition that left 102,000 
hectares of old growth forest available for logging and ignored the future 
interests of timber workers.
113 
      
The Regional Forest Agreement’s release attracted condemnation from the forest 
protest movement.   Conservation Council vice-president Beth Schultz said the 
agreement was a sell-out to the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management and the wood chip industry, and that the only certain outcome was 
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an escalating campaign to protect Western Australia’s precious old growth 
forest.
114    Peter Robertson of WAFA said that, while the RFA had ostensibly 
set aside large areas of forest, these were areas of woodland that the timber 
industry did not want, and the best stands of tall forest, including 90% of the 
production karri forest, had been handed over for clear felling and wood 
chipping.    Wilderness Society spokesperson David Mackenzie saw the RFA as 
a ‘calculated slap in the face’ for Western Australians and particularly south-west 
communities who depended on the forests as a tourist attraction.
115 
      
The Australian Workers’ Union, on the other hand, regarded the RFA outcome as 
a significant victory for the state’s conservationists, with an additional 150,000 
hectares of forests placed in reserves and no longer available for logging.    It 
claimed that the reduction in resources through ‘unreasonable demands by 
greenies’ would result in job losses and uncertainty, and criticised 
conservationists for remaining outside the RFA consultation process.
116   The 
Manjimup Chamber of Commerce and local council argued that the RFA offered 
a chance to unite timber communities by providing economic security and 
stability after a period of disruption.
117 
      
Immediately following the RFA’s signing the state government and the forest 
protest movement campaigned to support their respective arguments.  Full-page 
advertisements in the West Australian newspaper  by the federal and state 
governments attempted to convince the public that the RFA had managed to 
strike a balance between the demands of the tourism and forest industries by 
providing 12 new national parks and a $41.5 million industry development 
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package.
118   Environment Minister Cheryl Edwardes said the creation of new 
conservation reserve areas reflected the concerns of community interest groups 
and assured people that the RFA would protect the livelihoods of forest workers 
while at the same time conserving the natural environment for future 
generations.
119 
      
A full-page advertisement by the Conservation Council, WAFA and the 
Wilderness Society, also in the West Australian, displayed a large photograph of 
a clear-felled karri forest to emphasise the fact that 90% of Western Australia’s 
original old growth forest had already been destroyed and that, under the 20-year 
RFA, one-third of the remainder would be lost forever.   The advertisement listed 
six areas of high conservation value forest which were scheduled for destruction 
and urged people to contribute financially towards the forest campaign and to 
attend a public action meeting at the end of May.
120   In its quarterly publication, 
the Forest Times, WAFA contrasted the 'community’s vision' for the protection 
of all Western Australia’s old growth forests through the establishment of a 
sustainable timber industry based on plantations and regrowth with the 20-year 
RFA that gave the Department of Conservation and Land Management and the 
timber companies time to log all the remaining old growth forest for export wood 
chips, charcoal and sawn timber.
121  
 
A “Reclaim Our Forests” rally at the Perth Entertainment Centre was attended by 
an estimated crowd of 5,000 people who heard speeches from politicians, 
environmentalists and public figures who voiced their opposition to the RFA and 
support for the forests campaign.  Speakers included Opposition Leader Geoff 
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Gallop, Australian Democrats MLC Norm Kelly, Independent MLA Dr Liz 
Constable, Greens (WA) MLC Dr Christine Sharp, Dame Rachel Cleland and 
West Coast Eagles coach Mick Malthouse.    Professor Harry Recher from Edith 
Cowan University said the Regional Forest Agreement had failed to achieve its 
objective of producing a ‘comprehensive, adequate and representative reserve 
system’ and was simply a political exercise designed to guarantee resource 
security for the timber industry.
122    State Environment Minister Cheryl 
Edwardes later admitted that over one-third of the one million hectares of 
reserves classified under the RFA were not forested areas and comprised other 
vegetation such as swamps, sand dunes and cleared land.
123 
      
It was at this time that the forest campaign received valuable support from some 
new members of a broadening forest protest movement.   Dr Keith Woollard, a 
Perth cardiologist and ex-president of the Australian Medical Association, 
recalled that several of his friends and colleagues who were Liberal supporters 
had become frustrated at their failure to persuade the federal and state 
governments to adopt a more environmentally responsible approach to Western 
Australia’s old growth forests.   As a result, the Liberals for Forests group was 
formed with the objective of persuading the Liberal Party to formulate an old 
growth forests policy which would improve its chances for re-election.
124   
Woollard recalled that the group comprised mainly disenchanted Liberal 
supporters with an initial membership of around 3,000.   He also recalled that the 
group succeeded in providing Liberals with an avenue through which to register 
their opposition to the Court government’s forest policies and in demonstrating 
that people could be Liberal and also protect the environment.   Although 
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Liberals for Forests was self-funding and held only one revenue-raising event, 
Woollard said the media publicity for the forests generated from the group’s 
name was invaluable.
125   
      
While Premier Court initially remained unimpressed with the new group and 
urged Liberal supporters to work for change from within the party,
126 an editorial 
in the West Australian newspaper suggested that the potential electoral damage 
of Liberals for Forests might have proved the decisive factor in the government’s 
decision to accord such a high priority to a reassessment of the RFA.  The 
editorial also observed that the state government had become ‘trapped between 
its own political and contractual pressures and what have become increasingly 
non-negotiable demands by even moderate conservationists’, and warned that the 
Premier’s attempt at appeasement would fail to restore the mainstream coalition 
support that had been jeopardised by the RFA process.
127   The West Australian 
editorial provides further evidence of a more sympathetic approach adopted by 
the news media towards the forest protest movement which had become apparent 
during the 1997 Giblett Forest Rescue.   This contrasts with the oppositional 
stance taken by Perth newspapers in the late 1970s as observed by Beth Schultz 
in chapter four of this thesis. 
      
By mid-July 1999 opposition to the RFA could not be ignored and the state 
government decided to re-examine the terms of the agreement.   At the end of the 
month Premier Court announced a revised forest plan which would phase out 
logging in old growth karri and tingle forests by 2003 with the loss of an 
estimated 1,500 jobs. Additionally, the government planned to spend millions of 
  380 
dollars buying back timber contracts in order to meet its reduced logging 
target.
128   
      
The decision served only to worsen the government’s position.   Prime Minister 
Howard expressed anger over plans to drastically reduce karri logging from 
175,000 cubic metres to 50,000 cubic metres a year by 2003 while federal 
Forestry Minister Wilson Tuckey criticised the state government for reneging on 
the RFA’s commitment to provide 20 years’ resource security for the timber 
industry.   The Forest Industries Federation considered the job losses a ‘disgrace’ 
and believed the RFA amendment would result in further confrontation.   Trish 
Townsend from the Forest Protection Society accused the Premier of capitulating 
because of a fear campaign among city electors orchestrated by sports stars, 
doctors and lawyers.
129    Conservationists vowed to continue the fight to bring 
about an immediate end to all old growth forest logging.          
      
In September 1999 the state government further attempted to placate public 
criticism of its forest policies and management practices by announcing that 
work would start immediately on the re-organisation of the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management.
130    Introducing the Conservation and 
Land Management Amendment Bill into state parliament, Minister Edwardes said 
the government had heeded community concerns at the perceived conflict of 
interest between CALM’s conservation and commercial activities, and was 
determined to introduce a new forest management regime into Western Australia.   
The Bill proposed the establishment of a Conservation Commission to be the 
advisory and policy development body responsible for monitoring and auditing 
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the management practices of a revamped Department of Conservation and a 
newly established Forest Products Commission.   A separate Forest Products Bill 
would effectively separate commercial forest management responsibilities from 
conservation objectives.
131   
       
The RFA process had provided the catalyst for an intensification of forest protest 
activity in the late-1990s.   As Jean Hillier observed, while the RFA was a 
debacle that provoked an assault on the state government’s legitimacy and 
transformed the forest from 'an entity of nature' into ‘a compromised product of 
society, shaped by power, coercion and resistance’, the process had the positive 
effect of stimulating a challenge to the extent of the government's domination 
and control over the forests.
132   By using strategies designed to increase public 
support and participation in forest protest, such as professional critiques, media 
advertisements and public rallies, and particularly through the exploitation of 
prominent personalities and identifiable groups, the protest movement succeeded 
in undermining the credibility of the RFA and the Department of Conservation 
and Land Management.   Beth Schultz recalled the decision of conservationists to 
remain outside the RFA consultation process as a successful strategy that left 
them free to attack the proposed agreement and expose its lies and dishonesty.
133  
Wilderness Society co-ordinator David Mackenzie saw the RFA as exerting a 
positive influence on protest activity by creating a deadline for action, thus 
increasing the momentum of the forest campaign.  He judged the involvement of 
public personalities to be significant through demonstrating that the message to 
save the forests had broadened and was coming from a different direction.
134 
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“It’s the Old Growth, Stupid!” 
In early 1998 the forest protest movement decided on a strategic initiative that 
defined the final stage of the forest campaign.   The Conservation Council, the 
WAFA and the Wilderness Society held a meeting with communications advisor 
Guy Grant who suggested that the campaign should coalesce around the single 
message of saving old growth forests.
135   Grant based his suggestion on an idea 
that had been used by United States' President Bill Clinton, who had employed 
reminder signs displaying the message “It’s the economy, stupid” to maintain his 
focus on a central presidential election issue.    Accordingly, Grant produced 
some display signs for the forest protest movement saying, “It’s the old growth, 
stupid”.
136    The idea was to evoke a powerful sub-conscious imagery such as 
‘fantastic old trees, bark falling off the trunks, curtains of moss, cool wind 
blowing in your face’.   Most importantly, activists believed that saving all old 
growth forests was an achievable common goal that all the groups could work 
towards.
137  
 
In a 1997 study, Richard Lamb and Colleen Morris recognised the potential for a 
richer interpretation of the worth of forests through a greater appreciation of their 
cultural value to communities.  Lamb and Morris conducted qualitative research 
to determine the ‘identifiable values’ of old growth forests, including 
comparisons between forest management and community views on the spiritual, 
aesthetic and symbolic value of forests.   They concluded that the concept of ‘old 
growth forest’ was a cultural construct that derived from a variety of community 
interpretations and beliefs, some based on subjective experience, and they argued 
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for a greater consideration of social values when identifying areas of forest for 
reservation.
138 
 
The strategic decision to focus on old growth forests resulted in a conflict 
between conservationists and the state government over the interpretation of 
what constituted 'old growth forest'.     The Conservation Council accepted the 
1992 National Forest Policy Statement’s definition of old growth forest as: 
...forest that is ecologically mature and has been subjected to negligible 
unnatural disturbance such as logging, roading and clearing.   The 
definition focuses on forest in which the upper stratum or overstorey is 
in the late mature to overmature growth phases.
139 
 
In April 1999, the WA Forest Alliance alleged that the state government and its 
agencies had falsely claimed that almost 60% of Western Australia’s old growth 
forests were protected in reserves by applying a narrow definition of  ‘old growth 
forest’ which minimised the area of forest to be protected.
140 
 
Wattle Block Protest 
The campaign to save Western Australia’s old growth forests led to an expansion 
of direct action strategies and an escalation of forest and city-based protest.   
Violent confrontations between activists, government authorities and timber 
workers at Wattle forest near Walpole provide some insights into the stark 
realities of grass roots forest activism and the motivations of those who 
participated in old growth forest rescue actions.    The events also demonstrated 
how the state government's procrastination over the future management of 
Western Australia’s south-west forests created an atmosphere of frustration and a 
climate for confrontation. 
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Wattle block comprised 3,000 hectares of old growth karri forest which formed a 
natural link between the Shannon and Mount Frankland National Parks.   The 
area was interim heritage-listed and had been identified in the Regional Forest 
Agreement process as potentially in need of permanent protection.   When the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management began logging the forest in 
late 1998, forest activists established a camp on the South-West Highway from 
which they mounted protest operations in an attempt to save 70 hectares of forest 
from destruction and thus preserve the ecological integrity of the wildlife 
corridor.    In order to do so, protesters intended to disrupt and delay logging 
operations while at the same time generating maximum publicity for the fight to 
save old growth forests.    
      
In addition to occupying tree platforms and hiding in the bush to hinder 
authorities, activists also employed more confrontational strategies designed to 
both demonstrate their determination and maximise media attention.    The 
construction of “dragon cars” or “dragon flies” to block access roads involved 
burying old motor vehicles and machinery parts in a metre-deep hole which was 
then covered in concrete.   A cylinder was set in the centre to allow a protester to 
insert an arm and “lock-on” by means of a dog collar attached to the wrist.
141  
 
In November 1998, a Sunday Times front page article further demonstrated the 
Perth print media's growing sympathy for the forest protest cause.  A large 
picture of a young male activist chained to a tube set in concrete at Wattle block 
depicted 'the face of a war being waged in the South-West forests'.   The article 
described how 'Rare and endangered red-tail black cockatoos screamed 
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mournfully overhead, adding to the protest over the clear-felling of this ancient 
forest.'
142 (see Figure 8.4.) Many activists risked serious injury by locking 
themselves to machinery.   Leigh Maddock from Fremantle, spent ‘six 
uncomfortable hours’ locked onto a bulldozer with thumbcuffs until workers 
released her by removing a section of  panelling.   She said she carried out the 
action because she wanted to preserve Wattle forest’s magnificent karri trees as 
part of an integrated forest reserve system and was angry that CALM had 
ignored recommendations to conserve the area.     Maddock said that, as well as 
taking physical risks, protesters were making personal sacrifices, such as 
incurring debts to pay fines, in order to save the forests.
143  
 
University student Lauren Caulfield said she became involved as a WAFA 
activist in the Wattle block campaign shortly after leaving school because of her 
interest in issues of environmental and social justice.   She recalled that it had 
been a deliberate decision to establish the Wattle camp next to the main highway 
because clear-felling operations were taking place nearby and tourists could stop 
and see what was happening.   While the protesters were drawn from a broad 
range of backgrounds and age groups, Caulfield said many of them were young 
people because living in the bush demanded a reasonable level of fitness.    She 
said activists decided to employ a wide range of direct action tactics such as tree-
sits, road blocks, sit-ins, tripods and machinery lock-ons because this made it 
more difficult for authorities to predict protesters’ intentions.
144 
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Figure 8.4.   Wattle block protest.   Source: Sunday Times, 29 November 1998.          
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Caulfield said the Wattle protest was typical of several similar actions in the 
south-west forests during the late-1990s and that each day’s activities were 
planned during a ‘circle’ meeting each evening.    The sessions were designed to 
provide individual empowerment, to avoid hierarchies and to resolve conflicts.   
She recalled that meetings would usually commence with a debriefing of the 
current day’s events followed by brainstorming to formulate strategies and 
discuss the most appropriate tactics for the following day.   Once a consensus 
had been reached, activists would spend the night preparing for the various 
actions.   This might involve digging holes for car bodies, preparing for a tree-sit 
or erecting a tripod.
145    
 
By the time timber workers arrived to commence logging on the following day 
each activist had been designated a specific role, such as police, industry or 
media liaison.  Those participating in direct action were paired with ‘buddies’ to 
ensure safety and mutual support.   After activists informed industry staff of the 
day’s actions, local police would usually be called upon to respond after 
conferring with timber workers and protesters.   Caulfield observed that, by the 
end of 2000, police had formed a dedicated forest task force which included a 
special equipment trailer designed to counter forest actions.   Activists taking 
part in the protests were normally arrested and charged with offences, such as 
hindering a lawful activity or trespass.   She said protesters were willing to be 
arrested because the action represented a challenge to the injustice of the state 
government’s and legal system’s approval of a timber industry which did not 
have public support. 
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While acknowledging that the maintenance of daily direct action protests was 
repetitive and demanding, Caulfield believed the actions were successful in the 
short term by temporarily stopping forest logging and, in a broader context, by 
providing dramatic media exposure and increasing public interest.   Summarising 
the significance of the south-west forest rescues for the forest protest movement 
she concluded: 
I think that the blockade camps and direct actions, individual direct 
actions, in the south-west provided a really important heart and soul of 
the campaign for many people.   I think that they also provided a really 
important source of inspiration.
146 
 
By December 1998 over 50 people had been arrested at Wattle block as direct 
action protests intensified.
147    In January 1999 timber workers arrived for work 
after a three-week Christmas break to find activists on access roads chained to 
concrete blocks and car bodies, and others suspended from tripods.   Logging 
machinery could not be used while police attempted to remove and arrest the 
protesters.   An offer from Department of Conservation and Land Management 
workers to temporarily cease logging activities if the protesters moved was 
rejected by activists who repeated their demands for a moratorium on all old 
growth forest logging.
148  
 
Six months of mounting tension came to a head in August 1999 when the Wattle 
protest camp was attacked by 40 pro-loggers, some wearing balaclavas and 
carrying baseball bats, axes and sledgehammers.   The group set fire to a caravan, 
threatened protesters and trashed the area.   A Sunday Times photographer was 
led away by the attackers and had his film destroyed.
149 (see Figure 8.5.)     
Timber worker Robert Martyn, who took part in the Wattle camp attack, 
explained what motivated the violent action against the protesters. 
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Frustration had really got to breaking point and it was a 
statement...when you go for weeks on end – they’re stopping trucks 
from coming in, they’re stopping trucks from going out, they’re in the 
bush where you’re supposed to be working and so you can’t work – it 
was company policy that we were not allowed to touch them so 
frustration got the better of us...they pissed us off so we thought it was 
about time we pissed them off.
150 
 
Seven Manjimup people were eventually charged with riotous behaviour over the 
attack, while a further two residents were charged with criminal damage by fire 
and riotous behaviour relating to both the camp incident and a petrol bomb attack 
on a Northcliffe craft shop owned by a local conservationist.   Angry timber 
workers demonstrated outside Manjimup police station, claiming that police had 
targeted local people who had ‘cracked after years of pressure’ while ignoring 
protesters who camped illegally in the forests.   A “Double Standards 
Community Fund” was set up to raise money for legal fees.
151      
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Figure 8.5.  Forest protesters Louise Morris, Emma Belfield and Lauren 
Caulfield survey the damage to their camp at Wattle forest block near Manjimup. 
Source:  West Australian, 23 August 1999. 
 
Attempts to apportion blame for the incident soon followed.  State Environment 
Minister Cheryl Edwardes accused federal Forestry Minister Wilson Tuckey of 
inflaming timber workers by warning that anarchy would result if the protesters 
were not removed.   Conservationists also blamed Warren-Blackwood MLA Paul 
Omodei, who had warned protesters that, if violence occurred, they would have 
only themselves to blame.    Wilderness Society co-ordinator David Mackenzie 
and Wattle camp activist Emma Belfield alleged that local police were made 
aware of an imminent attack but failed to act.   Manjimup shire president Keith 
Liddelow said most of the local timber community knew about the planned 
attack on the camp and were keen to participate while Trish Townsend of the 
pro-logging Forest Protection Society confirmed that the attacks had involved 
loggers and local people in an action designed to present ‘a united front against 
the greenies’.
152   The West Australian considered that the violence had occurred 
partly as a result of the state government’s inability to amicably resolve the forest 
conflict and believed that, if it was shown that timber workers had carried out the 
attack, they would have damaged their own cause rather than that of the 
protesters.
153 
      
Although the destruction of the Wattle forest camp was not the only act of 
violence against protesters,
154 the incident was important in generating more 
media exposure and support for the forest protest movement.  Christine Sharp 
saw the attack as one of the most significant events of the late-1990s in swinging 
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public sympathy in favour of the forest blockade camps.
155   Bill Castleden from 
the Doctors for the Preservation of Old Growth Forests group regarded the 
timber workers as ‘pawns’ in the hands of the state government and the timber 
industry.
156   Conservationists viewed the assault on Wattle block as part of a 
broader campaign to silence debate about the forests by those who purported to 
represent the interests of timber workers and their families but really sought to 
preserve the status quo through ‘churning out misinformation, creating a climate 
of fear, polarizing communities and demonising “greenies”’.
157 
 
Action in the Cities 
Coincidental to the actions in the south-west forests, the forest protest movement 
intensified the old growth forests campaign in urban centres by organising a 
number of rallies and staged events to maintain public attention and educate city 
people about what was happening in the forests.  Parliament House became a 
popular venue for demonstrations as the protest movement increased pressure on 
politicians to end logging of old growth forests.  In early 1998 WAFA and the 
Great Walk Network announced a week long “Big Forest Party” outside 
parliament to protest against further clear-felling.  Members of the public were 
invited to visit or camp at the site to express their support and lobby 
parliamentarians.    Activities included speeches, petitions, readings, music, 
barbeques and slumber parties, with a march and rally at Supreme Court Gardens 
on the final day.
158    
      
Later in the same year the Wilderness Society declared Parliament House a 
Temporary Control Area, thus ‘banning’ parliamentarians from entering or 
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risking a $2,000 fine.   The action was designed to replicate the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management’s attempt to enforce a Temporary Control 
Area on Lane and Wattle forests by arresting and fining forest rescuers fighting 
to save old growth forests.  The Parliament House action was ‘enforced’ by a 
broad range of Western Australians as a demonstration of the strong public 
reaction against old growth forest logging.  Wilderness Society co-ordinator 
David Mackenzie said barring politicians from parliament was no more 
ridiculous than excluding Western Australian people from their own forests.
159    
 
A rally at Parliament House in March 1999 reflected mounting opposition to old 
growth forest logging among influential Western Australians.  The gathering of 
an estimated 5,000 environmentalists, doctors, business people and council 
leaders presented a seven-point conservation plan to Environment Minister 
Cheryl Edwardes.   The proposal included an immediate moratorium on logging 
of high conservation value forests and compensation payments for workers 
affected by cancelled timber contracts.   Retired surgeon Malcolm Hay said he 
believed public servants were afraid to speak out for fear of losing their jobs and 
that he was prepared to go to prison if necessary to stop logging in old growth 
forests.
160    
      
One year later the Parliament House protests were continuing, with around 2,000 
people demanding a halt to old growth logging.   Surgeon John Hanrahan, who 
addressed the crowd, believed the broad spectrum of people attending the rally 
reflected the massive change in community attitudes that the state government 
could not afford to ignore.   WAFA convenor Peter Robertson said that, unless 
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the Court Government did the right thing and imposed a moratorium on old 
growth forest logging and restructured the timber industry, Western Australians 
would make the forests an issue at the following year’s state election.
161 
      
In addition to protests at Parliament House the forest protest movement staged a 
number of attention-grabbing publicity stunts that were designed to maintain 
public focus on the continuing destruction of Western Australia’s old growth 
forests.   WAFA carried out a dawn raid on Forrest Place in the centre of Perth 
and erected a five-tonne karri stump from Giblett forest.   Three activists locked 
themselves to a metal rod in the stump, releasing themselves only for meal and 
toilet breaks.   Via Stidwell from the Friends of Giblett group commented that, 
while conservationists could not afford to mount an expensive advertising 
campaign like the Forest Industries Federation, the visual effect of a karri tree 
stump in the city was an effective way of educating people and gauging public 
opinion about forest issues.
162        
 
During 1998 Christmas festivities Wilderness Society supporter Rowan Logie 
carried out a “Santa Claus” protest from a tree in Kings Park with the message 
that Santa’s best present to the people of Perth would be a moratorium on 
logging the south-west’s old growth forests.
163   Forest activist Michael Quinn 
climbed to the top of Barracks Street Arch.   After unfurling a large banner 
displaying the message “If the RFA stands the karri will fall” he moved the Arch 
flags to half-mast and waved at motorists.
164   A group of nine protesters paraded 
naked through Perth city centre with the slogan “Stop stripping our old growth 
forests” painted on their backs and bottoms and on a banner carried in front of 
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them.
165 (see Figure 8.6.)   A similar protest was staged in Bunbury during a 
meeting of state cabinet when three members of the group No Unnecessary 
Destruction of the Environment (NUDE) stripped off to remind politicians that 
the south-west was being stripped of its old growth forests.
166   
 
Figure 8.6.   Forest protesters in Perth's Plaza Arcade.   Source: West Australian, 
11 December 1999.  
 
Public opinion polls during the late-1990s demonstrated mounting public support 
for forest protection.   A June 1998 survey revealed 87% of Western Australians 
disapproved of clear-felling the state’s old growth forests.
167   A further survey in 
September 1999 commissioned by the Conservation Council showed that the 
figure for those opposing old growth forest clear-felling had risen to 91%, those 
disapproving of old growth forest wood chipping from 83% to 92% and those 
against logging old growth forests from 74% to 82%.
168 
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The organisation of both forest and city-based campaigns received a boost in 
early 1999 with the opening of the Lorax forest rescue centre in Fremantle.     
Founded by a group of four women activists committed to preserving Western 
Australia’s old growth forests, the centre aimed at providing information and 
more opportunities for people to become actively involved in the forest 
campaign.   Activities included weekly workshops on forest issues, blockade 
strategies and individual protest options, with more ‘hands on’ activities such as 
painting banners, printing T-shirts and collecting donations.
169  The Conservation 
Council declared its support for the Lorax centre, viewing it as an ‘inspired 
initiative’ that offered young people a worthwhile cause on which to concentrate 
their energies and thus make a valuable contribution to society.
170    
      
Lauren Caulfield, who was involved in the organisation of the centre, recalled 
that the Lorax was born out of the 1998 forest blockades and from the need for a 
central liaison point between the city-based and the south-west campaigns.       
From its initial function as a blockade co-ordination centre, Caulfield said the 
Lorax expanded its activities into areas such as legal support, rally organisation, 
forest bus tours and public education.   She believes the Lorax was important in 
offering a welcoming contact point which encouraged people to seek more 
information about the old growth forest campaign and provided a working 
environment for grass roots forest activists.
171  
 
A “Fremantle Forests Rally” in September 1999 organised by the Lorax attracted 
an estimated crowd of 7,000 people who marched through the port city’s west 
end to protest against the destruction of old growth forests.    Mayor Richard 
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Utting placed the issue in a local context, comparing forest logging to destroying 
Fremantle’s heritage for the sake of providing jobs for bulldozer drivers.    Emma 
Belfield from the Lorax centre, who had been present at the Wattle block attack, 
was lauded as ‘one of the brave ones on the front line’.
172    In 2001 the Lorax 
group won the citizenship category of the Western Australia Youth Awards for 
its initiative in addressing the old growth forests as a community issue.
173 
      
The air of excitement and jubilation at the Fremantle rally reflected the mood of 
optimism that gradually spread throughout the forest protest movement as a 
result of the successful anti-RFA and old growth forest campaigns during the 
late-1990s.  This situation had occurred largely as the result of two crucial 
strategic decisions.  First, by choosing to remain outside the RFA consultation 
process the movement remained free of government manipulation and was able 
to set its own agenda.   Second, the decision to focus on the single message of 
saving old growth forests attracted the support of a majority of Western 
Australians.  These factors combined to produce a diverse campaign that 
intensified and expanded pressure on the government to adopt a fresh approach 
to the conservation and management of the state’s native forests.   As Christine 
Sharp observed:  ‘There were that many fires starting that it was difficult for the 
government to hose them all down’.
174   Unfortunately for its own survival the 
state government’s attempts to strike a balance between its commitments to the 
timber industry and the demands of an increasingly vocal conservation lobby 
proved to be all too late. 
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Fallen Trees, Fallen Government 
In May 1999, at Western Australia’s ALP conference, Opposition Leader Geoff 
Gallop won endorsement for a policy to end logging in all old growth forests 
when existing contracts expired in 2003.    Gallop said the new policy provided 
voters with a clear choice between the two major parties at the forthcoming 
election.   Federal Opposition Leader Kim Beazley said the state Opposition 
Leader had staked his leadership on the forest issue and had won the critical vote 
convincingly.
175   Bill Castleden of Doctors for the Preservation of Old Growth 
Forests recalled that forest protest groups had been lobbying the ALP and the 
unions in an attempt to persuade them to protect the state’s remaining old growth 
forests. 
It was important that the union movement told Gallop they weren’t 
going to cause havoc if Labor changed its policy...Gallop and his 
advisors understood clearly that the public wanted the forests protected, 
that it would be a good political move in the run-up to the election...they 
didn’t dare if the unions were going to kick up.
176 
 
The unions were finally persuaded to support a phase-out of old growth forest 
logging. 
      
Tim Daly was secretary of the Western Australian branch of the Australian 
Workers Union at the time.   He explained that the union agreement with the 
ALP Opposition to cease logging in old growth forests was reached after two 
centre faction unions, the Transport Workers Union and the Construction, 
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, combined with the influential left faction 
unions to achieve the required numbers.  Reflecting on the reasons for the 
decision Daly considered that, while some left faction unions had a philosophical 
opposition to old growth forest logging, it was the desperation of Western 
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Australian unions to remove the Court Liberal Government which supplied the 
real impetus to support the policy.   He said the issue provided the public with a 
distinction between the two major parties and Opposition Leader Geoff Gallop 
managed to convince the unions that the proposal to stop old growth forest 
logging would attract votes.
177 
      
During 2000 the forest protest movement co-ordinated election strategies which 
sought to isolate the Liberal Party as the only party unwilling to promise 
protection for old growth forests.
178    In November the Conservation Council, 
the South-West Forests Defence Foundation, the WAFA and the Wilderness 
Society launched “A Vote for the Forests” campaign in marginal electorates such 
as Darling Range, Joondalup and Alfred Cove with the objective of persuading 
voters to support parties prepared to halt old growth forest logging.
179  A four-
page colour brochure showed dramatic pictures of lush old growth karri forest at 
Boorara and the same area after it had been destroyed by clear-felling operations.   
The publication stated that, of seven political groups, only the Liberal Party 
supported a continuation of old growth forest logging and that the election result 
would decide the fate of the south-west forests. The ALP had by then committed 
itself to immediately reserving 340,500 hectares, or nearly 99%, of old growth 
forests and to create 30 new national parks and two new conservation parks.  
Electors were urged to lobby political candidates to ascertain their position on 
old growth forest protection and to make donations to a “Save the Forest 
Fund”.
180   The South Coast Environment Group, based in Walpole, developed a 
visionary 'Walpole Wilderness' protection proposal.   Led by Donna Selby and 
Rob Versluis, the group persuaded the ALP to adopt this as part of its policy to 
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protect Western Australia's old growth forests which it took to the 2001 state 
election.
181 
 
Although the Liberals for Forests group was not founded with the intention of 
forming a political party, when it became apparent that the Court Government 
would not change its policy and continued to refuse to protect all old growth 
forests, the group decided to field candidates at the state election.
182   T h e  
decision met with predictable opposition from the state Liberal Party which 
successfully challenged the group’s right to use the name “Liberals for Forests” 
on voting papers, arguing that it would confuse voters.
183   While the group 
planned to contest several lower house seats, the electorate of Alfred Cove 
offered the best chance of success.  Keith Woollard recalled that, although the 
area was ‘true-blue Liberal’, it was vulnerable to a challenge from an 
independent Liberal because people were unhappy with the Court government’s 
forest policy and the local member, Fair Trading Minister Doug Shave, was 
unpopular.
184   In June 2000 Woollard’s wife Janet, a former Australian Nursing 
Federation president, nominated to contest the Alfred Cove seat as an 
independent.
185   When her chances of victory received a boost following the 
ALP candidate’s withdrawal, Janet Woollard stated that, unless Premier Court 
ended old growth forest logging, he would not have her support to form a 
minority government.
186 
      
The Liberal government’s intransigence over its old growth forest logging policy 
also prompted the Doctors for the Preservation of Old Growth Forests group to 
canvas its members about their willingness to become involved in the election 
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campaign in order to protect the forests.   Out of a membership of over 200 
doctors 50% said they wanted the group to become actively involved, and this 
resulted in  ‘massive donations’ in response to the survey.
187 
 
In the February 2001 state election the ALP defeated the Court Liberal 
government by a margin of seven seats with the aid of Greens and One Nation 
preferences.   The three Greens Legislative Council members, Christine Sharp, 
Jim Scott and Giz Watson, were re-elected and joined by Robin Chapple and 
former Senator Dee Margetts.   They would hold the balance of power in the 
upper house.   Of the eight seats contested by Liberals for Forests the group 
polled an average 10.6% of the vote with Janet Woollard polling well enough to 
be elected as Independent member for the lower house seat of Alfred Cove.   In 
some constituencies anti-logging parties polled as high as 30%.   The Greens 
(WA) won 8% of the vote – two points higher than at the 1998 Senate 
election.
188   On 1 March 2001, almost three weeks after the election, Western 
Australia’s new Premier, Geoff Gallop, stated that all logging in old growth 
forests had ceased.
189    
tion Premier-elect Geoff 
Ga
 in the course of the campaign, because it was 
 clear defining issue and I think certainly there was a very strong 
support for us on that.
190 
      
The election outcome raised two important questions:  how significant was the 
old growth forest campaign in securing Labor’s victory and what were the 
implications of the election result for the future of the forest protest movement in 
Western Australia?   Immediately following the elec
llop reflected on the reasons for the ALP’s success: 
I’m certainly of the view that our strong position on the old growth 
forest helped enormously
a
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While the ALP victory had been greatly assisted by One Nation’s decision to 
allocate its preferences away from sitting members, Greens MLC Giz Watson 
argued the vote for ‘environmentally progressive parties’ such as the Greens and 
Liberals for Forests was greater than that for One Nation and reflected a growing 
community recognition of environmental issues.
191  
 
Polling place feedback also suggested that the forests had been a prominent topic 
of concern among voters together with coastal planning and salinity.
192    Data 
from the Australian Election Study 2001 showed that, compared to other 
Australian states, higher percentages of Western Australian electors considered 
environmental issues to be extremely important to them when they were deciding 
how to vote.
193   A brief on the Western Australian 2001 election produced by 
the Parliament of Australia Politics and Public Administration Group in March 
2001 concluded that: 
uted in a significant 
way to the demise of the Coalition Government.
194 
      
Christine Sharp, who retained her Greens upper house seat, considered that Geoff 
Gallop’s commitment to end old growth forest logging was an astute evaluation 
of the enormous popular appeal of the forest movement and that it was this 
promise which contributed towards the ALP’s electoral success.
195   Liberals for 
Forests president Keith Woollard recalled that the ‘magic words’ during the 2001 
election were ‘old growth forests’.  He believes the most significant achievement 
of his group was saving Western Australia’s old growth forests by helping to get 
the Labor government elected.
196   In her inaugural speech in state parliament, 
The logging of old growth forests was also an important electoral issue 
that had an impact upon the direction of preferences from the Greens 
and the Liberals for Forests and ultimately contrib
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Janet Woollard reflected on her motivation to stand for election and the group’s 
success: 
I ran for Parliament because Keith, my children and I – like 80 to 90 per 
cent of the population – are opposed to the continued wasteful logging 
of our old-growth forests.   Liberals for Forests was formed to help stop 
the logging.  We thought we could put pressure on the Liberal Party to 
change its policy and, initially, had no intention of running candidates 
for Parliament.   As the state election drew nearer, we were faced with 
the reality that the Liberal Party was not taking us seriously and was 
calling our bluff.  We responded by calling its bluff, and fielded eight 
candidates, none of whom had any previous experience in running for 
Parliament.   The Liberal Party’s lack of vision and lack of 
responsiveness to community wishes on this issue was reflected in an 
overwhelming expression of support for the protection of our forests, 
not just in the seat of Alfred Cove, but also in many other seats.   The 
election was a win for people who care about the environment.
197 
 
While the old growth forest campaign had exerted considerable influence on the 
state election outcome, the election result itself contained broader implications 
for the forest protest movement both locally and nationally.   Amanda Lohrey 
believed the Western Australian election result signified that the environment 
had become a prominent political issue.
198      In the Bulletin, Fred Brenchley 
argued that the old style of bridging the gap between environmentalists and the 
timber industry through deals between government, industry and unions was 
gone and that the Liberals for Forests group had clearly demonstrated an 
emerging need for social inclusiveness on environmental issues.
199   The Sunday 
Age’s Claire Miller interpreted the election results as signifying the emergence of 
a new Australian environment movement that displayed typical social movement 
characteristics within which ‘different elements of Australian society are 
spontaneously self-organising around a set of common aims’.   While Miller 
believed the significance of ‘amorphous’ groups such as Doctors and Liberals for 
Forests was difficult to assess, she identified the fundamental commonalities of a 
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desire for real environmental reform and a belief that the major parties had failed 
to prevent the increasing degradation and exploitation of natural resources.
200 
 
In contrast Judith Ajani has argued that the importance of Labor's policy 
commitment to halt old growth forest logging as a factor in securing the 2001 
election victory was overstated, as Premier Court had already set in motion plans 
to substitute native forest woodchipping with production from plantations.
201   
While it is true that at the time of the Regional Forest Agreement's signing 
Premier Court had announced his government's commitment to establishing new 
timber plantations,
202 during the state election campaign the forest protest 
movement showed that, rather than increasing its investment in a sustainable 
forest plantation industry, the Court Government was continuing to support the 
logging of old growth forests.
203   Evidence therefore supports the importance of 
the issue on Labor's election victory. 
      
Protest organisers reflected on the reasons for the campaign’s success and its 
impact on the forest protest movement.   Wilderness Society co-ordinator David 
Mackenzie thought the old growth forest campaign in Western Australia 
contained elements that differentiated it from protest activities in Australia’s 
eastern states.   These included the mobilisation of mainstream community 
support; the emergence of identifiable groups such as Doctors for Forests and 
Lawyers for Forests, which ultimately inspired the formation of similar groups in 
eastern Australia; the organisation of co-ordinated group protest under the 
umbrella of WAFA; a lack of serious internal division; and the emergence of key 
leadership figures in city and country areas who were able to formulate strategies 
  404 
and direct protest actions.   Most significantly, he believed the campaign’s 
‘residual effects’ provided inspiration and motivation for present-day forest 
activists.
204    
      
While acknowledging the importance of Labor’s election victory for the future of 
the forests, Beth Schultz from the Conservation Council observed that, in 
adopting the RFA definition of old growth forest, the ALP had excluded areas of 
high conservation karri forest which were worthy of protection.   She vowed that, 
until the state government implemented its commitment to ecologically 
sustainable forest management, the forest campaign would continue.
205   Peter 
Robertson of WAFA considered that, although the old growth forest campaign 
had resulted in a change of government and a more enlightened forest policy, 
there would always be an important role for forest protest in Western Australia to 
ensure that the public was kept informed and the state government held 
accountable for its actions.
206 
      
From a regional protest perspective Mary Frith recalled how she had witnessed 
considerable changes in state government and community attitudes.   She 
believed the relationship with CALM had turned ‘full-circle’ over the years.     
While initially, during the late 1980s, the department was friendly and helpful, 
confrontation over logging native forest areas during the 1990s produced 
considerable friction.   A more sympathetic attitude became apparent after 
changes to CALM’s executive and following the election of the Gallop Labor 
Government in 2001.   Frith also observed a dramatic improvement in relations 
with the shire council and the local community over the years: 
  405 
We’ve made the point that we’ve got something to offer, and I think the 
community has changed accordingly.   We are no longer persona non 
grata, and that’s nice.
207 
 
During the late 1990s the Western Australian forest protest movement created a 
social and political climate for success.   This resulted from the movement’s 
ability to strengthen and streamline its own internal organisation and group 
networks while at the same time applying its strategies to exploit growing public 
dissatisfaction with the state government’s failure to protect the south-west’s 
high conservation value forests.   The co-ordination of most forest protest 
activity within the bounds of WAFA promoted a sense of strength and unity 
while the forest rescue camps provided personal inspiration and group solidarity.   
More aggressive direct action strategies in the forests, such as tree platforms and 
machinery lock-ons and expanded urban protests, maximised media attention and 
maintained public focus on the forests.   
 
The election of Christine Sharp as Greens MLC for the South-West provided a 
political avenue for forest protest groups, and initiatives such as the High 
Conservation Value Forest Protection Bill generated intense parliamentary and 
public debate over forest conservation.    Furthermore, lobbying by forest protest 
groups of the ALP and the unions had contributed towards the adoption by the 
ALP of a policy to end old growth forest logging if it won government.  Most 
significantly, the protest movement's strategies encouraged broad participation in 
the forest campaign, including the active involvement of sporting personalities, 
high profile public figures and identifiable groups and this, in turn, transformed 
forest protest from a fringe radical activity to a mainstream issue worthy of 
public support.   The period emphasised the important roles played by Beth 
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Schultz, Peter Robertson and David Mackenzie in co-ordinating campaigns and 
directing strategies. 
 
Two key tactical decisions had provided the impetus for an intensive and diverse 
forest campaign which exerted relentless pressure on the state Liberal 
government and ultimately contributed towards its downfall.   First, the choice to 
remain outside the RFA process left the protest movement free to mount a 
campaign that exposed inadequacies within the proposed agreement and the 
community consultation process while at the same time damaging the credibility 
of the Department of Conservation and Land Management.   Second, the 
movement's focus on the single emotive issue of saving Western Australia’s old 
growth forests attracted massive public support and prompted the formation of 
several influential groups, most notably Doctors for the Preservation of Old 
Growth Forests and Liberals for Forests.   The ensuing 2001 Labor election win 
on a platform of halting old growth forest logging also represented a victory for 
the Western Australian forest protest movement. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
During the period between the 1890s, when conservationists first sought to 
protect specific areas of native bushland, up until the successful campaign in the 
late 1990s to save the state's old growth forests, the Western Australian forest 
protest movement was transformed into a dynamic social movement that 
occupied an important place in Western Australia's social, political and 
environmental history.    The transformation occurred as the result of a gradual 
expansion and refinement of the protest movement's organisation, networks and 
strategies.   A succession of strong activist leaders stimulated the movement's 
growth and influence. 
 
The contemporary Western Australian forest protest movement was 
characterised by an inclusive approach to dissent which encouraged wide public 
participation by providing outlets for different expressions of protest through an 
expanding network of metropolitan and regional forest protest groups.   By 
employing a range of non-confrontational and direct action strategies, the forest 
protest movement ensured that public attention remained focused on forest 
issues and that pressure was maintained on the state government to alter its 
forest policies. 
 
There were two periods of protest activity in Western Australia.  During an 
initial period from the 1890s until the early 1950s individuals began protesting 
about escalating destruction of the state's native forests and the first nature 
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conservation groups were formed. A second period of protest from the mid-
1950s saw the emergence of the contemporary forest protest movement which 
comprised five evolutionary phases of protest activity:  a formative phase from 
the mid-1950s until the late 1960s, when Perth conservationists combined to 
protect areas of urban bushland; a transitional phase during the 1970s, when 
dedicated forest protest groups formed and employed strategies of non-violent 
direct action; a collaborative phase in the early 1980s, when a conciliatory 
approach to a sympathetic state government resulted in some successes;  an 
expansionary phase during the late 1980s, when a network of protest groups 
was established in Western Australia's south-west; and a confrontational phase 
throughout the 1990s, when the forest protest movement conducted an intensive 
forest campaign using both non-confrontational and direct action strategies.  
 
It was during the first period of activity that a tradition of forest protest was 
established in Western Australia.   Although the main focus of the early 
conservationists was limited to calls for the protection of flora and fauna 
through the creation of conservation reserves, some features of their 
organisation and strategies carried over into the second period of protest.     
Specifically, these early protesters, who were mainly well-educated 
professionals, used non-confrontational strategies such as political lobbying, 
letter-writing, public education and attracting the support of influential figures 
to campaign for the conservation of specific areas of native bushland and 
against the destruction of trees, which were regarded as a valuable resource.  
The first conservation groups collaborated with each other on issues of mutual 
interest and both the Pinjarra and Stirling Range campaigns illustrated the 
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importance of strong leadership figures such as Bernard Woodward and J.G. 
Hay.   Additionally, there was evidence of an emerging conflict between 
conservationists and timber industry interests. 
 
The campaign in the mid-1950s to save the native vegetation of Perth's King's 
Park from development as an aquatic centre was a landmark event.   It heralded 
the start of the formative phase of a second period of forest protest during which 
the movement began to co-ordinate and combine its activities for specific 
campaigns.   While protesters continued to employ non-confrontational 
strategies such as lobbying and letter-writing that had been used during the first 
period of protest activity, tactics expanded and diversified.   The use of local 
radio and public meetings was designed to attract public attention and support, 
and the involvement of Olympic athlete Shirley Strickland in the campaign 
signalled the introduction of a strategy aimed at exploiting the influence of 
celebrity status to gain sympathy for a cause. 
 
While the King's Park campaign and the formation of the Tree Society in the 
1950s signalled a move towards combined protest action, the formation of the 
Nature Conservation Council, later the Conservation Council of Western 
Australia, in 1967 provided conservationists with an organisational framework 
within which to plan their activities and formulate strategies.   Prominent 
figures such as Bessie Rischbieth, Mabel Talbot, Shirley Strickland, Gloria 
Butcher, John Oldham, John Thomson and Graeme Rundle extended the 
tradition of leadership that had been established during the first period of 
protest. 
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The introduction of bauxite mining in the 1960s and of wood chipping in the 
mid 1970s not only posed new threats to Western Australia's forests but also 
stimulated the transition to a much broader forest campaign and the adoption of 
a more assertive stance by some conservationists in the 1970s.    The different 
strategic approaches adopted by the two dedicated forest protest groups formed 
in the mid-1970s - the Campaign to Save Native Forests and the South-West 
Forests Defence Foundation - illustrated how protest strategies were expanding.   
While both organisations included non-confrontational strategies from the first 
period of protest, the Campaign to Save Native Forests employed more 
confrontational forms of activism such as public demonstrations and staged 
events.  The more conservative South-West Forests Defence Foundation relied 
mainly on detailed submissions and legal action to further its cause.  Most 
significantly, the two groups offered people different avenues through which to 
express their opposition to forest destruction.  The success of both groups 
depended on key leadership figures such as Andrew Thamo, Christine Sharp, 
Beth Schultz and Arthur Conacher.   
 
The 1979 occupation of Alcoa's Wagerup alumina refinery site witnessed a 
transition from the use of conventional protest strategies to more 
confrontational forms of non-violent direct action aimed at maximising media 
exposure and attracting public attention.  The innovative strategies used at 
Wagerup were later employed in eastern states campaigns at Terania Creek and 
the Franklin River.    While the Bunbury wood chip terminal bombing 
generated publicity as the most violent action in the history of environmental 
protest in Australia, the Western Australian forest protest movement 
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disassociated itself from the incident, regarding the bombing as the work of 
extremists who had damaged the forest campaign. 
 
During the early 1980s new protest strategies and political upheaval caused a 
shift in the dynamics of forest protest that resulted in the movement employing 
strategies of negotiation and collaboration with government rather than 
confrontation.    Several factors contributed towards the change in orientation.   
The Western Australian forest protest movement realised that in order to 
increase public support and influence the introduction of legislative changes to 
protect the forests it had to professionalise its organisation and maintain 
ongoing criticism of the government's forest policies.  Furthermore, the protest 
movement recognised the potential of non-confrontational strategies aimed at 
persuasion and public education rather than direct action.  Most importantly, the 
election of a sympathetic state Labor government raised expectations that 
significant progress on forest issues was possible through the political system.   
 
Initially, the strategy of exploiting the protest movement's favourable 
relationship with the state ALP proved successful.   Both the Shannon Basin 
and Lane-Pool Reserve victories resulted from the movement's ability to ensure 
that the ALP remained faithful to its election pledges when it achieved 
government in 1983.    Coincidentally, at that time, success in Tasmania's 
Franklin River campaign had also followed the successful election of the 
Hawke federal Labor Government. 
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As well as celebrating two victories, the forest protest movement also expanded 
its activist network and range of strategies.   The formation of a Western 
Australian branch of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society to support the Franklin 
River campaign established valuable communication networks with eastern 
states' activists and guidance for the formulation of campaign strategies.  During 
its ongoing campaign against wood chipping, the protest movement increased 
its efforts to raise public awareness about forest issues through organising forest 
visits and participating in media debates.   Legal challenges became a hallmark 
strategy of Western Australian forest protest and, although the innovative Jarrah 
Class Action and the 'Forests Forever' cases both failed, activists considered 
them to have been successful through generating media attention and focusing 
public attention on the threat to the forests.   The organisation and strategies of 
the protest movement continued to be influenced by a succession of strong 
leaders such as Tom Hogarth, Neil Bartholomaeus, Beth Schultz, Barbara 
Churchward and Bernard Mahon. 
 
The period of optimism following the 1983 election of the Burke Labor 
Government was short-lived.  Failed campaigns against the formation of the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management and the extension of wood 
chip licences both illustrated how the state government placed its commitment 
to the timber industry above its concern for forest protection.   While 
unsuccessful, both campaigns strengthened the protest movement's ability to 
present professional critiques of government forest policies and to expose 
Western Australians to the effects of clear-felling large areas of native forests. 
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The failure of urban-based forest protest campaigns in the late 1980s marked a 
shift in the balance of successful protest action.    It was the rise of organised 
community-based protest activity in the state's south-west to protect local areas 
of native forest that resulted in a significant expansion of the forest protest 
movement's activist networks.   The successful campaign against the McLean's 
wood chip mill in Denmark, the Great Walk from Denmark to Perth, and the 
formation of activist groups in Bridgetown and other centres all demonstrated 
how local communities organised themselves for protest action and, like 
Queensland's Great Barrier Reef campaign in the late 1960s, employed non-
confrontational strategies aimed at attracting media attention and educating 
people about threats to their local environment.   Prominent leaders such as 
Alex Syme, Craig Chappelle, Nick Dodson and Mary and Jim Frith were key 
figures in the protest movement's expansion in the state's south-west. 
 
In contrast to a decline in the Australian environment movement's influence 
during the 1990s, forest protest activity in Western Australia was intense.   
Increasing frustration at its inability to change the state government's forest 
policies combined with a strengthening of protest networks through an 
expansion of organised forest protest into the state's south-west resulted in the 
Western Australian forest protest movement consolidating its activities and 
returning to more confrontational expressions of dissent.   During a final phase 
of activity the protest movement created a social and political climate for 
success by unifying its organisation and combining a diversity of non-
confrontational and direct action strategies aimed at both convincing the public 
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that the forests were worth saving and applying pressure on the state 
government to protect them.  
 
Several of the forest protest movement's organisational and strategic initiatives 
coalesced during the final confrontational phase of activity in the 1990s.   The 
formation of the Western Australian Forest Alliance united the network of 
urban and rural forest protest groups into a single force for organised protest 
action while the election of Christine Sharp as Greens MLC for the South-West 
provided an avenue into the state's political arena.   Spectacular direct action 
strategies in the forests such as tree platforms and machinery lock-ons 
combined with staged events in urban centres to attract media attention and 
maintain public interest in the forest campaign.  By continuing its strategy of 
encouraging broad public participation in forest protest activity, particularly 
through the involvement of sporting personalities, high profile public figures 
and identifiable groups such as Doctors for the Preservation of Old Growth 
Forests and Liberals for Forests, the protest movement effectively transformed 
forest protest into a mainstream public issue.     
 
Reflecting tactics used during the New South Wales and Victoria Green Bans 
movement of the 1970s, the protest movement's lobbying of Western Australian 
unions contributed towards a commitment by the ALP to cease old growth 
forest logging should it win government.   Most importantly, the strategy to 
focus on saving Western Australia's remaining old growth forests from 
destruction captured the public's imagination through exploiting wilderness 
imagery in ways that were reminiscent of Tasmania's Lake Pedder and Franklin 
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River campaigns.   As well, the tactical decision not to participate in the 
Regional Forest Agreement process ensured that the protest movement 
remained free to direct an energetic campaign against the RFA and the 
credibility of the Department of Conservation and Land Management.     
Campaign leaders Beth Schultz, Peter Robertson and David Mackenzie 
occupied key roles in the successful old growth forest campaign. 
 
The contemporary forest protest movement in Western Australia was most 
successful when it was able to generate considerable public support over single 
emotive issues such as saving King's Park from development and protecting old 
growth forests from destruction or, as in the Shannon and Lane-Poole Reserve 
campaigns, it managed to exploit a favourable political relationship with the 
state ALP.   The success of the urban-centred protest movement was limited by 
its inability to break the powerful economic alliance between the state 
government and the timber industry.   It was the rise of organised forest protest 
action in Western Australia's south-west that reinvigorated the movement and 
increased the momentum of the forest campaign.    
 
A tradition of forest protest was established in Western Australia in the 1890s.  
This thesis has examined the organisation, campaigns and strategies which 
transformed those first voices of protest into an influential social movement that 
succeeded in changing government forest policy to save the state's old growth 
forests.   The contemporary forest protest movement's victory in 2001 reflected 
the refinement and expansion of its organisation and strategies which had 
occurred during its passage through five evolutionary stages.   By adopting an 
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inclusive approach to dissent and expanding its activist networks, the movement 
encouraged broad public support and participation in its campaigns.  The 
application of a diverse range of non-confrontational and direct action strategies 
ensured that public attention remained focused on the forests and that 
continuous pressure was maintained on the major political parties to adopt 
favourable forest policies.   Ultimately, it was the forest protest movement's 
ability to convince Western Australians to take action to save the forests that 
resulted in its greatest triumph. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Chairpersons and Presidents of the Nature Conservation Council 
and Conservation Council of Western Australia 1967 to present 
 
 
Nature Conservation Council (1967) 
 
John  Oldham    Chairman    1967  -  1970 
 
John  Oldham    President    1970  -  1973 
 
Gloria  Butcher    Chairman    1970  -  1973 
 
 
Conservation Council of Western Australia (1973) 
 
John  Oldham    President    1973  -  1975 
 
Gloria  Butcher    President    1975  -  1976 
 
Penny  Hussey    Chairman    1975  -  1976 
 
Penny  Hussey    President    1976  -  1977 
 
Peter  Ravine    President    1977  -  1978 
 
Norman  Halse    President    1978  -  1980 
 
Neil  Bartholomaeus   President    1980  -  1982 
 
Barbara  Churchward   President    1982  -  1983 
 
John  Bailey    President    1983  -  1985 
 
Peter  Brotherton   President    Jan-May  1985 
 
Sue  Paterson    Acting  President   May/June  1985 
 
Catherine Taylor    Acting President    1985 - 1986 
 
Otto  Mueller    President    1986  -  1987 
Barbara Churchward 
 
Barbara  Churchward   President    1987  -  1989 
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Philip  Jennings  President    1989  -  1992 
 
Beth  Schultz    President    1992  -  1995 
 
Harry  Cohen    President    1995  -  1998 
 
Sue  Graham-Taylor   President    1998  -  2001 
 
Harry  Cohen    President    2001  -  2002 
 
Sue  Graham-Taylor   President    2002  -  2005 
 
Philip  Jennings  President    2005  -  2007 
 
David  Harries    President    2007  -  present 
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